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Abstract 
The Eurozone crisis during the late 2000s constituted one of the greatest socio-
political and economic challenges to the Eurozone and the EU more generally. During 
this time, some of the most fundamental changes to the EU modus operandi were 
introduced. These changes had, inter alia, a considerable impact on the, arguably 
already problematic, democratic process within the EU. The aim of this research is to 
determine how the measures assumed during the Eurozone crisis have impacted the 
EU Democratic Deficit. To determine this impact, a conclusive, empirical framework 
for evaluating the effect EU measures have on the Deficit, based on the theoretical 
contributions in the existing literature, is introduced within this research through the 
use of additive theory. This framework is then used in a detailed analysis conducted to 
determine the impact specifically of Eurozone crisis supranational measures on the 
Deficit. These measures include both those applicable throughout the entire 
EU/Eurozone (e.g. Six-Pack), and those applicable to specific Eurozone Member 
States (e.g. financial assistance programs). By considering measures that are both EU-
wide but also Member State-specific, both levels referenced within the relevant 
literature are addressed. Each measure is forensically examined and then evaluated 
against the indicators established in the empirical Deficit framework, and an overall 
conclusion is drawn in terms of impact of the measures on the Deficit. To more 
adequately examine the Member State-specific measures, the case of Greece, the first 
Eurozone Member State to request financial assistance and the one with the most 
severe financial and structural problems, is chosen. The outcome of the national level-
focused analysis is then put in perspective by comparatively analyzing these findings 
with the case of Ireland, in to yield whether there are wider conclusions or overall 
tendencies. The research outcomes indicate that, across the board, the supranational 
measures assumed during the crisis have impacted the Deficit negatively, chiefly 
through considerably increased delegation and influence of the supranational level on 
important national policy areas, lack of corresponding Parliamentary input, inability to 
protect EU citizens’ rights, and introduction of processes that lack the principles of 
transparency, accountability and stakeholder participation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
The aim of this research is to investigate and analyze one of the most 
important issues prevalent in the global political realm during recent years: the 
Eurozone crisis (hereinafter ‘crisis’) and its impact on the European Union’s (EU) 
democratic process. The crisis has been related to the more general late-2000s 
financial crisis, which began in the United States of America (USA) during 2007-8 
with the collapse of the housing market bubble (primarily sub-prime mortgages). The 
EU, and more specifically the Eurozone, followed later with a crisis in the form of a 
banking and then sovereign debt overload that eventually resulted in a credit crunch. 
The inability of EU, and more importantly Eurozone, Member States (MS) to borrow 
as a result of this credit crunch was disastrous for their economies, since they were not 
able to obtain the necessary funding to roll-over their debt. Therefore, the need arose 
for financial assistance mechanisms  of various forms to be created by the EU in 
cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The assistance provided 
was conditional upon the implementation of structural adjustment programmes of 
varying types and intensity, which were monitored by the Troika
3
: an ad-hoc 
cooperation between the IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European 
Commission (EC). In addition to the above, a broader overhaul of the EU’s economic 
governance framework was pursued, with the introduction of various measures 
aiming at greater fiscal integration and enhanced coordination. These legislative 
changes fundamentally altered the operating and decision-making mandates of the EU 
and its institutions.  
Given the aforementioned response to the crisis, the measures assumed can be 
broadly separated between those that were EU-wide, which include both financial 
assistance mechanisms (broadly, their conceptualization and establishment) and 
enhanced coordination measures (e.g. Six-Pack or Two-Pack), and those that were 
MS-specific, which primarily concern the way the financial assistance programs were 
actually implemented. The EU’s response to the crisis has, thus, focused on both the 
supranational and national levels. Similarly, the effect on the democratic process 
exists on both levels.  
The implementation of the above measures, especially the MS-specific ones, 
have been met with considerable citizen dissatisfaction, and claims that the EU has 
                                                 
3
 The word originates from Russian (troe = three, itself derived from Ancient Greek “τρείς”, meaning 
three), and its literal meaning is: a vehicle that is carried by three horses. It is a synonym of triumvirate, 
originating from triumvir, used to describe “one of three men sharing public administration in Ancient 
Rome” (Berube et al. 1997, 1447-8). It is contemporarily used to describe a union of three 
administrative bodies or individuals enjoying administrative power (Berube et al. 1997, 1447-8).  
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been unable to adhere to its values and democratic processes. In fact, one of the most 
prominent claims during the crisis has been that the measures adopted suffer from 
considerable democratic deficiencies, especially given the fact that they have 
fundamentally altered the nature and modus operandi of the EU. A mere indication of 
this citizen dissatisfaction is the outcome of the 2014 EU elections, the first to be 
conducted after the beginning of the crisis. The rise of anti-EU, and mostly extreme, 
political parties was evident, with 228 out of 751 Members of European Parliament 
(MEPs; approximately 30%) belonging to either far-right or far-left anti-EU parties, 
with extreme anti-EU sentiments, often combined with extreme ideology, across 
major EUMS, such as France (25%) and UK (28%; Hockenos 2014). In the 
meantime, the percentage of Europeans with a negative image of the EU has more 
than doubled
4
 from 2002 to 2014 (Katseli 2016, 29). These are but mere indications 
that the EU’s appeal to the electorate has been considerably reduced. The EU seems 
more distant, more technocratic and less accountable than ever before. There is, then, 
a question to be set in relation to these measures and their impact on the EU’s 
democratic process. 
However, it could also be argued that most EU citizens already consider these 
measures, and especially those that are MS-specific (financial assistance 
programmes), as challenging to the EU’s democratic principles and practices. 
Concordantly, a major part of the existing academic literature is of the same view. 
Hence, there seems to be a broad agreement over these issues. Despite such fact, 
academic research should not shy away from analyzing issues that are broadly 
considered as settled, since detailed, forensic analysis may actually yield different 
conclusions than those considered as a given.  
There are multiple examples where this has been the case in relation to the 
crisis supranational measures. On the one hand, while the financial assistance 
programmes are often considered lacking in democratic value, it is often not 
highlighted that all structural adjustment measures upon which they are conditional 
have also gone through the regular EU legislative process, in the form of Council of 
Ministers (CoM) Decisions (DEC), Recommendations (REC), Opinions (OP), 
Proposals (PROP), etc, as also observed by the interviewed (process and participants 
presented in section 4.3.3) Hon Prof. Ioannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of 
                                                 
4
 From 10% in 2002 to 22% in 2014 (Katseli 2016, 29).  
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Greece and Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, Member of the Greek Parliament (MP)
5
. 
Likewise, the Troika, which monitors the conditionality and structural adjustment 
programmes, has, since 2013, constituted a cooperation recognized also through 
regular EU CoM DECs. Hence, these are a part of the EU’s normal legal order and 
have gone through the regular EU legislative procedure. Why, then, should they be 
considered contrary to democratic process?  
Even in the case of national legislation relevant to financial assistance 
programmes, which, in any case, constitutes implementing legislation passed by the 
parliament and not an international agreement or other form of international 
legislative instrument
6
, it has gone through all three branches of government 
(executive, legislative, judiciary), and has, for the most part, been upheld (or where it 
has not, it was not implemented). Therefore, even the national-level democratic 
process has been adhered to. Similar conclusions can be drawn in relation to measures 
such as the Two-Pack provision of supranational oversight of Eurozone MS budgets. 
This was acknowledged and voted for by national parliaments. Thus, the legitimacy 
necessary for this process has been properly, at least legally, acquired
7
. In any case, it 
can also be argued that the budget of an MS, as a purely legislative act, in itself (i.e. 
without the issuance of additional legislative acts), does not include the possibility of 
violating any fundamental or democratic rights
8
.  In simple terms, why would any of 
these issues be considered challenging to the democratic process at all
9
? 
On the other hand, and despite the above, a negative impact of the crisis 
supranational measures on the democratic process is also existent. The argument 
could be raised that the nature of these measures, as well as the lack of any 
representative input in their provisions, indicates a deficit in terms of the democratic 
process. In relation to the Troika and the financial assistance programs, it could be 
argued that the conditional structural adjustment policies included were essentially 
imposed on Eurozone MS in financial turmoil that had little or no room to object to 
                                                 
5
 From the interviews with Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of Greece, Professor 
of Economics and, inter alia, former Finance Minister, and with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, 
MP of Greek Parliament, Professor of Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
6
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, MP of Greek Parliament, Professor of 
Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
7
 This argument was also raised in the interview with Dr. Lina Papadopoulou, Associate Professor of 
Constitutional Law. 
8
 ibid. 
9
 Similar arguments were also raised in the interview with the former ECJ judge. 
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any of the conditions
10
. National democratic processes relevant to these measures 
were stretched beyond proportion to accommodate the necessary character of these 
measures
11
. Similarly, it could be argued that the EU largely failed to protect the 
social and economic rights of EU citizens. Even though the measures included in the 
financial assistance programs were also existent in EU-based legislative instruments 
(e.g. DECs), those instruments also suffer from deficiencies in relation to the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as well as in relation to issues of influence over key 
national policies
12
. Finally, the international legal character of the many of the 
measures is indicative of a somewhat disappointing trend in terms of the strength and 
applicability of the EU’s community method13, and the IMF’s participation may raise 
serious concerns in terms of the EU’s independence and self-sufficiency14, 
designating that there is no more solidarity within the EU than in the global realm
15
. 
All the above issues will be further delineated and investigated throughout this 
present research, and especially in Chapters 7 (for the EU-wide measures) and 9-10 
(for the MS-specific measures). However, from this brief overview it is evident that 
there are important questions to be analyzed in terms of how exactly the supranational 
crisis measures have affected the EU’s democratic process. It is not at all clear which 
measures and in what way negatively have negatively impacted this process, or if the 
impact is negative at all. Therefore, this issue is not as self-evident and simple as 
often portrayed. Furthermore, and because this issue is often perceived as a given, 
detailed analyses of the conclusive set of supranational crisis measures is needed 
(even if the negative impact is assumed as a given), in order to precisely determine 
where the democratic process has been affected and how, and where it has not, such 
analyses are largely absent from the relevant existing literature (as demonstrated in 
Chapter 2). This type of analysis will, then, also serve to benefit future research on 
how to improve an adverse impact on the democratic process.  
                                                 
10
 This argument was also raised in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of 
Constitutional Law. 
11
 This argument was also raised in the interviews with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor 
of Constitutional Law, and with Dr. Lina Papadopoulou, Associate Professor of Constitutional Law. 
12
 This argument was also raised in the interview Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of 
Constitutional Laws. 
13
 This argument was also raised during the interviews with the former ECJ judge, with Prof. Kostas 
Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of Constitutional Law, and with Prof. Dimitris Chryssochoou, 
Professor of Theory and Institutions of European Integration. 
14
 This argument was also raised in the interview with the former ECJ judge. 
15
 This argument was raised in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of 
Constitutional Law.  
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The research question of this investigation is: How have the Eurozone crisis 
supranational measures, both EU-wide and MS-specific, impacted the EU’s 
Democratic Deficit? The EU Democratic Deficit (DD) is the most conclusive 
concept efficiently engulfing the various different democratic principles and processes 
relevant to the EU. The core issue of the research is not if the measures impacted the 
EU DD and in what general manner, but rather in what specific ways and why this 
impact occurred.  
The first issue to be raised, then, in relation to this research question is how 
the impact on the democratic process is evaluated. There are, obviously, multiple 
answers, since the concept of democracy has long escaped a broadly accepted 
definition or even a general agreement on its defining properties. The substantial 
history, both existential and academic, of the concept yields a great amount and 
variety of literature. Within the EU, the EU DD is the focus of the relevant scholarly 
field on the democratic processs. The literature is extensive in both size and issues 
examined, but centres around three main categories: input, output, throughput. The 
existence of the EU DD itself is not questioned per se by scholars of any of the 
theoretical camps. What is debated is the importance and magnitude of the DD 
(whether substantial or menial), and whether there is any reason for concern over it. 
How is the impact of EU measures on the EU DD to be evaluated? Despite the 
many useful theoretical contributions of the EU DD literature, a conclusive empirical 
framework for evaluating the impact of EU measures it is mostly lacking. Scholars 
disagree in relation to the theoretical aspects of the EU DD, but there has been no 
empirical framework upon which an evaluation of the impact of specific EU measures 
on the EU DD can be conducted. Τhis empirical framework is constructed within this 
research, utilizing the theoretical contributions of the existing literature as foundations 
(Chapter 3). Through the analysis of the existing literature of the EU DD, it is found 
that scholarship focuses on providing different answers to questions which examine, 
essentially, similar issues. These issues are re-organized and grouped under four 
empirical qualitative indicators that emphasize aspects that have been raised by all EU 
DD scholars. Additive theory and further examination into the ontological 
foundations of the existing literature on the broader fields of democratic theory and 
EU integration theories further contribute to the production of this model . This 
framework is generalizable; it can be utilized in evaluating any EU measure in terms 
of its impact on the EU DD, and its construction constitutes the first major 
contribution of this research to the existing scholarly field.  
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In addition to the above, the actual measures that are examined need to be 
further specified. To begin with, the temporal limitations of the research are set, in 
order to determine which measures are to be included in the analysis. As the Eurozone 
crisis is an ongoing phenomenon, setting these time limits present a challenge. The 
duration of the research is set to 5 years, from 2008 until 2013. 2008 was arguably the 
beginning of the financial crisis in the USA, and its transference to the Eurozone 
(Chapter 5).  
Justifying the ending of the investigation is somewhat more difficult. 2013, 
which is set as the cut-off date of this research, is chosen for the following reasons 
(delineated in section 4.2). Firstly, by the end of 2013 two Eurozone MS (Ireland and 
Spain) exited their financial assistance programmes, prompting arguments concerning 
the success of these programmes. If it is admitted by the EU that the above two 
Eurozone MS exiting the programmes constitutes the first in a number of successful 
programme completions, thus marking the end of a circle of instability, this is a fitting 
point for setting the end of an analysis of this type. Secondly, 2013 marked the last 
instance when a new Eurozone MS resorted to EU-IMF financial assistance (Cyprus). 
Finally, by the end of 2013, almost all important legislation relating to the re-
structuring of the EU and Eurozone framework had already been proposed and 
enacted. In addition to all the above, practical considerations also need to be taken 
into account, i.e. the need for every research to have an ending point. Based on the 
above, 2013 is chosen as an end-point for the purposes of this investigation.  
But how are the supranational crisis measures to be included and efficiently 
categorized? This constitutes the second major contribution of this research to the 
existing scholarly field, as this investigation analyzes conclusively and simultaneously 
the supranational crisis measures. To make the analysis more efficient, the measures 
are separated into two categories: EU-wide and MS-specific. These categories are 
further separated into sub-categories, according to their content (Figure 1). Pursuant 
to this, each category of measures is analyzed in-detail, referencing, inter alia, which 
specific measures are included, when and how they were adopted, which legal acts 
they include, etc. This is an important contribution to the existing field. As outlined in 
detail in Chapter 2, the existing literature could benefit from a categorization and 
more thorough and detailed reference and analysis of the specific provisions of each 
measure. 
 In terms of EU-wide measures, the focus of this research is the Eurozone. The 
Eurozone is not simply an economic sub-organisation within the EU construct. It 
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consists of the most cohesive and integrated EU MS, and hence it is, in a way, the 
final destination of the EU. As the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos highlights, the 
Eurozone “is the most advanced form of European Integration”16. In addition, the 
Eurozone MS were the ones most affected by the crisis and the most intensely 
coordinating measures included Eurozone MS. In either case, all EU MS except UK 
and Denmark (opt-outs) are obliged to join the Eurozone, i.e. any Eurozone reform 
will eventually apply to all EU MS. Naturally, the EU will receive secondary focus, as 
it is the overarching organisation within which the Eurozone lies, and it also itself 
underwent substantial policy modifications.  
For the MS-specific measures, the focus is on financial assistance and relevant 
structural adjustment programs. Clearly, it is not possible to include an analysis of all 
measures implemented in every specific Eurozone MS under financial assistance 
within the limits of this investigation, especially given the detailed and in-depth 
character of the analysis. A choice is, thus, made to investigate in-depth the measures 
implemented in one case, rather than investigating one specific measure throughout 
all cases. The Hellenic Republic (Greece) is chosen as the case for analyzing these 
measures. Greece was the first Eurozone MS to request EU-IMF financial assistance, 
and, in a way, the entire financial assistance process, the ad-hoc cooperation between 
the EU and the IMF for providing this financial assistance to Eurozone MS, as well as 
a large percentage of the EU-wide measures introduced during the crisis, were on 
account of Greece’s economic trajectory and request for assistance. Greece is also the 
only Eurozone MS that has received financial assistance through every single 
financial assistance mechanism established by the EU during the crisis (and also the 
only Eurozone MS to have utilized both existing financial assistance mechanisms of 
the IMF).  
Furthermore, Greece has received, by far, the largest amount of financial 
assistance from the EU and IMF combined, standing at EUR 236.3 billion (bn) 
disbursed as of May 2016. The large amount of financial assistance corresponds to the 
abrupt and extensive structural adjustment, arguably the most intensive throughout the 
Eurozone crisis, and perhaps one of the most intensive throughout history. To provide 
for adequate generalizability of the findings in terms of MS-specific measures, 
broader comparative observations of the conclusions on Greece with Ireland are 
presented, to establish whether there is a pattern in terms of the impact of 
                                                 
16
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, MP of Greek Parliament, Professor of 
Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
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supranational crisis measures on the EU DD for specific Eurozone MS. Ireland is 
chosen as a comparative case since it was the first Eurozone MS to be affected by the 
crisis, one of the first two to exit the crisis, and the one closest to Greece in all the 
criteria presented above (the claims for choosing these cases are further delineated in 
Chapter 5). 
Having broadly defined how the specific measures analyzed will be 
determined and categorized, the research methods utilized need to be outlined. Given 
the intricacy and the complexity of the issue to be investigated, three research 
methods will be used. The first method is in-depth, detailed, forensic document 
analysis. This is important so that each measure and its relevant provisions are 
thoroughly analyzed, thus ensuring validity of the research outcomes. The second 
method is enquiries and requests for additional, unpublished documentation from 
official EU institutions. In many cases, published material is not enough to provide 
information in specific areas where further analysis is necessary. Finally, the third 
method utilized is semi-structured, elite academic interviews. Given the nature of the 
measures, particularly MS-specific ones (i.e. financial assistance programs), and the 
related negotiating processes there is additional information to be obtained from the 
actual actors partaking in the process. This is another contribution of this research to 
the existing literature, since both further enquiries in relation to unpublished official 
documentation, as well as academic interviews in relation to this phenomenon, and 
especially in relation to the MS specific measures of Greece, have not previously been 
undertaken as systematically and with such top-level political elites as within this 
research. Of course, each method has its shortcomings, but their combination provides 
for the best possible research scenario. 
Inevitably, there are some anticipated shortcomings in relevance to this 
research, the most prominent of which is the temporal aspect. The Eurozone crisis is a 
contemporary phenomenon and the argument could be raised that there has not been 
sufficient time to efficiently come to conclusions in regards to its various aspects. 
However, the Eurozone crisis started 5 years prior the cut-off date set for this 
research. This, coupled with the substantial volume of modifications and changes 
introduced both at the supranational and national levels within the limit set, seems to 
make this interval sufficient to establish conclusions in relation to their impact one the 
EU DD. Moreover, it is this very contemporary character of this research that makes it 
invaluable in linking the analysis with possible effects on the real world of politics.   
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In conclusion, the aim of this research is to provide an evaluation of the way in 
which the supranational crisis measures within the EU, whether EU-wide or MS-
specific, have impacted the EU DD. In investigating this issue, a conclusive and in-
depth summation of the EU DD literature will be provided, and, based on this 
literature, a single, unified, empirical framework for evaluating the aforementioned 
impact will be created. This framework is generalisable and can be used for 
evaluating the impact of any EU measure on the DD. In order to conduct the analysis, 
the measures will be investigated in forensic detail. This is necessary, given the 
considerable number of provisions introduced, but also their nature, since legislation 
consists of several technicalities. Specificity and detail are, thus, required in order to 
produce a well-informed and accurate conclusion. This is also an important 
contribution of this research to the existing field. Such a detailed and specific analysis 
of the broad summation of these measures is largely absent from the relevant 
academic field, either at the national or supranational levels. 
The research is separated into three main Sections, aside from the Chapters of 
the Introduction and Conclusion (Chapters 1 and 11). Section A includes the 
functional details of the research. Within this section, Chapter 2 analyzes the existing 
literature relevant to the Eurozone, the crisis  and democratic processes. It highlights 
the contributions offered by the relevant scholarship in relation to both the EU and 
national (and, more specifically, Greek) levels. It also identifies the areas not 
previously extensively examined, where further contributions can be made by this 
research: construction of a single, empirical framework for evaluating impact of any 
EU measure on the EU DD, systematic categorization and in-depth analysis of 
supranational crisis measures at both EU and national levels, combination of the 
above to evaluate the impact of crisis measures on the EU DD. In Chapter 3, the 
construction of the empirical EU DD evaluation framework is presented. The 
framework is founded upon the important theoretical contributions offered by the 
existing EU DD scholarship. A single, 4-qualitative-indicators empirical, evaluative 
model is then created through the use of additive theory. Within this Chapter it is also 
examined if, and under what conditions, the construction of this empirical framework 
is possible. Chapter 4, delineates the research methods used, and the structure and 
design of the research.  
Section B concerns the EU-wide measures and the evaluation of their impact 
on the EU DD. Chapter 5 includes a brief chronological analysis of the unfolding of 
the crisis, and the temporal progression of the adoption of the EU-wide supranational 
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crisis measures. While the analytical contribution of this Chapter is somewhat limited, 
it adds considerable contextual nuance in how the crisis unfolded and under what 
circumstances the crisis measures were adopted. Chapter 6 includes a detailed 
foundational analysis of each of the EU-wide measures, including any pre-existing 
relevant similar frameworks that existed prior to the crisis. Finally, Chapter 7 is the 
first main analytical portion of the research, whereby the provisions of each of the 
measures, outlined in Chapter 6, are evaluated in terms of their impact on each of the 
four EU DD empirical, qualitative indicators of Chapter 3. It is the case that most 
measures introduced were entirely new, but, where similar measures existed, prior to 
the crisis a comparative analysis is also provided.  
Section C concerns the MS-specific measures of the crisis and the evaluation 
of their impact on the EU DD. This section is focused on the case of Greece and the 
comparative approach of the conclusions of Greece to the case of Ireland. Chapter 8 
provides a chronological analysis of the events that unfolded during the crisis in 
Greece. Similarly to the EU-wide corresponding Chapter 5, while there is limited 
analytical value in this Chapter, it adds necessary contextual nuance to when and 
under what circumstances the measures were assumed. Chapter 9 includes a detailed 
overview of each of the measures adopted, then evaluating the impact of their 
provisions on the EU DD indicators of the empirical framework established in 
Chapter 3. This Chapter is the second main analytical portion of the research. Chapter 
10 consists of the comparative analysis between Greece and Ireland, providing for 
wider conclusions that can be drawn. Finally, Chapter 11 is the conclusion to this 
research. 
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SECTION A: RESEARCH FOUNDATIONS, METHODS & 
LITERATURE 
Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Existing Literature  
2.1. Introduction  
 The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the existing literature relevant to the 
research question of this investigation. That is, the purpose is to examine any existing 
scholarship that investigates the impact of supranational crisis measures on the EU 
democratic process is investigated. Through this process, both the valuable 
contributions but also areas which have not yet been sufficiently explored by the 
existing literature, in which this current research can further contribute, will be 
provided.  
Preliminarily, it is perhaps surprising that there is very little in combining the 
supranational crisis measures and the EU DD. There is a considerable volume of 
literature drawing from political economy, leaving room for an EU-politics-based 
contribution, i.e. not primarily focusing on the measures adopted, but rather on the 
way they were adopted and their impact on democratic process. From the literature 
relevant to these issues, most of it is found to examine various broad concepts of 
democracy and how they have been transformed by the overall principles and general 
provisions of the crisis supranational measures.  
Therefore, while there are considerable insights offered by the existing 
literature, there is room for further contributions in terms of not only the specificity of 
the supranational crisis measures and their exact provisions, but in the way these 
measures impact not general concepts of democracy, but the EU DD. Furthermore, an 
account of, simultaneously, the national and supranational levels has remained largely 
unexplored by the existing literature. Scholars usually focus on one or the other (and 
usually favour the national level in terms of democratic process), with little account of 
the connection and interrelationship between the two. This is where this research aims 
to contribute.  Because of the above, and while there are substantial insights in the 
existing literature, its functionality and use for this research question is somewhat 
limited. This Chapter is separated across the two broad axes of the study: firstly, the 
literature relevant to the EU-wide measures is examined, followed by that relevant to 
the MS-specific measures, especially in relation to the primary case of this research 
for examining this category of measures (Greece). A conclusion is offered in the areas 
of contribution of this research to the existing field.  
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2.2. EMU & Democracy: Supranational Level 
Albeit not centered around a specific evaluative framework, existing literature 
related to the supranational level of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
17
 and 
problems relevant to democratic processes offers contributions in relation to more 
general conclusions. Many of the scholars highlight Dani Rodrik’s incompatibility 
principle, whereby it is not possible to have democracy, national determination and 
economic globalisation at the same time. It is only possible to have two of these three 
coinciding (Crum 2013, 615; Bohle 2014, 289).  
 The main arguments raised originate from the fact that participation in the 
EMU, while increasing financial gains and security, and decreasing transaction and 
other costs, effectively removes a wide variety of fiscal and monetary (control over 
interest/exchange rates) policy options from Eurozone MS governments (Crum 2014, 
620; Schmidtke 2004, 22-3; Meny 2014, 1339; Ravasio & Ohly 1997, 478-81). These 
alternatives would normally allow “national governments to respond to the diversity 
in the economic conditions and the political preferences they face” (Crum 2013, 614). 
For example, as Ravasio & Ohly (1997) highlighted during the early years of the 
EMU, in case of a crisis within the EMU, “countries will lose the exchange rate as an 
adjustment instrument” (479). As Crum (2013) concludes, policy measures assumed 
during the crisis resulted in “a clear contravention of national fiscal autonomy” (622). 
However, as Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos highlights, the ability to adapt monetary 
policy to a potential crisis, which would be held by the central banks of MS, is now 
replaced with the ECB’s quantitative easing policies18. The problem, then, is not the 
absence of the ability to adapt monetary policy, but the different interests of Eurozone 
MS governments expressed in the ECB’s Governing Council that do not coincide19. 
This would not be an issue if one government was in charge, as is the case of a central 
bank of any MS prior to Eurozone accession, of the USA or UK, etc.)
20
. In either way, 
the above restrictions also affected the ability of the state to implement more socially-
driven policies to enhance the protection of financial vulnerable groups from the 
effects of the crisis. This has been a recurring argument in terms of the relation 
between democracy and EMU, as Gill (1998) has argued (18).  
                                                 
17
 The concept of EMU is further delineated in section 4.2.1.  
18
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, MP of Greek Parliament, Professor of 
Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
19
 ibid. 
20
 ibid. 
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In terms of the specific scholarship on the Eurozone crisis, Bohle (2014) 
focuses on the sharp divide that has arisen between the Eurozone core and periphery. 
She suggests that “the current sovereign debt crisis…is threatening to tear European 
democracies apart” with Germany pushing adjustment costs onto the periphery 
Eurozone MS and, consequently, with large political changes occurring in those 
Eurozone MS (Bohle 2014, 288). Moreover, overall \iIncompatibilities between EMU 
governance and Eurozone MS’ governments arise, leading to restriction of 
“responsiveness to domestic political constituencies,” and to the phenomenon where 
economically powerful countries are tempted to ease the tensions between 
responsiveness and responsibility by withdrawing from their international 
responsibilities and externalising the costs of adaptation to the periphery. 
Peripheral countries, with limited room to manoeuvre, have much harder 
choices to make. Democratic breakdown, then, is more likely in the periphery 
than in the core (289).  
 German hegemony within the EMU, expressed through ordoliberal
21
 
foundations and policies, whether before or after the crisis, assumes primary 
positioning in the relevant literature. The influence of ordoliberalism dates back to the 
EMU’s establishment. Germany, with a very strong ordoliberal tradition was willing 
to participate to the EMU only provided that this tradition was not compromised 
(Majone 2012, 10). Hence, it exerted a substantial amount of influence in the very 
design of EMU, primarily through the fact that the concept of  ‘sound money’22 was a 
key commitment undertaken by MS in relation to their finances (Strange 2011, 5). In 
addition there was considerable influence in terms of the German Central Bank 
(Bundesbank) influencing the ECB upon its establishment
23
, even taking into 
consideration the fragmentation within the ordoliberal tradition in Germany at the 
                                                 
21
 Ordoliberalism was developed during the 1930s by Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and Hans 
Grossmann-Doerth in Freiburg University in Germany (hence ordoliberalism is also termed as the 
Freiburg school; similarly to neoliberalism as the Chicago school; Schnyder & Siems 2012, 3; Sally 
1996, 233). The first composite of the term originates from the Latin word ordo which means order. 
The theory advocates for a more regularized version of the laissez-faire environment proposed by 
liberalism (Sally 1996, 233). It does not embrace the broad notion of the majority of liberal theories 
that government is the essential problem or that a completely undisturbed market is the solution (Sally 
1996, 234). Instead,  the state should assume a positive role in ensuring a free market economy (liberal 
interventionism), “…supported by a strong legal system and appropriate regulatory framework” 
(Schnyder & Siems 2012, 2-4).  The state needs to be limited, but such limitation should not impede its 
power in areas where it is to assume a strong role, such a regulation (Bulmer 2014, 1246). Another key 
characteristic of ordoliberalism is a social aspect to the market economy paradigm, in order to prevent a 
“proletarianisation of the working class” (Schnyder & Siems 2012, 5; Bulmer 2014, 1246). Hence, the 
objection to the role of the state in welfare and social policy is mitigated, under the condition that said 
state would conform to market practises (Schnyder & Siems 2012, 2-4).  
22
 This is enshrined as an obligation in TEU article 119(3), where it is stipulated that EU MS are to 
maintain “sound public finances” (European Union 2012, 96-7).  
23
 It is the case that the Bundesbank and the Deutschmark did, in either case, arguably dominate the 
pre-EMU environment (Scharpf 2011, 6-11). 
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time (Dyson 2010, 604; Bulmer 2014, 1246-7; Featherstone 2003, 931; Featherstone 
2011, 201-2; Gill 1998, 8 & 10-15)
24
.  
The implementation of ordoliberalism within the EMU has been argued to 
produce adverse results, especially in relation to the core ordoliberal idea that 
“economic problems only emerge from budgetary indiscipline and not from risky and 
unsustainable economic behaviour in the private market” (Regan 2012, 473). Ideally, 
sound public finances ensure a better financial situation of the country, thus leading to 
better future prospects. However, as Regan (2012) suggests, budgetary indiscipline is 
not the only problem leading to economic difficulties, since  
the problem is not labour costs and government spending but the 
mismanagement of private capital by private actors coupled with an 
unsustainable tax base […] Thus, while the Irish and Spanish economies were 
overheating internally, the ECB continued to cut interest rates to encourage 
higher levels of economic growth in…Germany and France (479).  
Scharpf (2011) arrives at similar conclusions, highlighting that indebtedness problems 
of Eurozone MS under programmes were “due to private-sector rather than public 
sector borrowing” (20 & 22)25.  
In addition, there are also exogenous (to a MS) reasons accounting for 
economic problems within the Eurozone. Economic booms in the periphery, which 
were often accompanied by cheap capital inflows by banks in more economically 
powerful Eurozone MS (Germany, France, etc), inevitably led to loss of 
competitiveness. The governments of the periphery Eurozone MS had little ability to 
restore this loss, as EMU participation had removed fiscal policy alternatives from 
them (Bohle 2013, 301-2; Schaprf 2011, 16-8; Tsoukala 2013, 249)
26
. This effect was 
further intensified by the fact that within the ordoliberal-oriented EMU environment, 
primary focus was placed on price stability, which was misaligned with the economic 
and socio-political traditions of the periphery MS; this was a one-policy-fits-all 
paradigm that did not fit some Eurozone MS (Crum 2013, 617-8; Regan 2012, 470; 
Majone 2012, 8; Mourlon-Druol 2014, 1283-4; Regan 2012, 472)
27
. The above 
                                                 
24
 However, it has also been argued that “despite frequently repeated assertions that the Bundesbank 
has served as the model for the European Central Bank, the differences between the two institutions 
are much more significant than the similarities” (Majone 2012, 14).  
25
 On the opposite side, Katsimi & Moutos (2010) argue that “the Greek crisis, mainly government-
induced, provides prima facie evidence in favor of the SGP's focus on government balances” (573).  
26
 Core Eurozone MS experienced the opposite effect upon adoption of the Euro (Scharpf 2011, 13-4).  
27
 There are divisions of varying intensity between the economic models of EU MS. Some, such as 
between the liberal UK and the coordinated market economy in mainland Europe, are considerable. 
Others, such as between dependent market economies of Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) and Latin-capitalism-based economies of the Mediterranean, are more nuanced (Crum 2013, 
617-8).  
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resulted in trade imbalances and growth disequilibria, further weakening the import-
led, deficit-expanding economy of the periphery Eurozone MS vis-à-vis the export-
led, high competitiveness economy of the core Eurozone MS (Otero-Iglesias 2014, 1; 
Bulmer 2014, 1255). Featherstone (2011) observes that  
the euro area was seen as sustaining severe demand imbalances, exacerbating 
divergences between the growing deficits of Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Malta, and the growing surpluses of Germany and the Netherlands […] 
Germany was exporting credit dependence to others (200).  
As the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, conclusively suggests,
28
 
the Eurozone crisis revealed…the locked inequalities of MS…. (i.e.) that you 
are subjected to the same fiscal rules and you apply the same monetary policy, 
while you are in different levels of growth and in a different fiscal situation, 
you have a different banking system, you have different levels of efficiency of 
the tax system, you have different needs in relation to a growth strategy, and, 
of course, the surplus of one is not transferred to the other; when you have a 
very small community budget it cannot operate as a redistribution mechanism 
[…]. 
Ordoliberal ideals have not subsided during the crisis. Many institutional and 
legal measures adopted still largely reflect that model (Bulmer 2014, 1254-5; 
Featherstone 2011, 208). As Bulmer (2014) argues, Germany’s heavy promotion of 
ordoliberal standards reached proportions that are “consistent with Gramscian notions 
of ideational hegemony” (1247 and 1255). Similar points had been brought up from 
very early on (e.g. Gill 1998, 1-3). Germany has, aside from ordoliberalism, also 
exerted influence in a number of other areas relevant to the crisis measures. For 
example, the Bundestag opinion in the Greek bailout decision 2 BvR 987/10 of the 
German Constitutional Court, included arguments relating to the broad, rather than 
narrow, interpretation of TFEU article 125
29
, stipulating that this article does not 
constitute a ‘no-bailout’ clause. This argument later proved considerably influential in 
the supranational judicial level and ECJ C-370/12 (Pringle), in which the ECJ offered 
a similar interpretation.  
This interpretation was made possible, inter alia, because, according to an 
enquiry made in the context of this research to the General Secretariat of EUCO in 
relation to TFEU article 125(2), “no item of European Union secondary legislation 
has ever provided a definition or specification of the scope of application of the no-
                                                 
28
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, MP of Greek Parliament, Professor of 
Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
29
 Paragraphs 66 & 67 of 2 BvR 987/10, and 130 through 137 of the ECJ C-370/12 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 2011; European Court of Justice 2012a). Note that the German Court’s 
decision was issued almost a year earlier than the referral of the Pringle case to the ECJ (September 
2011 and August 2012 – European Court of Justice 2012c).  
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bail out clause laid down under Article 125(1) TFEU” (European Union 2012, 99; 
Council of the European Union 2016e – email correspondence). 
Consistent with the broad principles of ordoliberalism, throughout the crisis 
measures there has been an aim to “move towards the further depoliticisation of 
questions of money and finance […] claiming that there is no credible alternative to 
EMU in its current form” (Gill 1998, 16). This depoliticisation raises serious concerns 
in terms of democratic standards, as “institutions that ensure time consistency of 
policies in a democracy may be illegitimate because they sacrifice the democratic 
accountability of policy” (Schelke 2005, 375-7). As Sandbeck & Schneider (2013) 
suggest “highly political questions are turned over to a seemingly technocratic 
surveillance framework which can trigger an automatic sanction mechanism widely 
detached from any parliamentary control” (852). This is consistent with the 
contemporary mode of governance beyond party politics which downgrades or even 
excludes the popular component (also termed as post-popular democracy), a major 
driving force behind which is “the growing acceptance and legitimation of non-
political, or depoliticized, modes of decision making” (Mair 2013, 14-5 and 19). 
The depoliticized policy paradigm that has been presented throughout the 
crisis as the only way out of it is restrained fiscal policy (austerity)
30
. Hence, the lack 
of political alternatives has rendered the electoral choice essentially moot (Bohle 
2014, 302; Dukelow 2015, 107-8). As Maduro et al. (2012b) point out:  
It is a mistake to insist, as national politicians invariably do, when they defend 
the measures taken at late night Council meetings, that there is no alternative 
to the decision they have made (4).  
                                                 
30
 Aside from the concerns relating to the democratic process, there are also objections in terms of the 
actual implementation of austerity. It has been argued that when austerity is implemented in a pro-
cyclical manner (e.g. wage cuts during a recession), it may result into a Sisyphean situation: more 
austerity leads to more lending that leads to an increase of the state’s already sizeable debt and so on. 
Furthermore, there have also been concerns raised in terms of the scholarship supporting the 
implementation of austerity. The debate has been chiefly influenced by the studies of Reinhart & 
Rogoff in 2010 on debt sustainability and growth, and of Alesina & Ardagna (2009; Reinhart & Rogoff 
2014). Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) suggest that countries that experience high debt-to-GDP levels (over 
90%) “are associated with notably lower growth outcomes” (22). Their study has been argued to be the 
“intellectual bulwark in support of austerity politics” (Herndon et al. 2013, 15). Alesina & Ardagna 
(2009) argued that tax cuts are to be preferred against spending increases and that  “spending cuts 
adopted to reduce deficit have been associated with economic expansions rather than recessions” (3). 
Both studies were used as cornerstones in the implementation of austerity during the Eurozone crisis. 
For example, the ECB President stated in 2010 that “the idea that austerity measures could trigger 
stagnation is incorrect…” (Krugman 2013). The Reinhart-Rogoff (2010) paper was proven to suffer 
from statistical irregularities, which, if corrected, would result in the conclusion that the “average GDP 
growth at public debt/GDP ratios over 90 percent is not dramatically different than when public 
debt/GDP ratios are lower,” (Herndon et al. 2013, 2-3). 
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Democracy throughout the Eurozone and EU has become “democracy without 
choices” (Laffan 2013, 283-4). This lack of alternatives had been observed from very 
early on (e.g. Gill 1998, 16).  
Obviously, the above have different degrees of effect throughout Eurozone 
MS. MS that are more economically strong have had their position strengthened vis-à-
vis the economically weaker MS, not least through actual lending and corresponding 
structural adjustment. Correspondingly, this could lead to an increase in the authority 
of parliaments of the economically stronger, and thus more able to affect 
supranational policy, Eurozone MS vis-à-vis their executive, as was the case with 
Germany, but also vis-à-vis parliaments in the economically weaker, heavily indebted 
Eurozone MS  (Bulmer 2014, 1256-8; Crum 2013, 622). For example, repeated 
decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – 
most notably the one on the Greek bailout on September 2011
31
 and the one on the 
European Stability Mechanism – ESM  almost a year later on September 201232) 
provided the representative legislature of Germany (mainly Bundestag but also 
Bundesrat) with enhanced decision-making and inquisitive authority over financial 
assistance programmes and other relevant issues/bodies. Inter alia, these decisions 
demanded that German representative bodies “retain control of fundamental 
budgetary decisions even in a system of intergovernmental administration” (Maduro 
et al. 2012b, 11), as well as that the “professional secrecy of all persons working for 
the ESM must not stand in the way of the comprehensive information of the Bundestag 
and of the Bundesrat” (Schneider 53-4).  
There are multiple examples of this in relation to the cases of Greece and 
Ireland. In relation to Ireland, during November 2011, key, confidential details (e.g. 
2% increase in VAT) of the Irish budget were provided to the Bundestag before they 
were even given to the Irish Parliament for review (Smyth & Spiegel 2011). What is 
more, this was done under the auspices of the EC, which transposed the documents 
from the Irish executive to the German legislature (Smyth & Spiegel 2011). In 
relation to Greece, the German Constitutional Court decided in the Greek bailout case 
that 
there is a violation of the right to vote if the German Bundestag relinquishes 
its parliamentary budget responsibility with the effect that it or a future 
Bundestag can no longer exercise the right to decide on the budget on its own 
responsibility (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2011).  
                                                 
31
 Order of 7 September 2011 – 2 BvR 987/10 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2011). 
32
 Order of 12 September 2012 – 2 BvR 1390/12 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2012). 
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Both of these examples demonstrate that, on account of the supranational 
crisis measures, not only have the parliaments of the Eurozone MS under financial 
assistance lost considerable ability to impact policy, but also the their executives have 
increased their influence over the legislative process, and, most importantly, that 
institutional actors of the Eurozone MS acting as lenders, with particular emphasis on 
the legislature, have gained considerable ability to directly (and not through its 
representation along with the rest of the Eurozone MS, by the EC) influence policy in 
the MS under assistance. More specficially, in the example of Ireland, the German 
parliament, throught the financial assistance programs, negotiated directly with the 
Irish executive, before the Irish parliament was even aware of the legislation at hand. 
Similarly, in the example of Greece, the German constitutional court ruled that that 
relinquishing budgetary authority by the legislature was democratically unacceptable. 
However, this same resignation from freely determining the state budget was 
requested and was provided from all Eurozone MS under financial assistance 
programmes, and what is more, this request was also made by the German 
government, whose own national supreme constitutional court determined that such 
an action is opposite to the proper democratic functioning of the state. These issues  
constitute not only paradoxes but clear problems in relation to the proper functioning 
of representative democracy within the Eurozone. It seems that due to the crisis 
measures, some Eurozone MS are now able to afford better democratic standards than 
others (democratic ‘double-standards’). 
The counter argument often presented in relation to the above observations is 
that this is necessary for the Eurozone MS acting as lenders to be guaranteed the 
reimbursement and proper use of their loans. After all, the governments of those MS 
are also accountable to their own electorate and, as such, they must democratically 
abide by the will of the people who desire to be reassured that public money is 
accounted for and returned. As the Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras suggests  
When I was a FinM in the Eurogroup, they (other FinM) came and told me: 
how are we going to the parliament to take a decision to give you money, 
when they ask us what the average pension in Greece is and we are 
embarrassed to say (because it was comparatively higher)?
33
 
However, in the above cases, and more generally throughout the crisis,  there 
seems to be direct influence of other Eurozone MS within most of the national level 
policies of the MS receving financial assistance. Therefore, while this counter 
                                                 
33
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of Greece, 
Professor of Economics and, inter alia, former FinM. 
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argument may be logically founded, it seems democratically problematic that a state’s 
legislature and/or executive would or could have such extensive control and authority 
over another state. Democracy should not function expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, i.e. democracy in a lender MS cannot impede or should be at the cost of 
democracy on a borrower MS. If democracy in a lender MS results in an a priori 
distortion of democracy in a MS under financial assistance, then democracy at that 
lender state seems distorted as well.  
It is evident from the above that the existing literature focuses on the core-
periphery distinction and on issues relevant to intergovernmental hegemony and 
power relations within the Eurozone. Overall, it appears that most of the relevant 
literature is primarily assuming a political economy perspective (e.g. Dyson 2001; 
Crawford 1996;  Laursen 2013; Smaghi 2013; Cafruny 2015; Durand & Keucheyan 
2015; Jessop 2015). While this approach may often share similar characteristics and 
might investigate similar phenomena with an EU-politics approach, the focus of each 
is different. The approaches of the existing literature, originating primarily from 
political economy, focuses mostly on how various measures during the crisis have 
reduced national, particularly fiscal, autonomy, which is then later translated into 
reduction in broad democratic principles. An analysis from an EU politics perspective 
is more inclusive in relation to democratic process, as it assumes a more 
comprehensive standpoint in relation to democratic principles, not focusing only on 
the national level or to few concepts of legitimacy. For example, the argument that 
EMU deprived Eurozone MS from the ability to control monetary policy and, thus, 
externally devaluate in the case of fiscal adversity does, as argued from a political 
economy perspective, in fact reduce the national sovereignty of MS in restricting 
implementing fiscal policy at will. However, from an EU politics perspective, and 
more specifically from an EU DD perspective, this might not actually be 
democratically problematic, since relevant provisions enacted may have enjoyed 
previouslegislative ratification and popular support (as they did upon construction of 
the EMU), or may have even been matched by advances in supranational, 
representative decision-making authority.  
Hence, the two aformetnioned approaches actually yield different conclusions 
in terms of adherence to democratic principles/processes. The aim of this research in 
relation to the relevant scholarly field is to assume a broader EU politics-based 
perspective. The measures are not analyzed from a political economy perspective as is 
the case with most of the literature; rather they are analyzed in terms of their impact 
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on democratic process, which may include issues similar to political economy, but 
also additional ones. Hence, there is more room for contributing in relation to the 
manner and impact of the crisis measures on the EU DD i.e., to more conclusively 
analyze how the crisis measures have impacted the democratic process. To achieve 
this objective, there is room to contribute a unified empirical, evaluative framework 
which would streamline the impact on the democratic processes aspect of the analysis. 
There has been some literature on how economic governance within the EMU 
has impeded democratic processes, existent from the Maastricht Treaty and 
throughout the EMU’s course (e.g. Featherstone 1994; Gill 1998; Featherstone 2011). 
Despite this fact, these contributions largely focused on contradictions of broad 
principles of the governance of EMU vis-à-vis generic democratic concepts 
(legitimacy, accountability, etc) defined in a non-specific manner, i.e. without 
focusing on how these concepts have been examined within the context of the EU DD 
scholarship, or could benefit from update of additional developments (e.g. Crum 
2013; Egenberg et al. 2014; Schmidtke 2004; Beukers 2013; Gill 1998; Majone 2012; 
Meny 2014; Rittberger 2014).  
In addition, most of this existing scholarship largely focuses on the 
participatory (or input) aspects of democracy at the national level. An indicative  
example is Beukers (2013), who premises his analysis on the idea that “the most 
prominent source of legitimacy for European integration lies at the level of national 
parliaments and democracy” (17). Laffan (2014) and Maurer (2013), also rely almost 
exclusively on intergovernmental sources (e.g. Moravcsik), arguing a priori that the 
economic component of the EMU is purely intergovernmental (5). Yet the Eurozone 
crisis has constituted a major transfer of powers to the supranational level, notably on 
fiscal surveillance. Because of this, there is considerable room to further contribute to 
other aspects of the EU democratic process, such as output at both national and 
supranational levels, as well as input and throughput at the supranational level.  
Some scholars do draw broad connections with the input-output aspects of the 
EU  DD literature, but explicit references or in-depth analysis of the EU DD in 
relation to EMU remain largely unexmplored (e.g. Torres 2006; Majone 2012; Ruffert 
2011; Laffan 2014; Gandrud & Hallerberg 2014; Scharpf 2011; Schmidt 2009). The 
aim, then, is to contribute to these areas with the construction of an empirical 
framework for evaluating the impact of EU measures on the EU DD and with the 
evaluation of the crisis measures.There is also considerable room for contribution in 
terms of specific references to the supranational crisis measures, as in the existing 
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literature they are discussed in a somewhat more brief manner  (e.g. Gandrud & 
Hallerberg 2014; Rittberger 2014; Mourlon-Druol 2014;). Oftentimes, scholars focus 
either on one specific measure or a specific set of consequences of that measure (e.g. 
De la Porte & Heins 2015; Beukers 2013; Laffan 2014; Schwarzer 2012; Maduro et 
al. 2012b; Sandbeck & Schneider 2014; Baratta 2011; Tomkin 2012).  
  
2.3. Eurozone Crisis: National Level 
 This section aims at reviewing the scholarship relevant to the MS-specific 
supranational crisis measures, with a particular emphasis on this investigation’s main 
case of Greece. EMU literature, both before and after the crisis is substantially larger 
and more expanded; literature specific to the national level, and much more to Greece, 
is more scarce in the international academic realm. Most of the MS-specific literature  
originates from an economy or political economy perspective, similarly to the 
literature relevant to EU-wide measures (e.g. Carstensen 2013; Dukelow 2015; 
Featherstone 2011; De Giorgi et al. 2012; partially Scharpf 2011 27-31; Bosco & 
Verney 2012; Busch et al. 2011; Theodoropoulou 2014; Athanassiou 2009; 
Kaplanoglou & Rapanos 2011; Katsimi & Moutos 2010). Further contributions in this 
field of scholarship can be made in terms of a more exclusive focus on democracy and 
the impact of crisis measures on the democratic process, as the above do not 
extensively focus on these issues. In the few cases where democracy is directly 
investigated, that is done in a broad manner (e.g. Bosco & Verney 2012 with electoral 
outcomes/participation in Eurozone MS under structural adjustment; Tsakatika & 
Elftheriou 2013; Verney 2012). The national-supranational dimension is left largely 
unexplored, and most pieces of existing literature examine the crisis measures through 
their impact on national–level policies alone.  
In relation to the literature specific to Greece, this dimension is also left 
largely unexplored. For example, Ladi (2014) analyses Greek public administration 
before and after the crisis, not exploring the entirety of the financial assistance 
program structural adjustment provisions. Similarly, Katsanidou (2012) investigates 
only party behaviour in relevance to the programmes, and Aranitou et al. (2011) 
briefly analyses an indicative set of changes under the programmes from the 
perspective of Greece’s political history. The more detailed analyses of the case-
specific relevant scholarship are presented from a legal perspective (e.g. Katrougkalos 
2010 and 2011; Manitakis 2011; Marias 2010a and 2010b; Kasimatis 2010; Drosos 
2010; Xrysogonos 2010), although most of it is in Greek and, hence, not easily 
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accessible to international scholars. This scholarship focuses mainly on the 
contradictions (or lack thereof) between the financial assistance programmes and the 
manner in which they were implemented, and the Greek legal order, usually with a 
focus on the Constitution of Greece (CoG). Marias (2010a) presents quite a detailed 
account, especially regarding the relevant EU-based DECs addressed to Greece, their 
relevance and similarities with the financial assistance programs, and their potential 
conflicts with the existing EU Treaty framework (2215). Xrysogonos (2010) and 
Kasimatis (2010) also manage to highlight the contradictory paths of national 
legislation for the 1
st
 financial assistance programme within the domestic political 
realm, as well as a detailed evaluation of the Greek loan agreements, particularly in 
terms of national sovereignty, resignation from immunity based on such sovereignty, 
and the relevant legal framework in the English law which governs the loan 
agreements. Still, there is considerable room left for a more EU politics-based 
approach to democratic issues which, although based on relevant legislation, are more 
abstract and based on the EU DD approaches. Therefore, there is the possibility for 
further contributions focusing more on the democratic and less on the legal aspect of 
the issue at hand. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 The aim of this Chapter was to provide a background on the existing literature 
relevant to this research. The existing literature offers considerable insight in relation 
to the power relations and hegemonic tendencies within the EU, the growing 
imbalances between core and periphery MS (especially within the Eurozone), and the 
challenge to MS equality posed by the transformation of the relationship between the 
MS into a relationship between lender and borrower. In addition, many scholars focus 
on the power and authority EU institutions or EU MS governments have acquired 
through the supranational crisis measures. These issues are important for 
understanding the EU and its future post-crisis measures.  
However, as outlined above, the areas examined within this research are 
essentially novel. Most of the scholarship originates from a political economy 
perspective, even when addressing issues of democratic process, which seems, in 
either case, to considerably favor an input-based approach at the national level. 
Hence, issues relevant to broader considerations of the democratic process within the 
EU framework, and of the EU DD, are left unexplored. The research aims at 
contributing in this area, while also contributing in the field of EU politics through the 
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construction of an empirical framework for evaluating the impact of EU measures on 
the EU DD. There have been considerable contributions offered in relation to the 
restrictions of national-level policy-making upon joining the EU, and much more the 
Eurozone (mostly in relation then to fiscal, monetary or economic policy). This has 
been a recurring argument in relation to the EMU structure. However, this is primarily 
dealt from a political economy perspective, leaving further room to contribute from an 
EU politics perspective. This perspective, in relation to the democratic process, 
presents considerations that are in addition to those falling within the remit of the 
political economy perspective, but also introduces a more comprehensive evaluation 
of the national-supranational level inter-relation within the EU.  
 In relation to the national level, existing literature is, as expected, less 
prominent in the international scholarly field, compared to literature relevant to the 
EU level. This is especially the case in relation to Greece, where most of the literature 
relevant to this research is in Greek and is published in Greek journals or books. 
Aside from the above, literature pertaining to the national level still largely originates 
from a political economy or purely economic perspective. Similarly to the 
observations relating to the EU level existing literature, there is more room to 
contribute in more specific and forensic analysis of the measures assumed, in 
considering the national-supranational level dimension, and, most importantly, in 
introducing an EU-politics based approach. As most analyses at the national level 
assume either a political economy or a strictly legal perspective, the scholarly filed 
could benefit from an EU politics-based perspective, which would examine more 
thoroughly and specifically the impact of measures assumed during the crisis on the 
EU DD.  
 Based on the above, there are three main areas of contribution of this research 
to the existing scholarly field. The first is focused on offering an approach based in an 
EU politics perspective, including the creation of an empirical model for evaluating 
the impact of EU measures on the EU DD.  This framework makes it possible to 
undertake an overall evaluation of the impact of any EU measure (not only those 
specific to the crisis) on the EU’s democratic process. The second area of contribution 
of this research to the existing field is the more detailed and forensic analysis of each 
of the supranational crisis measures. The third area of contribution is the consistent 
and systematic evaluation of the impact of the crisis measures on the EU DD. This is 
done from an EU politics perspective, since the measures assumed are both national 
and supranational, and thus mandate the analysis of both levels as well as their 
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interaction. This approach offers a broader and more comprehensive exploration 
compared to the existing literature (which is mostly based on political economy), 
which, implicitly and, oftentimes, explicitly, favours a national-focused, input-based 
analysis of the impact of the crisis measures on the democratic process. Measures are 
not only evaluated in terms of their impact on economic policy, financial capabilities, 
fiscal autonomy, etc of EU and Eurozone MS (which, in either case, may or may not 
raise concerns in terms of democratic process), but in terms of their overall impact on 
the democratic process, which includes other concerns relating to how these measures 
were assumed and what their impact is on democratic processes, such as delegation, 
Parliamentary influence, etc.  
 In conclusion, despite the fact that there have been considerable contributions 
offered by the existing literature in the areas relevant to this research, the 
aforementioned three areas remain unexplored. It is in these areas that novel 
contributions are provided by this research to the existing scholarly field, mainly 
focused on an EU politics perspective. The aim is not only to advance the current 
literature, but to provide a solid foundation for building future research on the EU DD 
and the EU/Eurozone modified structure that has arisen after the crisis.  
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Chapter 3: EU Democratic Deficit Evaluative Framework 
3.1. Introduction  
As outlined in the preceding Chapter, a single, consistent empirical framework 
for evaluating the impact of any EU measure(s) on the EU DD is largely absent from 
existing literature, although scholarship to the EU DD is extensive and offers 
important theoretical insights into the democratic process of the EU. The aim of this 
Chapter is to present such a framework, and outline its specifics. The framewok will 
have to, broadly, satisfy the following three basic condition. Firstly, it will have to 
account for the sui generis nature of the EU. In other words, it will have to include 
indicators that address the impact on the democratic processes of the national and EU 
levels, since EU policy-making (especially during the crisis) consists of both. 
Secondly, in order for this framework to be generalizable, it will have to have the 
potential for application to any EU measure beyond specifically the crisis measures. 
Thirdly, it should reflect principles of the existing literature of the EU DD. To achieve 
this, certain modifications and re-organization of the existing literature will have to be 
introduced.  
The Chapter follows the following structure. To begin with, the literature 
relevant to the EU DD is analysed and categorized. There are three main approaches 
to the EU DD: Input, Output, and Throughput. Furthermore, the foundations of the 
relevant literature are presented. The EU DD scholarship draws (either directly or 
indirectly) from two broader theoretical fields: democratic theory and EU integration 
theory. In the next section, the ontological concerns for the construction of this audit-
based, empirical model are discussed. Is it possible, or even prudent, for this model to 
be constructed based upon current EU DD literature? And if so, how can this be 
achieved and what are the necessary conditions to be satisfied? In this case, the 
contribution of additive theory is invaluable in setting a precedent for the construction 
of empirical models based on different theoretical approaches, and the necessary 
conditions for this construction. The following main section of this Chapter is 
concerned with the actual construction of the framework. The elements of the three 
approaches of the EU DD are re-organized, summarized and structured around four 
qualitative, empirical indicators. Each of the indicators is further individually 
analyzed vis-à-vis its relation to the different EU DD scholarship approaches, as well 
as their foundations.  Finally, the Chapter concludes with the overall purpose and aim 
of this framework, its attributes and generalizability, and its use within the context of 
this present investigation.  
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3.2. The EU Democratic Deficit Approaches   
Obviously, the EU DD draws primarily from the elements of the broader 
theoretical field of democratic theory. Although this is examined later in the Chapter 
(section 3.3.1), it is perhaps fitting to briefly provide some introductory remarks. The 
definition of democracy is a subject of extensive controversy and analyses, resulting 
in the absence of a widely accepted definition, either at a theoretical (political 
philosophy) or at a practical (political system) level (Diamond 1999, 7-17; Dahl 1999, 
19-20)
34
. The definitional debate is so extensive that it includes the question of 
whether the debate itself is meaningful or necessary (Beetham 1993, 55). From a 
basic etymological approach, the word democracy is derived from the Latin word 
“democratia”, itself originating from the Greek word “δημοκρατία” (Berube et al. 
1997, 369)
35
. It  is a composite word, consisting of the following words: demos 
(“δήμος”), which translates to the people/free citizens, and kratos (“κράτος”) which 
translates to power/force/government (Dormparaki 2005, 213 & 461). Democracy, 
thus, literally means the power of the people.  
As with the concept of democracy, so with the EU DD, there is no single, 
widely accepted definition. Rather, there are two main views. The first view, called 
the orthodox view, places the focus on the absence of representative elements within 
decision-making processes of the EU (Chryssochoou 2000, 32; Schmidt 2006, 64-5; 
Majone 2010, 150). This is consistent with the broader debate on parliamentary 
decline in modern, Western democracies. The absence of “social responsibility” 
among members of Parliaments has turned politics into a game rather than a process 
of debating and resolving policy issues and, hence, parliamentary procedure has 
steadily been distorted (Chryssochoou 2000, 108-9)
36
. Moreover, the executive 
branch, with its agencies and technocratic actors, has become substantially more 
powerful over the legislative, especially given the increasingly technical nature of 
legislation (Schmidt 2006, 64).  For example, within the EU, the EP is unable to cover 
                                                 
34
 As Chryssochoou (2000) argues “a large number of problems arise when one tries to present a 
definitive view of democracy, let alone examine its qualities in the actual process of government” (48). 
As Held (1993) suggests: “Furthermore, there is not simply one institutional form of democracy. 
Contemporary democracies have crystallized into a number of different types…” (14). 
35
 As a functioning political system, democracy first originated in Ancient Greece, predominantly in the 
city-state of Athens (Dahl 1998, 10-2). There are earlier references to representative regimes in Greece, 
predominantly in Chios, and then also in Megara, Ambracia and other city-states, during the mid-6
th
 
century BC, but none assumed the definitive form of democracy as existent in Athens (Robinson 2004, 
1; Held 2006, 12). 
36
 There have been counter-arguments to such position. For example, Hix (2008) argues that 
parliaments were always less powerful than executives, and therefore this critique, whether for the 
national or the supranational level, is largely misguided.  
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for the loss of national parliaments’ participation at the EU level (Chryssochoou 2000, 
114 and 117 and 122; Hix 2008, 68-9).  
The second view suggests that there is a “gap between elite proposals and 
popular perceptions,” which can be corrected only by a stronger counter-balance to 
the European Council (EUCO)/CoM (i.e. EC & EP to grow stronger; Chryssochooou 
2000, 34). This is reinforced by the argument that “the consociational dimension of 
Union governance effectively weakens the infrastructure of transnational democracy 
by making executive-centred elites the decisive subject of EU politics” (Chryssochoou 
2000, 171). Thus integration and its management are in the hands of elites who, for 
the sake of decisional efficiency
37
, compromise the interests of their governments 
(Chryssochoou 2000, 171). 
These two views regarding the definition of the EU DD correspondingly 
address two overarching themes: the first view emphasizes the participation of 
citizens in decision-making process of the EU (representative institutions), while the 
second emphasizes the acceptance of the outcome of that decision-making process by 
the citizens. Building on these views, there have been, overall, three different 
approaches developed within the existing literature in relation to the EU DD: Input, 
Output and Throughput. The first two (Input and Output
38
) are considered the more 
traditional ones, and draw on elements of political systems theory
39
. They originate 
from the work of Fritz Scharpf and his study on democracy during the 1970s (Scharpf 
1999, 3 & 6). Scharpf (1999) writes:  
I have described these as input-oriented and output-oriented legitimising 
beliefs […] Input-oriented democratic thought emphasizes government by the 
people. Political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the will of 
the people… By contrast, the output perspective emphasizes government for 
the people. Here political choices are legitimate if and because they 
effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question. While 
both of these dimensions are generally complementary, they differ 
                                                 
37
 Defined as “the ability of…elites to reach amicable agreements through accomodationist patterns of 
joint decision making” (Chryssochoou 2000, 171).  
38
 Input and Output have taken various forms in between different authors. Different terms used 
include: redistributive vs regulatory, rights-oriented vs public interest-oriented, direct vs indirect, 
procedural vs performance. Extensive analyses can be found in Moravcsik 2002, Majone 1998 & 2010, 
Follesdal 2006, Follesdal & Hix 2006, Bellamy 2006 & 2010, Erksen & Fossum 2004 & 2011, 
Auberger & Iszkowski 2007, Bredt 2011, Cheneval & Schimmelfennig 2013, Hobolt 2012. 
39
 The distinction originates from the difference between Republican and Liberal views of democracy. 
The Output approach tends to be more consistent with the view of Liberalism (Hobbes), emphasizing 
the protection of personal rights by the EU and the effectiveness of its policies (Scharpf 2009, 178). 
Input is more relevant to the Republican tradition (Aristotle), emphasizing the involvement of citizens 
in the EU decision-making processes. 
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significantly in their preconditions and implications for the democratic 
legitimacy of European governance… (emphasis added by author; 6)40 
The third approach (Throughput) is a more recent addition to EU DD literature. It 
focuses on procedures of delegation between different institutions, and if these are 
transparent, allow civil society participation, are governed by regulations, etc. This 
approach can be seen as in the middle ground between Input and Output. 
  
3.2.1. Input 
The Input approach emphasizes the input of citizens necessary to produce the 
democratically proper outputs (Scharpf 2009, 188). While not exhaustively the case, 
most scholars of this approach suggest that “the same normative standards of 
legitimacy we know from liberal democratic states should also apply to the EU, in 
complexity notwithstanding” (Follesdal 2006, 443). As Chryssochoou (2000) argues 
“…no principles of democracy which are compatible in its (democracy) domestic 
context should be seen as incompatible above that level” (63). It is suggested that 
“democratic legitimacy does not stem from the aggregation of the preferences of all, 
but from the deliberation of all” (Eriksen & Fossum 2000a, 18). As Follesdal & Hix 
(2006) contend, “institutional design (and), not policy outcomes,” should be the main 
focus of a democratic society (548). The EU might have begun as a mere facilitator, 
but has now evolved into almost all areas over which a state has authority. Therefore, 
oversight and participation through representative institutions is now necessary for 
democracy to properly function within the EU
41
.  
It is argued that if a core function of democracy is to allow necessary binding 
collective decisions to be made despite valid disagreements and uncertainty about 
their potential outcomes, the electoral process is essential for the policy makers to be 
both positively (being voted into office/re-elected) and negatively (being voted out of 
office) encouraged to be responsive to the will of the citizenry. In addition, 
deliberation platforms and party competition are of the utmost importance in 
adequately representing the policy debates within a society and providing ample 
                                                 
40
 Scharpf, in his choice of the phrases “for the people” and “by the people” obviously draws on the 
words of former USA President Abraham Lincoln during the Gettysburg Address in 1863 (Library of 
Congress 2014a), who said: “…that the nation, shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government 
of the people by the people for the people, shall not perish from the earth” (emphasis added by the 
author; Library of Congress 2014a & 2014b).  
41
 This argument, relating to the necessity of increasing the decision-making capacity of supranational 
representative institutions (e.g. EP) since, while their role in the past was also confined, the EU has 
evolved and acquired authority over many more policy areas, was also raised in the interview with 
Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of Constitutional Law.  
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information in order for a voter to choose between candidates (Follesdal & Hix 2006, 
549-51). Of course, some institutions should remain insulated from citizens’ 
influence; however those have to be identified and, most importantly, have to present 
evidence of the reasons this isolation is beneficial to the general interest (Follesdal 
2006, 459-60; Follesdall & Hix 2006, 542-3).  
In this approach, there is also focus on the lack of contested input. Follesdal & 
Hix (2006) argue that “if citizens cannot identify alternative leaders or policy 
agendas, it is difficult for them to determine whether leaders could have done better 
or to identify who is responsible for policies” (548). After all, it is proposed that “it is 
precisely because there is no visible quasi-official ‘opposition’, that citizens cannot 
distinguish between opposition to the current EU policy regime and opposition to the 
EU system as a whole” (Follesdal & Hix 2006, 548-9).  
Moreover, it is argued that the EU suffers from a “neo-liberal bias,”42 
favouring negative integration, i.e. market liberalisation with intense characteristics of 
competition leading to a “race to the bottom,” over positive integration, which would 
emphasize social protection (Moravcsik 2002, 617). In relation to this argument, it is 
further put forth that the EU’s lack of legitimacy is owed to the failure of the EU to 
implement and/or adequately defend a social policy agenda. These policies would 
cover the legitimacy gap as they have been proven to be  “an essential source of 
democratic legitimation for the nation state” (Majone 1998, 13).  
The Input approach also includes arguments relevant to the small role of the 
EP, both examined separately and comparatively to other EU institutions (EC and 
EUCO /CoM; Majone 1998, 7-8). This is relevant to the problematically low turnout 
rate in EU elections, which tend to be regarded as secondary to national ones. Hence, 
even considering “…the growing power of the European Parliament, there is not a 
democratic electoral contest for EU political office or over the direction of the EU 
policy agenda…” (Hix 2008, 70). Such lack of participation has most prominently43 
been explained by the lack of a single, well-defined, consensus-based demos, i.e. “a 
                                                 
42
 “the capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization as the answer (to the 1960s and 1970s 
crises) …with the articulation of what became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s” 
(Harvey 2005, 13). The main principles are: Fiscal discipline, Redirecting public expenditure toward 
high economic returns, Tax reform, Competitive exchange rate, Interest rate liberalization, Trade 
liberalization, Liberalization of foreign direct investment, Privatization, Deregulation, Secure property 
rights (Birdsall et. al. 2010, 7). 
43
 Inter alia, Cheneval & Schimmelfennig 2013, 336-8; Hobolt 2012, 90; Moravcsik 2002, 615-6; 
Eriksen & Fossum 2004, 437-442; Schmidt 2013, 4; Bellamy & Castglione 2000, 78-9. 
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community of politically equal individuals, deliberating about the common good in a 
single, transnational public sphere” (Cheneval & Schimmelfennig 2013, 338-9)44.  
The above issues have not escaped criticism. Moravcsik (2002) argues that 
these arguments ”rest on the questionable premise that greater participation in 
European political institutions will generate a deeper sense of political community in 
Europe or, at the very least, greater popular support for the EU” (615; Moravcsik 
2008, 338). Furthermore, the suggested lack of opposition and of a more socially-
oriented agenda within the EU has also been met with criticism. A race to the bottom 
is only possible in a small number of policy areas, in which it mostly has not 
occurred, while social protection within the EU has remained relatively stable 
(Moravcsik 2002, 618-9). In either case, EU MS governments are unwilling to 
surrender their decision-making authority in important policy realms such as welfare, 
education, etc, and EU MS citizens share this view, since social policy is considered a 
fundamental function of the state. In fact, given the above considerations, “the 
development of welfare policies at European level would actually aggravate the 
legitimacy problem, reinforcing the popular image of a highly centralised and 
bureaucratised Community” (Majone 1998, 14).  
Objections have also been raised against the argument that the EP plays a 
small role within the EU, especially when compared to other EU institutions. Majone 
(1998) suggests that the EU system is similar, but not identical to any national-level 
democratic system, and hence it is not correct to assume that it has any branches of 
government (8). In any case, the small role of the EP does not necessarily equate to 
reduced levels of democracy, as the EP is only one of many actors involved in 
safeguarding the democratic process. It is mistaken to assume that  majority rule is 
identical  democracy, since the latter concept includes additional also consists of 
many non-majoritarian institutions and processes, particularly in federal, quasi-federal 
and “plural societies”45 (that more closely resemble the EU paradigm; Majone 1998, 
10). 
 
                                                 
44
 It is further argued that, in order to successfully implement a supra or transnational democratic 
model, it is important that a coherent political community is existent by identifying “those 
characteristics which actually make a group of people a political community” (Chryssochoou 2000, 81 
& 87-91; Warleigh 2003, 109).  
45
 Societies that are “sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic or racial 
lines into virtually separate sub-societies with their own political parties, interest groups, and media of 
communication” (Lijphart 1984, 22-3). 
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3.2.2. Output 
The Output approach to the EU’s democratic deficit stems from the main 
argument that further input of citizens on EU decision-making processes is not only 
unnecessary, given the EU’s nature, but might also lead to less efficiency, an element 
which is, as argued, the most fundamental purpose of the EU. Supporters of this 
model do not necessarily deny the lack of citizen input to the decision-making 
processes of the EU, but rather argue that, whether by design or effect, the input can 
and should be sacrificed to achieve the desired output (to be produced through non-
majoritarian processes; Schmidt 2013, 5; Bellamy 2010, 3). As Moravcsik (2008) 
argues, “reform to increase direct political participation…would almost likely 
undermine public legitimacy, popularity and trust without generating greater public 
accountability” (340). This is concurrent with the view that the EU “should not seek 
to imitate the democratic processes of nation-states” (Hobolt 2012, 90; generally 
Schmidt 2013, 10)
46
. 
In this approach it is argued that the EU is merely a facilitating organisation/ 
regulatory agent aimed at increasing financial gains by aiding increased cooperation 
between EU MS. The EU was not constructed to be anything more, and is not 
anything more (technocracy over democracy – Warleigh 2003, 16; Featherstone 1994, 
159-63). It does not enjoy any authority over core national policy issues that are 
electorally salient (taxes, social welfare, education, etc.; Moravcsik 2002, 607-8; 
Moravcsik 2008, 333; Auberger & Iszkowski 2007, 274). These areas require 
democratic participation since they include, at a large degree, redistributive effects 
(Majone 2003, 5). In contrast, policy areas that the EU can affect, do not include the 
above, are highly specialized and technical, and do not have a redistributive character. 
Hence, in this case, participation is not a democratic prerequisite, i.e. the EU policy 
areas are not electorally salient (Majone 2010, 157; Bellamy 2006, 735-8; Hobolt 
2012, 90; Schmidt 2013, 10). 
Given the above, an infusion of input democracy in this technocratic system 
would actually have adverse effects on the democratic process. In other words, it is 
argued that further “politicization would result in redistributive rather than Pareto-
efficient outcomes, and so in fact undermine rather than increase legitimacy of the 
                                                 
46
 This seems in accord with arguments of democratic theory similar to those advance by John Stuart 
Mill’s, i.e. that “the more the electorate meddles in this business… the greater the risk of undermining 
efficiency” (Held 2006, 86-7). 
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EU” (Follesdall & Hix 2006, 538)47. Independent actors, with delegated authority, 
would prove to be much more impartial as well as more protective of EU citizens’ 
interests, since they are politically insulated and are legally obligated to serve the best 
interest of the EU and not of sectoral interests (Majone 1998, 22-3). Hence, the issue 
of concern is not so much a deficit of democracy, but rather a crisis of credibility 
(Follesdal & Hix 2006, 537-8). Even in areas in which the EU has competence, 
supranational policies are characterised by intense intergovernmental fragmentation, 
and its actions are restrained by institutional checks and balances (Moravcsik 2002, 
608-11 & 2008, 335). These elements are also argued to be part of the reason for the 
evidently apathetic electoral behaviour of EU citizens (Moravcsik 2002, 616-7; 
Bellamy 2006, 737). As Majone (2010) argues, policies of the EU are “...too 
technical, too far removed from the everyday concerns of the citizens to attract the 
interest of anybody except bureaucrats” (157).  
Supporters of this approach also put forth the argument that the criteria 
employed to democratically evaluate the EU are too optimistic and reminiscent of an 
ancient, direct form of democracy, and that “many analysts…overlook the extent to 
which delegation and insulation are widespread trends in modern democracies” 
(Moravcsik 2002, 605). This leads to standards that are unfitting not only for the EU, 
but for MS as well (Auberger & Iszkowski 2007, 274). Therefore, the criticism 
levelled against the EU does not only pertain to the EU, but to the modern form and 
operation of the democratic system (Moravcsik 2002, 613). For example, EU 
independent technocrats, who are not subjected to democratic oversight, are, in many 
cases, responsible for exactly the same areas as those of independent national 
technocrats (e.g. Central Bank functions). In any case, it is argued that “across nearly 
every measurable dimension, the EU is at least as democratic, and generally more so, 
than its member states” (Moravcsik 2008 332-340).  
Even if it is supposed that the EU suffers from some deficiency in terms of 
democratic operation, it is argued that indirect representation of citizens via their 
respective governments is both valid and sufficient in terms of accountability. The 
national executives are held indirectly accountable for all actions at the supranational 
level through the national electoral process (Moravcsik 2002, 607 and 2008, 334-6; 
Scharpf 2009, 182). In any event, arbitrary action is quite difficult, given that 
“countries can opt out in the case they do not agree with a specific policy” 
                                                 
47
 This is concurrent with market regulation theory, suggests that limited policies that have a Pareto-
optimal and not a redistributive outcome (and are often geared towards correcting market failures) 
should be made by non-majoritarian / independent institutions. 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 33  
(Moravcsik 2002, 609). Conversely, some of the supporters of the Output approach 
(e.g. Majone) are more reserved in terms of the efficiency of this indirect 
accountability, suggesting that “such indirect legitimation cannot provide an adequate 
normative foundation for its (the EU) supranational component” (Majone 1998, 12)48. 
In this case, it is suggested that the legitimation necessary for policies conducted by 
purely (much as realistically possible) supranational institutions, such as the EC, is 
derived from their contribution to protecting economic and other various rights of EU 
citizens, potentially against EUMS governments’ interests (Majone 1998, 13).  
As with Input, there have been many arguments against evaluating the EU 
with purely outcome-based criteria. As Eriksen (2000) argues, “the notion of utility 
calculus as the basis of legitimacy is problematic, for conceptual and empirical 
reasons” (43). The argument that the EU is not the type of organisation that is or 
should be of a democratic nature (Hix 2008, 181), has been criticised by scholars such 
as Chryssochoou (2000) who suggests that: 
 no single state that aspires to democracy can convincingly assert that the 
formation of  a union composed of smaller entities should neglect the 
importance of democratically monitoring the decision taken within its 
structures. All the more so if these decision enjoy the status of having direct 
public effect (36). 
In fact it has often been argued that not only is the EU undemocratic, but that it 
“magnifies the pathologies of the national democracies” (Nicolaides 2013, 351).  This 
proliferation of democratic deficiencies of the national level to the supranational level 
“is in itself a legitimate reason for reinforcing the institutional capacity of citizens to 
become the decisive subjects of EU politics” (Chryssochoou 2000, 63). 
Even in case of a purely output-based evaluation, some form of participation is 
necessary since, without it, it is impossible to determine which policies are to the best 
interest of the entire EU citizenry, in order to construct them in a Pareto-optimal 
manner (Auberger & Iszkowski 2007, 274). Citizens’ preferences can only be 
expressed through participation and deliberation and they do not remain static. As 
Follesdal & Hix (2006) argue, even if it is assumed that policies originate in the 
favour of the citizenry (an “abstract European-wide median voter”), lack of electoral 
input translates into “few incentives for the Commission or governments to change 
these policies in response to changes in citizens’ preferences” (545 and 549 
respectively). Hence, further input serves both as a guide to what the citizens want 
                                                 
48
 The argument in support of a regulatory approach to regional unions, and the EU more specifically, 
and the legitimazing effect of output, was also described in the interview with Prof. Dimitris 
Chryssochoou, Professor of Theory and Institutions of European Integration. 
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and an incentive for policy-makers to respond to changes in those preferences. 
(Follesdal & Ηix 2006, 545 and  549)49.  
Moreover, the assumption that no further democratisation is necessary due to 
the fact that EU policies do not have a redistributive character is argued to be 
misleading. EU policy today creates many winners and losers, moving away from a 
purely Pareto-optimal system
50
 (Follesdal & Hix 2006, 543 and 551-2; Lord 2008, 
317; Bredt 2011, 40-1). In any case, the distinction between redistributive and 
regulatory policies is not at all clear, and there is argued to be no apparent reason for 
suggesting that technocratic/independent actors will produce better policies than 
majoritarian institutions (Bredt 2011, 42; Bellamy 2006, 737). In fact, while 
technocrats are often presented as impartial, it is argued that they “have an 
unfortunate tendency to overlook issues that are legitimate worries for ordinary folk,” 
and to also be prone to pressures from particular lobbies or actors (Bellamy 2006, 
740; Follesdal & Hix 2006, 546). Hence, even in the cases of the most technocratic 
actors (whether national or supranational) such as a Central Bank and its functions 
(e.g. setting interest rates), “far from being pure technical exercises, such decisions 
have an obvious political dimension” (Bellamy 2006, 739).   
Finally, counter arguments are also presented against the manageability of 
indirect accountability. As Auberger & Iszkowski (2007) point out, indirect 
accountability within the CoM is rather fragile, as the QMV system, expanded to 
include a number of additional policy areas after the Treaty of Lisbon, may result in 
outvoting of certain governments. These governments cannot then be held 
accountable for policies which they defended, but in which, through no liability of 
their own, they were outvoted (274).  
 
3.2.3. Throughput  
Finally, there are scholars who support the Throughput approach. This 
approach has less of a normative weight than the aforementioned two (Schmidt 2013, 
14). Schmidt (2013) suggests that “throughput focuses on the quality of the 
governance processes of the EU […] (and) is process-oriented, and based on the 
interactions – institutional and constructive – of all actors engaged in EU 
                                                 
49
 This argument was also raised in the interview with Prof. Dimitris Chryssochoou, Professor of 
Theory and Institutions of European Integration. 
50
 It has been argued that the democratic system itself, regardless of its level (national or supranational), 
is a priori redistributive and not Pareto optimal (Dahl 1999, Hardin 1999).  
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governance” (5). The theory concerns issues regarding the interaction between 
different institutions as well as conditions of policy-making for the institutions 
themselves, such as their efficacy, accountability, inclusiveness, transparency, and 
openness. Such concepts are investigated in terms of their outcomes, as well as their 
ideational perspective, i.e their more constructivist aspect (Schmidt 2013, 6-8).  
Institutionally, throughput focuses on the way in which different political units 
work, but also in the ability which citizens and interest groups have to directly 
influence policy within these units. Despite the increase of pluralist decision-making 
provisions in EU institutions, transparency and inclusiveness remain questionable in 
light of the ever increasing role of lobbies. Accountability is also harmed since most 
decisions are taken behind closed doors (e.g. COREPER, EC) and the EP is 
increasingly unable to affect those decisions (Schmidt 2013, 15-6).  
Focus on the process, in addition to that placed on the institutions and/or 
populace, has been echoed in writing of some input-side academics. For example, 
Eriksen (2000) argues that “…both procedures for deliberation and for decision-
making are required […] Certain procedural norms and institutional settings are 
required…” (61-2). However, other input-based scholars are more reluctant. Bellamy 
& Castglione (2000) argue that “…democratic legitimacy depends on a thick network 
of institutions more than on thin procedural rules” (78).  
 
3.3. The Foundations of the EU Democratic Deficit 
 In the above sections, the different approaches to the EU DD were presented 
and analysed in detail. However, to effectively create an empirical model for 
evaluating the EU DD based on these approaches, their foundations have to also be 
investigated. This will reveal further similarities and differences of the approaches 
and their origins, but will also help determine if the creation of such a model is 
ontologically possible, delineating what foundational distinctions have to be taken 
into consideration. The foundations of the EU DD literature are in two different 
broader theoretical areas: democratic theory and EU integration theories. Elements 
drawn from the former theoretical area are clear, with direct links in the EU DD 
literature, whereas elements drawn from the latter theoretical area are more indirect, 
i.e. there are no direct references to EU integration theories within the EU DD 
literature. However, their influence can still be traced.  
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3.3.1. Democratic Theory 
Democratic theory concerns the investigation of the concept of democracy, 
mainly from a philosophical-theoretical, historical or applied (political system) 
approach. As previously highlighted, there is no single, universally-accepted 
definition of democracy, with debates extending as far as questioning the importance 
of the debates themselves (Beetham 1993, 55). This is perhaps surprising, given its 
extensive usage in the modern world, particularly in Western, developed states
51
.  
The majority of EU DD literature scholars are in agreement with the 
democratic theory perspective of analyzing democracy as a political system and not as 
a philosophical concept, focusing on the characteristics which are common to modern, 
Western, liberal democratic states – and indeed in EU MS – and to which most 
democratic theorists would agree, while avoiding the arguments and disagreements 
over the actual definition of the concept (e.g Follesdal & Hix 2006, 547). Hence, 
democracy is analyzed more from an empirical or evaluative point of view, rather 
than from a theoretical one. It is suggested that a functional (not a theoretical) 
definition of democracy is sufficient for the system’s empirical evaluation, and such a 
definition should only focus on the primary characteristics of democracy, thus 
resolving or side-stepping many of the existing definitional disagreements, of which 
“the extent and significance …has been greatly exaggerated. Most …turn out on 
closer inspection to be not about the meaning of democracy, but about its desirability 
or practicability” (Beetham 1994a, 28). This approach has been applied by many 
democratic theory scholars, primarily of David Beetham in his democratic audit 
model, introduced in the 1990s and aimed at evaluating the quality of a state’s 
democratic process (the model was first applied to the UK; Beetham 1994b & 1999). 
Beetham (1994b) distinguished popular control and political equality as the two 
fundamental characteristics of the democratic political system, then subdividing 
political control into “popular election of the…legislature and the head of government 
[…], accountability of government […], civil & political rights […], (and) civil 
society” (28-9).  
Most problems in relation to the EU DD, as emphasized by scholars in the 
existing literature, are located with popular control rather than political equality, and 
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 It is the case that these political systems are usually described as republics and not democracies. In 
terms of this distinction, it seems common to assign directness to the Ancient Greek democracy (so-
called pure democracy), and representation to the Roman Republic (as by James Madison). However, 
there is no historic evidence to support such a claim and the two words are essentially synonyms (Dahl 
1998, 16-7). The etymology of the word republic is identical to democracy, i.e. from Latin respublica, 
a composite word from res: matter, thing and publica: of the people (Berube et al. 1997, 1159). 
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more specifically with legitimacy (Beetham’s “popular election of the…legislature 
and the head of government”) and accountability (Chryssochoou 2000, 49-50). As 
Moravcsik (2008), one of the most prominent EU DD scholars and a supporter of the 
output approach, argues, “one hears...that the European Union suffers from a 
‘democratic deficit’. It is unaccountable and illegitimate,” further arguing that the 
EU’s democratic deficit can be defined either “as an absence of public accountability 
or as a crisis of legitimacy” (331 and 340). The focus on legitimacy and 
accountability is also evident from the elements included in the two main definitional 
views of the EU DD, as examined above (section 3.2).  
Legitimacy can be characterized as the ex ante process of democracy, through 
which citizens provide their consent for the decision-making process to be excercised 
by a governing structure (legislative and, by extension, executive), and their 
acceptance of  the authority of this structure. This acceptance is one of the most 
important foundations of the democratic political system (Schaprf 2009, 173; Birch 
1993, 32; Bellamy 2003, 10). Traditionally, legitimacy is divided into three categories 
according to Max Weber (Ehin 2008, 622; Birch 1993, 33-4):  
 Traditional: Compliance is ensured via direct loyalty to the leader, such as the 
tribal chief, the king, etc. 
 Charismatic: Compliance is ensured through faith to the charisma of a specific 
leader and their qualities, such as Charles De Gaulle for example. 
 Legal-Rational: Compliance is ensured through “general acceptance of the 
procedures by which these orders and laws are produced” (Birch 1993, 34). 
The EU, as well as most countries which follow the modern Western, liberal, 
democratic tradition, follows the Legal-Rational type of legitimacy. 
 Accountability
52
 can be characterized as the ex post facto process of 
democracy, through which citizens, having provided legitimacy to the governors and 
having accepted their authority, evaluate their actions and policies, and decide 
whether to reward or to sanction them (Strom 2003, 62)
53
. Through accountability, 
citizens have the right to evaluate the actions of elected officials, and determine 
whether they were in accordance or contrary to the conditions upon which legitimacy 
was bestowed, e.g. agreement with or divergence from the electoral platform, 
                                                 
52
 Etymology: From a (to) and cunter (count, from Latin computare) (Berube et al. 1997, 9). The origin 
of the term is traced back to 1085 and William I of England, who “required all the property holders in 
his realm to render a count of what they possessed” (Bovens 2010, 951). 
53
 Strom (2003) distinguishes three types of sanctions imposed by the principal on the agent in case of 
non-representation: veto power (block decisions), de-authorization (e.g. removal from office), and 
specific penalties (monetary, etc.; 62).  
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commitments, etc. (Huller 2012, 252-3). Accountability, is divided into two 
categories (Huller 2012, 252-3; Dahl 1999, 21):  
 Vertical, i.e. citizens holding rulers accountable (elections) – also termed 
democratic accountability.  
 Horizontal, i.e. competition between the different representatives – also termed 
delegative accountability.  
How are the EU DD approaches related to this broader framework of 
democratic theory? To begin with, there is an agreement of the majority of EU DD 
scholars that democracy, in the context of the EU DD, should be examined from an 
empirical, rather from a theoretical basis. In other words, there is broad agreement 
that democracy can be evaluated based on a set of its foundational characteristics, 
even in the absence of a single, universally-accepted definition. Furthermore, all EU 
DD approaches emphasize investigation of similar broad issues: effect of EU policies 
on democratic control by citizens (at the national and supranational levels), and 
quality of democratic processes within institutions at the supranational level.  
The divergence between the different EU DD approaches appears in relation to 
the importance of either legitimacy or accountability. In the Input approach, there is 
more emphasis placed on how the decision-making institutions acquire the legitimacy 
necessary to decide on and implement policies. Hence, increased citizen input, 
whether direct or indirect, in the decision-making process, and in the election of 
institutions responsible for policy-making, will provide increased legitimacy. In the 
Output approach, issues of accountability are more pertinent, as there is increased 
emphasis placed on the evaluation of the EU policy outcomes by citizens. The 
Throughput approach lies in the middle, although it seems to place more emphasis on 
the processes of EU institutions (rather than outcomes), thus emphasizing legitimacy 
more than accountability.  
 
3.3.2. EU Integration Theories 
 In contrast to the direct reference of principles of democratic theory, the 
foundations of the EU DD scholarship on EU integration theories are more nuanced, 
as there is no relevant direct reference in the existing EU DD literature.  There have 
been two grand-level EU integration theories. The first is Neofunctionalism, 
developed in the aftermath of World War II during the late 1950s by Ernst B. Haas in 
order to efficiently explain regional integration (Stroby-Jensen 2007, 86). Haas (1958) 
describes Neofunctionalism as when a regional organization is able “to assert itself in 
such a way as to cause strong positive or negative expectations […], to unite business 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 39  
and labor … in an effort to make common policy , […] and a resourceful 
supranational executive that ends already agreed to cannot be attained without 
further united steps” (xiii-xiv). Primary emphasis is placed on the supranational54 
institutions within the EU, which are presented as progressively independent of state 
influence. It is argued that they will ultimately be abel to make decisions based not on 
national interests but rather on interests representing the EU as a whole. In this way 
state power would be overcome; “integration is most nearly automatic when these 
forces are given maximal play” (Haas 1966, 330). The theory is based on the premise 
that citizens would grow increasingly dissatisfied with their national governments, as 
they would prove to be increasingly weak players in a world of growing turbulence 
and uncertainty, and would slowly turn to supranational institutions instead. 
Central to the theory of neofunctionalism is the concept of spillover
55
, i.e. 
when “a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the 
original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a 
further condition and a need for more action, and so forth” (Lindberg 1994, 107). Put 
simply, it is when “cooperation in one field necessitates cooperation in another” 
(Stroby-Jensen 2007, 86). Lindberg (1994) expands on the idea of spillover effect and 
presents five key features of it (107-8):  
 spillover dynamics depend on the convergence of the goals towards integration 
 when facing difficult or contested decisions, central institutions take increased 
initiative and have power delegated to them 
 issues and problems created in central institutions cannot be solved except 
through further integration of said institutions.  
 economic integration can lead and advance spillover in other sectors  
 nonmembers of a customs union might have negative reactions, something that 
can only be dealt with by further integration of institutions.  
In short, Neofunctionalism places primary emphasis on the supranational level, both 
for integration but also for most of the processes within the EU. 
Of the above elements, the fact that economic integration advances integration 
in other areas and that when faced with difficult decisions central institutions acquire 
                                                 
54
 The concept of supranationality is one of the main characteristics of Neofunctionalism, defined as the 
existence of governmental authorities that resemble the archetype of a federation, but are not yet 
identical with it (Haas 1968, 59). 
55
 Haas put primary emphasis on functional spillover, which refers to a more automated kind of 
procedure where cooperation in one sector naturally yields cooperation in another, and not so much on 
other types, such as political spillover, which is essentially forced upon by the status quo (Stroby-
Jensen 2007, 89).  
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increased delegated authority, are extremely relevant to the current EU status quo, 
especially during the Eurozone crisis. Further economic integration seems to have 
caused a spillover effect into other areas (e.g. further monetary integration with the 
Banking Union), and during the Eurozone crisis, there has been a surge of delegated 
authority to central institutions, such as the EUCO, EC, etc. Both of these points are 
elaborated further in SECTIONS B and C.  
The second grand-level EU integration theory is intergovernmentalism. The 
theory was developed during the 1970s by Stanley Hoffmann, and was later expanded 
and refined during the 1990s by Andrew Moravcsik (liberal intergovernmentalism). In 
brief, intergovernmentalism is based on three premises (Moravcsik 1991, 25):  
 the realist assumption that states and their governments are the most powerful 
players in the regional framework,  
 the fact that decisions at the supranational level are almost always based on the 
lowest common denominator of the most powerful states,  
 the fact that states would be reluctant to make “transfers of sovereignty” 
Moreover, Intergovernmentalism suggests that, taking into account that a 
government’s ultimate target is to maximize of its time in office, it will be 
predisposed to obey national over supranational interests. The time that a government 
spends in power depends upon national elections and not some form of supranational 
collective action. Therefore, a state’s government will be more apt to support and 
push for national interests, even if those run against a supranational perspective, based 
on a rational choice of maximizing gains (Moravcsik 1993, 483-487). 
Intergovernmentalism places the primary emphasis on the national level of the 
decision-making process.  
The above two theories, although not referenced directly, have impacted the 
formation of the different approaches within the EU DD literature. This does not only 
pertain to the specifics of these theories, but also to the importance of one or another 
level of decision-making processes within the EU. The Output approach seems to be 
founded on premises more consistent with arguments of Intergovernmentalism. It is 
worth noting that one of the most prominent supporters of the Output approach, 
Andrew Moravcsik, is also one of the most important scholars of 
Intergovernmentalism. Although no direct reference to the theory is made, the Output 
approach emphasizes the adequacy and sufficiency of the oversight of supranational-
level actors by national-level democratic mechanisms. In addition, the arguments of 
the Output approach pertaining to the limited decision-making capacity of the EU in 
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key national policy areas of MS, and the unwillingness of the MS governments to 
consent to an increase of this capacity, share the same foundations with the 
aforementioned arguments of Intergovernmentalism.  
Conversely, the Input approach has foundational principles that are closer to 
Neofunctionalism (although comparatively less than Output to 
Intergovernmentalism). According to arguments advanced in the Input approach, the 
national level has become increasingly unable to provide sufficient democratic 
oversight over the supranational level; the latter has also progressively gained 
increased policy-making capacity in relation to more sensitive national policy areas. 
Hence, the issue has to now be addressed at the supranational level, and include a 
substantial boost in citizen participation, whether direct or indirect (representative). 
Similarly, in Neofunctionalism it is suggested that the supranational level will 
progressively assume increased decision-making capacity, geared to more 
technocratic rather than majoritarian actors. In fact, it is supported that this process 
will have adverse effects on the democratic process, particularly in terms of the ability 
of citizens to participate (Stroby-Jensen 2007, 95). This is consistent with Input 
arguments of progressively reduced ability of citizens to affect policies, which are 
now in the hands of technocrats and experts. In terms of Throughput, given the 
emphasis on the supranational level of policy, and the conditions that actors at that 
level should satisfy to abide by democratic principles, it seems to be closer to 
Neofunctionalism than Intergovernmentalism 
 
3.4 Ontological Concerns 
In order to efficiently construct the empirical framework for evaluating the 
impact of EU measures on the EU DD, and to have this framework founded upon 
elements of all three EU DD approaches, coexistence of these approaches within the 
model is necessary. A synthesis of different, and oftentimes partially conflicting, 
theories – while maintaining their theoretical integrity – towards a more 
comprehensive empirical framework for evaluation of various phenomena is not a 
novelty, and it has been applied on many occasions, particularly in relation to the EU 
(mainly in terms of EU integration theories; e.g. Moravcsik 1998; Ioannou et al. 
2015). One prominent approach to this synthesis is applied by Jupille et al. (2003), in 
which multiple options of what is termed as ‘theoretical dialogue’ between different 
theories are examined in an attempt to utilize elements from specifically in this case 
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both rationalism and constructivism to more comprehensively contribute to the 
analysis of the institutionalist perspective of the EU.  
From the different options considered, additive theory, based on 
complementary domains of application, is found to be comparatively the best one, 
since it does not include subsuming, absorbing or abolishing any theoretical approach 
against another, but rather provides a synthesis of the empirical aspects of these 
approaches in a unified framework, always maintaining their distinctive theoretical 
characteristics and integrity (Jupille et al. 2003, 18-9). In this way, a more 
comprehensive and well-rounded empirical framework is produced. Although there 
are clear differences and disagreements between the two theories of this particual case 
(rationalism and constructivism), it is argued that the theoretical discussion has run its 
course and that it is time to develop a basis for empirical analyses (Jupille et al. 2003, 
8). On this basis, the differences between these two theories decrease significantly, 
both in number and kind (Jupille et al. 2003, 16). 
Similarly to the case of Jupille et al. (2003), in the case of the EU DD 
literature, it is argued that the theoretical discussion between the different approaches 
is extensive. The debate would certainly benefit from further investigation of the 
empirical (as opposed to the theoretical) aspects of the relevant elements. The 
aforementioned approach of additive theory based on complementary domains of 
application demonstrates the possibility and relevant conditions of constructing a 
single, empirical, evaluative framework that is based on the existing EU DD literature 
and relevant approaches, even if these approaches contain partial differences. After 
all, the additive theory approach has been applied on entirely different theories with 
substantially more fundamental and irreconcilable differences compared to the 
approaches of the EU DD, which have only partially-opposing views of the same 
overall theoretical domain. Hence, the model is definitely applicable in the case of the 
EU DD.  
For the use of additive theory to be successful, Jupille et al. (2003) set the 
following requirements (18-21): 
 Existence of common ground between theories, so that there is common 
terminology and consistency. 
 Sufficient analysis of the relevant field, and of the similarities and differences 
between the theories and their respective foundations.  
 Preservation of the integrity of each theory within the evaluative model. 
Also, the additive synthesis is optimal if (Jupille et al. 2003, 22): 
 One theory adds elements to another. 
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 The theories explain similar phenomena. 
 The theories’ explanations do not overlap. 
The above conditions are satisfied in the field of the EU DD literature. Firstly, 
the EU DD theory consists of merely different approaches, and not entirely different 
theories. Hence, there is common terminology, as well as consistency. Secondly, 
within this Chapter, sufficient analysis was provided, both of the similarities and 
differences not only between the different EU DD approaches, but also their 
respective foundations. Thirdly, it was emphasized that the EU DD empirical 
evaluative model aims at additively synthesizing these approaches to more 
comprehensively evaluate the impact of EU measures on the EU DD, all the while 
maintaining their theoretical integrity (that is, there is no combination or composition 
of the approaches). 
 Further to the above, the conditions for optimal additive synthesis are also 
present. The EU DD approaches explain the same phenomenon without overlapping, 
since they emphasize different aspects of the democratic system and address EU 
measures from different perspectives. In this way, one approach actually potentially 
complements the other in a potential empirical evaluation. For example, in relation to 
the democratic process, while the Output approach focuses on the national level, the 
Input focuses on the supranational level. An additive synthesis of both provides 
evaluation of the EU DD at both levels, and is thus more comprehensive than an 
evaluation based on only one approach and only one level. The same applies to all 
aspects of the approaches. That is, the additive synthesis of the EU DD approaches – 
while maintaining their theoretical integrity – into a single, empirical framework, 
provides for a more comprehensive evaluation of the impact of EU measures on the 
EU DD, compared to an evaluation of the same phenomenon based on only one of the 
approaches.    
Finally, the issue of the weighting of indicators needs to be addressed within 
the discussion relevant to ontological issues of the empirical framework. As stated 
above, the aim of additive theory is to synthesize different theories, and in this case 
approaches, into a single model, so as to benefit the empirical investigation of a 
certain phenomenon by providing a more comprehensive evaluative model. As 
previously highlighted, one of additive theory’s advantages over other modes of 
theoretical dialogue is that there is no attempt to subsume or antagonise the theories 
additively synthesized. As such, in the case of the EU DD evaluative model, all 
elements examined by the existing literature’s approaches are considered of equal 
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weight. The aim of the model is to provide a way for a more comprehensive 
evaluation of the impact of EU measures on the EU DD, and not to suggest that one or 
another approach (or specific elements thereof) is more important, correct or stronger 
compared to another. This equal weighting also contributes to the objectivity of the 
model, as all approaches are considered as equal, and none is given more weight than 
the other. The same applies in terms of the indicators of the constructed model. This is 
a qualitative, audit-based model. The purpose is to engage with consequences of EU 
measures on EU democracy, and provide for some key questions that have to be asked 
in relation to these consequences. Similarly to other models created (e.g. the 
democratic audit approach of David Beetham), there is no grading scale indicating 
that the existence of one indicator is more important than another.  
 
3.5. Construction of an EU DD Empirical Evaluation Model   
 In the sections above, the elements of the different approaches and their 
foundations, as well as the differences and similarities between them, were presented, 
following which, various ontological concerns were addressed. To construct the EU 
DD empirical evaluation model, a brief re-organization and overview of the elements 
of each approach, and its respective foundations, is necessary in order to specify the 
elements to be included in the model, as well as to demonstrate that all approaches 
(and their elements) are taken into consideration in a comprehensive and equal 
manner. This will also help delineate the common areas that can be grouped under a 
single indicator across the three different approaches. Table 1, below, presents the 
outcome of this re-organization and overview, based on the detailed analysis of 
sections 3.2. and 3.3. of this Chapter. The respective elements of each approach are 
numbered in single sequence, common across all three approaches. 
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Table 1: Overview of EU DD approaches & foundations.  
Approach No Elements 
Input 
1 EU started as a facilitator, but now it has considerable influence in a wide range of policy-areas of MS, leading to redistributive effects. 
2 Participation is necessary for governors to be positively (election) and negatively (non-election) predisposed to follow citizen preferences. 
3 
Deliberation and party competition platforms are important, in order for different political views to be expressed and for citizens to have 
sufficient information in selecting candidates for election.  
4 Certain institutions can be justifiably isolated from majoritarian influence, only if society’s common good is achieved this way.   
5 Lack of majority opposition offering non-extreme (e.g. not simply exiting the EU) alternatives.   
6 The EU implements elements of intensely neoliberal ideology.  
7 Failure of the EU to defend or implement a strong social policy model.  
8 The EP has a small role. 
9 EU elections suffer from reduced participation (lack of EU electoral platform and of a single European community).  
Output 
10 EU’s main purpose is facilitating cooperation and financially reinforcing MS. 
11 
Further democratization of the EU (input) would lead to a reduction of efficiency, through increasing difficulty, or even inability, of 
producing the desired, Pareto-optimal output.  
12 EU has no authority over key national policy areas that are electorally salient (since they include redistributive effects).  
13 
EU aims at Pareto-optimal results, and further politicization (increase in democratic control) would result in redistributive and not Pareto-
optimal outcomes. 
14 
Independent, technocratic institutions are more impartial and protective of EU citizens’ interests than majoritarian, representative institutions, 
given their political insulation and obligation to represent EU and not national interests.  
15 Democratic evaluation criteria for the EU are overly optimistic, or are unfitting to the modern form of democracy overall. 
16 Indirect democratic oversight through the national level of EU MS is valid and sufficient. OR 17 below 
17 
Indirect democratic oversight through the national level might not be valid or sufficient, but the legitimacy of the EU stems from the 
protection of socio-economic interests of EU citizens. 
Throughput 
18 The EU and its institutions process should be the focus of democratic analyses.  
19 Interaction of different EU institutions and relevant processes: accountability, efficiency, civil society participation, transparency  
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Considering the elements presented in Table 1 above, as well as the extensive 
analysis outlined in the sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this Chapter, there are appear to be 
common areas across the three EU DD approaches. That is, scholars from different 
approaches appear to put emphasis on similar aspects of EU measures in terms of their 
impact on the EU DD, then disagreeing over the interpretation of these aspects and their 
impact. The above principles can be grouped in four, distinct indicators of the EU DD 
empirical framework, as analyzed in the following sections. The indicators are 
presented in the form of thematic questions, as this best facilitates a more 
comprehensive analysis of the issues involved, and is more fitting to the qualitative 
character of the framework. 
 
3.5.1. Key National Policy Areas, Redistribution & Delegation 
 One of the most prominent issues raised across the approaches of Input, Output 
and Throughput is whether the EU affects key national policy areas or not. All scholars 
seem to agree that areas such as taxation, defense, economic and social policy, 
budgetary provisions, etc. are considered very important to a state’s structure and 
decision-making capacity, and are electorally salient due to their redistributive and 
reallocative effects. Output scholars argue that MS governments would be unwilling to 
transfer any policy-making authority over these issues to the supranational level, both 
because the electorate would oppose such a transfer (hence remaining in office for those 
governments could be jeopardized), and also because the government needs to be able 
to exercise independent authority over policies that are considered key for the state. 
Conversely, Input scholars argue that the EU has already acquired substantial decision-
making authority in those areas. 
 The question that is raised in relation to the above then, is whether the EU has 
authority over key national policy areas or not. Here there are differentiations observed 
between the EU DD approaches. Input scholars argue that the EU has authority over key 
MS national policy areas, with redistributive effects (which are argued, in any case, to 
be very difficultly distinguished from regulatory ones). Output scholars argue that the 
EU does not possess authority over these areas and, given the disposition of the 
electorate and MS governments, it is unlikely that this would ever become the case. 
These elements yield a divergence on the foundational aspects of each approach, with 
Input being more focused on the supranational level – neofunctionalism, emphasizing 
legitimacy of relevant actors assuming the decisions. In contrast, the Output approach is 
more based on intergovernmentalism, i.e. has the main focus on the national level, 
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arguing that the MS are in charge of key policy-making within their respective 
constituencies. Regardless of the individual approaches’ points of view, the central 
question is whether EU measures affect core national policy areas and have 
redistributive effects or not (Pareto-optimal).  
In addition to the above issues, however, the level of delegation must also be 
taken into account in relation to this question, regardless of the type of policies that the 
supranational level can affect. In other words, regardless of whether the EU can affect 
more key national level policies or not, the question should also be asked if there is an 
increase in its ability to affect national policies generally. Naturally, emphasis should be 
given to sensitive policy areas, such as taxation, but the overall status of the delegation 
from the national to the supranational level can also provide useful insights. This aspect 
is also relevant to the Throughput approach, which places an overall emphasis on the 
processes of supranational institutions. In other words, it is important to examine how 
this delegation is conferred. Considering the above, the first indicator of the empirical 
EU DD evaluative framework is: Do the measure(s) affect key national policy areas 
and have a redistributive (and not Pareto-optimal) effect on EU citizens? More 
generally, has delegation increased or decreased?   
 
3.5.2. Majoritarian/Representative Institutions’ Influence 
 A key element of the modern democratic political system, perhaps the most 
important one, is majoritarian or representative institutions, primarily parliamentary 
structures. Through these structures, citizens are allowed to affect (albeit indirectly) 
every important aspect of policy-making, thus having input in the decisions taken. In the 
case of the EU DD, both the Input and Output approaches focus primarily on the role of 
the EP, but also of other majoritarian-based elements. Input scholars argue that the EP 
plays a relatively small role in the EU’s decision-making process, even when taking into 
account its role-enhancing modifications introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. They also 
place primary emphasis on the existence of relevant deliberation platforms and political 
party competition, so that citizens can obtain a clear view of the opinions of competing 
elites (a characteristic in itself fundamental to the democratic process) and benefit from 
the existence of platforms where deliberation over supranational issues can take place. 
Throughput also places primary emphasis in the participatory processes of EU 
institutions, and thus in in line with the above observations. Contrary to this view, 
Output scholars argue that the indirect democratic oversight through the national level 
institutions participating in the EU policy process (such as the national governments in 
EUCO for example) is both valid and sufficient for ensuring democratic safeguards.  
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In this case, Input (as well as Throughput) scholars emphasize the aspect of 
legitimacy in the democratic process (i.e. who it is that authorizes the EU to proceed to 
an action) and the principles upon which it is conferred, arguing that the supranational 
level is now equally important to, or perhaps more so than, the national level 
(neofunctionalism). Output scholars place more emphasis in accountability arguing that 
national level institutions are enough to hold EU actors accountable, clearly echoing the 
principles of intergovernmentalism with primary emphasis on the national level.  
Similarly to the first indicator of the framework, regardless of the differences of 
the specifics of each approach in relation to the influence of majoritarian institutions 
within EU policy, all three approaches place emphasis on this issue. Considering the 
above, the second indicator is: What provisions do the measure(s) include relevant to 
the EP and national Parliaments, and what are the resulting dynamics between 
them and other functions of the democratic system within the EU (whether at 
national or supranational level)? 
 
3.5.3. Processes of EU institutions  
 This indicator focuses mostly on the Throughput approach. Regardless of the ex 
ante and ex post facto processes of democracy within the EU, correspondingly Input, 
with a focus on how legitimacy towards decision-making authority is conferred, and 
Output, with a focus on how accountability towards the outcome of this authority 
(policies) is instituted, there should also be emphasis placed on how the relevant actors 
actually decide on policies. This lies in the middle of the above two stages, highlighting 
the need for certain conditions to exist which bind the process of decision-making of 
supranational institutions, i.e. for the decision-making process to be efficient, 
transparent, open to civil society participation, and accountable. These conditions are 
necessary both for the legitimacy conferred to be valid, and for accountability to be 
exercisable. In other words, votes cast in favor of an executive that supports further 
delegation to EU supranational actors is conferred on the condition that such actor will 
be transparent. Correspondingly, if transparency is lacking, accountability for this 
executive and, indirectly, proper evaluation of the outcomes of the EU institution in 
question, becomes impossible.  
 In this case, it appears that the Throughput approach assumes the middle ground 
not only between the other two EU DD approaches, but also in terms of their 
foundations. That is, it is in the middle of legitimacy and accountability. Moreover, by 
emphasizing the processes of institutions, this issue can concern both the national and 
the supranational level (i.e. both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism) without 
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placing emphasis on one or the other. Given the above, the third indicator is: Is there 
transparency, efficiency and representation of multiple interests during the 
process of the formation of the measure(s,) as well as within the measure(s) 
themselves?  
 
3.5.4. Direction of EU policies & Opposition   
 The last element which is raised in the EU DD literature, primarily by the 
approaches of Input and Output, is the direction of EU policies. Scholars from both 
approaches emphasize the importance of the EU in protecting the rights of citizens, 
focused on a more social-policy-based model, even potentially  against MS 
governments. Input scholars argue that the EU is suffering from a neoliberal bias in its 
policies, and it has thus largely failed to defend such a social policy paradigm within the 
EU. Furthermore, it is suggested that there are elements of ideational hegemony, 
resulting in the inexistence of a pro-EU majority opposition, i.e. opposition which 
advocates for non-extreme (exit from the EU) alternatives. This has adverse results not 
only in terms of the policies implemented, where there is a growing tendency for the EU 
to be geared to a one-policy-for-all structure, but also in terms of the elite competition 
within a democratic system. In other words, there are fewer and fewer different options 
to choose from. In terms of the Output approach, opinions on this issue appear to be 
closest to those of the Input approach. Output scholars argue that the EU technocratic 
actors, according to them the most important ones of the supranational level, are much 
more impartial and insulated from political influence precisely because of their 
independence from influences of a majoritarian or politicized nature. Therefore, they 
best represent the interests of EU citizens as a whole. It is from this representation, and 
the defending of EU citizens’ socio-economic rights, that the EU derives its legitimacy.  
Based on the above, there appears to be some convergence between the two 
approaches on this issue in placing primary emphasis on the protection of citizens’ 
social and economic rights by EU institutions, and the legitimizing effect arising from 
such protection. Input scholars take it a step further, in presenting the EU as advocating 
a more social-policy-focused paradigm, and in arguing that it has failed to effectively 
safeguard this paradigm by experiencing a substantial neoliberal bias. In terms of the 
foundations of the two approaches relative to this thematic area, again, there appears to 
also be some convergence. Both the Input and Output approaches emphasize 
accountability more that legitimacy in this case; that is the ability of the EU to protect 
and/or implement relevant policies for EU citizens. Similarly, in terms of EU integration 
theories, both approaches are closer to the neofunctional view of the EU, advocating for 
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the efficiency, or lack thereof, of the supranational level to protect the social and 
economic rights of EU citizens, and focusing less on the national level 
(intergovernmentalism).  
From the above, it is evident that an area that is considered pivotal in the 
evaluation of the EU DD, both for Input and Output scholars and regardless of their 
specific views, is the direction of EU policies and efficiency in equally protecting EU 
citizens’ socio-economic rights. Therefore, the fourth, and final, indicator or thematic 
question is: What is the direction of the measure(s) and have they been successful in 
protecting the social and economic rights of EU citizens? In any case, was there 
any realistic, majority, pro-EU opposition to the measures?  
 All the four above thematic questions or indicators of the EU DD evaluation 
framework, along with their corresponding elements of the three different approaches of 
the existing EU DD literature (the numerical values are the same as in Table 1 for 
consistency), are concisely presented in Table 2 below:  
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Table 2: EU DD empirical framework & corresponding EU DD approaches.  
Approach No Elements No Indicators / Thematic Questions 
Input 1 
EU started as a facilitator, but now it has acquired considerable influence in a 
wide range of policy-areas of MS, which leads to redistribution. 
A 
Do the measure(s) affect key national policy areas, and hence 
have a redistributive (and not Pareto-optimal) effect on EU 
citizens? More generally, has delegation overall increased or 
reduced?   
Output 
 
10 EU’s main purpose is facilitating cooperation and financially reinforcing MS. 
11 
Further democratization of the EU (participation) would lead to a reduction of 
efficiency, through increasing difficulty, or even inability, of desired, Pareto-
optimal output.  
12 
EU has no authority over key national policy areas which are electorally salient 
(since they include redistributive effects).  
13 
EU aims at Pareto-optimal results, and further politicization (increased of 
democratic control) would result in redistributive and not Pareto-optimal 
outcomes. 
Input 
2 
Participation necessary for governors to be positively (election) and negatively 
(non-election) predisposed to follow citizen preferences. 
B 
What provisions do the measure(s) include relevant to the EP 
and national Parliaments, and what are the resulting dynamics 
between them and other functions of the democratic system 
within the EU (whether at national or supranational level)? 
3 
Deliberation and Party-competition platforms are important, so that differing 
political views are expressed and citizens have sufficient information to select 
candidates for election.  
4 
Certain institutions are justifiably isolated from majoritarian influence, only if 
society’s common good is achieved this way.   
8 Small role of the EP. 
9 
Reduced participation in EU elections (lack of EU electoral platform and of 
single European community).  
Output 
15 
Democratic evaluation criteria for the EU are overly optimistic (e.g. same or 
more delegation and authority of the executive at the national level, compared to 
the supranational level), or are unfitting to the modern form of democracy 
overall. 
16 
Indirect democratic oversight through the national level of EU MS is valid and 
sufficient. 
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Output 14 Independent, technocratic institutions are more impartial 
C 
Is there transparency, efficiency and representation of multiple 
interests during the process of the formation of the measure(s,) 
as well as within the actual measure(s) themselves? Throughput 
18 The EU and its institutions process should be the focus of democratic analyses.  
19 
Interaction of different EU institutions and relevant processes: accountability, 
efficiency, civil society participation, transparency  
Input 
5 There is lack of mediocre / majority opposition.   
D 
What is the direction of the measure(s) and have they been 
successful in protecting the social and economic rights of EU 
citizens?  
6 Elements of intensely neoliberal ideology.  
7 Failure of the EU to defend or implement a strong social policy model.  
Output 
14 
Independent, technocratic institutions are more protective of EU citizens’ 
interests than majoritarian, representative institutions, given their political 
insulation and the obligation to represent EU and not national interests.  
17 
Indirect democratic oversight through the national level might not be valid or 
sufficient, but the legitimacy of the EU stems from the protection of socio-
economic interests of EU citizens. 
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3.6. Conclusion   
 The aim of this Chapter was to construct an empirical model for evaluating the 
impact of EU measures on the EU DD. An in-depth investigation of the EU DD 
literature was conducted, and scholarship was found divided across three different 
theoretical approaches: Input, Output and Throughput. In addition, the foundations of 
these approaches were analyzed. These approaches are based on the broader field of 
democratic theory and EU integration theories. The influence of principles from 
democratic theory is direct and evident, with clear references within the EU DD 
literature, while the influence of EU integration is more nuanced and indirect, with no 
such references.  
 The Input approach includes arguments relating to the increase of the 
decision-making capacity of the EU, especially in relation to core national policy 
areas such as taxation or social security.  This increase leads to further input by 
citizens, whether of a direct or indirect (representative institutions, etc.) nature, being 
necessary to ensure proper functioning of democratic processes. In terms of its 
foundations, the Input approach emphasizes issues at the supranational level and, as 
such, is more consistent with arguments of neofunctionalism. Additionally, in terms 
of the broader field of democratic theory, from the two main concepts emphasized in 
the overall EU DD literature, i.e. legitimacy and accountability, the Input approach is 
founded primarily on legitimacy, given its arguments for increased citizen 
participation.  
 The Output approach includes arguments relating to the fact that the EU is 
merely a facilitating organization, aiming at Pareto-optimal outcomes, and that it 
lacks any significant authority over key national policy areas. There is also the 
argument that this situation will continue in the future, as governments would be 
unwilling to transfer any such authority, and hence decisions will always be taken at 
the EU level for largely technical issues and with agreement based on the least 
common denominator. Therefore, further democratization through participation is not 
only unnecessary but can prove harmful to the Pareto-optimal character of the EU. In 
terms of foundations, the Output approach is more relevant to arguments of 
intergovernmentalism, with emphasis placed primarily on the national level, and the 
fact that it is in this level that most of the decision-making authority is concentrated 
within the EU. In terms of democratic theory, the Output approach emphasizes 
accountability more than legitimacy, with primary importance on the outcome of EU 
policies and how those are evaluated in relation by the citizenry.  
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 Throughput is a more recent addition to the EU DD literature, and stands in 
the middle of Input and Output, placing primary emphasis in the processes of 
decision-making. Arguments in this approach highlight that aside from the 
participation of citizens before and the evaluation of policies after the decision-
making process, the processes during the decision-making need to also be taken into 
account. Said processes should abide by transparency, efficiency, etc. In terms of EU 
DD foundations, Throughput is in the middle ground between legitimacy and 
accountability (similarly with the Input and Output EU DD approaches). In terms of 
EU integration theories, however, it is closer to neofunctionalism, as it stresses more 
the processes of supranational institutions than national ones.  
 The investigation across the EU DD literature, approaches, and foundations is 
pivotal in order to adequately construct the empirical, evaluative framework. Before 
the actual construction, the relevant ontological concerns were developed. Even 
though the EU DD approaches are not entirely different theories, they, along with 
their foundations, have substantive differences. Can they co-exist in a single 
framework? Firstly, it was highlighted that the framework is empirical rather than 
theoretical. It aims at evaluating the impact of EU measures on the EU DD, not offer 
novel theoretical approaches or criticize the existing literature. Secondly, it was 
emphasized that the framework includes all three approaches of the EU DD, while 
maintaining their theoretical integrity, so as to build a more comprehensive evaluative 
model. In other words, the issues examined by each of the approaches are separated 
from any further judgments included in the literature, and are then reorganized and 
grouped to form an evaluative framework.  
Similar approaches have been employed towards empirical frameworks based 
on different theoretical contributions, with one of the main ones being additive theory 
based on complementary domains of application. This approach promotes the 
construction of an empirical, evaluative model based on an additive synthesis of the 
elements of relevant theories, even though they may be partially, or even entirely, 
different. The aim is not to find a compromise regarding relevant disagreements, but 
rather to more comprehensively empirically evaluate a given phenomenon. This 
applies to the present model as well. It is not the aim to combine the different EU DD 
approaches, or to subsume one under the other, but rather to include issues examined 
by all three, as they complement one another in an empirical basis and can definitely 
serve a more comprehensive evaluation of the EU DD in a simple empirical 
framework.  
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 Based on all the above, and the analysis of the relevant EU DD literature, the 
empirical model for evaluating the impact of EU measure(s) on the EU DD was 
constructed. It is divided into four thematic questions or areas of concern (indicators), 
being qualitative in nature. The aim is to examine a given set of EU measures against  
these key issues, in order to determine their impact on the EU DD. The indicators are:  
A) Do the measure(s) affect key national policy areas, and hence have a 
redistributive (and not Pareto-optimal) effect on EU citizens? More 
generally, has delegation overall increased or reduced?   
B) What provisions do the measure(s) include relating to the EP and national 
Parliaments, and what are the resulting dynamics between representative 
institutions and other functions of the democratic system within the EU 
(whether at national or supranational level)? 
C) Is there transparency, efficiency and representation of multiple interests 
during the process of the formation of the measure(s,) as well as within the 
actual measure(s) themselves? 
D) What is the direction of the measure(s) and have they been successful in 
protecting the social and economic rights of EU citizens? In any case, was 
there any realistic, majority, pro-EU opposition to the measure(s)? 
The measures assumed during the Eurozone crisis are to be investigated, analyzed in 
detail, and then evaluated against the above four thematic question indicators. Given 
the qualitative nature of the framework, a number of conclusions can be then drawn 
from the above analysis, in terms of how the EU measures examined (both of the 
Eurozone crisis but also in general) impact the EU DD. The empirical analysis can 
then be richer than one confined to one or other of the Input, Output or Throughput 
analytical positions. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methods & Design  
4.1. Introduction  
After having established the contributions, the relevant literature, and the 
empirical model to be used within this research, the purpose of this Chapter is to 
outline the methods this investigation will employ, and to delineate its design, i.e. 
what are the research question, hypothesis, variables, etc. Firstly, the research design 
of the analysis is provided. This includes the research question, hypothesis and 
variables of the research, and also the time limit of the investigation, i.e. which period 
will be covered. Secondly, the material to be analyzed is defined, i.e. what is covered 
and included within the supranational measures during the Eurozone crisis that were 
aimed at both the national and EU levels. In relation to this, a justification is provided 
for choosing one main and one comparative research cases for evaluating the impact 
of MS-specific crisis measures on the EU DD. Finally, the research methods 
employed by this research are outlined. The analysis utilizes three methods: in-depth 
detailed document analysis, enquiries regarding non-published documentation, and 
semi-structured elite interviewing. The Chapter concludes with a brief overview of 
what is to be answered by this research, in what way, and analyzing what material.    
 
4.2. Research Design 
In this investigation, the research question is: How have the Eurozone crisis 
supranational measures, both EU-wide and MS-specific, impacted the EU’s 
Democratic Deficit?  In other words, the research will examine the measures adopted 
at the supranational level, i.e. by EU institutions during the Eurozone crisis with the 
purpose of countering it. The emphasis of the analysis will be the impact of the 
measureson democratic processes, as those are highlighted in the existing EU DD 
literature. The independent variable of the research is the supranational measures 
adopted during the Eurozone crisis, and includes any supranational measure, i.e. any 
measure adopted by the EU (either by one of its intergovernmental formations, such 
as EUCO, or by one of its supranational institutions, such as the EC), to counter the 
Eurozone crisis and its effects, within the time limit set further below, i.e. between 
2008 and 2013 (see further below for temporal limitation justification).  
The independent variable is categorized in accordance with the MS-
specific/EU-wide distinction, i.e. into supranational measures that concern the entirety 
of the Eurozone or the EU (e.g. Six-Pack) and supranational measures that are 
specifically aimed towards the national level, i.e. specific Eurozone MS (e.g. financial 
assistance programs). The former category of measures can be further subcategorized 
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into measures relevant to the provision of financial assistance to Eurozone MS (e.g. 
EFSF SA, ESM, etc) and measures relevant to introducing stronger and more 
enhanced coordination between Eurozone/EU MS. The latter category of measures, 
i.e. those specific to Eurozone MS, consists largely of the financial assistance 
programmes and their transposition into corresponding national legislation. More 
specifically in relation to these programmes, the overall EU-IMF financial assistance 
framework consists of two parts: the financial part, i.e. the loan agreements, usually 
termed Financial Assistance Facility Agreements (FAFAs), outlining the specifics of 
the loans (disbursements, maturities, etc), and the structural adjustment part upon 
which the financial assistance is conditional, i.e. the Memorandums of Understanding 
(MoUs)
56
 outlining the detailed policy reforms which the beneficiary MS has to 
implement in order to qualify for receiving each disbursement for the loan. The 
following Figure 1 demonstrates the categorization of the independent variable. 
Figure 1: Categorization of the independent variable of the research. 
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 The term MoU is utilized as an umbrella term within this research. The IMF uses the Memorandum 
of Economic and Financial Policies, usually accompanied by a set of definitions in a Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding (International Monetary Fund 2001, 144-5). The EU uses the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, or MoU under the now 
permanent ESM framework. The MoUs are signed between the beneficiary MS and the IMF, and the 
beneficiary MS and the EC representing, in one form or another (i.e. either directly or through financial 
assistance mechanisms) the rest of the Eurozone or EU (depending on the mechanism) MS. Policy 
conditionality is monitored by the Troika (e.g. Article 7 of REG 472/2013, Article 13 of the ESM 
Treaty, etc; European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013, 7; ESM 2012a, 30). 
Supranational crisis measures 
(2008-2013) 
EU-wide MS-specific 
MoUs, etc 
Loan 
Agreements/FAFAs 
Financial assistance 
programmes 
Enhanced 
coordination 
Financial  
assistance  
mechanisms 
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This categorization is maintained across the structure of the evaluation Chapters (7 for 
the EU-wide measures, Chapters 9 and 10 for the MS-specific measures). A more 
detailed operationalization of the exact measures included in the independent variable 
is provided in Chapters 6 and 9,10.  
The dependent variable of the research is how the above measures have 
impacted on the EU DD. The operationalization of the EU DD (in terms of how it is 
evaluated empirically within this research) is delineated in Chapter 3. It is important 
to highlight, as was emphasized throughout Chapter 3, that this is not a definition of 
the theoretical concept or debate regarding the EU DD, but rather a proposal 
regarding how it can be empirically evaluated in relation to EU measures. Naturally, 
the national and EU levels will affect in a different way each of the four EU DD 
empirical evaluation indicators presented in Chapter 3. That is, measures relevant to 
one indicator may be more prevalent in the national level and less at the EU level. For 
example, analysis of how national Parliaments participated will be more extensive for 
the MS-specific than the EU-wide measures. However the indicators are weighed 
equally.  
The temporal dimension of the research also needs to be sufficiently 
identified. The beginning of the research is set in 2008. The financial crisis of the late 
2000s first begun in 2007/8 in the USA, but it was in late 2008 that the crisis reached 
the Eurozone through Ireland, as more extensively analyzed in the following Chapter 
5. Setting the end-point of the research is a more difficult task, since, in this present 
case, it could be argued that the crisis is still ongoing. For the reasons following 
below, 2013 is set as the ending point of this research (cut-off date).  
Firstly, during the investigated five-year interval (from 2008 until 2013), there 
were a tremendous number of fundamental changes in legislation, both EU and 
national, which are more than sufficient to provide for adequate volume of material to 
conduct research on.  Secondly, 2013 marked the last instance whereby a Eurozone 
MS resorted to EU-IMF financial assistance, with little or no indications that any 
other new Eurozone MS would follow. This was Cyprus, which reached an agreement 
with the Troika in March 2013 and signed an MoU on 29 April 2013 (Table 4). 
Thirdly, by 2013 two Eurozone MS that were under EU-IMF assistance and structural 
adjustment became the first to exit their programmes. In November 2013, both Ireland 
and Spain ended their programmes with the EU-IMF (Eurogroup 2013a and 2013b)
57
. 
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 Note that after the cut-off date of this research, Portugal exited its programme in mid-May 2014 and 
Cyprus in late-March 2016 (European Stability Mechanism 2014a and 2016).  
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The countries’ exit from the programme prompted the EG to release the following 
statement:  
(Ireland/Spain) …is a living example that EU-IMF adjustment programmes 
are successful provided there is a strong ownership and genuine commitment 
to reforms […] The success of the Irish/Spanish financial assistance 
programme also clearly illustrates our resolve to work together to ensure the 
cohesion and stability of the euro area (Eurogroup 2013a and 2013b).  
If it is admitted by the EU that the above two Eurozone MS exiting their financial 
assistance programmes constitutes the first in a number of successful programme 
completions, thus marking the end of a circle of instability, then perhaps this is, by 
itself but also in combination with the arguments presented above, a suitable ending 
point for this research, in order to effectively reflect upon and investigate the changes 
adopted and implemented during this period. In either case, it could be argued that “by 
the standards of financial crises, four years is a long time span. A year after the 
Lehman shock of September 2008, confidence in the U.S....had been restored and the 
recovery had started. A little more than a year after the 1997 exchange-rate 
debacle...Asian economies were thriving again” (Pisany-Fery 2014, 174). Finally, 
practical considerations also need to be taken into account. Every research has to have 
an ending point, and, based on the above reasons, 2013 was chosen for the purposes 
of this investigation. 
 
4.2.1. The EU Level  
 In relation to the independent variable category of EU-wide measures, of 
particular interest in this research is the EMU
58
, which evolved out of the Treaty of 
Maastricht and has three stages (Delors et al. 1989, 30-36; European Commission 
2014l):  
 Stage 1 from 1990 to 1994 entailed the completion of the internal market and 
enhanced financial integration. 
 Stage 2 from 1994-1999 included the establishment of the European Monetary 
Institute and preparation for the creation of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), and the pursuance of economic convergence and regulation of Euro area 
governance (Stability and Growth Pact), and the preparation for the Euro.  
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 The idea for a common European currency existed as early as 1929, in the speech of the then German 
Chancellor Gustav Stresemann in the League of Nations, as a result of the increasing number of 
European states after the Treaty of Versailles. Stresemann asked: “Où sont la monnaie européenne, le 
timbre-poste européen qui’il nous fandrait?” i.e.  ‘Where is the European currency and the European 
stamp that we need?’ (League of  Nations 1929, 70; European Commission 2014k). The first active 
attempt at forming the EMU was during 1969-1970 (Bulmer 2014, 1246). After that, and upon an EC’s 
proposal, on October 1970 the expert group which had been assigned with creating the stages of the 
EMU, headed by the then PM of Luxembourg Pierre Werner, issued its report (Werner et al. 1970). 
Due to various adverse global financial conditions (gold standard and USA, oil crises, etc), a detailed 
timetable was eventually set on April 1989 by the Delors Committee, headed by Jacques Delors, which 
provided for the three-stage EMU process (Delors et al. 1989, 30-36 
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 Stage 3 from 1999 onwards includes the final fixing of exchange rates, the 
establishment of the ECB/ESCB, and the introduction of binding budgetary rules and 
of the Euro.  
EMU “involves the coordination of economic and fiscal policies, a common monetary 
policy, and a common currency, the euro (European Commission 2014m). While all 
EU MS partake in it, they are involved at different stages. All take part in the 
economic union (economic policy coordination, fiscal debt/deficit limits, common 
monetary policy through the ESCB/ECB), but the most integrated have moved to 
adopting the common currency, i.e. the Euro, and undergo enhanced ECB scrutiny. 
Those latter EU MS are the members of the Eurozone.  
It is worth highlighting that participation in Stage 3 of the EMU is not 
optional. All EU MS (opt-outs presented below aside) are to progress to the 3
rd
 stage 
of EMU, i.e. “all Member States of the European Union, except Denmark and the 
United Kingdom, are required to adopt the Euro and join the Euro area”, following a 
specified procedure and, primarily, satisfying the acquis communautaire
59
 and 
convergence criteria
60
 (European Commission 2014n). Of the convergence criteria, 
the most important are the debt and deficit limits, for which the reference values are 
set in TEU article 140, TFEU article 126, and TEU/TFEU Protocol (No12), the last of 
which establishes the 3% GDP deficit / 60% GDP debt targets (European Union 2012, 
108-9 and 99-102 and 279-80 and 281-2 respectively).  There are two opt-outs from 
the automatic progression to the Stage 3 of the EMU: the United Kingdom
61
 and 
Denmark
62
.  
The formal introduction of the Euro was on the 1
st
 of January 1999 “as an 
accounting currency for cash-less payments and accounting purposes” with 11 EU 
MS as members, and it was established in physical form 2 years later (European 
Commission 2014q). Today, the Eurozone consists of 19 of the 26 EU MS (without 
accounting for the two aforementioned opt-outs) as presented in Table 3.  
                                                 
59
 The core fundamental principles, laws, bi-laws, etc of the EU regarding a wide variety of policy 
areas, consisting of 35 Chapters (European Commission 2014p). 
60
 There are five convergence criteria: Price Stability = Consumer price Inflation rate ≤ 1.5 percentage 
points above the rate of the 3 best performing EuroMS, Sound Public Finances = Government Deficit ≤ 
3% of GDP, Sustainable Public Finances = Government Debt ≤ 60% of GDP, Durability of 
Convergence = Long term interest rates ≤ 2 percentage points above the rate of the 3 best performing 
Eurozone MS (in terms of price stability), Exchange Rate Stability = ERM II participation without 
tensions ≥ 2 years (European Commission 2014o). 
61
 The UK, according to TEU/TFEU Protocol (No 15) on Certain Provisions Relating to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is exempted from the Stage 3 of EMU, and retains national 
power over monetary policy (in the Protocol there is also a specific commitment by the UK on 
avoiding excessive government deficits; European Union 2012, 284-6). 
62
 According to TEU/TFEU Protocol (No16) on Certain Provisions relating to Denmark, Denmark is 
exempted from automatically proceeding to the Stage 3 of EMU, pending on satisfying national 
legislative provisions (European Union 2012, 287). 
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Table 3: Eurozone accessions (European Commission 2014q).  
Enlargement Wave Year Countries No 
Founding Members 1999 
Luxembourg 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Spain 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Portugal  
Finland 
Ireland 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1
st
 2001 Greece  12 
2
nd
   2007 Slovenia  13 
3
rd
  2008 
Malta  
Cyprus  
14 
15 
4
th
  2009 Slovakia 16 
5
th
  2011 Estonia 17 
6
th
 2014 Latvia 18 
7
th
  2015 Lithuania 19 
  
Two Eurozone decision-making institutions are arguably the most important 
(aside from the ECB) and, thus, of particular interest to this research: the Eurosummit 
and the Eurogroup (EG). The EG is a sub-configuration of the ECOFIN only for the 
Eurozone MS FinM, meets informally usually once every month, and elects its own 
President for a 2.5 years term (European Council 2015a). It is legislatively established 
in TEU/TFEU Protocol (No 14) (European Union 2012, 283). The Eurosummit is 
analogous to the EG, in that it can be considered as a sub-configuration of EUCO. It 
consists of the Heads of State or Government of Eurozone MS, and began under an 
unofficial character, with the first Eurosummit being held in Paris in October 2008 
because of the financial crisis and the urgent need to assume decisive measures to 
respond to it (European Council 2015b). The body remained unofficial until the entry 
into force of the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Growth (TSCG) in March 2012 
(for more details see Chapter 6), whereby it was recognized as an official EU 
instrument, but, similarly to the EG, retained its informal character (European Council 
2012a, 19). Eurosummits are to be convened at least twice a year in order for there to 
be a discussion on issues relating to the Eurozone (European Council 2012a, 19). In 
March 2013, the CoM released the RoP for the Eurosummit (Council of the European 
Union, 2013d).  
In terms of the supranational level, there also needs to be a clarification in 
terms of the EU and the Eurozone vis-à-vis the focus of this research. It is the case 
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that the primary focus is placed with the Eurozone, while secondary focus is placed 
with the EU. This distinction is necessary for several reasons. First of all, Eurozone 
MS can be considered to be at the heart of the EU integration process. They are the 
ones considered to be furthest along the integrative process and enjoy the greatest 
degree of convergence among all EU MS. This, after all, is the principal reason for 
allowing the adoption of a common currency in addition to all other EU-wide policy 
coordination procedures adopted by every EU MS. In this sense, from an integration 
point of view, the Eurozone is the “advanced form of European integration”63. 
Furthermore, Eurozone MS were and are the group most affected by the crisis within 
the EU, and, partly because of this, they are clearly at the centre of supranational 
crisis measures adopted (e.g. Table 6).  In any case, the common currency was 
perhaps one of the main reasons that the EU, and the EU MS, went to such lengths to 
maintain economic stability in the Eurozone since contagion was far more 
straightforward and far quicker than among EU MS. In addition, as progression to 
Stage 3 of EMU is considered mandatory for all EU MS but the UK and Denmark 
(opt-outs), any change that is solely manufactured for the Eurozone to counter the 
crisis will eventually come to apply to all EU, and future Eurozone, MS. This 
research, by placing the primary emphasis on Eurozone-wide measures, essentially 
includes measures that all EU MS will eventually become a part of.  
 Obviously, the Eurozone is not an independent or different organisation from 
the EU. Many of the supranational crisis measures concern the entire EU, in 
conjunction with focusing on the Eurozone, as outlined in Table 6. For example, the 
Six-Pack includes legislative instruments concerning both solely the then Eurozone 
MS, but also the EU – and future Eurozone – MS. Also, the EC, an EU and not 
Eurozone institution, has played an integral part in proposing, enforcing, and 
monitoring measures. Given these observations, while it is clear that the Eurozone is 
the main and, in regards to independence and importance, the only institutional entity 
within the EU which can be termed as a sub-organisation, the EU remains the 
‘umbrella’ organization and principal legal entity. As such, while primary focus is 
assigned with the Eurozone, secondary focus is also given to EU-wide measures.  
 
4.2.2. The National Level  
 In relation to the category of MS-specific measures of the independent 
variable,  Eurozone MS measures are the ones to be analyzed. Aside from the 
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 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, MP of Greek Parliament, Professor of 
Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
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aforementioned observations relating to the primary focus of the research on the 
Eurozone, Eurozone MS were the subject of the most elaborate and democratically-
challenging measures during the crisis. Furthermore, financial assistance to Eurozone 
MS is not provisioned anywhere within the TEU/TFEU, which makes the assistance 
process legally but also democratically challenging and questionable
64
. Further to the 
above, from all Eurozone MS, those under EU-IMF financial assistance and structural 
adjustment must be the primary concern of this investigation, as they underwent 
extensive modifications during their structural adjustment periods, which other 
Eurozone MS that received no financial assistance did not face. The measures in these 
cases presented considerable challenges to the democratic process, and is thus more 
fitting to determine the impact on the EU’s democratic deficit at the national level. 
It is, obviously, not manageable to evaluate the impact on the EU DD of every 
measure for every Eurozone MS under financial assistance within a single research 
and in the depth required. Therefore, it is necessary to either examine one measure 
across all Eurozone MS that implemented it or one Eurozone MS that implemented 
most, if not all, of the measures that other Eurozone MS also adopted. The latter is 
chosen, as this provides for the ability to forensically investigate the most measures 
possible. To achieve greater validity and generalizability, the Eurozone MS chosen 
must have implemented the most of the MS-specific measures. Table 4 below outlines 
the Eurozone MS under financial assistance, along with the measures they employed 
and the amounts of the assistance provided. 
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 The TFEU provisions the granting of financial assistance to non-Eurozone MS for Balance of 
Payments problems in article 143(1). Financial assistance may also be provided to any EU MS in 
accordance with TFEU article 122(2) for  “…natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its 
(EU MS) control…” (European Union 2012, 98-9 and 110-11). It also needs to be noted that TFEU 
Article 125(1) prohibits the EU or an individual EU MS to assume or be liable for “the commitments of 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, 
or public undertakings of another Member State;” this is the so-called no bail-out clause (European 
Union 2012, 99). 
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Table 4: Eurozone MS that received financial assistance from the EU-IMF (data compiled by author; amounts are in EUR bn)
65
.  
Eurozone 
MS 
EU + IMF 
Total  
Amount 
Disbursed 
EU IMF 
EU Amount 
Disbursed 
Institution 1st MoU 1st FAF/Loan Agr. Date out 
Amount 
(approx. 
disbursed) 
Instrument Date in Date out 
Greece 236.2 
52.9 GLF  03-05-2010 08-05-2010 11-03-2012 20  SBA 09-05-2010 14-03-2012 
130.9 EFSF SA 11-03-2012 01-03-2012 30-06-2015 12 EFF 15-03-2012 15-01-2016 
7.16 EFSM 17-07-2015 01-08-2015 - - - - 
20.4
66 ESM 19-08-2015 19-08-2015 - - - - - 
Ireland 62.01 
22.5 EFSM 
03-12-2010 
N/A 03-2014 
21.81 EFF 16-12-2010 18-12-2013 
17.7 EFSF SA 27-10-2011 08-12-2013 
Portugal 76.3 
24.3 EFSM 
17-05-2011 
N/A 12-11-2014 
26 EFF 20-05-2011 30-06-2014 
26 EFSF SA 24-05-2012 18-05-2014 
Spain 41.3 41.3 EFSF SA 23-07-2012 24-07-2012 31-12-2013 - Terms of Ref. - - 
Cyprus 7.3 6.3 ESM May 2013 08-05-2013 31-03-2016 1 EFF 15-05-2013 06-03-2016 
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 Sources: Algemene Rekenkamer 2014; European Financial Stability Facility n.d.(1) and n.d.(2) and 2011c and 2012 and 2013a and 2015a and 2015b and 2015c and 2015d; European 
Stability Mechanism 2012c and 2013 and 2014 and 2015a and 2015b and 2016a and 2016b; Council of the European Union 2010f and 2011i and 2015c and 2015d and 2015e; European 
Commission 2010a and 2011b and 2012d and 2012e and 2014h and 2015d; Irish Department of Finance 2010; Hellenic Parliament 2010a; International Monetary Fund 2010a and 2011a 
and 2012b and 2013a and 2013b and 2016a and 2016b and 2016c and 2016d.  
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 EUR 86 bn committed in total until 2018 (European Stability Mechanism 2015a) 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 65  
From the above Table 4 it is clear that Greece is the Eurozone MS that has 
employed the most of the MS-specific measures. In addition, Greece was the very first 
Eurozone MS to request and receive financial assistance, which at the time was 
provided through bi-lateral loans with each of the Eurozone MS, combined with IMF 
financing (Eurogroup 2010b). In a way, the entire financial assistance process, the ad-
hoc cooperation between the EU and the IMF for providing this financial assistance to 
Eurozone MS, as well as a large percentage of the EU-level measures introduced 
during the crisis, were most likely on account of Greece’s economic trajectory and 
assistance request.  
Furthermore, as stated above, Greece is the only Eurozone MS that has 
received financial assistance through, and thus has utilized, every single financial 
assistance mechanism established by the EU during the crisis. Greece is also the only 
Eurozone MS that has utilized both existing financial assistance mechanisms of the 
IMF: Stand-By Arrangement (SBA)
67
 and Extended Fund Facility (EFF)
68
. In 
addition, Greece has received, by far, the largest amount of financial assistance from 
the EU and IMF combined, standing at EUR 236.3 bn disbursed as of May 2016, 
more than 200% of the second highest amount of financial assistance received by 
Portugal. The large amount of financial assistance is reflected in the abrupt and 
extensive structural adjustment, arguably the most intense throughout the Eurozone 
crisis, and one of the most intense throughout history. The indicators below, based on 
the Tables 22 through 27 as presented in APPENDIX A, indicate the severity of the 
structural adjustment Greece has undergone from 2008 until 2013:  
 In Greece, an average of approximately 31% of the total population was at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion between 2008-2013, by far the highest across the 
Eurozone MS (Table 22; Eurostat 2016a).  
 Greece has lost 25.5% of its GDP from 2008 to 2013, more than triple the second 
largest loss among Eurozone MS (Spain with 7.6% loss; Eurostat 2016b).  
 Greece has the second highest average unemployment rate among all EU MS 
between 2008 and 2013 at approximately 17% of the total population. However, it 
has had a more abrupt adjustment than Spain, (first highest average at approximately 
20%), adjusting from a 7.8% unemployment rate in 2008 to 27.5% in 2013, with an 
increase of close to 20 percentage points (Spain has a 15 percentage points rise; 
Tables 24 and 25; Eurostat 2016c). The same applies to youth unemployment (less 
than 25 years old). Greece comes in second among all EU MS between 2008 and 
2013 with an approximate 40% youth unemployment rate, after Spain 
(approximately 43%). However, again, Greece has adjusted much harsher, 
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 Aimed mostly to providing short-term assistance to countries coping with crises and ensuing 
problems with balance of payments, with a duration of two (and a potentially third) years (Interantional 
Monetary Fund 2016e). 
68
 Aimed at providing medium to long-term financial assistance to countries with serious payments 
imbalances, with a duration of three (and a potentially fourth) years (International Monetary Fund 
2016f). 
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experiencing an increase of approximately 36.5 percentage points between 2008 and 
2013 (Spain: 31 percentage point increase).     
 Greece has, by far, the highest average General Government Debt (approximately 
149%) and the second highest average General Government Deficit (approximately 
11.4% GDP) among all EU MS between 2008 and 2013 (Tables 26 and 27; Eurostat 
2016d and 2016e).  
Given all the above considerations, Greece is chosen as the primary case for 
analysis of the supranational crisis measures aimed at the national level. However, to 
increase generalizability and address the broader issues in relation to MS-specific 
measures, comparative observations with the conclusions drawn from Greece are 
presented in relation to another Eurozone MS to establish whether there is a pattern in 
the impact of supranational crisis measures for specific Eurozone MS on that national 
level. Ireland is chosen as this comparative case, since it was the first Eurozone MS to 
be affected by the crisis, one of the first two Eurozone MS to exit its financial 
assistance program (actually the first to exit a financial assistance programme similar 
to Greece, since the other Eurozone MS exiting was Spain that received assistance 
only for restructuring its banking sector and, thus, had a limited MoU/FAFA 
compared with the rest of the Eurozone MS; both claims delineated in Chapter 5), and 
the one closest to Greece in all the above statistical data (Tables 22 through 27 in 
APPENDIX A). In a way, Ireland and Greece constitute the opposite ends of the 
spectrum. Greece is the one extreme, with the considerable amounts of financial 
assistance and a prolonged period of structural adjustment (still continuing to this 
day), whereas Ireland, the first to suffer the economic consequences of the crisis, is 
the other extreme; the first to exit the financial assistance program, and one of the first 
to demonstrate signs of a rebounding economy.  
 
4.3. Research Methods  
As observed by the review of the existing literature in Chapter 2, the existing 
scholarship that is relevant to issues examined in this research offers insights, but has 
several areas in which further contributions could be offered. One such area is a 
detailed and forensic examination of the supranational measures assumed during the 
crisis, whether those concerned the EU or national levels. This is an area where this 
investigation makes an important contribution to the existing field, offering a novel 
approach regarding the supranational measures adopted during the crisis: focus is 
placed on clearly structuring, and presenting in detail, the entirety of the supranational 
measures adopted during the crisis, whether EU-wide or MS-specific (for the latter, 
these are confined to Greece, and, in a secondary manner, to Ireland), by analyzing 
their procedure of adoption, legal basis and functional characteristics. Utilizing this 
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forensic analysis, the empirical evaluation of these measures on the EU DD is 
presented, in the second major contribution of this research to the scholarly field. In 
order to effectively pursue the above issues, three research methods are utilized to 
carry out this research: document analysis, enquiries submitted to official institutions 
and relating to additional, unpublished, information and documentation, and semi-
structured interviews.  
 
4.3.1. Document Analysis  
 The primary method utilized is document analysis, since it fits the 
requirements for detail and forensic analysis of the crisis measures, and can serve to 
unravel and discover every element of those measures, in order to then validly draw 
conclusions on their impact on the EU DD.  It is the case that both hard-law structures 
and soft-law interactions are regulated by, from a smaller to a greater extent, 
legislation or other relevant acts. While it may seem a standard or obvious method, it 
is worth noting that some of the contributions of this research to the existing literature 
are precisely because of the way in which document analysis is pursued. Instead of 
placing emphasis on secondary sources, within this investigation primary focus is 
placed on exhaustively analyzing the primary legal sources for the adopted measures. 
As such, an unfiltered and conclusive outcome on the true nature and EU DD impact 
of those measures can be formed. This is quintessential to properly and accurately 
produce valid results of the analysis.    
The main official sources from which documents and other relevant research 
data will be drawn are, for the national level, from the Hellenic Parliament and the 
Government Gazette of the Hellenic Republic, and for the supranational level, from 
the Official Journal of the EU, as well from the internal documentation of different 
institutions investigated (such as EFSF SA, ESM, etc). The results of the above 
analysis will then be cross-referenced against the empirical EU DD evaluative 
framework, as established in Chapter 3, in order to produce the outcomes necessary to 
determine the impact of measures during the crisis on the democratic deficit of the 
EU.   
To place the analysis within the more general context under which the 
investigated measures were assumed, and in order to avoid a ‘dry-cut’ research 
focused only on purely legalistic evaluations, timelines will be provided both for the 
supranational and national levels (Chapters 5 and 9 respectively). Hence, the method 
is not constrained solely to forensic analysis of legal or operational documentation, 
but a broader look at the socio-political and economic situation during the adoption 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 68  
and implementation of the crisis supranational measures. In this case particular 
emphasis will be placed both on detailed reference and also on breadth and variety of 
sources, in order to establish the most conclusive timelines of events possible, 
including major media outlets (e.g. BB, New York Times, Bloomberg, etc). 
 
4.3.2. Enquiries relating to additional information  
 Despite the in-depth analysis of the documentation publicly available, in some 
cases it is necessary to obtain more specific information relevant to the measures 
implemented, and the processes under which those measures were adopted, which is 
not readily available or has not been released in public. In these cases, direct contact is 
made with the relevant authorities, followed by submission of appropriate requests to 
obtain such information. For the EU level, access to documents and other relevant 
material is guided by TEU Article 15(3)
69
, complemented by secondary legislation in 
EP/CoM REG 1049/2001 “Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission Documents” (European Union 2012, 54; European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2001). In this research, relevant requests 
have been submitted to the EC and the General Secretariat of the CoM regarding a 
variety of documents relating to the specifics of Task Force for Greece (TFGR), the 
EP and its relation with the Troika, TFEU article 125, etc. This documentation is 
referenced where relevant.  
 
4.3.3. Interviews   
 Document analysis can indeed provide the detail and forensic analysis 
necessary for this research. However, in certain cases, such as for example the 
negotiation or implementation of MoU measures, it does not necessarily cover the 
entire breadth of information, as many related processes take place behind closed 
doors or, in any case, are not included in documents. Therefore, this research also 
employs semi-structured, elite interviews with key, top-level actors. Types of 
interviews for research are largely divided according to the type of questions utilized. 
Close-ended questions are used most often when “…one aims to make inferences 
about a larger population…,” while open-ended questions are used when “…one 
needs to probe for information and to give respondents maximum flexibility in 
structuring their responses…,” in order to obtain the nuances of the responses and 
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 “Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in 
a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union's institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies, whatever their medium” (European Union 2012, 54).  
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provide for an in-depth analysis of the responses’ reasoning (Aberbach & Rockman 
2002, 673-4). Based on this distinction, academic interviews are divided largely in 
three types: structured, semi-structured and unstructured, described as follows (Leech 
2002, 665): 
 Unstructured interviews are essentially similar to conversations, and are mostly used 
by ethnographers; they are more a “source of insight, not for hypothesis testing.”  
 Structured interviews consist of close-ended questions in opinion surveys, 
questionnaires, etc., and are mostly used when the researcher already knows a lot on 
the subject of the research, and wants “very specific answers to very specific 
questions.” 
 Semi-structured interviews occupy the middle ground between unstructured and 
structured interviews. Open-ended questions are used, but with a certain core 
structure behind them.  
From the aforementioned types of interviews, semi-structured interviews are 
most fitting for this present research, targeted towards elites, such as public officials, 
government officials, Members of Parliament, executives, etc. The aim, inter alia, is 
to guide the “work that uses other sources of data” (Goldstein 2002, 669). As such, 
open-ended questions and a semi-structured-interview context are the most fitting for 
this research (Aberbach & Rockman 2002, 674). There are anticipated disadvantages 
in terms of coding and analysis, considering, for example, the different sequencing 
and overall variance of the questions (Aberbach & Rockman 2002, 674). However, as 
Aberbach & Rockman (2002) observe, “the advantages of conversational flow and 
depth of response outweigh the disadvantages of inconsistent ordering […] because 
the less than ideal approach is better than the alternative (in this case, a clumsy flow 
of conversation…” (674). Finally, additional limitations relevant to the interview 
process concern the conditions under which they were held (distance, financial or 
availability concerns).  
The interviews conducted have a longitudinal survey-type characteristic, and 
the main questions used were regular, grand tour (both general and specific), and 
example ones, with prompts being used less frequently (Aberbach & Rockman 2002, 
675; Leech 2002, 667-8; Berry 2002, 681-2). In relation to sampling, a nonrandom or 
systematic error is avoided, as the instruments used to evaluate the impact of the 
measures on the EU DD, i.e. the indicators presented in Chapter 3, are founded and 
derived from the EU DD literature. Naturally, systematic errors of another nature, 
such as nonresponse, could not be avoided. However, given the limited use of the 
interview data within this research (there is no quantification of the data, no 
quantitative content analysis, etc), as well as the very specific areas that these 
interviews cover, such systematic errors are considerably reduced (Goldstein 2002, 
669). In terms of random sampling error, an attempt was made to include individuals 
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who were actually involved in the processes of these measures, represent a variety of 
political, partisan, etc., affiliations and belong to all three branches of government (in 
accordance with relevant processes used across similar studies, e.g. Aberbach & 
Rockman 2002, 673). Individuals belonging to the above categories are the target 
population relevant to the research question (Goldstein 2002, 670).  
In terms of the process, ethics approval was sought by the University of 
Sheffield Politics Department’s relevant Ethics Review Panel, in accordance with the 
requirements and principles of the University of Sheffield’s Ethics Policy Governing 
Research Involving Human Participants, Personal Data and Human Tissue. The 
Ethics’ approval was given under Reference number 009234. Relevant requests for 
interviews were sent. It is firstly worth noting that His Excellency the President of 
the Hellenic Republic, Professor Prokopis Paulopoulos graciously accepted an 
approximately 40-minute personal discussion in his office in the Presidential Palace, 
where various issues relevant to the Eurozone crisis, the crisis measures, and the 
impact of both on the democratic process of the EU and Greece were discussed (an 
official interview was not possible because of the constitutional role of the President). 
In addition, nine interviews were conducted in total, with a medium duration of 30-40 
minutes per interview, with the following top-level officials:  
 Honorable Professor Ioannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of 
Greece (Central Bank) and Professor of Economics at the University of 
Athens, and, inter alia, former FinM. 
 Honorable Professor Evangelos Venizelos, MP of Greece, Professor of 
Constitutional Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, and, inter 
alia, former: Deputy PM (2011-2012 & 2013-2015) and FinM (2011-2012) 
and President of the major center-left Greek political party PASOK (2012-
2015).  
 Honorable Professor Louka Katseli, Chair of the Board of Directors of 
the National Bank of Greece, President of the Hellenic Bank Association, 
Professor of Economics at the University of Athens, and former: Minister 
for the Economy, Competition and Maritime Affairs (2009-2010) and 
Minister for Labour Affairs and Social Security (2010-2011) of Greece and 
MP. 
 Honorable Professor Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP (2014-2019) and member 
of the Economic and Financial Affairs committee of the EP (ECON), and 
Professor of Constitutional Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.   
 Professor Dimitris Chryssochoou, Professor of Theory and Institutions of 
European Integration at Panteion University of Social and Political 
Sciences.  
 Professor Zoi Georganta, Professor of Econometrics at the University of 
Macedonia and former Board Member of ELSTAT.  
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 Dr. Lina Papadopoulou, Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at 
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. 
 Dr. Miranda Xafa, former member of the IMF’s Executive Board. 
 Former judge of the European Court of Justice (ECJ; the interviewee 
requested they be referenced only by generic professional title). 
4.4. Conclusion 
 The aim of this Chapter was to analyze the structure, aims and functional 
elements of this research. The research question of this research is set as follows: How 
have the Eurozone crisis supranational measures, aimed at the EU and national levels, 
impacted the EU’s Democratic Deficit? Based on this design, the independent 
variable is the supranational measures adopted during the crisis. This involves all 
measures adopted from 2008, arguably the beginning of the crisis and its transference 
within the Eurozone, to 2013, arguably the beginning of the end of the crisis with two 
Eurozone MS exiting their financial assistance programs. The variable is separated 
across two categories that largely follow the supranational-national dimension of EU 
policy-making: measures concerning the entire EU/Eurozone (EU-wide), and 
measures concerning specific Eurozone MS (MS-specific), with further sub-
categorizations as presented in Figure 1. The independent variable is more specifically 
operationalized in Chapter 6 for the EU-wide measures and Chapters 9 and 10 for the 
MS-specific measures. The dependent variable is set as the evaluation of the impact of 
the measures on the EU DD, more specifically operationalized in the EU DD 
empirical framework of evaluation as established in Chapter 3. 
For the EU-wide measures, of particular importance to this research is the 
Eurozone, as those MS in it sustained the most abrupt and intense financial problems, 
structural adjustment, etc. In addition, the measures assumed for the Eurozone MS 
were, arguably, the most intense. Finally, all EU MS are obliged to join the Eurozone 
(opt-outs of UK and Denmark set aside), and therefore any Eurozone-based change 
will, eventually, apply to the entire EU. Within this context, the EG and Eurosummit 
are also important. However, the Eurozone is not itself independent, and the EU 
remains the main organization, it receives secondary focus within the research. 
In relation to the national level, it is deemed that the best research strategy to 
more thoroughly and effectively examine the MS-specific measures is to choose a 
single case. Greece is chosen based on the amount of assistance, the extent and 
intensity of structural adjustment, the continuously deteriorating financial situation, 
and the fact that it was the first Eurozone MS ever to request EU-IMF assistance. To 
draw broader conclusions in relation to similar MS-specific measures implemented to 
other Eurozone MS, a comparative analysis is undertaken with Ireland, which was the 
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first Eurozone MS to be affected by the crisis, of the two to first exit the crisis, and the 
one closest to Greece in all the statistical criteria cumulatively. 
To conduct the investigation three methods are utilized. The first is in-depth, 
detailed document analysis. This provides for an intricate and forensic analysis of the 
supranational crisis measures and, most importantly, of their impact on the EU DD. 
The second method is similar to the first, and consists of enquiries relating to non-
published documentation. Oftentimes it is necessary to obtain further information or 
more documentation which is not published. In these cases, official access-to-
documents request were made to the appropriate authorities, in order to obtain this 
additional documentation. Finally, the third method utilized are semi-structured elite 
interviews with top-level officials. This serves to provide context and additional 
information that may not appear in any documentation, either published or non-
published, and is particularly useful in the MS-specific measures. Obviously, there are 
shortcomings to the methods used. Documentary analysis may be considered dry, 
requests for documents can never cover the full breadth of unpublished material, 
interviews may suffer from non-response or other errors, financial, temporal or 
availability constraints, etc. However, it is argued that the combination of all three 
provides for the best possible research strategy to serve the aims of this investigation.  
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SECTION B: SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL & EU DEMOCRATIC 
DEFICIT 
Chapter 5: Supranational Timeline  
5.1. Introduction  
The aim of this Chapter is to present a timeline of how the crisis unfolded at 
the supranational level. Reference is firstly made to the beginning of the crisis in the 
USA, and its further contagion/transfer across the Atlantic to the EU. A timeline is 
then presented for  EU/Eurozone-level events, concluding in a summative table. 
While the analytical value of this material is limited, it adds important contextual 
information to the situations under which the crisis measures were assumed  
 
5.2. The onset of crisis – USA  
While the crisis itself is not the focus of this investigation, it is useful to 
provide a brief background into how it began and how it was transferred to the 
Eurozone. It is the case that financial crises have differed greatly across time, starting 
as early as the Tulipmania bubble of 1637 (Sinclair 2010, 93-4). The starting point of 
the late 2000s financial crisis is placed approximately in 2007/8 in the USA, although 
it can be traced as far back as the credit boom of stocks relating to dot.com bubble
 
and 
the ensuing stock market frenzy during the 2000s, or even as far back as 1997 
Thailand/Association of Southeast Asian Nations/East Asia credit crisis (Sinclair 
2010, 93 & 100). Many causes have been presented, but the core problem that led into 
the eventual credit crunch
70
 was subprime mortgages and the decision to withdraw 
investment from them (stop purchasing related securities). During the 2000s boom of 
the USA housing market, predatory lending was used to produce higher profits, 
leading to a relaxation of the conditionality for mortgages, and to Alternative A-paper 
and subprime mortgages (low conditionality mortgage products with high risk) 
increasing in number compared to prime mortgages (Wallison 2010, 8). After the 
housing bubble burst, subprime mortgage products became toxic and their price 
skyrocketed. The Asset-Backed Securities’ market collapsed, and the uncertainty 
regarding Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), i.e. which financial products were 
safe and which weren’t, led to a decrease in confidence between banks, which in turn 
led to the restriction of credit “in order to compensate for the uncertainty surrounding 
possible default” (Martins 2010, 3). 
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 A credit crunch or credit squeeze is a shortage of credit in whatever form, (usually loans), when “the 
supply of credit is restricted below the range usually identified with prevailing market interest rates 
and the profitability of investment projects” (Council of Economic Advisors 1991).  
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During February 2007 “the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation
71…announced that it will no longer buy the most risky subprime 
mortgages and mortgage-related securities,” while on September 2007, the UK 
Chancellor of the Exchequer authorised the Bank of England to provide liquidity 
support for Northern Rock, “the United Kingdom’s fifth-largest mortgage lender,” 
which was later placed under the UK Treasury’s ownership on February 2008 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2014). The financial services sector was 
terminally overrun, with large investment banks, such as Bear Stearns and other large 
financial services’ firms, such as Lehman Brothers and Merill Lynch, filling for 
bankruptcy, being bailed-out, sold and/or placed under the control of the USA 
government
72
 (Wallison 2010, 4-7). According to the USA’s Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, within one year (2008 to 2009), the number of problem 
institutions increased by approximately 179%, and of problem assets by 
approximately 153% (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2009, 3). 
The USA policy response consisted of two sides, both of which were vastly 
different from the EU/Eurozone responses. The first side was aimed at dealing with 
the problematic (toxic) assets of large banking and finance corporations. During 2008 
the Troubled Asset Relief Programme
73
 was set up authorising the Secretary of the 
USA Treasury Department “to purchase, troubled assets from any financial 
institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary,” (United 
States of America 2008, 3767). In simple terms, the USA government absorbed the 
majority of the toxic private debt
74
. The second side was aimed at combating 
unemployment, stagnant market conditions, etc. A stimulus package of a total $840 
bn
75
 was introduced, which assisted in the creation of jobs, the enhancement of 
growth, the introduction of tax cuts to alleviate the tax burden, the funding for federal 
contracts, etc (Recovery.gov 2014). 
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 Otherwise known as Freddie Mac. It is a Government Sponsored Enterprise, created in 1970 
“primarily to keep Fannie Mae (created to buy mortgages, thus freeing capital that could go to other 
borrowers) from functioning as a monopoly” (Pickert 2008). Its mission is “to stabilize the nation's 
residential mortgage markets and expand opportunities for homeownership and affordable rental 
housing…” (Freddie Mac 2014).  
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 The most astonishing case was Lehman Brothers, a financial services and investment banking 
corporation, which filed for bankruptcy in September 2008 under a massive debt of $613 bn 
(overexposed to sub-prime mortgage securities; Lehman Brothers 2008)  
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 USA Public Law 110-343/03-10-2008: Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008 (United States of 
America 2008). 
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 It is worth noting that just in 6 months (October 2008 – March 2009), the USA Treasury purchased 
preferred stock of banks worth a total of more than $200 bn (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2014) 
75
 USA Public Law 111-5/17-02-2009: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (United 
States of America 2009). 
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5.3. EU & Eurozone 
Concerns about contagion of the crisis from the USA to the EU arose quite 
early, on account of the expanding inter-bank credit crunch. Among growing fears for 
a domino effect and a potential bank run, the Irish government, with a considerably 
exposed banking sector, moved to guarantee all the loans and deposits of Irish banks – 
approximately EUR 400 bn – in September 2008 (Pop 2013; Murray-Brown & 
Dennis 2008). Ireland also became the first Eurozone MS to impose austerity 
measures in an attempt to counter the deteriorating lending situation of the state at the 
international markets, initiating a wave of protests by thousands of people (The Irish 
Times 2008; The Irish Examiner 2008; Little 2008).  
Despite the above, and also the common belief that the first MS to resort to 
EU-IMF financial assistance was Greece, the first MS to resort to assistance was 
actually a non-Eurozone MS: Hungary
76
 in October 2008, with the first MoU entered 
into a month later (November 2008; European Commission 2014r)
77
. Similarly, 
Latvia
78
 as well as Romania
79
, also followd requesting financial assistance from the 
EU-IMF ad-hoc cooperation (December 2008 and Spring 2009 respectively) on 
similar basis as Hungary (based mainly on REG 332/2002; European Commission 
2014s and 2014t), still before any Eurozone MS had requested assistance. Therefore, 
the EU-IMF ad-hoc cooperation, contrary to popular belief, actually predated the 
Eurozone MS financial assistance programmes(albeit by few months). It does need to 
be highlighted, however, that the EU and IMF were two of many actors participating 
in the assistance to these EU MS, as opposed to being the only two involved in 
assistance for Eurozone MS. The cases of non-Eurozone MS did not raise any concern 
in relation to the Eurozone, since, after all, the TFEU (article 143), as well as relevant 
EU secondary legislation (CoM REG 332/2002, based on TEU article 352), expressly 
provision the granting of mutual financial assistance to an EU MS outside the 
Eurozone (i.e. under a derogation), should it face Balance-of-Payments (BoP) 
problems (European Union 2012, 110; Council of the European Union 2002b).  
Not too long after the Hungarian MoU, in mid-November 2008, the then EC 
President setup an “independent High Level Group on financial supervision [...] (to) 
                                                 
76
 Financial assistance at a total amount of EUR 6.5 bn; CoM DECs 2009/102/EC and 2009/103/EC 
(European Commission 2014r; Council of the European Union 2008b and 2008c). 
77
 The package included EU, IMF and World Bank financial assistance (European Commission 2014r). 
78
 CoM DEC 2009/289/EC, CoM DEC 2009/290/EC (Council of the European Union 2009a and 
2009b). 
79
 At a total amount of EUR 20 billion, including World Bank and European Investment Bank 
assistance; CoM DEC 2009/459/EC (European Commission 2014t; Council of the European Union 
2009c).  
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make recommendations to the Commission on strengthening European supervisory 
arrangements covering all financial sectors” (European Commission 2008a). The 
emphasis was placed on creating a more adequate supervisory framework for the 
financial sector, lack or failure of which was a major reason for the USA crisis 
(European Commission 2007, 2 and 2008a). The report of the Group was issued 
almost four months later in February 2009. In addition to this, the EC proposed a 
fiscal stimulus plan, titled the European Economic Recovery Plan, which was fully 
endorsed by EUCO on December 2008 (European Council 2009, 9). It was based on 
“an immediate budgetary impulse amounting to EUR 200 bn (EUR 170 bn from EU 
MS budgets and EUR 30 bn from EIB)…and a number of priority actions, grounded 
in the Lisbon Strategy…aimed at raising potential growth,” and it was aimed at 
cushioning the effects of the recession of many Eurozone/EU MS on society based on 
“solidarity and social justice” (European Commission 2008c, 3-6). An enquiry was 
deposited with the EC (section 4.3.2) in terms of the implementation of this stimulus 
plan and, according to the EC, the plan consisted of the following parts (European 
Commission 2016b):  
 “An injection of resources in the real economy of EUR 170bn through fiscal stimulus 
by Member States.[…]  
 An increase in intervention by the European Investment Bank… of EUR 30 bn in 
2009-2010, especially for small- and medium-sized businesses for renewable energy 
and for clean transport. […] 
 The Commission proposed and the Council approved in July 2009 an European 
energy programme for recovery with a total budget of EUR 4 bn. […] 
 The simplification of procedures and expedited implementation of programmes 
financed by the various EU funds, such as the Cohesion Fund, Structural Funds, and 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.  
 …the European Social Fund was increasingly mobilised to assist employment, 
especially for the benefit of the most vulnerable segments of the population. […] 
 …the establishment of the 2020 European Fund for Energy, Climate Change & 
Infrastructure (the Marguerite Fund) […]. This was the first example of co-financing 
in a single fund of EU institutions with several National promotional Banks from EU 
Member States.” 
 Despite the aforementioned actions, the crisis begun to more extensively 
affect Eurozone MS. In January 2009, S&P downgraded Spain, while in Ireland, the 
first Eurozone MS to implement austerity measures, there were protests against 
budget cuts between February and March 2009, with demonstrators reaching more 
than 100.000 people (Bloomberg 2011; RTE 2009a and 2009b; BBC 2009; The Irish 
Times 2009). Against this background, in October 2009 the newly elected Greek 
government announced that the previous government undermined the deficit value, 
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and that it needed to be revised upwards to more than double of its former value
80
. 
This led to major downgrades from all three major CRAs (Fitch, Standard & Poor’s, 
and Moody’s)81, leading to a severe credit crunch for Greece; the country was 
virtually unable to borrow from the international financial markets at sustainable 
interest rates.  
Because of the above, in early 2010 the Greek government became the second 
Eurozone MS to introduce austerity measures in an attempt to reassure the financial 
markets (Pisany-Ferry 2014, 181). In addition to this, during February 2010, the EU 
declared its willingness to participate to assist Greece in conjunction with IMF 
lending, should that prove necessary (European Council 2010b). Fears of contagion to 
similar Latin-capitalism-modelled Eurozone economies, and particularly Spain, led 
the then Spanish PM, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to also quickly adopt austerity 
measures, to prevent a financial meltdown (Moya 2010b). By this point, there were 
considerable fears over the financial situation and fiscal sustainability of all heavily-
indebted Eurozone MS, i.e. the Eurozone periphery
82
. As a result, Portugal became 
the fourth Eurozone MS after Spain to implement austerity measures in March 2010 
(Bloomberg 2011).  
The above actions were proven insufficient to inspire stability to the markets, 
and on April 2010 Greece became the first Eurozone MS to request EU-IMF financial 
assistance (PrimeMinisterGR 2010). The May 2010 EG confirmed the activation of 
the assistance mechanism (at the time bi-lateral loans from Eurozone MS), subject to 
strong conditionality monitored by the EC (Eurogroup 2010b)
83
. A few days later, the 
ECOFIN agreed on creating the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) Societe 
Anonyme (SA), a Special-Purpose Vehicle Public Limited Company aimed at 
providing financial assistance to Eurozone MS, and on reinforcing the existing 
Eurozone legal framework, through emphasizing fiscal discipline and “establishing a 
                                                 
80
 The specific timeline for Greece is analyzed in Chapter 8.  
81
 Fitch, Standard & Poor’s, and Moody’s are the three CRAs that are officially authorized to conduct 
ratings for states by the USA’ Securities & Exchange Commission, under the license of a “Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization - NRSRO” (Securities and Exchange Commission 1994, 1 
and 8-9). 
82
 These Eurozone MS are often referred to with the acronym P.I.I.G.S., i.e. the initials of Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain (BBC 2010; Featherstone 2011). The acronym, used as early as 1979 and 
often written as PIGS, has an intensely derogatory connotation and has been the cause of loud protests 
from governments in those countries (Koba 2011; Krouse 2012; Mackintosh, 2010; The Economist 
2010). 
83
 This 1
st
 financial assistance programme for Greece would be followed by a 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 in 2012 and 
2015 respectively (BBC 2011; Kyriakidis 2016 6-7; Table 4) 
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permanent crisis resolution framework” (Council of the European Union 2010a, 6-7; 
Eurogroup 2010c).  
As the nature of the crisis, which started from Ireland as a mortgage ‘bubble’ 
(i.e. quite similar as the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA), took a turn from the 
private sector to the public sector, transforming towards a sovereign debt crisis, 
EUCO established a Task Force to report on the necessary measures “needed to reach 
the objective of an improved crisis resolution framework and better budgetary 
discipline” (European Council 2010c, 6). The Task Force presented its final report on 
October 2010, one month after the EC had made the first proposal for reviewing the 
SGP and general economic governance framework within the EU and Eurozone, 
proposing the adoption of the Six-Pack (European Commission 2010b). The report, 
endorsed by EUCO, included a variety of enhanced supranational economic 
governance and oversight measures, most relating to increase of SGP sanctions in 
quantity and effectiveness, also presenting the need for creating “a credible crisis 
resolution framework for the euroarea capable of addressing financial distress and 
avoiding contagion;” this mechanism was the ESM (Task Force to the European 
Council 2010; European Council 2010c, 1-2).  
From September 2010 onwards, Ireland also began facing credit crunch 
difficulties similar to Greece, consecutively being downgraded by CRAs. This 
inevitably led to the need for requesting financial assistance from the EU-IMF ad-hoc 
cooperation on November 2010, and to Ireland becoming the second Eurozone MS to 
do so (Pisany-Ferry 2014, 182; Thomas 2010; Council of the European Union 2010g). 
Despite the turmoil across the Eurozone, Estonia became the 17
th
 MS to join on 
January 2011 (European Commission 2014u). Issues persisted with the three main 
CRAs now downgrading  Portugal as well (Pisany-Ferry 2014, 183). Demonstrations 
against austerity took place in Portugal with more than 200.000 people, but the credit 
crunch was inevitable and the country became the third Eurozone MS to request 
financial assistance in April 2011 (Pereira et al. 2011; Kowsmann & Forelle 2011; 
Eurogroup 2011).  
In the meantime, and given the severity of the unfolding situation, in
 
March 
2011, and in order to establish the permanent stability mechanism that had been 
decided in 2010, TFEU article 136 was amended in order to “establish a stability 
mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area 
as a whole” (European Council 2011d, 2). The Treaty establishing this permanent 
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mechanism (ESM) would be signed on February 2012
84
 (Council of the European 
Union 2012b, 1). 
There was large citizen opposition to the austerity-based policies implemented 
across the Eurozone, the pinnacle of which was the Indigants or Los Indignados that 
begun protests on May 2011. The movement originated in Spain from 15 May 2011 
onwards (hence also referenced as the ‘15-M movement’)85. The protests, which ran 
through 2011 and 2012, were large in size and influenced similar demonstrations 
across the EU, particularly within Eurozone MS under financial assistance.  
From July to September 2011, Italy became the fifth Eurozone MS to introduce 
austerity measures amidst growing uncertainty and unsustainable lending interest 
rates, while Spain continued to implement additional spending cuts. On account of 
this continuously worsening situation, the EC proposed another two pieces of 
fundamental legislation in November 2011, aimed at enhancing coordination between 
Eurozone MS even further than the Six-Pack; these were termed the Two-Pack 
(European Commission 2011c). In addition, on March 2012 the Treaty on Stability, 
Convergence and Governance (TSCG) was signed, which included the Fiscal 
Compact.  
The above actions were, once again, proven not to be enough. Both Italy and 
Spain were downgraded by Standard and Poor’s (Donadio 2011; Donovan 2011). This 
was followed by successive downgrades of another seven Eurozone MS (France, 
Portugal, Cyprus, Austria, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia), as well as of the then 
existent financial assistance mechanism EFSF SA (Chan & Trotman 2012; AP 2012). 
This continued across 2012, with S&P downgrading 16 Spanish banks (Pisany-Ferry 
2014, 184; Reuters 2012). Inevitably, Spain became the fourth Eurozone MS to 
request financial assistance in June 2012, but in this case only for its banking sector 
(Table 4; Eurogroup 2012).  
On the same day as the Spanish request, Cyprus also requested financial 
assistance, raising the total final number of Eurozone MS under financial assistance 
(until the cut-off date of this research)  to five (European Stability Mechanism 2014b; 
Orphanides & Christie 2012). The request of Cyprus came amid growing problems of 
its banking sector, primarily due to its exposure on Greek debt that had been involved 
in the Private Sector Involement (PSI) process of the 2
nd
 Greek financial assistance 
                                                 
84
 There was a first version of the Treaty signed in July 2011, but the second version was signed, being 
“modified to incorporate decisions taken by the heads of state and government of the euro area on 21 
July and 9 December 2011” (Council of the European Union 2012b, 1).  
85
 It was expressed by a series of demonstrations mainly by youth, and was organized largely using 
social media (Twitter, Facebook, etc). The first protests were of young Spaniards demonstrating in 
Spain’s main square, Puereta del Sol (BBC 2012; Rainsford 2011). 
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program, which had been concluded approximately two months before (Al Jazeera 
2012). However, the Cyprus MoU was concluded more than a year after the request, 
on account of differences
86
 which arose during the negotiations between the Troika 
and the Cypriot government (Table 4). Growing fears of a bank run led to Cypriot 
banks being closed for almost two weeks during March 2013 (16
h
-28
h
), with 
restrictions being enforced  (Parmenter 2013; Johnston 2013)
87
. In April 2013, the 
bailout was approved by the Cyprus Parliament
88
 (Republic of Cyprus 2013). 
To advance the reforming process at the EU institutional level, during the June 
2012 Eurosummit, Eurozone MS leaders affirmed their intention to create “an 
effective single supervisory mechanism” for the national banking sectors in order to 
“break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” (European Council 2012b). 
This was termed as the “Banking Union,” by the EC89 (European Commission 2012g, 
1). During November 2013 Ireland and Spain, terminated their programmes remaining 
under Post-Programme Surveillance
90
 (PPS; European Financial Stability Facility 
2013a; European Stability Mechanism 2015b). The countries’ exit from their 
programmes prompted the EG to portray the EU-IMF programmes as a success 
(Eurozone 2013a and 2013b). After the cut-off date of this research the same exit and 
PPS have also applied to Portugal since June 2014, and Cyprus since March 2016, 
leaving Greece, which has entered a 3
rd
 financial assistance programme as of 2015 
(with a three year duration until 2018), the only Eurozone MS currently under 
financial assistance (Table 4; European Commission 2014h; European Stability 
Mechanism 2016a). The above events, until the cut-off date of this research, are 
summarized in the following Table 5. 
 
                                                 
86
 Despite the growing pressures and the dangers reported being imminent, until March 2013 an 
agreement had still not been ‘ironed-out’ between Cypruse and the EU-IMF cooperation, primarily on 
account of the bank levy terms, which, at the time, included all customers of a bank, even with less 
than EUR 100.000 in their account (6.75% levy, and 9.9% levy for more than EUR 100.000 accounts; 
BBC 2013a). Additional disagreements included privatizations, pensions, etc (BBC 2013a; Psyllides 
2012). It was the first time that such a measure was implemented in regards to the Eurozone crisis. 
Towards the end of March 2013 an agreement was reached to exclude deposits under EUR 100.000 
from the levy (Eurogroup 2013c; CNN 2013) 
87
 The overall capital controls lasted for approximately two years, being lifted entirely in April 2015 
(Kambas 2015).  
88
 Law No 4173/30-04-2013 (Republic of Cyprus 2013) 
89
 COM(2012) 510 final/12-09-2012 EC Communication to the EP/CoM (European Commission 
2012g, 1). 
90
 Established under article 2 of REG 472/2013. It provisions that the EC, with the ECB, are to conduct 
regular review missions to Eurozone MS that have received financial assistance and have exited their 
programme, until at least 75% of the amount of the assistance has been repaid (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2013a, 9). 
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Table 5: Condensed timeline of supranational-level events (data compiled by author).  
Date Event 
2
0
0
8
 
30-09 Ireland guarantees all banks laonsideposits 
04-11 Hungary financial assistance programme 
11-11 EC sets-up de Larosiere High Level Group 
26-11 EC stimulus plan 
2
0
0
9
 
28-01 Latvia financial assistance programme 
14-01 Spain is degraded by S&P 
25-02 de Larosiere High Level Group Report 
24-04 Romania financial assistance programme 
21-10 Greek FinM announces 2009 deficit will be double (6% -> 12,5%) 
 2
0
1
0
 
11-02 EU: Assistance to Greece, with IMF, possible 
26-03 EC sets-up Economic Governance Task Force 
03-05 Greece 1st financial assistance programme 
10-05 ECOFIN: Set-up EFSM, EFSF SA., revise Eurozone framework 
07-06 EFSF SA incorporated 
29-09 EC proposes Six-Pack 
28-11 Ireland financial assistance programme 
21-10 Economic Governance Task Force Report 
29-10 EUCO: Endorses the Economic Governance Task Force Report & ESM 
24-11 3 ESAs established (EIOPA, ESA, ESMA) & ESRB 
28-11 EG: ESM Agreement 
2
0
1
1
 
01-01 Estonia joins Eurozone 
25-03 Amendment TFEU Article 136 for Eurozone stability mechanism 
13-05 Portugal financial assistance programme 
11-07 ESM Treaty lst version signed 
21-07 Greece 2nd financial assistance programme 
08-11 Six-Pack enacted (across 16-11) 
23-11 EC proposes Two-Pack 
2
0
1
2
 
02-02 ESM Treaty 2nd (final) version signed 
02-03 TSCG signed (includes Fiscal Compact) 
25-06 Cyprus requests financial assistance  
29-06 Eurosununit Set-up Banking Union 
20-07 Spain financial assistance programme 
2
0
1
3
 
29-04 Cyprus financial assistance programme 
21-05 Two-Pack enacted 
15-10 Banking Union SSM established 
14-11 Ireland & Spain exit financial assistance and enter PPS 
 
5.4. Conclusion  
The aim of this Chapter was to provide the temporal context relevant to the 
Eurozone crisis and, more specifically, to the EU-wide crisis measures adopted. It was 
clear that the late-2000s financial crisis began as a private-sector, sub-prime mortgage 
crisis in the USA. Despite the fact that it initially affected the Eurozone also in this 
way (Ireland), it eventually transformed into a public-sector, sovereign debt crisis, 
with heavily-indebted periphery Eurozone states experiencing adverse financial 
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effects and being unable to borrow sustainably from the international markets. While 
Greece was the first Eurozone MS to resort to EU-IMF financial assistance, it is worth 
highlighting that Ireland was actually the first affected. It is also worth noting that, 
while often presented as such, the EU-IMF cooperation had been activated in relation 
to non-Eurozone MS, some time before Greece resorted to financial assistance. This 
cooperation arguably became a novelty when concerning Eurozone MS. Hence, while 
the cooperation was existent, the participation of the IMF within the Eurozone can be 
considered as a novelty.   
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Chapter 6: Overview of Supranational Measures   
6.1. Introduction  
 The aim of this Chapter is to provide a detailed and forensic overview of the 
EU-wide crisis supranational measures. This is the first of the two categories of the 
independent variable. This Chapter also constitutes one of the major contributions of 
this research to the existing scholarly field. It outlines the supranational measures 
assumed during the crisis not only in forensic detail but with legal clarity, i.e. each 
measures is referenced along with its corresponding legal basis. Broadly, EU-wide 
supranational crisis measures can be further sub-categorized into those aimed at 
providing financial assistance and those aimed at increased or enhanced coordination 
between EU/Eurozone MS (Figure 1).  
 
6.2. Pre-Crisis Mechanisms   
 The EU-wide pre-existing (to the crisis) mechanisms cover two categories of 
measures: provision of financial assistance on the one hand and fiscal surveillance 
(debt, deficit, etc) on the other. A brief overview of these measures is presented in this 
section, and an analysis from a comparative perspective in relation to the measures 
introduced during the crisis in terms of the EU DD indicators is presented (where 
applicable) throughout this Chapter and Chapter 7. Despite popular belief that 
financial assistance within the EU was a novelty, a mechanism providing such 
assistance predates the crisis. However, this mechanism did not cover the possibility 
of provisioning financial assistance to Eurozone MS, and its applicability and force 
were considerably reduced compared to the mechanisms introduced during the crisis.  
 
6.2.1. Medium-Term Financial Assistance (MTFA) 
 EU mechanisms for the provision of financial assistance were created as early 
as 1971 with the “machinery for medium-term financial assistance” to EU MS under 
BoP problems provisioned in CoM DEC 71/143/EEC (Council of the European Union 
1971). This assistance was accompanied by economic policy conditionality, i.e. 
“undertakings in respect of economic policy the recipient Member State must enter 
into” (Council of the European Union 1971, 178). This machinery was complemented 
by the creation of a Community Loan Mechanism (CLM) under REG 682/81
91
, 
accompanied by stricter conditionality. In the CLM, the CoM evaluated the 
adjustment programme submitted by the EU MS facing BoP problems, which 
                                                 
91
 Based on the provisions of REGs 397/75 and 398/75 (Council of the European Union 1975a and 
1975b and 1981, 1) 
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included “economic policy conditions” aimed at returning the BoP to a sustainable 
path, in order to determine whether to grant a loan (Council of the European Union 
1981, 1).  
 The 1971 machinery for assistance and the CLM were combined into one 
single facility for Medium-Term Financial Assistance (MTFA) under CoM REG 
1969/88 (Council of the European Union 1988, 1-2). Under this united facility, based 
on TEU articles 143
92
 and 308
93
, there was economic policy conditionality applied for 
the EU MS requesting assistance and monitoring of the implementation of this 
conditionality by the EC (Council of the European Union 1988, 1-3). After the 
establishment of the Eurozone, the MTFA was modified under REG 332/2002
94
 
(mainly based on TEU article 352
95
), which repealed REG 1969/88, restricting the 
MTFA’s usage only to non-Eurozone MS (Council of the European Union 2002b, 1-
2).  
It is worth noting that REG 332/2002 was last modified under CoM REG 
431/2009, adopted in May 2009, one month after the request of financial assistance by 
Greece (Council of the European Union 2002a). The changes introduced by the 
amending act aligned the MTFA framework with the modalities of financial 
assistance as created under the, then, temporary framework of bi-later Eurozone MS 
loans to Greece, i.e. to include an MoU in all provisions relevant to conditionality 
(Council of the European Union 2002a, 4-5). In addition, the amount available for 
assistance was doubled from EUR 25 to EUR 50 bn, obviously anticipating the impact 
of the Greek, and later Eurozone, crisis on the EU MS fiscal positions (Council of the 
European Union 2002a, 3). 
   
6.2.2. Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
 In relation to fiscal restrictions, budgetary discipline, etc, the pre-existing EU 
legislation was encapsulated in primary EU law (TEU/TFEU) and secondary law 
(SGP). In relation to primary EU law, there are clear stipulations that the EU MS 
should maintain a balanced budgetary position (“budgetary discipline”) and avoid 
excessive deficits in TFEU Article 126, and TFEU Protocol (No12). Protocol (No12) 
sets the 3% GDP deficit / 60% GDP debt targets (European Union 2012, 99-102 and 
                                                 
92
 Then article 108 of the Treaty of Rome.  
93
 Then article 235 of the Treaty of Rome. 
94
 Last amended by CoM REGs 1360/2008 and 431/2009 (Council of the European Union 2002a).  
95
 Then article 308 of the TEC. 
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279-80). These are the foundational provisions for the establishment of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP).  
 Complementing the aforementioned primary EU law, the SGP was introduced 
as secondary EU legislation, consisting (prior to the crisis) of (European Commission 
2014e; Council of the European Union 2015b, 5): 
 EUCO Resolution 97/C 236/01 (European Council 1997b),  
 Preventive Part: CoM REG (EC) No 1466/97, as amended by CoM REG 1055/2005 
(Council of the European Union 1997a and 2005a) 
 Corrective Part: CoM Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, as amended by CoM REG (EC) 
No 1056/2005 (Council of the European Union 1997b and 2005b) 
The EUCO resolution included the commitment by EU MS (except those 
under derogation) to maintain budgetary discipline and to “correct excessive deficit as 
quickly as possible after their emergence” (European Council 1997b, 2). The EU 
institutions relevant to the EDP, namely the EC and CoM, also committed to 
proceeding with the necessary actions and to producing the necessary reports in 
compliance with the TEU/TFEU, with the CoM also a priori committing “always to 
impose sanctions if a participating Member State fails to take the necessary steps to 
bring the excessive deficit situation to an end...” (European Council 1997b, 2). 
CoM REG 1466/97 introduced the procedures and guidelines for the 
submission of EU MS Stability and Convergence programmes
96
, their evaluation by 
the CoM, and monitoring of actions related to those programmes, in order to avoid the 
creation of excessive deficits. The REG sets differentiated medium-term budgetary 
objectives for all EU MS, also providing for the possibility of deviation (Council of 
the European Union 2005a, 2-3). The EC and CoM are tasked with monitoring the 
implementation of the submitted programmes. CoM REG 1467/97 concerns the 
specifics of the EDP (deadlines of publishing reports or imposing sanctions under 
EDP, of implementing requested deficit correction measures, when the EDP is 
suspended etc). This REG also defines the circumstances when an excessive deficit is 
considered “exceptional and temporary”97 (Council of the European Union 1997b, 8). 
                                                 
96
 Stability programmes are submitted by Eurozone MS, while Convergence programmes are submitted 
by non-Eurozone MS (Council of the European Union 1997a, 3-4). 
97
 When “resulting from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and 
which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government, or when resulting from 
a severe economic downturn,” or when the EC forecasts “that the deficit will fall below the reference 
value following the end of the unusual event or the severe economic downturn” (Council of the 
European Union 1997b, 8). Severe economic downturn was originally defined as a minimum 2% real 
GDP fall. However, the numerical value was later removed in 2005, being replaced by “negative 
annual GDP volume growth rate or from an accumulated loss of output during a protected period of 
very low annual GDP volume growth relative to its (EU MS) potential,” during the time when both 
France and Germany had qualified for an EDP but, unlike other Eurozone MS (e.g. Portugal), they 
“succeeded in halting the application of the excessive Deficit Procedure that enshrined Germany’s own 
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The REG also sets a 0.5% GDP annual increase as a benchmark for achieving 
excessive deficit correction, and vests monitoring capacities for compliance with 
reports, RECs and DECs to the EC and CoM. Finally, it stipulates the conditions 
under which a deposit is to be used as a sanction, and when it can be converted to a 
fine (Council of the European Union 1997b, 9-10). 
 
6.3. EU/Eurozone Crisis Measures 
 The number, and especially the scope, of the EU Eurozone crisis measures 
aimed at the supranational level are considerable and most of them novel, so much so 
that constitute any comparison with the pre-existing status-quo void of any substantial 
conclusion. Even in the case of the modification of the SGP (Six-Pack), the 
specializaqtion, additions and alterations are so substantial so as to essentially 
constitute a new piece of legislation.  The measures introduce far-reaching and 
fundamental changes in the EU modus operandi, particularly in terms of technocratic 
authority, national-to-supranational delegation, and EU-level decision-making 
capacity. It is worth noting that some of the measures are of a dual legal nature: they 
combine the form of an international agreement with that of EU legislation, in that 
they are agreements outside the EU jurisdiction but with EU or Eurozone MS 
participating and with the agreement making exclusive use of EU institutions.  
 
6.3.1. European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)  
 The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) was the very first 
attempt at countering the crisis at a supranational level. During May 2010, shortly 
after the Greek request for financial assistance
98
, it was decided by ECOFIN in an 
extraordinary meeting to create two new financial stability mechanisms: the EFSM 
and an SPV, later to become the EFSF SA (Council of the European Union 2010a, 7). 
The EFSM is broadly similar to the MTFA
99
, being available to all EU MS that face 
“severe economic or financial disturbance caused be exceptional occurrences beyond 
its control” (Council of the European Union 2010b, 1). It was created under CoM 
REG 407/2010 and is based on TFEU article 122(2), which allows for the CoM to 
approve, under conditions, financial assistance to an EU MS if it is threatened “with 
                                                                                                                                            
stability culture at the EU level” (Council of the European Union 1997b, 8 and 2005b, 6; Bulmer 2014, 
1247-8; generally IMF 2004, 86-9; Collignon 2004, 2; Bagus 2012, 109-10). 
98
 Note that Greece, the first Eurozone MS to request financial assistance, had already done so almost a 
month before on late April 2010. By the time EFSM was created, the 1
st
 Greek MoU had already been 
concluded. In that case, assistance was provided via pooled, bi-lateral loans from Eurozone MS to 
Greece. 
99
 The MTFA is preserved alongside the EFSM (Council of the European Union 2010a, 7 & 2010b, 1) 
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severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its 
control” (European Union 2012, 98; Council of the European Union 2010a). Its 
lending capacity was set to a maximum of EUR60 bn, a considerably larger amount 
than that provisioned under the MTFA
100
 (Council of the European Union 2010a, 7).  
Financial assistance through the EFSM is provided by loan or credit line, and 
is accompanied by a set of economic policy conditions in the form of an adjustment 
program (proposed by the MS and approved/potentially modified by the CoM) and an 
MoU including these conditions and agreed between the EC and the MS concerned 
(Council of the European Union 2010b, 2-3). The ECB, along with the EC, participate 
in the drafting of the MoU, while the EC is entrusted with monitoring its 
implementation (Council of the European Union 2010b, 2-3). The approval of 
financial assistance, as well as the relevant adjustment program (and, hence, the MoU) 
by the CoM is achieved under QMV. By the cut-off date of this research, the EFSM 
had been activated for Portugal and Ireland
101
 for a total of approximately EUR 50 bn 
(Ireland: EUR22.5 bn, Portugal: EUR24.3 bn) with the loans concluded as of 2014 
(European Commission 2015a; Table 4). 
The EFSM is the first official instance whereby the EU - IMF cooperation is 
introduced within the context of the Eurozone, as well as the first instance whereby 
the ECB and the EC (two out of the three Troika institutions) assumed drafting 
responsibilities in relation to MoU. None of these provisions existed in the only other 
previous financial assistance framework (MTFA; Council of the European Union 
2002). Therefore, this is a first step towards the creation of the so-called Troika 
(Council of the European Union 2010b, 1). In addition, the EFSM is also the first 
appearance of the concept of the MoU within the EU legal order; a term otherwise 
extensively used by the IMF (Council of the European Union 2010b, 2)
102
.  
 
6.3.2. European Financial Stability Facility Société Anonyme (EFSF SA)  
The EFSF SA is the second institution decided in the May 2010 ECOFIN. It is 
an SPV established as a Public Liability Limited Company
103
 based in Luxembourg 
                                                 
100
 MTFA had a limit of EUR  12 bn (European Council 2002, 2).  
101
 After the cut-off date of this research and the conclusion of the EFSM assistance to Ireland and 
Portugal, the mechanism was used only once more as a bridge financing instrument for Greece (an 
interim financing instruments between the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 financial assistance programs) on July 2015 for 
the amount of EUR 7.16 bn (Council of the European Union 2015). 
102
 As referenced in section 6.2.1, the MoU had also existed in the MTFA as an amendment to the 
relevant REG 332/2002 after Greece’s request for financial assistance and its 1st programme.  
103
 One of the main purposes for choosing the form of a company was to prevent contagion throughout 
other Eurozone MS (which may occur through the bi-lateral lending process as implemented in the 1
st
 
financial assistance program for Greece), by minimizing the financial risk of the Eurozone MS 
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almost a month afterwards on 7
th
 June 2010.  On the same day, the EFSF Framework 
Agreement, an international agreement part of international (not EU) law
104
, was 
signed between the Eurozone MS and the company (European Financial Stability Facility 
2011a, 1 & 2014, 1-2). The company’s Board of Directors consists of each of the then 
17 Eurozone MS’ Eurogroup Working Group105 representatives (or alternates of 
such), with the EC and ECB (or other additional EU institutions) being able to attend 
meetings as observers with no voting rights (European Financial Stability Facility 
2011a, 23 and 2016). The company’s shareholders/guarantors are also the same 17 
Eurozone MS (European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 1 and 2011b, 7). 
The purpose of the EFSF SA is to provide financial assistance only to 
Eurozone MS, in contrast to both the EFSM,  which provides financial assistance to 
all EU MS, and to the pre-existing MTFA, which provides financial assistance only to 
non-Eurozone MS (Council of the European Union 2010a, 7; European Financial 
Stability Facility 2011a, 1). The available financial assistance
106
 is a maximum of 
EUR 440 bn
107
, and is given conditionally upon conclusion of and compliance with an 
MoU between the EC (on behalf of Eurozone MS) and the MS concerned, and related 
to “budgetary discipline and economic policy guidelines” (European Financial 
Stability Facility 2010a, 1-2).  
It needs to be highlighted that as the EFSF SA is in the form of the company 
and its Framework Agreement falls under international and not EU law, it is not based 
upon any EU Treaty provision, in contrast to the EFSM and the pre-existing MTFA. 
The financing aspect of the company (Financial Facility Agreements) falls within the 
remits of the international business realm. The MoU and conditional structural 
adjustment measures based on TFEU article 136(1) (European Financial Stability 
Facility 2011a, 5).  
                                                                                                                                            
providing financial assistance to losing only the shares contributed to the company (interview with Dr. 
Lina Papadopoulou, Associate Professor of Constitutional Law).  
104
 The company’s statute is part of Luxembourg company law. 
105
 Sub-configuration of the Economic and Financial Committee, consisting only of Eurozone MS 
representatives, the EC and the ECB. The Committee was created under TFEU article 134 (different 
from COREPER – Committee or Permanent Representative of MS governments under TFEU article 
240) to deliver opinions to the CoM or EC, to monitor the economic situation of MS, with a particular 
focus on external financial relations (third countries or international institutions), to examine the free 
movement of capital and freedom of payments, and to prepare the work for the CoM (and for the 
Eurogroup when in the Eurogroup Working Group sub-configuration) relevant to financial issues 
(European Council 2012, 105 and 154).   
106
 This was given originally only through loans (Loan Facility Agreements), and later through a 
variety of instruments such as Loans, Precautionary Facilities (e.g. credit lines), Facilities for 
recapitalizing financial institutions, Facilities for purchasing bonds in either primary or secondary 
markets (European Financial Stability Facility 2010a, 1 and 2011, 1-2). 
107
 The capital is acquired through the EFSF SA engaging with a variety of financial instruments 
(European Financial Stability Facility 2010a, 1-2). 
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By the cut-off date of this research, EFSF SA has provided financial assistance 
to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, at a total amount of approximately EUR 188 bn 
(European Financial Stability Facility 2014b). From 1 July 2013 and onward, the 
company is not to conduct any new lending operations and is inactive. All of its 
responsibilities and activities are conducted by the ESM (European Commission 
2014d; European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 30; European Stability 
Mechanism 2012, 3)
108
.  
 
6.3.3. TFEU Article 136 Amendment & ECJ Case C-370/12 
Approximately 4 months after the May 2010 ECOFIN, and the creation of the 
EFSF SA as a temporary financial assistance mechanism, during the October 2010 
EUCO Summit, the Heads of State/Government of the EU MS agreed on the “need 
for Member States to establish a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole and invite the President of the 
European Council to undertake consultations… on a limited treaty change…” 
(European Council 2010a, 2). There were three main characteristics of this new 
mechanism agreed upon during this EUCO: a private sector participation, a role for 
the IMF, and “very strong conditionality” for the financial assistance programmesof 
this new mechanism (European Council 2010a, 2). EUCO also reaffirmed the 
neo/ordo liberal policy direction of the EU to be assumed during the crisis, noting that 
“fiscal discipline is reinforced in the European Union” (European Council 2010a, 2). 
The November 2010 EG elaborated further on the above main characteristics 
of the new mechanism
109
, inter alia stipulating that any financial  assistance would be 
provided under unanimous agreement by all EG members (Eurogroup 2010a, 2). 
Based on the above, the EUCO on December 2010 agreed
110
 on a TFEU amendment 
                                                 
108
 However, the duration of the company is unlimited and it is to be dissolved when all outstanding 
payments from Eurozone MS under assistance have been repaid (European Financial Stability Facility 
2014a, 4). 
109
 The EG reiterated the importance of the IMF’s participation, stipulating that any assistance is given 
conditionally upon “stringent programmes of economic and fiscal policy adjustments” (Eurogroup 
2010a, 1). It also maintained IMF involvement in the assistance programmes (the IMF loan is the only 
one more senior to the ESM loan; Eurogroup 2010a, 2). Finally, the EG provisioned a private sector 
involvement, with rules “adapted to provide for a case by case participation of private sector 
creditors” (later termed PSI and implemented in Greece for the first time; Eurogroup 2010a, 2). It also 
needs to be highlighted that this is the first instance whereby the unified rule of Collective Action 
Clauses (CACs), similar to the UK’s or USA’s systems, is mandated for all Eurozone MS government 
bonds issued after June 2013 (Eurogroup 2010a, 2). 
110
 On the first day of the EUCO summit, the Belgian government submitted a proposal under the 
simplified revision procedure of TEU article 48(6) (any section of Part Three of the TFEU, which 
includes Economic and Monetary Policy, can be amended by the EUCO after EP, EC and ECB 
consultations without the conference of EU MS governments’ representatives that is mandated under 
the ordinary revision procedure – In the case of monetary policy the vote has to be unanimous)  to 
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to allow for the ESM to be consistent with EU law (although not to make the ESM 
part of the EU legal order), with the entry into force of the amendment set on 1 
January 2013 (European Council 2011a, 1). The amending EUCO DEC 2011/199/EU 
was officially published on 25
 
March 2011, adding an additional paragraph 3 to TFEU 
article 136, which permitted the Eurozone MS to “establish a stability mechanism to 
be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. 
The granting of such financial assistance…will be made subject to strict 
conditionality” (European Council 2011b, 2)111.  
The amendment was challenged before the ECJ. On July 2012, a case of the 
High Court of Ireland, between an Irish MP (Thomas Pringle) and the 
government/Advocate General of Ireland, was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling in relation to the above amendment of article 136 TFEU and the ESM Treaty 
signed in 2012 (European Court of Justice 2012; European Stability Mechanism 
2012)
112
. The ECJ, in case C-370/12 (Pringle case) dismissed all the referring 
questions
113
, ruling that there were no issues with either TFEU article 136 revision or 
with the ESM Treaty (par. 186, European Court of Justice 2012)
114
.  
 
6.3.4. Euro Plus Pact 
 In February 2011, the Eurosummit decided to “achieve a new quality of 
economic policy coordination in the euro area to improve competitiveness…” 
(European Council 2011d, 13). This new arrangement was to include all Eurozone 
MS, but other EU MS would also be invited to participate (European Council 2011d, 
13). A month later, during the March 2011 Eurosummit, “The Pact for the Euro… 
(establishing) a stronger economic policy coordination for competitiveness and 
convergence” was officially adopted in text by the Eurozone MS and the following 
                                                                                                                                            
amend TFEU article 136 by adding a paragraph to allow for the establishment of the ESM by Eurozone 
MS (European Union 2012, 42 and 59-137; European Council 2011a, 1 and 2011b, 1). 
111
 Entire paragraph added: “3.The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability 
mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The 
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
conditionality” (European Council 2011b, 2).  
112
 The applicant (Pringle) claimed inter alia that the amending DEC 2011/199/EU altered and 
increased the competences of EU institutions through the ESM, and hence the simple revision 
procedure of TEU article 48(6) could not have been used, and that the relevant DEC introduced 
provisions that ran contrary to EU Treaties’ provisions on economic and monetary policy, as well as to 
EU law in general, also directly encroaching the EU’s exclusive competence in these (par. 2, European 
Court of Justice 2012). 
113
 While not within the remits of this analysis, there have been several issues raised in relation to the 
ECJ’s judgment in this case (e.g. Schömann 2014, 20-4; Tuori & Tuori 2014, 128-145).  
114
 In terms of whether the entry into force of the DEC was a precondition for the conclusion of the 
ESM Treaty, the ECJ ruled that this amendment confirms a power which the MS already had; hence the 
entry into force of the DEC was not a precondition (par. 184 and 185, European Court of Justice 2012). 
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EU MS: Latvia & Lithuania (joined Eurozone after 2011), Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania, i.e. 23 out of the then 27 EU MS (European Council 
2011c, 5; European Council 2011e, 1). The aim is to  
further strengthen the economic pillar of EMU and achieve a new quality of 
economic policy coordination, with the objective of improving competitiveness 
and thereby leading to a higher degree of convergence reinforcing our social 
market economy (European Council 2011c, 5). 
The Euro Plus Pact concerns areas under national and not EU competence. It 
includes common objectives, as those are agreed by the Heads of State/Government of 
the participating MS on an annual basis. Those commitments, which are to foster 
competitiveness, employment, and contribute to the sustainability of public finances, 
then need to be translated into “concrete national commitments”, (European Council 
2011, 14-5). They are included in each participating MS annual National Reform or 
Stability Programmes, while the monitoring of their implementation is conducted by 
the EC through an assessment of commonly agreed (by EUCO) indicators (European 
Council 2011c, 14-5 and 20). The policy mix for pursuing the above aims is 
determined freely by each participating MS, although a commitment to consult the 
other participants prior to the adoption of “…each major economic reform having 
potential spill-over effects…” is undertaken (European Council 2011, 14-5).  If 
challenges are found in any of these areas, then the MS concerned has to address them 
within a given timeframe (European Council 2011c, 15). 
 Given the fact that the Pact does not include the potential for any delegated or 
other legislative acts on the part of the EU, that it includes agreements on policy areas 
which fall outside the competence of the EU, and that it is based simply on 
monitoring of each participating MS by the peers, it is largely based
115
 on the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC; European Council 2016)
116
. The OMC involves is a 
                                                 
115
 Conversely, the fact that this Pact was adopted in relevance to the OMC is not referenced anywhere 
within the text. However, in a strategic note the EC observes that the Pact was “guided by the largely 
ineffective Open Method of Coordination,” (European Commission 2015b, 1). In addition, in various 
respective national documents, such as for example the 2015 Stability Programme of Germany, the 
Euro Plus Pact commitments are recognized as being voluntary in nature (Federal Republic of 
Germany 2015b, 20), while in others, such as the 2013 document of Ireland on the Euro Plus Pact, they 
appear simply as commitments without further characterization (Republic of Ireland 2013). 
116
 OMC originated from principles outlined at the December 1997 Luxembourg EUCO (mostly in 
relation to employment; European Council 1997a and European Union 2016). Drawing on this and 
other EUCO Conclusions (e.g. the one in June 1999 at Cologne), the OMC was officially established in 
the March 2000 Lisbon EUCO (Hodson & Maher 2001, 723), in the conclusions of which a separate 
subchapter is devoted to “implementing a new open method of coordination… as the means of 
spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals” (European 
Council 2000). OMC, in which social partners, NGOs and other societal actors are extensively 
involved, has 4 key characteristics: setting short/medium/long term timetables and guidelines for 
achieving goals (adopted by the CoM), comparing best practices by setting benchmarks/indicators, 
adopting measures for transferring the relevant policies to the national/regional levels, peer-review and 
monitoring/evaluation by the EC (European Council 2000; European Union 2016).  
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‘soft’ law approach, as it does not include any binding EU legislation, and is purely 
intergovernmental in nature: the EU MS are each evaluated against one another (peer-
pressure), utilizing the EC as a surveillance mechanism; the ECJ and EP have no role 
in this process (European Union 2016). Albeit theoretically useful, the OMC has been 
judged to have had rather limited success in inducing reforms (European Commission 
2015b, 1.  
 The implementation of the Pact has fallen short of expectations, despite an 
auspicious beginning (European Commission 2015b; European Council 2011f). Few, 
if any, participating MS have proceeded with including Euro Plus Pact references or 
provisions within their annual National Reform Programmes and Stability 
Programmes
117
. For example, for the year 2015, only 5 of the above 23 EU MS 
included specific references to the Euro Plus Pact and its commitments
118
. 
  
6.3.5. European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Treaty 
 During the October 2010 EUCO summit, the Heads of State/Government of 
the EU MS agreed to replace both the existing EFSM and EFSF SA with a permanent 
mechanism for providing financial assistance to Eurozone MS after June 2013, 
towards which the aforementioned DEC 2011/199/EU
119
 was introduced (European 
Council 2011c, 21; European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 3). This permanent 
mechanism was the ESM
120
: an international, intergovernmental organization outside 
the EU framework, established under an international treaty (ESM Treaty) signed by 
all the then 17 Eurozone MS and governed by international public law (European 
Council 2011c, 22; European Commission 2012a). The ESM utilizes the EC and the 
ECB in performing various related tasks (under relevant authorisation by the EU MS; 
                                                 
117
 It is worth noting that only one – Ireland – was found to have a separate document for Pact 
commitments, and that only for a few years between 2011 and 2016 (e.g. Republic of Ireland 2013).  
118
 Four Eurozone MS, i.e. Belgium (Kingdom of Belgium 2015, 165-7), Germany (Federal Republic 
of Germany 2015a, 34 and 2015b, 20), Latvia (Republic of Latvia 2015, 6), Malta (Republic of Malta 
2015, 51), and 1 non-Eurozone MS, i.e.  Denmark (Kingdom of Denmark 2015, 1). 
119
 While the relevant DEC 2011/199/EU was adopted on 25
th
 March 2011, it entered into force more 
than one year after the ESM Treaty’s signature, on 1st May 2013 (European Parliament 2013). 
120
 The purpose of the ESM is “to mobilise funding and provide stability support under strict 
conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, to the benefit of ESM 
Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, if indispensable to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States” (European 
Stability Mechanism 2012a, 10). 
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European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 6). Participation for all Eurozone MS in the 
ESM is obligatory (European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 5)
121
.  
The ESM Treaty was first signed on 11
th
 July 2011, but was later modified
122
 
and signed again almost six months later on 2
nd
 February 2012 (European Stability 
Mechanism 2012b, 1)
123
. The ESM has a total capital of EUR 700 bn
124
 (European 
Council 2011c, 24). It is also worth highlighting that the ESM has a very close 
relationship with the IMF, with the latter’s participation at both technical and financial 
levels to be mandated, and with a request for simultaneous financial assistance by the 
IMF constituting a requirement for a Eurozone Member State requesting assistance 
from the ESM (European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 5). Any dispute in relation to 
the ESM Treaty is to be submitted to the ECJ, under TFEU Article 273 (European 
Stability Mechanism 2012a, 8). 
 
6.3.6. European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
On November 2008 the then EC President setup an “independent High Level 
Group on financial supervision [...] (to) make recommendations to the Commission on 
strengthening European supervisory arrangements covering all financial sectors” 
(European Commission 2008a). The specific aim of the Group centred on revising the 
supervisory framework of the three existing Lamfalussy
125
 3
rd
 level Committees 
(Committee of European Banking Supervisors
126
, Committee of European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
127
, Committee of European Securities 
                                                 
121
 Hence, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, which joined the Eurozone after 2011, also became 
signatories to the ESM Treaty (European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 1 compared to the original 
signatories as in European Commission 2012a).   
122
 The major modifications in the second version were the connection of the Treaty with the TSCG 
(specifically its budgetary discipline part or Fiscal Compact), requiring that a Eurozone MS that 
requests financial assistance ratify it, the alignment with IMF practices in regards to PSI, and additional 
changes in terms of financial instruments used by the ESM and relevant pricing (Council of the 
European Union 2012b, 1-2). 
123
 It entered into force approximately six months after it signature on 27
th
 September 2012 (European 
Stability Mechanism 2012b, 1).  
124 Broken down to “… EUR  80 billion … in the form of paid-in capital provided by the euro-area 
(and)  […] a combination of committed callable capital and of guarantees from euro area Member 
States to a total amount of EUR  620 billion” (European Council 2011c, 24).  
125
 The Lamfalussy, comitology-based process was initiated in 2001 to establish “an efficient  
mechanism to begin converging European financial supervisory practice and enable  Community 
financial services legislation to respond rapidly and flexibly to developments in  financial markets” 
(European Commission 2007, 2). It includes three levels: the first, whereby broad legislation is agreed 
upon, the second, whereby technical details are provided by the EC (with EP input), the third, whereby 
the three Committees mentioned above advise the EC on the details and ensure convergence of relevant 
national practices, and the fourth, whereby the EC ensures EU law is transferred within the national 
ordre public (European commission 2007, 2). 
126
 Established under EC DEC 2004/5/EC (European Commission 2004a). 
127
 Established under EC DEC 2004/7/EC (European Commission 2004b). 
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Regulators
128
) as well as coordinating “the allocation of tasks and responsibilities 
between the national and European levels” (European Commission 2007, 2 and 
2008a).  The High-Level Group released its report on Financial Supervision in late 
February 2009, which report was endorsed by the EC (Barroso 2009).  
The Report proposed the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council under 
the ECB, which would “pool and analyse all information, relevant for financial 
stability, pertaining to macro-economic conditions and to macro-prudential 
developments in all the financial sectors” (the de Larosière Group 2009, 46). It further 
provided that the role and responsibilities assigned to the aforementioned 3
rd
 level 
Committees “are not sufficient to ensure financial stability in the EU and all its 
Member States,” proposing the creation of the European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS): a network of the above 3
rd
 level Committees which would be 
further reinforced to set supervisory standards and manage cooperation with and 
between national supervisors (The de Larosière Group 2009, 47-9). The proposed 
three new Authorities (European Banking Authority, European Insurance Authority, 
European Securities Authority) would have increased competences to, inter alia¸ 
adopt binding supervisory standards, legally enforce mediation between national 
supervisors, adopt decisions which are binding to individuals institutions, and license 
EU-wide institutions (e.g. CRAs). National supervisors would still be responsible for 
day-to-day supervision (the de Larosière Group 2009, 57).  
The above three proposed authorities were established more than a year later 
in November 2011, with the aforementioned increased competences: the European 
Bank Authority (EBA) under EP/CoM REG 1093/2010, the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) under EP/CoM REG 1094/2010, and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) under EP/COM REG 1095/2010. 
The European Systemic Risk Board (not Council, as had been originally proposed) 
was established under EP/CoM REG 1092/2010 (European Parliament & Council of 
the European Union 2011a and 2011b and 2011c and 2011d).  
 
6.3.7. Six-Pack 
 One of the key issues during the Eurozone crisis was the efficiency of and 
adherence to the SGP, which sets the limitations and rules relevant to the fiscal 
position of EU MS. The Six-Pack is a total of 5 REGs and 1 DIR adopted during 
November 2011, aimed at amending, renewing and enriching the SGP and consisting 
                                                 
128
 Established under EC DEC 2001/527/EC (European Commission 2001). 
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of the following legislative acts (European Commission 2014c; Hungarian Presidency 
of the Council of the European Union 2014): 
 CoM DIR 2011/85/EU, on EU MS Budgetary Frameworks (Council of the European 
Union 2011g), 
 EP/CoM REG (EU) 1173/2011, for Eurozone budgetary surveillance (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e), 
 EP/CoM REG (EU) 1174/2011, for Eurozone excessive macro-economic imbalances 
correction, (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011f), 
 EP/CoM REG (EU) 1175/2011, amending SGP REG 1466/97 (European Parliament 
& Council of the European Union 2011g), 
 EP/CoM REG (EU) 1176/2011, for EU macro-economic imbalances (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011h),  
 CoM REG (EU) 1177/2011, amending SGP REG 1467/97 (Council of the European 
Union 2011h). 
DIR 2011/85/EU aims at delineating the process of the implementation of 
TFEU Protocol (No12), setting the 3% GDP deficit and 60% GDP debt targets, and 
more generally the rules for budgetary frameworks of EU MS (European Union 2012, 
279-80; Council of the European Union 2011g, 41 & 44). Inter alia, it introduces the 
three-year Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) as an integral part of the 
SGP and it stipulates that specific values should exist within the EU MS national 
budgets to ensure compliance with the deficit/debt values (Council of the European 
Union 2011g, 43 and 45-6). 
 REG 1173/2011 concerns the budgetary surveillance of Eurozone MS, 
introducing sanctions that enhance SGP enforcement (European Parliament & Council 
of the European Union 2011e, 1 and 3). This REG, among others, calls for new and 
stricter sanctions within the Eurozone, and delineates the interest and non-interest 
bearing deposit procedures in case of deficit/debt violations, as well as sanctions 
imposed in cases of statistical inaccuracies (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2011e, 2-5). It also introduces new sanctions of a more direct nature 
within the process of TFEU article 126, otherwise not included in the TFEU
129
 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e, 5). This REG also 
includes horizontal delegation for a duration of 3 years (can be repealed by either the 
EP or the CoM) to the EC for imposing relevant fines (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2011e, 2 and 5-6).  
 REG 1174/2011, similarly to REG 1173/2011, concerns only Eurozone MS 
and the correction of macroeconomic imbalances that might exist within the Eurozone 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011f, 8). It also focuses on 
                                                 
129
 Such as a fine imposed by the EC on a Eurozone MS that has been deemed by the CoM to not have 
corrected its deficit (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e, 5 
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societal factors, aimed at promoting “interlinked and coherent policies for sustainable 
growth and jobs, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs” (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011f, 8). Fines under this procedure 
are annual and are imposed under a procedure similar to that of REG 1173/2011 
above. The EC’s proposal for a fine is deemed adopted, unless the CoM, under QMV, 
rejects it within 10 days, i.e the decision-making process is Reverse Qualified 
Majority Voting (RQMV; European Parliament & Council of the European Union 
2011f, 10). In both REGs 1173/2011 and 1174/2011 qualified majority voting does 
not include the Eurozone MS concerned.  
 REG 1176/2011 concerns all EU MS, and aims at correcting macroeconomic 
imbalances that occur within the entire EU (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2011h, 25). Surveillance is expanded “beyond budgetary 
surveillance to include a more detailed and formal framework” (European Parliament 
& Council of the European Union 2011h, 25). It may “include…mission to Member 
States by the Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank,” and can be 
initiated by the EC upon mere suspicion that a given EU MS might suffer from 
imbalances in the future (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 
2011h, 27 and 29). The REC also establishes the creation of a scoreboard to predict 
macroeconomic imbalances (alert mechanism), as well as the “excessive imbalance 
procedure,” (EIP) under which the EU MS concerned must provide a plan and 
timetable of the implementation of relevant CoM recommendations addressed to it 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011h, 26-7). The procedure 
is placed under TFEU Article 121 §4 (European Union 2012, 97-8).  
REG 1175/2011 is the first main SGP revision, and amends REG 1466/97 
(preventive part; European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011g, 12). 
It broadly provisions “more stringent surveillance” of the Stability Programmes 
submitted by EU MS (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011g, 
12). It introduces the concept of the European Semester, whereby the CoM surveys 
and reviews how EU MS apply the broad economic guidelines and their Stability or 
National Reform Programmes, and what measures are taken to prevent 
macroeconomic imbalances (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 
2011g, 15). The EP is to be involved in the European Semester, mostly through  its 
ability to interview key political players (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2011g, 16). Within this REG it is emphasized that “the submission 
and assessment of stability and convergence programmes should be made before key 
decisions on the national budgets for the succeeding years are taken” (European 
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Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011g, 12-4). REG 1177/2011 is the 
second main SGP revision, and amends regulation 1467/97, pertaining to the EDP and 
introducing similar provisions to the above REG 1175/2011 in terms of monitoring 
and EP inclusion in the entire EDP process, (Council of the European Union 2011h, 
35).  Taking into consideration the above, the Six-Pack REGs can be thematically 
separated as follows:  
 REG 1176/2011 introduces the EIP for all EU MS.  
 REGs 1175/2011 and 1177/2011 modify and further enhance, through sanctions and 
temporal limitations, the SGP for all EU MS.  
 REGs 1173/2011 and 1174/2011 introduce even further enhancements of the 
sanctions related to the SGP and EIP for Eurozone MS.    
 
6.3.8. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Growth (TSCG) 
The TSCG is an international agreement between 25 EU MS
130
, aside from the 
UK, which vetoed the TSCG as an EU Treaty amendment (hence the international 
legal nature of the TSCG)
131
, the Czech Republic, because of ratification difficulties, 
and Croatia, which acceded the EU afterwards. It was signed on 2 March 2012 and 
entered into force almost a year later on 1 of January 2013 (European Council 2012a; 
European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 4; European Parliament 2013). The TSCG had 
been announced in the form of a stronger ‘Fiscal Compact’ during the Eurosummit of 
December 2011 (European Council 2011g)
132
. The result of this was the TSCG,  with 
the specifics of the Fiscal Compact further delineated in Title III of the TSCG (articles 
3-8; European Council 2012a, 11-6). 
  
                                                 
130
 The Treaty applies to all Eurozone MS and all EU MS participating, once a decision to abrogate 
their Eurozone derogation or opt-out has been lifted, or if they choose to be bound only by the Fiscal 
Compact and Economic Coordination provisions in Chapters II and IV of the Treaty regardless of 
derogation or opt-out abrogation (European Council 2012a, 21-2). 
131
 During the Eurosummit of December 2011, during which the TSCG had been decided, it had been 
noted that  “considering the absence of unanimity among the EU Member States, they (Eurozone Heads 
of State or Government) decided to adopt them (additional coordination measures) through an 
international agreement […] The objective remains to incorporate these provisions into the treaties of 
the Union as soon as possible” (European Council 2011g, 7).  At the time, a modification of the EU 
Treaties to incorporate the TSCG was supported by all EU MS except the UK, which vetoed this  
“largely on the grounds that … (it) had not managed to secure a guarantee that it (the TSCG) would 
not affect the UK’s financial services industry” (Miller 2012, 1). 
132
 The idea of introducing the Fiscal Compact originated primarily with Germany. A few days prior to 
the December 2011 EUCO and Eurosummit,   “France and Germany set out in a letter to the European 
Council President, Herman Van Rompuy, joint proposals for Treaty changes to address the Eurozone 
crisis,” including forbidding any PSI in debt restructuring process, automatic sanctions for EDP, 
balanced-budgets Golden Rule, etc, with all enshrined either in an EU Treaty amendment or, failing to 
reach unanimity, a Eurozone MS-based Treaty (Miller 2012, 2-3). Most of the proposals were reflected 
in the final form of the TSCG (European Council 2012a). 
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6.3.9. Two-Pack 
The Two-Pack consists of two REGs adopted in May 2013 and concerns only 
Eurozone MS. The REGs were “designed to further enhance economic integration 
and convergence amongst euro area Member States,” (European Commission 2014f ) 
and are (Council of the European Union 2013b):  
 EP/CoM REG (EU) 472/2013, for surveillance of financially unstable Eurozone MS 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a). 
 EP/CoM REG (EU) 473/2013, for assessment of Eurozone MS budgets and excessive 
deficit corrections (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b).  
REG 472/2013 focuses on enhanced budgetary surveillance of Eurozone MS under 
financial stress or already under a financial assistance programme with the 
EFSM/EFSF SA/ESM or IMF or other relevant financial institution, reiterating the 
importance and need for implementation of strict conditionality and enhanced 
surveillance (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 3). In 
addition, a surveillance procedure of a Eurozone MS may be implemented in the case 
that this MS is simply “threatened with serious financial difficulties” (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 1-3). Within this enhanced 
surveillance framework, the Troika is, for the first time since the beginning of the 
crisis, officially established within the EU legal order
133
 (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2013a, 5-6).  The decision to subject a Eurozone MS 
to enhanced surveillance is taken by the EC. The participation of the EP in this 
process is provisioned but, again, mostly restricted to its right to call for interview or 
enter a dialogue with the institutions involved (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2013a, 9-10). 
According to this REG, Eurozone MS that are under financial assistance, that 
are generally under enhanced surveillance, or that are implementing policies that incur 
adverse effects throughout the Eurozone, prepare a Macroeconomic Adjustment 
Program (MAP
134
; European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 5). 
In relation specifically to provisions relating to financial assistance, this REG 
stipulates, among others, that  an evaluation of the requesting Eurozone MS 
government debt by the Troika is to be conducted. Furthermore, the MoU is 
referenced as the document agreed between the relevant Eurozone MS and the EC on 
behalf of the EFSF SA or ESM (i.e. on behalf of the rest of the Eurozone MS), and is 
                                                 
133
 Article 3(5): “The Commission, in liaison with the ECB …and, where appropriate, with the IMF, 
shall conduct regular review missions …to verify the progress made by that Member State…” 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 5). 
134
 MAPs are generally used as the set of structural adjustment policies upon which financial assistance 
by the EU-based EFSM, EFSF SA, ESM, etc is conditional; European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2013a, 5 
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to be compatible with the MAP (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2013a, 6-8). Finally, the process of Post-Programme Surveillance (PPS)
135
 is 
established, whereby the Troika conducts review missions to a Eurozone MS 
receiving financial assistance, after its program has ended and until it has repaid at 
least 75% of the assistance received (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2013a, 9). The second Two-Pack REG 473/2013 concerns perhaps one of the 
most democratically important supranational measures implemented during the crisis; 
the supranational evaluation of Eurozone MS national budgets before their enactment 
through relevant national provisions (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2013b, 13-18)
136
. Eurozone MS need to submit drafts of their national budgets 
to the EC for evaluation “in advance of becoming binding” (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2013b, 13). After the submission, the EC adopts an 
opinion on the draft budgets submitted, and, if discrepancies or non-compliance with 
obligations (e.g. SGP) are found, the Eurozone MS concerned needs to modify the 
budget in accordance with the EC’s opinion as soon as possible, and then re-submit it 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b, 19-20). The opinions 
of the EC, as well as the draft budgets, are transmitted to the EG for discussion 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b, 20). In addition to the 
above, Eurozone MS are to “report ex ante on their public debt issuance plans to the 
Eurogroup and the Commission” (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2013b, 13 and 20).  
This REC also introduces the Economic Partnership Programme (EPP), to be 
submitted by a Eurozone MS under an EDP (Eurozone MS under MAPs of REG 
472/2013 are exempted). The EPP includes “a number of specific priorities aiming to 
enhance competitiveness and long-term sustainable growth and addressing structural 
weaknesses,” and is additional to the National Reform or Stability Programmes 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b, 20-1). In terms of 
delegation, the EC is authorized to issue all delegated acts included in the REG, 
                                                 
135
 The corresponding IMF process is Post-Programme Monitoring (PPM), initiated when “a member’s 
outstanding credit in the General Resources Account…exceeds a threshold of 100 percent of quota” or 
in other cases were, for example, there are developments that call “into question the member’s progress 
toward external viability” (International Monetary Fund 2000). It “is intended to ensure the continued 
viability of a country's economic framework and provide early warning of policies that could 
jeopardize the country's external viability and, hence, its capacity to repay the IMF” (International 
Monetary Fund 2016g). 
136
 Article 6: “Member States shall submit annually to the Commission and to the Eurogroup a draft 
budgetary plan for the forthcoming year by 15 October. That draft budgetary plan shall be consistent 
with the recommendations issued in the context of the SGP …” (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2013b, 18). 
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unless opposed by the EP or CoM (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2013b, 22). Finally, provisions similar to those of REG 472/2013 above exist 
in relation to the ability of the EP to call for interview key actors or to be informed 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b, 22-3).  
 
6.3.10. Banking Union 
During the late-June 2012 Eurosummit, Eurozone MS leaders affirmed their 
intention to create “an effective single supervisory mechanism” for the national 
banking sector in order to “break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” 
(European Council 2012b). This was termed the “Banking Union” by the EC, and 
would assume oversight of the banking sector (European Commission 2012b, 1 and 7-
10). The banking union was legally established across 2013-14, and consists of the 
following (Council of the European Union 2014a through 2014c):  
 Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): Established in October 2013. It is based on 
CoM REG 1024/2013 and EP/CoM REG 1022/2013 (Council of the European Union 
2013c; European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013c). The first 
CoM REG “confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions” (Council of the European Union 2013c), 
while the second amends the EBA framework in light of such conferral (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013c).  
 Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM): Completed in July 2014. It is based on 
EP/CoM REG 806/2014 (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
2014a). The SRM will assume the responsibility for resolving failed banks of MS 
(European Commission 2014g).  
 Single Rulebook: Established across 2013-14. It is based on EP/CoM DIR 
2013/36/EU, EP/CoM REG 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Directive IV and 
Capital Requirements Regulation respectively), EP/CoM DIR 2014/49/EU (Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme Directive) and EP/CoM DIR 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive; European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013d 
and 2013e and 2014b and 2014c). The above “among other things, lay down capital 
requirements for banks, ensure better protection for depositors, and regulate the 
prevention and management of bank failures” (European Commission 2014g). 
 6.4. Conclusion  
 Taking into consideration the aforementioned analysis, Table 6 below 
comprehensively presents the EU-wide crisis measures, along with their respective 
participating EU/Eurozone MS.  
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Table 6: Supranational crisis measures and participants (data compiled by author; ranked by date)
137
  
MEASURES PARTICIPANTS 
Name  Category Date  Legislation  19 Eurozone MS 9 non-Eurozone MS 
EFSM Financial assistance  11-05-2010 CoM REG 407/2010    
EFSF SA Financial assistance  07-06-2010 Luxembourg Public Limited Company  × 
Euro Plus Pact 
Enhanced 
coordination 
25-03-2011 EUCO Conclusions  
 only Denmark, 
Poland, Romania. 
TFEU article 136 
amendment 
Financial assistance  25-03-2011 EUCO DEC 2011/199/EU   
ESM Financial assistance  
1
st
: 11-07-2011  
Final: 02-02-2012 
International (ESM) Treaty  × 
ESFS (ESAs) 
Enhanced 
coordination 
24-11-2010 
1) EP/CoM REG 1092/2010 (ESRB) 
2) EP/CoM REG 1093/2010 (EBA)                                        
3) EP/CoM REG 1094/2010 (EIOPA)                             
4) EP/CoM REG 1095/2010 (ESMA)                               
  
Six-Pack 
Enhanced 
coordination 
November 2011 
1) CoM DIR 2011/85/EU/                                                 
2) EP/CoM REG (EU) 1173/2011                                     
3) EP/CoM REG (EU) 1174/2011 
4) EP/CoM REG (EU) 1175/2011 (amends REG 1466/97)             
5) EP/CoM REG (EU) 1176/2011 
6) CoM REG (EU) 1177/2011 (amends REG 1467/97)                                          
 
 only for DIR 
2011/85/EU & REGs 
1175, 1176, 
1177/2011, except 
UK.  
TSCG 
Enhanced 
coordination 
02-03-2012 International Treaty  × 
Two-Pack  
Enhanced 
coordination 
21-05-2013 
1) EP/CoM REG (EU) 472/2013  
2) EP/CoM REG (EU) 473/2013  
 × 
Banking Union 
Enhanced 
coordination 
2013-2014    
(Decided: 29-06-2012) 
1) CoM REG 1024/2013, EP/CoM REG 1022/2013 (SSM)  
2) EP/CoM REG 806/2014 (SRM)                                                                
3) EP/CoM DIR 2013/36/EU, EP/CoM REG 575/2013, 
EP/CoM DIR 2014/49/EU, EP/CoM DIR 2014/59/EU 
(Single Rulebook) 
  
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 Sources as in throughout Chapter, and Tables 3 and 4. 
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A brief comment on Table 6 above should be made in relation to the integration levels 
of the EU. The data presented is indicative of the level of fragmented or differentiated 
integration
138
 across the EU (Stubb 1996). Even the sharp division between Eurozone 
and EU MS, integration-wise, now seems to fade, pushing the EU into a more a la 
carte direction. The response to the crisis has resulted in even more measures that 
provided the ability to EU MS to pick and choose “in which policy area they would 
like to participate” (Stubb 1996, 285). For example, the TSCG is an international 
treaty for Eurozone MS, in which EU MS, except three, participate, including one 
with a Eurozone opt-out (Denmark). The same situation, ceteris paribus, applies to the 
Euro Plus Pact (only one of the MS with opt-out joined). Another example is the Six-
Pack, whereby only half of the measures included apply to non-Eurozone MS, with 
the other half applying only to Eurozone MS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138
 “…the general mode of integration strategies which try to reconcile heterogeneity…” in the EU 
(Stubb 1996, 283).  
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Chapter 7: Supranational Measures Evaluation  
7.1. Introduction  
 The aim of this Chapter is to evaluate the EU-wide crisis measures in terms of 
their impact on the EU DD, through the use of the EU DD empirical framework 
constructed in Chapter 3. As outlined in Chapter 6 and Figure 1, the EU-wide crisis 
measures can be separated thematically across two main sub-categories: measures that 
concern the provision of financial assistance and measures that concern enhanced 
coordination between Eurozone/EU MS. To facilitate the analysis, this thematic 
distinction is maintained throughout this Chapter.  
In relation, specifically, to the first subcategory, i.e. financial assistance, it 
needs to be highlighted that, at least insofar as the focus of this assistance is Eurozone 
MS, this is a completely novel process and constitutes a combination of national-
supranational or supranational-international levels for the EU. For example, the use of 
EU institutions to monitor the implementation of MoUs raises issues in terms of EU 
legal and democratic processes. As regards the MoU/Loan Agreement process, the 
analysis of this Chapter focuses more on their abstract form and relation to the EU 
legal order, and less on the actual policies included in the MoUs or their adoption and 
implementation by the Eurozone MS concerned. Observations relating to this latter 
aspect are presented in more detail, both for Greece and in a comparative perspective 
for Ireland, in SECTION C of this research. The second subcategory (enhanced 
coordination)  includes and follows more mainstream processes of the EU, thus 
posing less of a procedural challenge to the existing status quo.  
The structure of this Chapter examines each of the four indicators of the EU 
DD empirical framework, as established in Chapter 3, within each of which the 
aforementioned sub-categorization of the EU-wide measures is maintained. To further 
facilitate the evaluation, the analysis of the impact on each of the indicators is broken 
down into more concise thematic areas. 
 
7.2. Indicator A: Key national policy areas, redistribution, delegation   
7.2.1. Key national policy areas, redistribution 
It is the case that most, if not all, of the measures assumed at the EU 
supranational level during the Eurozone crisis extensively affected key national policy 
areas with redistributive effects. Obviously, the more pertinent and more direct were 
those relevant to the financial assistance mechanisms: EFSM, EFSF SA and ESM. All 
three of these institutions included provisions granting considerable influence to EU 
supranational actors, particularly the EC, ECB and EG (or EG Working Group - 
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EWG) on key national policies, mainly through the MoU process and the structural 
adjustment policies included therein. Hence, the primary issue of concern here is the 
concept of the MoU itself, and whether it is covered, in any way, under the EU 
framework. Of particular importance is the element of conditionality of the MoU in 
relation to the EU status quo, since conditionality not only adds a very strong element 
of necessity in terms of abiding with the MoU provisions (otherwise the lack of 
funding can be disastrous), but is also enforced by EU institutions
139
. In terms of the 
EU-wide enhanced coordination measures, the issue of concern is provisions that, 
directly or indirectly, result in an increase in the ability of supranational actors to 
affect key national policy areas. 
In relation to the above issues, the EFSM arguably presents the most limited 
impact of the three mechanisms in terms of supranational level actors influencing 
national policy. This is precisely because, contrary to the EFSF SA and the ESM, it is 
an exclusively EU-based financial assistance mechanism (the other two are outside 
the EU legal framework as they are an international corporation and an international 
organization), which includes all EU MS both as potential lenders and borrowers.  
Because of its EU-based nature, it includes less provisions affecting the national 
policy realm, as it is constrained by the EU legal framework. In relation to the MoUs, 
it provisions that the MS concerned should prepare an “adjustment programme” to be 
approved by the CoM, which is then to be consistent with an MoU concluded between 
it and the EC (European Council 2010b, 2). Within the EFSM’s REG 407/2010, it is 
still provisioned that any activation of the EFSM would be done under “strong 
economic policy conditions” for the MS concerned, in order for it to achieve a 
financially sustainable position, but the nature of the economic policy conditions is 
not as specific as in latter measures
140
 (European Council 2010b, 1-3). 
Contrary to the above, issues in terms of the MoU process become 
increasingly problematic with the EFSF SA and the ESM. These institutions, contrary 
to the EFSM, were constructed specifically for providing assistance to Eurozone MS. 
This possibility is not included within the EU Treaties, hence these institutions were 
established outside the EU framework. In relation to the EFSF SA, MoUs and 
structural adjustment measures became much more specific compared to the EFSM. 
More importantly, as the EFSF SA is outside the EU framework, structural adjustment 
                                                 
139
 In any case the argument could be put forth, as in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP 
and Professor of Constitutional Law, that the MoUs are not international treaties or documents of a de 
jure binding character and that, instead, this character is de facto expressed through conditionality. A 
such, this is perhaps the most important area of the MoUs to be analyzed in relation to the EU DD. 
140
 In the EFSM REG, reference is made to “general economic policy conditions” accompanying the 
financial assistance (European Council 2010b, 1-3). 
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measures were only outlined in the MoU, with no equivalent EU-based structural 
adjustment program, compared to the  updated, post-2009 MTFA or the EFSM, which 
maintain the concept of an adjustment program in principle, with the MoU being its 
materialization (European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 2).  
In turn, the lack of foundation of the MoU in any EU-based process in the 
EFSF SA raises serious issues in terms of democratic process and accountability. 
Considering that the Eurozone MS are the sole shareholders of EFSF SA, and that the 
company exclusively employs EU institutions, the potential lack of any connection 
between the conditionality policies and the EU framework could be considered as an 
attempt to circumvent EU democratic safeguards in allowing EU-based formations 
(such as the EG or Eurosummit that, in this case, were identical to the EFSF SA 
meeting of the  Board of Directors) to make decisions outside the EU procedure and 
safeguards. Given the nature of this decisions, which included extensive impact on 
key national policy areas of the Eurozone MS requesting or receiving financial 
assistance, this would be democratically problematic. To avoid these issues, it is 
provisioned within the EFSF SA framework that the MoU is to be compatible with a 
TFEU article 136(1) DEC (European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 2 and 5). 
While not mandatory, in practice all MoUs under the EFSF SA framework were also 
reflected in a relevant EU DEC. More specifically:  
 Ireland received combined EFSM & EFSF SA financial assistance (Table 4). The 
assistance of the EFSM was based on CoM DEC 2011/77/EU/07-12-2010, and the 
relevant Irish EU MoU was agreed on 03-12-2010 (Council of the European Union 
2011a, 34; Republic of Ireland 2010, 1).  
 Portugal, similarly to Ireland, also received combined EFSM & EFSF SA financial 
assistance (Table 4). The EFSM assistance was based on CoM DEC 2011/344/EU and 
the relevant Portuguese EU MoU was agreed on 13-05-2011 (Council of the European 
Union 2011b, 88; European Commission 2011b, 38).  
 Greece, unlike Ireland and Portugal, received financial assistance only from the EFSF 
SA and not the EFSM (aside from the EFSM; Table 4). This was based, in relation to the 
policy-based aspect of the assistance
141
, on an MoU between EFSF SA, Greece, the 
Hellenic Financial Stability Fund and the Central Bank of Greece (European Financial 
Stability Facility 2012a, 1-4). The relevant EU-based decision CoM DEC 
2011/734/EU/12-07-2011
142
 under TFEU articles 126(9) and 136 (EDP). 
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 The financing aspect was based on a a Master FAFA (including various FAFAs) of 01-03-2012 
(European Financial Stability Facility 2012a, 1-4). 
142
 This is main recasting DEC of DEC 2010/320/EU/10-05-2010 (European Financial Stability Facility 
2012a, 3; Council of the European Union 2010d and 2011c). DEC 2010/320/EU was recast a number 
of other times through DECs 2010/486/EU/07-09-2010, 2011/57/EU/20-12-2010, 2011/257/EU/07-03-
2011, 2011/791/EU/08-11-2011, 2012/211/EU/13-03-2012, 2013/6/EU/04-12-2012 (Council of the 
European Union 2010c, 2010d, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e, 2011f, 2012a, 2013a).   
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Therefore, contrary to popular belief, in each of the cases of financial assistance by 
the EFSF SA, the conditional structural adjustment policies included in the MoUs had 
actually been also approved through a regular, EU-based process
143
.  
A similar provision is included in the now permanent ESM, whereby the MoU 
is to be in agreement with any act issued under EU-based legislation, with such 
provision, however, being set in a general manner and not specifying any EU 
legislative procedure (European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 29). This, then, appears 
to offer to the MoU process the democratic safeguards applicable in any other EU-
based decision-making process, since MoU measures are not included only in the 
framework of some international organization or corporation, but also have EU-based 
equivalents that have gone through the regular EU legislative process.  As the ECJ in 
case C-370/12 (Pringle) observed, “the conditions to be attached to the grant 
of...(financial) support to a Member Sate are, at least in part, determined by 
European Union law” (par. 174, European Court of Justice 2012). 
 In relation to the EU-based process, up to the establishment and use of the 
EFSF SA, as outlined above, it entailed the issuing of CoM acts, but without a unified 
EU legislative basis. After the ESM, the relevant Two-Pack REG 472/2013 
established the process of enhanced surveillance for Eurozone MS, which addresses 
the relationship between the MoU and any EU legislative acts. The process is to be 
activated, inter alia, when a Eurozone is requesting financial assistance from any EU-
based, or international institution (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2013a, 3-8). In this case, the MS concerned prepares, in cooperation with the 
Troika, a MAP, which is then approved by the CoM and its implementation monitored 
by the Troika (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 5-7)
144
. 
These provisions are a completely novel addition to the EU operating framework. The 
foundation of the entire REG is referenced as TFEU articles 136 and 121(6), but none 
of these two articles include provisions relevant to any MAP by a Eurozone MS, nor 
to the connection of this MAP with the MoU and, thus, the assumption of a 
conditional character by it.  
The above observations indicate that, contrary to popular belief, MoUs are not 
stand-alone documents that are completely outside the EU framework. The measures 
                                                 
143
 There may also be de jure problems in this case, as the EFSF SA MoU and CoM DEC connecting 
process was only really applied in the case of Greece. While Ireland and Portugal both also had CoM 
DECs outlining policies adopted in the MoU, these DECs did not fall under the provisions of Article 
2(1)(a) of the EFSF Framework Agreement, as they were not DECs under TFEU Article 136(1). 
Hence, technically, these were not covered under the provisions of the EFSF Framework Agreement. 
144
 The Troika also examines any MAP updates necessary (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2013a, 6). 
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outlined in the MoUs have, in one way or another, always had an equivalent EU-
based legislative act, which includes the MoU measures and was issued in accordance 
with the normal EU legislative procedure. Therefore, the problem in relation to the 
MoUs is not, as often perceived, the absence of any EU participation in the measures 
included but, instead, whether these EU-based acts that are relevant to the MoU 
measures are sufficiently provisioned within the EU framework, i.e. whether they 
accommodate the conditional character of the MoUs.  
The element of conditionality, while a key characteristic of the MoUs and the 
entire financial assistance process, is absent, at least in this form, from the EU 
operating framework. Through the connection of the MoU with the EU-based legal 
instruments, a conditional character seems to be added to these instruments, which 
they do not, by mandate, have. In fact, the only case where conditionality appears 
within the EU is in TFEU article 122(2) which stipulates that the EU “may grant, 
under certain conditions, Union financial assistance…,” (European Union 2012, 98). 
This, by extension, applies to the EFSM as well. The addition of conditionality in this 
case has its basis on the prepatory work for the Treaty of Maastricht, where it was 
emphasized that a financial support scheme should be set in order to assist Member 
States facing serious financial difficulties, and that it should be attached to positive 
conditionality
145
 (European Union 1991, 24 & 54). As financial assistance is given on 
condition that structural adjustment policies are implemented, i.e. belongs to positive 
conditionality, this could be argued to fall within the EU Treaties process, at least 
insofar as the process of TFEU article 122(1) is concerned (although this principle 
could be conceivably equally extended to any EU-based financial assistance scheme 
as well). Through this interpretation, the EU could be considered to be entitled, upon 
providing financial assistance to Eurozone MS, to attach certain policy conditions to 
it.  
There is no definite legal interpretation of this issue, and it is also important to 
highlight that the concept of conditionality appears only in relation to TFEU article 
122(2) and, therefore, would apply only to the assistance programs of Ireland and 
Portugal in relation to the EFSF SA, and not to that of Greece, or any other MoU-
equivalent EU legislative act in relation to an ESM programme. Even in the cases of 
Ireland and Portugal, as observed above, the EFSM framework, precisely because of 
its EU-based nature, includes provisions related to more general economic conditions 
than those included in the MoUs and, hence, this could also be conceived as a 
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 Positive conditionality can be defined as entailing “promising benefits to a state if it 
fulfills…conditions,” while negative conditionality “involves reducing, suspending, or terminating 
those benefits if the state violates the conditions” (Smith 2005, 23). 
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potential incompatibility between the EFSM framework and the MoU. However, 
more broadly in relation to conditionality and the EFSF SA and ESM, and considering 
the aforementioned observations, it seems technically acceptable for the EU to add a 
conditionality character to the provision of financial assistance. This contradicts the 
popular belief that the MoU measures are democratically challenging because they are 
outside the EU process. 
What do the above demonstrate in relation to the EU DD? It is evident that 
through the MoU/MAP process, supranational actors have now increased decision-
making and monitoring capacity in relation to Eurozone MS key national policies. 
However, this is provisioned in both international instruments for financial assistance 
(MoUs) as well as EU-based instruments (CoM DECs or MAPs). The question, then, 
is not, as often throught, whether the EU, as an organization, partakes in the MoU 
policies but whether the mode of participation of the EU in these policies is really 
possible, i.e. whether the EU framework, and the ability of EU institutions to affect 
key national policies of MS through the MoU/MAP process, include the concept of 
detailed conditionality. In this case, it seems that conditionality is estranged to the 
purpose and, mostly, mandate, of the EU-based legislation equivalent to the MoU 
measures and relevant authorizations given to EU institutions. In other words, EU 
institutions partaking in the financial assistance process do not seem to have the 
mandate to impose conditionality in relation to specific policies to be implemented by 
a Eurozone MS. Therefore, the issue in relation to the MoU process is not so much 
that EU institutions may have gained new ability to influence key national policy 
areas (which is examined later individually for institution), but rather that they can do 
so in a way that is different from the EU operating framework. Through 
conditionality, supranational institutions have gained not only decision-making 
authority but also power in implementing the outcome of this authority. Furthermore, 
the mostly technocratic character of these institutions makes this quite challenging in 
terms of legitimacy, and the lack of specific procedures on how the MAP/MoU 
process is to be conducted makes accountability quite difficult.  
 In terms of EU-wide measures aimed at enhanced coordination between MS, 
those too seem to include various provisions that, directly or indirectly, provide for 
more influence of supranational actors in key national policy areas. What is more, this 
influence, as opposed to that obtained through the financial assistance process, is 
permanent. A first example is the Euro Plus Pact. Although technically founded on a 
voluntary basis, the measures included aim at further coordination of policies that lie 
outside EU competences, most of which (such as employment and taxation) are 
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considered key for the national level. It is the case that the effect of the Pact has been 
limited, both because of its ambiguous, mostly unbinding, legal nature (OMC), as 
well as of its methods of implementation (peer-review & peer-pressure). However, the 
Pact could be conceived as a first step towards a more formal process, which will 
include more supranational institutions affecting these key national policy areas at a 
later stage.   
A more pertinent impact on key national policy areas relating to the EU-wide 
enhanced coordination crisis measures is through the Six-Pack. DIR 2011/85/EU 
introduces specific numerical fiscal rules, which are to be reflected on the budget and 
budgetary process of all EU MS (Council of the European Union 2011g, 42-45). To 
ensure consistent implementation of these rules, the DIR further introduces the three-
year MTBF, which shifts the focus of supranational level influence from the annual 
basis that the MS budgets were established until now to the medium-term, further 
provisioning that each annual budget has to be in line with the MTBF (Council of the 
European Union 2011g, 46). What happens if a new government, with different policy 
priorities, is elected mid-way through the MTBF? To cover for this possibility, article 
11 of the DIR further provides that a new government may pursue new policy 
priorities and adapt the MTBF accordingly, but in this case, “the new government 
shall indicate the differences from the previous medium-term budgetary framework” 
(Council of the European Union 2011g, 46). This provision does not really safeguard 
the democratic process as much as establish the minimum respect for its core, i.e. 
representative authority in key national policies (mostly encapsulated in the budgetary 
process). Furthermore, in subsequent legislation that includes specific provisions 
relevant to the MTBF, such as in REG 1175/2011, this stipulation of the ability of an 
MS government to alter the MTBF is not referenced at all (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2011e).  
Observations relevant to key national policy areas are even less encouraging 
throughout Six-Pack REGs 1175/2011 and 1176/2011. The first amends the 
preventive part of the SGP, and introduces the concept of a European Semester, 
whereby the budgetary process and related issues (e.g. debt issuance) are 
synchronized across the entire EU (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2011e, 15). Within this REG it is provisioned that any acts relevant to the 
provisions of TFEU article 121, are to be taken under consideration by a MS before 
any key budgetary decisions (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 
2011e, 15). If deviations are observed, then RECs issued may include specific 
measures (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e, 15). In this 
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case, the stipulation that the relevant measures are to be taken prior the approval of 
the national budgets, obviously increases the influence of the relevant acts vis-à-vis 
key national policy areas. In addition, it is provisioned that the guidelines issued in 
cases of deviation are to be specific, compared to the previous, more general, 
framework. Finally,  issues of compatibility with the TFEU are also raised, since 
article 121 does not provide for the ability of EU institutions to adopt RECs that 
include specific measures, but only of “broad guidelines of economic policies of the 
Member States and of the Union” (European Union 2012, 97).  
 Similar compatibility issues are raised in relation to REG 1176/2011, which 
introduces the EIP
146
. Again, the TFEU basis for this REG is questionable. The EIP is 
placed under TFEU article 121(3) and 121(4) (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2011h, 25). The former provides for the ability of EU institutions to 
“monitor economic developments in each of the Member States and in the Union as 
well as the consistency of economic policies with the broad guidelines” (European 
Union 2012, 97). It is, then, ambiguous as to whether economic developments can 
envelope the entirely new process of EIP, especially considering that the EIP includes, 
as mentioned above, “specific rules”147. Furthermore, the fact that EIP is an addition 
and does not replace the existing article 121 procedure suggests that this is not process 
within the article itself, but rather an exogenous element added through this REG. 
Relevant concerns arise in relation to Article 8(1) of the REG, whereby it is 
provisioned that any MS under an EIP “shall submit a corrective action plan to the 
Council and the Commission […] (which) shall set out the specific policy actions…” 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011h, 30). However, within 
the process of TFEU article 121, only EU institutions may proceed with PROPs, OPs, 
or RECs in relation to deviations from the broad economic guidelines set. It is a one-
way system, with no provisions under which the submission of a specific plan by the 
MS concerned, which would, in fact, include detailed measures and timetables, could 
be placed. Even more important issues in relation to this REG are raised in relation to 
the imposition of fines or deposits to Eurozone MS that have been observed to 
consistently not conform to the above RECs (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2011h, 27). The imposition of monetary penalties, or the possibility 
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 This process is similar to the EDP, but relevant to macroeconomic imbalances of EU MS (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011h, 30). 
147
 In relation to these concerns, there is the provision of TFEU article 121(6) that the EP and CoM can 
issue REGs in establishing “detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedures” of articles 
121(3) and 121(4) (European Union 2012, 98). It still, however, doubtful whether this allows for 
extending at such degree, and in some cases actually adding, new processes based on or within TFEU 
article 121.  
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for the introduction of a relevant measure, is not provided for anywhere within TFEU 
article 121.  
In the case of REG 1176/2011, therefore, there is the addition of yet another 
entirely new procedure of monitoring and sanctioning of public finances by the 
supranational level. Supranational actors acquire new abilities to scrutinize and more 
closely monitor national level policies, and impose sanctions (in this case primarily in 
relation to economic policy) in many cases going beyond relevant EU Treaty 
provisions. This, in turn, also leads to concerns over the legal foundation of these 
processes. As these policies directly affect the budgetary process of EU MS, one of 
the core national policy areas, strict adherence to the principle of conferral
148
 should 
be observed. In addition, provisions in relation to participation of civil society or 
representative structure are minimal.   
The above concerns are also relevant to the new ESAs. Their upgrade from 3
rd
 
level Committees to Authorities provided for an increase in their decision-making 
capacity, now obtaining the capability for initiating and enforcing mandatory policies 
and supervision within the national realm of EU MS. Formerly, as Committees, the 
role was mainly restricted to advisory functions for the EC (e.g. European 
Commission 2004c, 3). Similarly, the Banking Union also considerably increases the 
impact of supranational actors over key national policy areas and, more specifically, 
the MS banking sector. This is important, as the banking sector is key in relation to 
the private economic realm. More specifically, through the SSM, the ECB directly 
oversees and supervises large financial banks (the rest remain under national 
supervision; European Commission 2014g). According to the Chair of the Board of 
Directors of the National Bank of Greece and President of the Hellenic Bank 
Association, Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, there are 128 signifcant banks and groups 
throughout the EU “that are under the oversight of the SSM”149. In addition, the SSM 
also approves each Board member of those banks using “fit and proper criteria.”150 
A more compounded effect of the supranational level on the national level 
banking sector is through the SRM. Under the previous framework (DIR 
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 TEU article 4(1) provides that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain 
with the Member States” (European Union 2012, 18). Specifically, the Principle of Conferral is defined 
in TEU article 5(2), and stipulates that “under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only 
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein. competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States” (European Union 2012, 18).  
149
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of Employment and Social Security 
(2010-2011)  . 
150
 ibid. 
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2014/59/EU), “each Member State shall designate one or, exceptionally, more 
resolution authorities that are empowered to apply the resolution tools and exercise 
the resolution powers” (Council of the European Union 2014e, 219). However,  under 
the new SRM framework,  
where…,the Board performs tasks and exercises power which …are to 
be performed or exercised by the national resolution authority, the 
Board shall… be considered to be the relevant national authority 
(Council of the European Union 2014d, 25). 
In other words, the SRM now takes full control of relevant financial entities resolution 
over from the national level.  
 Even more democratic concerns are raised in relation to the enhanced 
coordination measures that are solely focused on Eurozone MS are even more 
democratically problematic. The TSCG provides for a stricter form of economic 
policy coordination, setting specific limits for when a budget is to be considered 
balanced (maximum 0.5% GDP structural deficit) and for a specific 1/20 rate per year 
reduction of the debt if it is in excess of 60% GDP, going beyond the commitments 
referenced within the EU Treaties (European Council 2012a, 9-11 and 14). 
Furthermore, a number of requirements in relation to fiscal policy of Eurozone MS 
are established, which are in addition to the existing EU framework, such as ex ante 
reporting on debt issuance and discussion among all Eurozone MS of major economic 
reforms to be undertaken by one of them (European Council 2012a, 15 and 18).  
These provisions clearly place additional burden on MS budgets to conform yet to 
another criterion which, however, is not provisioned anywhere within the EU 
framework. As such, this constitutes a direct and additional influence of the 
supranational level into the budgetary process of Eurozone MS by the supranational 
level, and in fact through provisions outside the EU framework.  
 Perhaps the most democratically questionable provision of the TSCG is the 
obligation undertaken by signatories to introduce a correction mechanism activated 
automatically when divergence is observed from the MTBF targets (European 
Council 2012a, 11-12). This mechanism is to be established through “provisions of 
binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise 
guaranteed to be… adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes,” and to 
be based on common principles proposed by the EC (European Council 2012a, 12). In 
this case there are several concerns.  
 To begin with, this provision disregards any constitutional, socio-political, and 
fiscal traditions and existing conceptualizations within different Eurozone MS. While 
in some MS a debt-break might be considered acceptable, in others it might not. What 
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is more, even in the case where a debt-break is introduced, the TSCG provisions that 
this is to be done in accordance with the guidelines provided by a technocratic, 
supranational actor: the EC. No ability is provided in terms of civil society or other 
national institutional actors influencing this process and its outcome. Furthermore, 
this provision does not only bind the administration at the time of the TSCG, but also 
the following ones, and does so for an issue of the utmost importance for the state: the 
budget. Therefore, it does not only increase the ability of the supranational level to 
influence the most important policy area of a MS, but also reduces the national level 
authority vis-à-vis the supranational level (of which the instruments, and particularly 
the EC, enjoy increased decision-making and technical authority). As of the cut-off 
date of this research, there are 6 EU MS (5 Eurozone and 1 non-Eurozone)
 
that have 
introduced a balanced-budget rule
151
.  
Issues of increased delegation in relation to key national policy areas are also 
raised in the Two-Pack. REG 472/2013 establishes the process of enhanced 
surveillance for Eurozone MS to be activated when a Eurozone MS is “experiencing 
or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to… (their) financial stability 
which are likely to have adverse spill-over effects on other Member States in the euro 
area,” or when it is requesting financial assistance from any EU MS-based, or 
international institutions (e.g. IMF, etc.; European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2013a, 3-8).  
When a Eurozone MS is under enhanced surveillance, then it, in cooperation 
with the Troika and the relevant ESAs and ESRB where appropriate, adopts 
“measures aimed at addressing the sources or potential sources of difficulties” 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 4). The Troika is also 
to conduct monitoring and review missions to the Eurozone MS concerned, to 
determine the progress made in relation to these targets (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2013a, 5). If it is determined that further measures are 
needed and the CoM adopts a relevant DEC, or when the Eurozone MS requests 
financial assistance, then the MS prepares a MAP, which is approved by CoM after an 
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 In terms of the Eurozone MS, Germany was the first to introduce it in 2009 (termed 
“Schuldenbremse”). This constituted the model upon which it was agreed by the then French President 
and German Chancellor that the relevant Eurozone-wide provisions should be based (The Economist 
2011a). In November 2011, Austria also introduced similar legislation, with the purpose of 
incorporating it into the constitution (Schneeweiss 2011). During 2011 the Spanish government also 
introduced “a German-style ‘golden rule’ deficit cap,” into the constitution (The Economist 2011b; 
BBC 2011c). In 2012, Italy passed legislation amending the constitution “to make future governments 
run balanced budgets” (Mackenzie & Heavens 2012). Lastly, Slovenia passed legislation amending the 
constitution for a budget-spending cuts in 2013, to become effective from 2015 onwards (Rousek 
2013). In terms of EU MS, “Poland has a self-imposed debt threshold of 55% of GDP […] The Polish 
constitution prohibits borrowing if debt hits 60% of GDP” (Sobczyk 2011). 
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EC PROP and its implementation is monitored by the Troika (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2013a, 5-7). The Troika also examines any MAP 
updates necessary, cooperates closely with the Eurozone MS concerned to “take 
measures... aiming to reinforce the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue collection 
capacity and the fight against tax fraud and evasion,” and, specifically in relation to 
financial assistance programmes, maintains its monitoring capacity until at least 75% 
of the amount of financial assistance received is repaid (PPS)
152
. It is worth noting 
that the duration of the PPS may be extended by the CoM upon an EC PROP 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 6). 
There are a few concerns that should be addressed in relation to this REG, the 
primary one of which is the extension of the Troika review missions and of the MAP 
to Eurozone MS that are not in a financial assistance program. Until this REG was 
issued, the Troika had the responsibility of negotiating and monitoring the 
implementation of a financial assistance program of a Eurozone MS. This REG does 
not only recognise and establish the Troika within the EU legal framework, but 
further extends its use beyond financial assistance, making it a permanent structure 
within the EU framework. Similarly, the EU-based adjustment program for Eurozone 
MS receiving financial assistance is extended, through the concept of the MAP, to 
cases of Eurozone MS that are not under a financial assistance programme. In this 
way, a Eurozone MS that is deemed suffering from difficulties in relation to its 
financial stability is monitored by the Troika even if it has not requested any financial 
assistance and, should the measures it adopts not prove sufficient, then it has to 
negotiate a MAP with the Troika, again, even though it is not receiving any financial 
assistance. This is a crucial REG, as it extends the ability of supranational actors to 
affect directly key national policy areas, even in cases where no financial assistance is 
provided. What is more, the REG provisions explicitly the influence of the Troika, 
consisting of three fully technocratic, non-majoritarian institutions, in the area of 
taxation and combating fraud, otherwise one of the most important policy areas of a 
state. Finally, the PPS process raises serious concerns, as this indicates that Troika 
oversight and influence can be extended for a considerable amount of time after 
financial assistance has ended. 
The importance of this REG lise mostly in relation to the Troika and its 
authority. One aspect of this issue is the almost permanent participation of the IMF 
within the EU/Eurozone. This demonstrates considerable weaknesses on the part of 
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 The Troika is also responsible for preparing a Debt Sustainability Analysis for Eurozone MS 
receiving financial assistance (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 9). 
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the EU and raises serious concerns in terms of democratic process and influence over 
key national policy areas
153
, at the very least for Eurozone MS outside a financial 
assistance program. Why did the IMF participate in the first place? As both the 
Governor of the Bank of Greece and Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras and Prof. 
Evangelos Venizelos suggest, the participation of the IMF was because a choice of the 
German government and Chancellor
154
. The Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos further 
explained that this choice was made  
to express lack of trust to the EC, because the EC did not predict the crisis and 
to counter it, and because it (German government) judged that it (the EC) did 
not have the expertise and strictness vis-à-vis governments; that it is more 
lenient towards governments of MS in crisis
155
.  
IMF’s participation poses considerable challenges to the governance not only 
of the Eurozone, but of the entire EU. As the Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras, Governor 
of the Bank of Greece, suggests “the role of the IMF was not, in the end, positive […] 
it would be best if it did not exist (within the Eurozone framework). It has a very high 
level of expertise, but it also has obsessions in various issues, and it also has 
expensive loans: 4.5% interest rate while the ESM has less than 1%”156. After all, it 
has been argued that the involvement of the IMF within the Eurozone “would be felt 
as an admission that the eurozone is incapable of dealing with its internal problems 
and that it needs help from “Washington” […] (and) would be seen as a blow to EU 
surveillance and in particular to the stability and growth pact (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 
2010 and more generally Featherstone 2011, 203). The challenges raised are not only 
from an economic or political economy perspective, but also from a democratic 
one
157. The process of the IMF’s participation, while typically covered (IMF is invited 
to sit on EG meetings, etc), has been argued to raise serious questions about the EU 
democratic process and the juxtaposition between the external nature of the IMF to 
this process and its, now permanent, participation in Eurozone/EU affairs
158
. This 
indicates that the IMF has, de facto, become a permanent institutional aspect of the 
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 This argument was also raised in the interview with the former ECJ judge.  
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 From the interviews with the Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of Greece, 
Professor of Economics and, inter alia, former FinM, and with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, MP 
of Greek Parliament, Professor of Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
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 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, MP of Greek Parliament, Professor of 
Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
156
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of Greece, former 
FinM and Professor of Economics. 
157
 From the interview with the former ECJ judge.  
158
 ibid. 
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EU and Euroozone, while also constituting the most major indirect influence of the 
USA in Eurozone affairs
159
. 
The other Two-Pack REG 473/2013 sets unified time limits for submission 
and adoption of the national budget, the MTBF, etc. for all Eurozone MS, thus 
harmonizing the budgetary process. This REG also includes perhaps the most 
fundamental crisis measure of supranational influence in key national policy areas, 
and perhaps one of the most important steps in Eurozone, and more broad EU 
economic (or at least fiscal) integration
160
: oversight of national budgets, prior their 
adoption, by supranational level institutions (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2013b, 17). The process  includes the obligation of Eurozone MS to 
submit their draft budgets, i.e. before they are adopted by the respective national 
legislatures, to the EC and the EG for evaluation (European Parliament & Council of 
the European Union 2013b, 18). The EC issues an OP on the draft budget of each 
Eurozone MS; if the EC “identifies particularly serious non-compliance with the 
budgetary policy obligations laid down in the SGP,” it requests a modification of the 
draft budget accordingly (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 
2013b, 18-9). The EG then discusses the draft budgets and relevant EC OPs 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b, 20). 
This constitutes a truly landmark measure not only within the Eurozone, but 
within the EU in general. This the first time that supranational actors, and in-fact one 
of them being exclusively technocratic, obtain such direct access and ability to affect 
the principal domestic policy issue that is otherwise a matter for a representative 
institution (the national parliament): the budget. Not only that, but the REG provisions 
the obligations of the Eurozone MS to conform to modifications of their draft budgets 
proposed by these actors, before even submitting for consideration in Parliament. 
There is an obvious legitimizing problem here, not only because of the mere fact of 
the overview of the budgets by supranational actors, but also because of the provision 
of the draft budget to be modified prior to its deposit in parliament. In other words, 
this REG essentially adds two completely new institutional actors in the budgetary 
process of each MS. 
In addition, there is no provision upon which reviewing of national budgets by 
a supranational technocratic actor can be based upon, and no such mandate is 
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 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Evangelos Venizelos, MP of Greek Parliament, Professor of 
Constitutional Law and, inter alia, former Deputy PM and FinM. 
160
 This argument was also raised in the interviews with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor 
of Constitutional Law, with  Prof. Dimitris Chryssochoou, Professor of Theory and Institutions of 
European Integration, and with Dr. Lina Papadopoulou, Associate Professor of Constitutional Law.  
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provided within the EU Treaties. In fact, given the sensitivity of the budget for a state, 
not only in relation to key national policy but also as a core instrument of the 
expression of sovereignty and self-governance, again the principle of conferral should 
be fully observed. Even if supranational scrutiny over national budgets is considered 
democratically acceptable, the EC is a completely technocratic, non-elected actor, 
with little legitimacy and accountability to provide opinions over the national budgets, 
and even less to scrutinize it, bearing in mind that it is entirely different, both in 
structure, purpose and, more importantly, in legitimacy and accountability provisions, 
from respective Independent Fiscal Institutions, such as the Office of Budget 
Responsibility in the United Kingdom (International Monetary Fund 2016h). That is, 
there are no equivalent legitimation mechanisms in terms of the EC, but also the EG, 
influencing the national budget of Eurozone MS
161
. REG 473/2013 also includes a 
reinforced process in relation to the EDP for Eurozone MS. If a Eurozone MS is 
deemed to be under EDP by the CoM, then it is to present an Economic Partnership 
Programme (EPP) “describing the policy measures and structural reforms that are 
needed to ensure an effective and lasting correction of the excessive deficit…” 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b, 20).  
 Overall, it is evident that, either through financial assistance mechanisms, or 
through enhanced coordination measures, supranational actors have gained 
considerably increased decision-making capacity in terms of national key policy 
areas, most with redistributive effects, especially when compared with their previous 
authority. However, this is often found in different areas than commonly perceived. 
For example, it is widely considered that the problem regarding MoU policies is that 
they lie outside the EU framework, while it was found that, actually, all MoUs have 
corresponding, EU legislation counterparts. The issue in this case is not the absence of 
EU-based relevant processes, but the extension of these processes so as to 
accommodate the connection with the MoU, i.e. the fact that conditionality is 
potentially incompatible with the purpose and mandate of both the corresponding EU 
legislation and the supranational actors included in it. Furthermore, in many cases 
supranational actors are able to directly monitor and affect a wide range of important 
economic or budgetary issues, and are able to even impose sanctions, culminating in 
the ability to monitor and scrutinize the entire budget. This is considerably 
problematic in terms of legitimacy of these actors to influence these policies, since 
they are either technocratic or an intergovernmental formation. How legitimate is the 
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 This argument was raised in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of 
Constitutional Law.  
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FinM of Austria to decide on issues relevant to the Greek budget, even if they have 
been elected (appointed by the legislature) and are held accountable by the Austrian 
people (and vice versa)? Furthermore, considering that the exact processes for 
exerting this influence is never fully delineated, and, in many cases is either intensely 
technocratic or held behind closed doors (e.g. EG when deliberating on the Eurozone 
MS budgets), it is difficult to exercise proper accountability, as there is little 
transparency and rules as to how these provisions are actually implemented and who 
is responsible.  
 
7.2.2. EC Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity  
 As analyzed in detail in section 3.5.1, Indicator A of the EU DD includes not 
only an investigation of how the supranational level can affect key national policies of 
the MS, but also the overall level of delegation in terms of supranational institutions 
(except the EP, which is examined separately in Indicator B of the EU DD). That is, 
have EU institutions gained more or less decision-making authority, or has there been 
no change? The first of the institutions examined is the EC.  
 The EC has acquired considerably more decision-making authority through the 
measures adopted to provide financial assistance to Eurozone MS.  In the EFSM 
framework, the authority of the EC remains relatively stable in reference to its 
previous authority to monitor structural adjustment policies implemented by MS in 
the pre-existing MTFA. However, the EFSF SA Framework Agreement includes a 
stipulation that all the Eurozone MS agree to task the EC with performing certain 
duties under this Agreement (European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 3)
162
. Those 
duties entail, inter alia, the negotiation and agreement with Eurozone MS concerned 
on the MoU (along with the rest of the Troika), and the monitoring of its 
implementation with the ECB (European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 5 and 12). 
The EC undertakes similar duties under the, now permanent, ESM, and is authorized 
(European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 6 and 28-31):  
a. with the ECB, to assess whether there is a risk for the Eurozone by the difficulties 
experienced by the MS concerned, 
b. with the ECB/IMF, to determine the sustainability of the debt of the MS concerned,  
c. with the ECB, to assess the financing needs of the MS concerned,  
d. with the ECB/IMF, to negotiate the MoU, on behalf of the ESM, with the MS 
concerned,   
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 It needs to be highlighted that within the EFSF SA, the Troika assumes full form in negotiating and 
monitoring MoUs. As stipulated in Article 2(1)(a) “the Commission (in liaison with the ECB and the 
IMF) shall be hereby authorised to negotiate the MoU with the relevant Beneficiary Member State ….” 
(European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 5).  
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e. to sign the MoU, on behalf of the ESM and subject to prior approval by the 
organization’s Board of Governors (Eurozone MS), with the MS concerned, 
f. with the ECB/IMF, to monitor compliance of the MS concerned with the MoU policy 
conditionality. 
g. with the ECB, to determine whether the amount of an ESM precautionary financial 
assistance credit line (Article 14 of the ESM Treaty) is sufficient to cover the 
financing needs of the MS concerned 
As compared to the pre-ESM tasks of the EC, the following can be observed. Point (a) 
is broadly covered as tasks assigned to the EC even before the ESM, through TFEU 
provisions of monitoring financial stability of the Eurozone (e.g. TFEU article 136; 
European Union 2012, 104) or entire EU (e.g. TFEU articles 121 or 126; European 
Union 2012, 97 and 99-100). Points (c), (d), (e), (f) did also apply to the EC prior to 
the ESM, through the MTFA process [e.g. respectively articles 3(2), 3a, 5 of REG 
332/2002; Council of the European Union 2002, 4-5].  
 However, neither the EFSF SA nor the ESM are technically part of the EU 
legal order. As such, any authority delegated to the EC is not derived from a CoM-
issued REG or DEC and, thus, from the EU Treaties (as is the case under the MTFA 
or EFSM). In this case, the EC no longer operates within the EU legal framework, and 
so becomes an international rather than an EU institution (even if only typically, since 
only Eurozone MS signed and are allowed to enter the agreement). The first issue to 
investigate, then, is whether an international organization or entity can use the EC 
outside the EU legal order. Per settled ECJ precedent
163
, it is not forbidden to utilize 
EU institutions in relation to agreements outside the EU law framework, under the 
condition
164
 that the tasks assigned “do not alter the essential power conferred on 
those institutions” by the TFEU/TEU (par. 162, European Court of Justice 2012). Is 
this condition met?  
The ECJ, in case C-370/12, held that the tasks entrusted to the EC and the 
ECB in relation to the ESM did not, in fact, alter their character and, in any case, did 
not “entail any power to make decisions of their own” (par. 160 & 161, European 
Court of Justice 2012. However, the analysis presented above suggests that the EC has 
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 In ECJ joined cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 (Parliament v. Council & Commission) and case C-
316/91 (Parliament v. Council), it was held by the ECJ that when the EU’s competence in a field is not 
exclusive, as is the case in financial assistance (the ECJ also held that the broad framework of the ESM 
falls under economic policy, in which, again, the EU does not have exclusive competence; par. 160, 
European Court of Justice 2012), then MS can enter into commitments outside the EU framework and 
that there is no provision preventing MS “from entrusting the Commission with the task of coordinating 
a collective action undertaken by them” (par. 120, European Court of Justice 2012; par. 20 and 
generally 16, European Court of Justice 1993; generally par. 26 & 41, European Court of Justice 1994) 
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 In accordance with, among others, ECJ Opinions 1/92 and 1/09, which examined cases of 
agreements between MS assigning duties to EU institutions that were outside the EU framework 
(relevant par. 32 & 41, European Court of Justice 1992 and par. 75, European Court of Justice 2011). 
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had its decision-making capacity de facto increased, and its character was altered 
considerably through the duties assigned to them in relevance to financial assistance. 
For example, the EC did not previously enjoy such binding authority (through 
conditionality of financial assistance) and influence over so many different policy 
areas, many of which outside the competence of the EU (e.g. budgetary measures, 
taxation, defense, etc). Furthermore, the fundamental character of the EU is to 
promote the interest of the entire EU, whereas here the EC is transformed into a key 
decision-making actor in relation to specific policies of one MS, while representing 
only a certain portion of the other MS.  
In addition, while tasks broadly similar to those undertaken by the EC in 
relation to the EFSF SA/ESM were also previously assigned to it under the pre-
existing MTFA, these concerned only non-Eurozone MS and were assigned directly 
to the EC through an EU legislative instrument, which includes the entirety of the EU, 
i.e. a CoM REG. Only in 2013 was a similar provision included for the EFSF 
SA/ESM in relation to the EC’s role (REG 472/2013), and this was still very indirect 
and limited to proposing that the Troika negotiates the MAP with the Eurozone MS 
concerned and monitors the its implementation, and that the EC ensures the 
consistency of the MAP with the MoU (as outlined in section 7.2.1 above). Therefore, 
although the actual tasks of the aforementioned points with which the EC is entrusted 
in the case of the ESM may be argued to be similar to those under the MTFA, the 
legislative gap and relevant differences are apparent. Furthermore, even if it is 
considered that the condition for using the EC outside the EU framework is met, there 
are further issues to be raised in relation to whether, when performing tasks under this 
capacity, the EC is bound by primary EU law and the rights protected therein
165
. The 
EC claims that, when operating under the aforementioned capacity, it is not bound by 
these restrictions
166
. 
In addition to the above, the EC acquires increased ability to influence national 
policy through the Troika but in processes beyond financial assistance in REG 
472/2013. Through the process of enhanced surveillance, the Troika can conduct the 
exact same activities as it can for Eurozone MS under financial assistance, but this 
time for Eurozone MS that are facing or merely threatened with financial difficulties.  
This includes on-site monitoring as well as deliberations between the MS concerned 
and the Troika in relation to measures to be assumed and/or the MAP (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 3-5). Moreover, as it has been 
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 From the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of Constitutional Law.  
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presented above, the PPS of Eurozone MS under a financial assistance program may 
be prolonged beyond the mark of 75% of assistance being repaid. This is decided by 
the CoM after an EC PROP. However, this PROP can be rejected only if RQMV is 
achieved in the CoM, which is, in itself, much more difficult than not achieving a 
QMV.  Through this provision, it is not only the case that the EC can continue to 
affect these policy areas long after the financial assistance program has concluded, but 
can, by its own decision, extend the monitoring even beyond the threshold set under 
the REG.   
Even if it is considered that the EC can perform the aforementioned 
monitoring, it is not clear upon which legal foundation this monitoring can become 
conditional for the MS receiving financial assistance. In fact, as it has been 
demonstrated further above, the EU-based equivalents are stretched in order to 
assume the conditional character of the MoU, which is mostly contrary to their 
mandate and purpose. More to the point, however, the EC, when operating within the 
Troika, seems to have also undermined a considerable portion of the values it is to 
defend (employment, labour market collective agreements, etc.), as well as to have 
exceeded its institutional mandate (primarily in relation to the conditional character 
that its actions now assume under the Troika-MAP/MoU process). In accordance with 
the TEU, the EC is to propose new laws to the EP and EUCO, to manage the EU’s 
budget, to enforce EU law, and to represent the EU internationally (European 
Commission 2014a & 2014b). It “represents the interests of Europe as a whole (as 
opposed to the interests of individual countries) [sic]” (European Commission 
2014b). Through its participation to the Troika, the EC seems to have gained strong 
decision-making capacity in areas falling outside its, and in many cases the EU’s, 
jurisdiction and competence (e.g. taxation or wages). In addition, making policy in 
such areas may create or promote divisions between different MS, and may better 
represent the interests of some, versus all, EU MS.  
Furthermore, the roles assumed by the EC seem to be somewhat prone to 
controversy and potential conflict of interest, as the EC is both the negotiator, enforcer 
and overseer of the agreements reached in relation to financial assistance. This was 
also highlighted in the EP Report on the Troika
167
, which suggests that:  
...there is a potential conflict of interest within the Commission between its 
role in the Troika and its responsibility as guardian of the Treaties and the 
acquis communautaire, especially …with regard to Member States’ wage and 
social policy, an area in which the Commission has no competence, as well as 
respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; points 
                                                 
167
 Procedure 2013/2277(INI) 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 122  
out that such a situation contrasts with the Commission’s normal role” 
(European Parliament 2014a).   
The augmenting of the EC’s decision-making capacity is also considerable in 
relation to the set of measures aimed at further economic coordination of EU MS. 
Across the Six-Pack it is clear that the EC is given considerably more authority to 
conduct in-depth reviews, on-site missions, assess and survey MS, etc. In Recital (7) 
of REG 1173/2011 (concerning only Eurozone MS) it is referenced that:  
The Commission should play a stronger role in the enhanced surveillance 
procedure as regards assessments that are specific to each Member State, 
monitoring, on- site missions, recommendations and warnings. When taking 
decisions on sanctions, the role of the Council should be limited, and reversed 
qualified majority voting should be used (European Parliament & Council of 
the European Union 2011e, 1) 
This Recital describes in a nutshell the entire reform of the EC’s role across the crisis 
measures aimed at further enhancing economic coordination between EU MS, and it 
is repeated throughout most of the REGs in the Six-Pack
168
. 
 Once of the main issues is wide-spread introduction of RQMV in favour of EC 
PROPs. More specifically, in relation to breaches of SGP and EIP obligations, under 
REGs 1173/2011 and 1174/2011, as well as in relation to the EIP for all EU MS, 
under REG 1176/2011, any EC PROP imposing sanctions for breach of TFEU article 
121 obligations, including interest and non-interest bearing deposits and fines, or any 
relevant REC for EIP corrective actions, are all considered adopted by the CoM, 
unless a blocking majority is formed, i.e. RQMV is now the applicable voting process 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e, 10-11 and 2011f, 10 
and 2011h, 31)
169
. Obviously, it is much more difficult to form a blocking majority 
than for a PROP or OP to fail because of non-attainment of votes under QMV. 
Therefore, many of the EC PROPs will now be enacted by the CoM much easier than 
before. In fact, it is referenced in Article 1(4)(3) of REG 1175/2011 (preventive part 
of the SGP for all EU MS) that:  
The Council is expected to, as a rule, follow the recommendations and 
proposals of the Commission or explain its position publicly (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011g, 15).   
Here, the increase in the decision-making authority of the EC corresponds to a 
simultaneous decrease in the authority of the CoM, i.e. the technocratic supranational 
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 REGs 1174/2011 Recital (10), 1175/2011 Recital (12), 1176/2011 Recital (6) (European Parliament 
& Council of the European Union 2011f, 26 and 2011g, 13 and 2011h, 8 respectively).  
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 In relation to REG 1175/2011, although it is provisioned that the EC REC in relation to specific 
measures to be implemented by EU MS under TFEU article 121(4) and the SGP (MTBF) are to be 
adopted by the CoM under QMV, if they are not adopted the first time, the EC makes another proposal 
that is adopted, unless an RQMV is reached by the CoM (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2011g, 19 and 22). 
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actor acquires considerably more executive (insofar as this can be characterized as 
such within the EU framework) authority than the supranational intergovernmental 
actor. 
 It needs to be highlighted that, in the past, and especially in relation to the 
SGP, CoM relevant processes were somewhat dominated by political power, as 
countries with more political weight possessed greater percentage of votes and more 
political weight. For example, France and Germany pushed for more relaxed SGP 
criteria in 2005, mainly by removing the automated procedure of the EDP and 
providing for more room for intergovernmental bargaining (De la Porte & Heins 
2015; Majone 2012). Considering this issue, the increasingly binding nature of EC 
PROPs and OPs under this reinforced SGP framework, which corresponds to an 
increase of the EC’s decision-making authority (an otherwise non-elected, highly 
technocratic actor) especially vis-à-vis the CoM, might introduce increased efficiency 
and uniformity in applying the rules, and less political influence in this process.  In 
either case, however, these new reinforced SGP rules are to the detriment of 
legitimacy and accountability. The EC is held, directly or indirectly, substantially less 
accountable than the CoM, especially at the national level (at the supranational level 
the EP does maintain some, albeit rather restricted, scrutiny over the EC), and is non-
elected. This means that a non-elected actor acquires considerably increased decision-
making authority over key national policy areas related to the SGP, potentially at the 
cost of the authority of the more accountable and legitimate (in comparison) 
intergovernmental actors (CoM).  
 Another issue relevant to the Six-Pack is the ability of the EC to conduct in-
depth and enhanced surveillance reviews and onsite mission in EU MS that are in 
breach of SGP and EIP obligations. This is provisioned in  
 REG 1173/2011 article 8(3), with the EC being able to conduct in-depth inspections 
to MS, including access to all statistical data (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2011e, 5),  
 REG 1175/2011 article 1(3), in which the EC is entitled to conduct undertake 
monitoring and surveillance missions to MS in evaluating the implementation of any 
relevant European Semester CoM DECs, RECs or OPs (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2011g, 15),  
 REG 1175/2011 article 1(15), through which the EC170 can conduct on-site 
monitoring relevant to the MS economic situation under enhanced surveillance 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011g, 23),  
 REG 1176/2011 (MIP for all EU MS) Recital (15), articles 5, 9(1), 9(7) and 13, 
through which the EC can conduct in-depth reviews and surveillance missions to all 
EU MS under ΕIP, or in case they are threatened with being affected, or even if they 
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 Ιn cooperation with the ECB in case of a Eurozone or ERM II MS (European Parliament & Council 
of the European Union 2011g, 23). 
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are at risk of being affected, by macroeconomic imbalances, or to monitor 
implementation of MIP plan by MS (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union 2011h, 26 and 29 and 30-31), 
 REG 1177/2011 through which the EC171 can conduct on-site monitoring relevant to 
the MS economic situation under EDP and enhanced surveillance (Council of the 
European Union 2011h, 34). 
The above provisions greatly augment the decision-making capacity of the EC. This is 
especially the case in relation to REG 1176/2015, under which the EC can conduct in-
depth reviews and on-site missions even in the case where an EU MS is merely at risk 
of being affected with macroeconomic imbalances. In short, the EC has not only 
acquired more decision-making authority, but has acquired considerably increased 
ability in the implementation and monitoring of MS policies. This intense monitoring 
capacity of the EC lacks strong foundations in the EU Treaties, and raises serious 
concerns in terms of the extent of authority of this technocratic actor to monitor and 
review policies of the national level at such depth.  
 Finally in relation to the Six-Pack, direct horizontal delegation from the CoM 
and EP is provided to the EC under Chapter VII of REG 1173/2011 (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e, 6). The delegation is conferred 
on the EC for acts related to the monitoring and, if appropriate, imposition of fines 
relevant Eurozone MS statistics (Article 8 of the REG) for 3 years (tacitly extended if 
EP or CoM do not object) but can be revoked at any time by the CoM or the EP 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e, 6). The authority to 
delegate the issuance of acts to the EC via a legislative act is provisioned in TFEU 
article 290, subject to the conditions that the EP or the CoM can revoke the delegation 
at any point, and that no objection will be raised within a specific limit by the EP or 
CoM against the EC-delegated act (European Union 2012, 172). The REG satisfies 
these conditions.   
The third set of issues to be considered is relevant to the EU-wide enhanced 
coordination measures that concern only the Eurozone MS. In relevance to Two-Pack 
REG 473/2013, the EC acquires the most significant boost in its decision-making 
capacity relevant to key national policies of the national level. Through this REG, it is 
the EC that the Eurozone MS submit their budgetary plans to, before they become 
binding at the national level, and it is the EC that assesses these budgetary plans and 
may request their modification in cases of non-compliance with the SGP (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b, 19). In other words, the EC can 
now directly influence the budget of Eurozone MS, even before national Parliaments 
                                                 
171
 Footnote supra. 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 125  
adopt it. This constitutes a landmark authority for a supranational institution. 
Furthermore, the EC is set responsible for monitoring compliance with the EPP that is 
submitted by Eurozone MS under an EDP and includes the structural reforms 
necessary to correct the excessive deficit (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2013b, 20.  
 From the above, it can be concluded that the EC has had a considerable 
increase in its overall capacity to affect key national policies through EU-wide crisis 
measures, either those aimed at providing financial assistance or those aimed at 
enhanced coordination of MS. This is primarily through its participation in the Troika, 
which has now expanded to processes that are additional to financial assistance (e.g. 
enhanced coordination) within the Eurozone. What is more, this increase in its ability 
to influence national policy areas appears to be both legally, but, most importantly, 
democratically, challenging.  
 
7.2.3. ECB Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity  
 The ECB experienced a substantial but, in comparison to the EC, somewhat 
more limited boost in its decision-making capacity, mostly through its participation in 
the Troika. In relation to financial assistance crisis measures, the EFSM is the first 
time, including the MTFA framework, that the ECB assumes such a primary role in 
economic policy of EU MS. The only pertaining relating to the ECB in the pre-
existing MTFA was that the loans could be “granted as consolidation of support 
made available by...” the ECB, and it was the ECB that makes the arrangements 
necessary for the disbursement of the loans (Council of the European Union 2002, 2). 
In contrast, the EFSM provides for full consultation between the EC and the ECB on 
the economic conditions for financial assistance, as well as mutual oversight, review 
and update (if necessary) of the adjustment program (Council of the European Union 
2010b, 2).  
Similar provisions, but with the IMF now added to form the Troika, exist in 
relation to the EFSF SA and the, now permanent, ESM, as well as in relation to the 
EU-based part of financial assistance conditionality, as encapsulated in REG 
472/2013 (European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 5; European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2013a, 6-7and 12; section 7.2.2)
172
. Issues in this case 
are broadly in line with those outlined in relation to the EC (section 7.2.2).  In relation 
to EU/Eurozone MS economic coordination measures, in the Six-Pack, in cooperation 
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with the EC, IMF and ESAs/ESRB (if applicable), the ECB is responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of the EIP or for enhanced surveillance of 
Eurozone/ERM II members (REGs 1175/2011 and 1176/2011; European Parliament 
& Council of the European Union 2011g, 23 and 2011h, 31-2).  
The above observations indicate that the ECB has acquired considerably 
increased and more direct decision-making capacity in relation to national MS 
policies, oftentimes in measures that are mostly, or exclusively, economic. This is 
particularly problematic not only because of the purely technocratic nature of the ECB 
vis-à-vis the mostly redistributive character of economic policies affected, but also 
because of its mandate.  The ECB is established as a monetary policy instrument 
aimed primarily at maintaining price stability through monetary actions
173
. Monetary 
policy is clearly distinct from economic policy, with the Central Bank (in this case the 
ECB – the same principle applies for National Central Banks) being independent from 
the political realm and relevant influences or pressures. However, in this case, the 
ECB seems to now have direct input and influence economic policy. As the Hon. 
Prof. Louka Katseli highlights “an independent central bank should not be part of the 
negotiations (between the Troika/EG and the MS concerned), but it is all the time”174.  
An indicative example of the above is the ECB President’s 5 August 2011 
letter to the Italian PM. In this letter detailed fiscal policy measures, such as  specific 
retirement provisions, privatisations, wage reforms, collective bargaining system 
reforms, etc., were outlined and their adoption by the Italian government was 
requested by the ECB (Corriera Della Serra 2011; Dinmore & Atkins 2011). As the 
EP, in its Report on the social aspects of the operation of the Troika, observed: “the 
ECB has taken decisions that fall outside its mandate”175 (European Parliament 
2014c).
176
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 In accordance with the ECB’s / ESCB’s Statute (Protocol No 4 of the Treaties of the EU) as well as 
article 127.  Article 2 of the Statue sets the primary objective of the ESCB as maintaining price 
stability. Its tasks, according to article 3 of the statute, are “to define and implement the monetary 
policy of the Union; to conduct foreign-exchange operations…; to hold and manage the official foreign 
reserves of the Member States; to promote the smooth operation of payment systems” (European Union 
2012, 230-1). The ECB can also submit reports in regards to its fields of competence to any EU or 
national authorities “but within the limits and under conditions set out by the Council in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in Article 41” (European Union 2012, 231).   
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 Interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of Employment and Social Security 
(2010-2011). 
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 This argument was also raised in the interview ibid.   
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 However, the ECJ, in case C-370/12 (Pringle) found that, in terms of duties undertaken through the 
ESM Treaty, neither the EC nor the ECB exceeded their mandate (par. 158-169, European Court of 
Justice 2012). 
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Considering the above, and the strictly monetary nature, both de jure and de 
facto, of the ECB, the direct increased input of the ECB into the economic realm, 
especially in relation to Eurozone MS and the EU-based financial assistance 
mechanisms, seems problematic from a strictly legal, but also from a broader 
democratic point of view. Economic policy, with large redistributive effects, is related 
to the political realm, as collective decision-making through the democratic process is 
necessary for conducting policy in these areas. Hence, influence by the intensely 
technocratic ECB on key electorally salient policies with redistributive effects raises 
concerns in relation to the democratic process. These issues were also highlighted by 
the EP Report on the Troika
177
, which:  
Points …to the potential conflict of interest between the current role of the 
ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the 
four Member States, as well as its mandate under the Treaty as it has made its 
own actions conditional on decisions it is itself part of (European Parliament 
2014a).    
and, in addition, highlighting the potential conflict of interest in the role assumed by 
the ECB within the assistance framework, notes that: 
… throughout the crisis the ECB has had crucial information on the health of 
the banking sector and financial stability in general, and that with this in mind 
it has subsequently exerted policy leverage on decision-makers (European 
Parliament 2014a).   
From the above, it is clear that not only has there has been a considerable increase in 
the decision-making capacity of the ECB, but there are also indications that this 
increase is potentially contrary to its mandate. The ECB has now increased ability to 
exercise decisive authority over economic (and other, through the MAP/MoU process) 
policies of the MS, many of which are considered key and are of a redistributive 
rather than regulatory character.   
 
7.2.4. CoM Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity  
 In regards to the decision-making capacity of the CoM, in contrast to the cases 
of the EC and ECB, has mostly either remained the same or even lost some of its 
decision-making capacity. Only in few cases has it acquired new authority. In relation 
to the EU-based financial assistance mechanisms, in the EFSM the CoM’s decision-
making authority and processes remain largely the same as the pre-existing MTFA
178
. 
In relation to the EFSF SA, the CoM is referenced only in relation to the relevant 
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 In both the authority of deciding on granting the financial assistance and on the terms of such 
assistance (i.e. the adjustment program) is assigned to the CoM, and in both cases this is decided under 
QMV (MTFA article 8 and EFSM article 3(3) Council of the European Union 2002, 3 & 2010, 2).  
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TFEU article 136(1) DEC. In terms of the EFSF SA Framework Agreement, it is 
provisioned that the final decision for the granting of a loan and for realeasing each 
disbursement, and thus on the MoU and on whether or not the MS has complied with 
it, are taken by the Eurozone MS in unanimity, as Guarantors of the company 
(European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 24). Here the CoM seems to maintain its 
ability to influence policy, similarly to the EFSM.  
In relation to EU-wide enhanced coordination measures, throughout the Six-
Pack the CoM has lost considerable authority, especially when compared to the EC. 
As presented further above (section 7.2.2), in most measures implemented across the 
Six-Pack (more specifically REGs 1173/2011 through 1176/2011), EC PROPs or OPs 
are considered adopted unless RQMV is achieved in the CoM, versus the regular 
procedure where the EC’s PROPs or OPs are only adopted if upheld under QMV. 
There seem to be some exceptions, but upon closer analysis these instances also 
follow the above norm
179
. The wide-ranging introduction of RQMV makes it much 
harder to not approve EC-proposed acts. In addition, considering the QMV weighting 
applicable under the Treaty of Lisbon, this also considerably changes the balance of 
power within the CoM (European Parliament 2014b). For example, RQMV would be 
almost impossible to achieve without any of the first five most populous countries 
(Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Poland), on measures which could concern 
imposition of fines or deposits for smaller MS, such as Greece or Cyprus (European 
Parliament 2014b). Therefore, unless one of these MS was on board, smaller EU MS 
will almost never be able to block an EC proposed act, as opposed to what was 
formerly applicable, where, even under the post-Lisbon CoM voting rules, a QMV 
would still have to be formed to pass the act, or, at the very least, a weak QMV would 
have to be formed to block it. The new, post-Lisbon CoM voting system, combined 
with RQMV, results simultaneously at both a boost in the supranational element of 
the EU, by giving increased policy capacity to the EC (RQMV), and the 
intergovernmental element of the EU, by attributing more authority to larger (at least 
by population and economy) EU MS. 
Despite the apparent loss of CoM authority, there are a few cases where it has 
actually increased. For example, the CoM is authorized to issue DECs, pursuant to its 
own RECs, i.e. more powerful legislative acts, in relation to breach of obligations 
under REG 1175/2011 and TFEU article 121(4), or in relation to REG 1176/2011, and 
the EIP (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011g, 14 and 
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 In articles 4 through 6 of REG 1173/2011, QMV is applied as a voting system for an EC PROP, 
however that is only restricted to amending, and not abolishing or not approving, the relevant PROP 
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2011h, 31). Furthermore, the CoM is tasked with approving (QMV), the MAP or 
enhanced surveillance measures for Eurozone MS in the Two-Pack, as well as 
monitor the implementation of the EPP for Eurozone MS under an EDP (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 4-8). Similar observations can be 
made in relation to the EG. In relation to Eurozone MS, the EG, an otherwise informal 
meeting of the ECOFIN FinM for Eurozone MS, acquires the capacity to review and 
discuss the national budgetary plans of all Eurozone MS, along with the EC OPs on 
them (REG 473/2013; European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013b, 
19-20). Overall, the CoM has lost some of its decision-making capacity, or at least its 
room for political manoeuvring, especially in relation to key national policy areas 
where large disagreements may arise (such as the budget). However, in relation to 
specifically the Eurozone MS budgets, the EG (sbuconfiguration of the CoM) has 
gained considerably ability to influence policy through the EG’s power to review 
national budgets before they become binding. 
 
7.2.4. ECJ Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity  
Throughout the crisis measures, and in particular the EFSF SA and its 
permanent successor ESM, the ECJ underwent an increase in its decision-making 
capacity. The ECJ is set responsible for resolving disputes between Eurozone MS in 
relation to the EFSF SA (European Financial Stability Facility 2011a, 31)
180
. For the 
ESM, the ECJ is set responsible at second, and final, degree in relation to “any 
question of interpretation or application of the provisions of this Treaty and the by-
laws of the ESM” between an ESM member and the ESM or between ESM members 
(European Stability Mechanism 2012a, 51). Finally, the ECJ is also set responsible in 
the TSCG in relation to charges brought by the EC or a participating MS relevant to 
failure of implementing the debt-break provisioned in the treaty (European Council 
2012a, 16).  
Similarly to the analysis for the EC and ECB, the question is raised whether it 
is possible for the ECJ to adjudicate on issues that concern an international 
corporation (EFSF SA), an international organization (ESM) and an international 
agreement (TSCG). The relevant TFEU article 273 states that the ECJ 
… shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between Member States which relates 
to the subject matter of the Treaties if the dispute is submitted to it under a 
special agreement between the parties (European Union 2012, 165).   
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Therefore, this article, while allowing for the ECJ to assume judicial duties potentially 
outside the EU Treaty framework (if this has been agreed by the MS concerned), it 
places two conditions:  
 First, the ECJ’s jurisdiction has to concern a dispute of MS, i.e. regardless of the legal 
framework, it is not possible for the ECJ to assume judicial duties in a dispute 
between a MS and another state or two other states.  
 Second, there is also a material jurisdiction restriction imposed, i.e. the ECJ is 
authorized to resolve disputes only if it “relates to the subject matter of the Treaties” 
(European Union 2012, 165).  
Are these conditions met? In relation to the ESM, the ECJ examined in case C-
370/12  whether itself was subject to an increase of its decision-making capacity, or 
whether it is assigned any new tasks (par. 154, European Court of Justice 2012). It 
ruled that any disputes that would be submitted to it under the ESM do, in fact, fall 
within the subject matter of the Treaties and, hence, the ECJ’s authority in relation to 
ESM disputes falls within TFEU Article 273 (par. 173, European Court of Justice 
2012). More specifically, it ruled that in the case of a dispute concerning the MoU, 
this is still within the remits of the EU Treaties, since per article 13(3) of the ESM 
Treaty, the MoU is consistent with EU-based economic policy measures (European 
Stability Mechanism 2012, 29). As such, “the conditions to be attached to the grant 
of...(financial) support to a Member Sate are, at least in part, determined by 
European Union law” (par. 174, European Court of Justice 2012).  
 However, there are questions to be raised in relation to whether the 
aforementioned two conditions of TFEU article 273 are met. While the ECJ did argue 
that the MoU is to be fully consistent with EU legislation, it is not identical to it. As 
such, it is questionable whether the MoU is in fact within the remit of the subject-
matter of the Treaties. Secondly, in accordance with TFEU article 126(10), nor the EC 
nor another EU MS can bring forth charges to the ECJ related to the EDP (article 126) 
against another MS (European Council 2012, 101 and 161). While the ESM Treaty, in 
relation to PPS, refers only to TFEU articles 121 and 136 (Recital 17; European 
Stability Mechanism 2012a, 8), the process of TFEU article 126 (EDP) is potentially 
included in the process of article 136. Therefore, while the ECJ may not adjudicate on 
matters of TFEU article 126 according to the TFEU, it now may do so through the 
ESM Treaty. It, thus, seems that the ECJ has acquired new authority to adjudicate 
over issues that it may not adjudicate over according to the EU Treaties. 
 The TSCG is also designated as a special arrangement in accordance with the 
aforementioned TFEU article 273, but again, it is questionable whether the above 
conditions are met (European Council 2012a, 17). While it is the case that further 
economic coordination falls within the subject matter of the Treaties, the Treaties 
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themselves do not include any obligation by EU or Eurozone MS to establish an 
automatic correction mechanism; much less one which is of a legal permanent basis. 
As such, it is questionable whether the non-introduction of this mechanism by an MS 
within the jurisdiction of the ECJ.  
 
7.2.5. Interim Conclusion on Indicator A 
 Indicator A was concerned with whether the measures introduced during the 
crisis affected key national policy areas and, thus, have redistributive, rather than 
Pareto-optimal, effects in relation EU citizens.  In addition, the focus was also the 
overall ability of supranational level institutions to affect policies of MS, i.e. whether 
the overall level of delegation has increased. In relation, then, to the EU-wide crisis 
measures, and already from the extent of the analysis for this indicator alone, it is 
evident that this has been the area most affected.  
 In relation to key national policy areas of MS, EU-wide financial assistance 
measures clearly increased the influence of supranational actors. The primary concern 
in this case are the structural adjustment policies outlined in the MoU. Overall, 
through the MoU process, a variety of supranational actors acquired considerable 
influence over key, and also general, national policies of EU MS. What is more, this is 
for a prolonged duration, considering that PPS may last until at least 75% of the loan 
is repaid. In general, the more distance between the financial assistance mechanisms 
and the EU frmaework, the greater the influence becomes. This is because the 
structural adjustment aspect of the assistance, i.e. the MoUs, become more specified, 
binding and extensive in the mechanisms that are external to the EU status quo. The 
EFSM, the only purely EU-founded assistance mechanism, included the least 
increase, as it provisioned an EU-based structural adjustment program in principle, 
followed then by an MoU, in which the details were included. It is also worth noting 
that, as the EFSM was solely based on EU legislation, it was more restricted in terms 
of supranational actors to influence key national policies, not least because it included 
all EU MS (both Eurozone and non-Eurozone), and thus the decision-making process 
included considerably more stakeholders with different interests. 
 In contrast to the above, through the EFSF SA and the ESM, which were 
solely by and for Eurozone MS, supranational actors gained considerably more 
influence in key national level policies, not least because, as these are institutions 
outside the EU framework, they include only the MoU without a relevant structural 
adjustment program. To remedy this situation, both the EFSF SA (TFEU article 136) 
and the ESM (in general) provision the compatibility of the MoU with any EU act that 
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may be issued relevant to the Eurozone MS concerned. Correspondingly, EU based 
legislation (REG 472/2013) provisioned for the introduction of a MAP, which is to be 
consistent with any MoU signed. In a way, even if indirectly, it seems that any MoU 
has also gone through the EU legislative process, contrary to popular belief that 
problems relating to the MoUs arise from the fact that it has not gone through the EU 
process. It seems, then, that any increase in the decision-making ability of 
supranational institutions through these assistance programs is EU-sanctioned, at least 
insofar as they obtain this ability through the MoUs. From this aspect, it seems that 
delegation is regularly provisioned within the EU framework and that there are no 
problematic elements or issues of increase in terms of this particular area. 
 While this is true, the way in which the MoUs impact policy also has to be 
analyzed: namely conditionality. This is important because conditionality adds an 
obligatory character that mandates policies be implemented under the risk of non-
disbursement of financial assistance that is necessary for the financial survival of the 
MS. In this case, the outcome of the analysis is different than the above. The element 
of conditionality only exists in TFEU article 122(2), and thus only in relation to the 
EFSM, which, coincidently, is the only EU-based financial assistance mechanism and 
the one that included the comparatively milder impact on key national policies.  
In contrast to the above, there is no provision that would cover for the element 
of conditionality in actions by supranational actors within the frameworks of either 
the EFSF SA or the ESM. The EU corresponding legislation (either TFEU article 136 
or REG 472/2013) includes no element of conditionality. This creates an interesting 
phenomenon whereby, through their connection with the MoU process, EU-based 
legislative instruments acquire new attributes (namely conditionality) that are not 
provisioned for within the EU Treaties. Considering the above, supranational actors, 
within the context of Eurozone financial assistance, as well as EU legislation itself, 
acquire increased ability to influence key policy areas of MS, not so much through an 
increased level of delegation (which could be argued to fall within the remits of the 
EU framework) but through the nature of this delegation, i.e. the conditional character 
of the requested reforms.  
In congruence with the above, the levels of delegation of the specific 
supranational institutions involved in financial assistance, i.e. the EC, ECB and CoM 
(EG), has considerably increased. It has often been presented that the problem with 
the roles that these institutions assume under the assistance framework is the fact that 
they are outside the EU framework, and thus acquire increased ability to influence 
policies that would not normally be allowed within the EU. This concern is partially 
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true. It is the case that EU institutions can be used outside the EU framework upon EU 
MS authorization, but their essential powers must not be altered. However, as has 
been demonstrated, while these institutions might have enjoyed the same level of 
influence over key national policies within the EU, the nature of such influence was 
not existent, i.e. conditionality.  
As such, these institutions, and primarily the EC and ECB, experience an 
alteration in their essential powers when operating under the EFSF SA/ESM 
framework. In addition, this is also the case because of the apparent conflict of 
interest of the EC, the lack of foundational basis of the Troika (even after 2013, the 
relevant EU legislation/Two-Pack is indirect at best), and the potential exceeding of 
the EC’s and, primarily, the ECB’s (monetary actor influencing economic policy, i.e. 
technocratic, isolated actor influencing redistributive policies) mandate. As Prof. 
Louka Katseli suggests in relation to how the Troika operated in the Greek case, “the 
Troika formation…has had many institutional problems” including the original 
absence of an institution to provide liquidity and financial assistance, or act as a 
lender of last resort in times of crisis, which led eventually to the operation of the 
ESM; other problems included, democratic legitimacy, its relationship with 
parliaments, the role of the ECB, the IMF’s participation, and its operations on the 
ground.
181
 
In relation to EU-wide measures aimed at enhanced coordination, it is 
observed that those too provide increased decision-making capacity to supranational 
institutions. For example, the MTBF, the EIP, the EU Semester, the TSCG all provide 
supranational institutions with the ability to influence MS budgets, mainly through 
numerical rules that are, in many cases, additional to those of the EU Treaties, all 
institute new supervision procedures, and all introduce more and stricter sanctions. 
The most obvious example is the ability of the EC/EG to overview and even request 
modifications in Eurozone MS budgets before parliamentary approval is sought, as 
well as the extension of the Troika supervisory framework into the enhanced 
surveillance procedure of Eurozone MS, i.e. even when a Eurozone MS is not under 
financial assistance. These provisions give a considerable boost in the ability of the 
supranational level to monitor and scrutinize key national policy areas. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn in relation to specific EU institutions and 
EU-wide enhanced coordination measures. The EC experienced a considerable boost 
in its decision-making authority through the wide-reaching introduction of RQMV as 
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 Interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of Employment and Social Security 
(2010-2011). 
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a replacement of QMV, leading to a much easier adoption of EC acts by the CoM, and 
much harder rejection of them. In addition, the EC has increased ability to conduct 
onsite monitoring and enhanced surveillance, which, coupled with the introduction of 
RQMV, creates a substantial surge of authority by the EC, especially compared to the 
simultaneuous apparent reduction in the power of the CoM.  
A consequence of the above is the increasing depoliticisation of issues in the 
CoM, which now has considerably less room for political maneuvering. While this 
may be seen as increased efficiency, it has to be taken under consideration that most 
of the issues relevant to these processes concern key national policies, and primarily 
the budget, of MS, and are hence redistributive in character. Taking this into 
consideration, this increasing depoliticisation is considerably problematic, as 
electorally salient issues are increasingly determined by non-elected, technocratic 
actors. Obviously, the ability of the EC to review and request modifications to the 
budgets of Eurozone MS prior to their parliamentary approval also considerably 
increases its authority, this time vis-à-vis the national level. Finally, through its 
participation in the Troika, which has expanded its mandate to actions in cases beyond 
financial assistance programs, as well as the MAP, it has gained ability to influence 
both key and broader policies of Eurozone MS. Similar observations apply for the 
ECB. Finally, the ECJ seems to have experienced a de facto limited increase in its 
decision-making authority, even in areas that may be contrary to Treaty provisions.  
What do these issues tell us in relation to the EU DD? It is clear that the crisis 
measures have provided for a considerably augmented ability of the supranational 
level to influence key national policy areas. What is more, this increase occurred in 
institutions which are largely, or exclusively, technocratic. The EC, the ECB and, at a 
much lesser degree, the CoM, can now affect key national policies with redistributive 
effects, which they were not able to influence before, in a more direct and binding, but 
more importantly in a permanent, way. In addition, this increase oftentimes lacked 
strong foundations in primary, or even secondary, EU legislation.  
 
7.3. Indicator B: Parliamentary authority (EP and national Parliaments) 
7.3.1. European Parliament  
 In relation to the EU-wide financial assistance measures, there is no reference 
made to the EP whatsoever. This is striking, and quite democratically problematic, 
since the policy adjustment aspect of the financial assistance programs, as has been 
demonstrated in the sections above and will be further demonstrated in SECTION C, 
provide EU-level technocratic institutions with considerable ability to influence key 
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national policy areas, mostly through the MoUs. This is not matched with a 
corresponding increase in the decision-making or even oversight capacity of the EP. 
Therefore, participation of representative institutions, and particularly the EP, has 
been argued to be a core deficiency in the implementation of the MoUs
182
. This lack 
of paqrticipation, particularly in relation to the MoU/MAP process, was discussed a 
number of times in the EP Conference of Presidents
183
, and it was decided that the EP 
report on the operations of the Troika
184
 and REG 472/2013 could constitute a legal 
basis for an increase in the involvement of the EP in the MoU process, with an new 
Inter-Institutional Agreement or, at the very least, an EC-EP MoU or exchange of 
letters (European Parliament 2015a, 14-5 and 2015b, 12)
185
. However, it was also 
agreed that the EP’s participation would be limited, with no input in the actual 
decision-making processes between the different institutions, and with actions 
including only hearings (both in camera and public) with relevant officials and actors, 
as well as EP plenary debates (European Parliament 2015c, 14-5) 
The final confirmation of the above new framework came at the 21 January 
2016 Conference of Presidents, approving, with modifications, the proposal on the 
specifics of this mechanism put forth in an undisclosed letter by the Chair of ECON to 
the EP President (European Parliament 2016a, 13-4). Pursuant to the above, an 
access-to-documents request was registered
186
, requesting the relevant documentation. 
The EP provided
187
 the aforementioned unpublished letter of ECON Chair to the EP 
President, which includes the various modalities of the EP’s input process on the 
financial assistance programmes(Gualtieri 2016). 
 In this unpublished letter, it is proposed that an ECON-based, 25-member 
Financial Assistance Working Group (FAWG) be established, tasked with 
“monitoring of the implementation of financial assistance programmes supported by 
the ESM” (Gualtieri 2015, 1). The EP Committees of BUDG, EMPL, REGI and CONT 
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 The EP itself called for greater democratic legitimacy in its two Reports [Procedures 
2013/2277(INI) and 2014/2007(INI)] on issues of the MoUs and the Troika (European Parliament 
2014a and 2014c). 
183
 3rd September 2015, 22
nd
 October 2015, 2
nd
 December 2015 (European Parliament 2015a through 
2015c). 
184
 Procedure 2013/2277(INI) (European Parliament 2014a).  
185
 It was also agreed that ECON lead the construction of the proposed framework, and that the EP 
Committees of Budgets (BUDG), Employment & Social Affairs (EMPL), and Regional Development 
(REGI) also be involved (European Parliament 2015c, 14-5). 
186
 The process is outlined in section 4.3.2. 
187
 It also released a letter by the Greek PM to the PMs/Presidents of Eurozone MS of 28 June 2015 
requesting an extension of the 2
nd
 Greek program , and another letter of the Greek PM of August 2015 
to the EP President, requesting for greater involvement of the EP on the 3
rd
 Greek ESM-based program 
(Hellenic Republic Prime Minister 2015a and 2015b).  
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 136  
are all to participate with one representative each (Gualtieri 2015, 1-2). FAWG’s actions 
focus on organizing (Gualtieri 2015, 2):  
 meetings between the Commission, ECB, IMF, ESM, and the Greek government 
(in camera or public to be determined by FAWG)  
 exchange of views (in camera) with the Commission after each quarterly review 
of the program and prior to the publication of the review’s report,  
 fact-finding missions, reporting to ECON,  
without, however, “attempting to take part directly in the decision-making itself or in 
the implementation of programmes by the institutions” (Gualtieri 2015, 1).In addition 
to the above, ECON itself may, drawing on FAWG’s work, draw up reports or resolutions 
on financial assistance programs. More generally, ECON may also invite Troika and 
Council representatives for an economic dialogue in relation to pre-program countries. It 
is also suggested that relevant EP plenary debates be organized at least once a year. An 
Inter-Institutional Agreement is deemed necessary to “lay out the modalities of the 
parliamentary scrutiny of programmes.” The EP’s Research Service also confirmed in 
personal communication that FAWG would operate for all Eurozone MS under financial 
assistance, with the possibility of extending its capacity to PPS MS as well (European 
Parliament 2016b).  
The letter suggests that the institutional basis for the above are provisions relevant 
to Two-Pack REG 472/2013, and more specifically articles (Gualiteri 2015, 2):  
 7(1) par. 5: the Commission shall orally inform the EP relevant Committee on the 
MAP drafting progress,  
 7(4) par. 3: the Commission shall orally inform the EP relevant Committee on 
conclusions of MAP progress monitoring,  
 7(10): The EP may invite the Member State concerned and the Commission top 
exchange views on MAP progress,  
 18: The EP may invite representatives from the Commission and the Council in a 
dialogue on the application of this Regulation  
 
Concurrent with the observations in relation to REG 472/2013, above legal 
foundations as well as the provisions included and are relevant to FAWG, are rather 
thin. In terms of the EP, this is unfortunate, given that democratic legitimacy could 
actually be increased by active participation of the EP in MAPs. Firstly, in three of the 
above four provisions, only the EC is mentioned, and not the entire Troika, and the 
representation of the ESM is not provided for anywhere within this Regulation. 
Therefore, it is somewhat ambiguous how the FAWG is legally covered to interact 
and hold meetings with all Troika institutions and the ESM, and how it is legally 
entitled to organize an exchange of views between them and the MS concerned. 
Secondly, even in the case of the EC, the provisions include a one-way obligation of 
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information to the EP. It is doubtful whether this covers the much broader and 
extensive process of exchange of views or dialogue between the EP and the EC. 
Thirdly, it is not at all clear from the REG that the EP can, in fact, legally monitor the 
implementation of financial assistance programs, as its authority is limited only to 
receiving information, without any potential for follow-up actions. In fact, the only 
element of the EP’s monitoring framework which seems to be well-founded on the 
REG is in relation to pre-program Member States (presumably those under enhanced 
surveillance pursuant to the REG’s article 2) and the dialogue with thew CoM and 
EC.  
Aside from observations related to measures of financial assistance, those that 
introduce enhanced coordination, include EP references, but the relevant provisions 
are so minimal in value and merits that the EP’s participation is, de facto, quite little, 
especially considering the substantial augment of the EC and ECB policy-making 
capacity. Throughout the Six-Pack, reference is made to the need for the EP (and the 
national Parliaments) to be more actively involved in the new economic governance 
framework of the EU and Eurozone by engaging in a dialogue with the relevant 
institutional actors involved in these processes (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2011e, 2 and 2011f, 9 and 2011g, 13 and 2011h, 32; Council of the 
European Union 2011h, 34). The input of the EP within these measures, which in the 
case of the SGP revisions (RECs 1175/2011 and 1177/2011) is included in a new, 
additional section (termed ‘Economic Dialogue’), is almost entirely restricted to the 
ability of the EP to invite officials of the institutions involved in these processes, 
along with the potential to extend a similar invitation to the MS concerned, for a 
discussion or an exchange of views on relevant issues (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union 2011e, 4 and 2011f, 11 and 2011g, 16 and 2011h, 32; 
Council of the European Union 2011h, 37).  
 Similar provisions are included in the Two-Pack. Despite the fact that the 
Two-Pack progressively increases the authority of the supranational level in key 
national policy areas, the EP’s influence is maintained at a minimal level, again, 
restricting it to inviting key relevant EU institutional actors (and the IMF for REG 
472/2013) involved in either the MAP (i.e. MoU) or the supranational budgetary 
oversight processes for an exchange of views, with the MS being invited to participate 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2013a, 5-6 and 8 and 2013b, 
22-3).  
  It is clear that all the aforementioned provisions are rather disappointing in 
terms of representative input in the decision-making process within the EU after the 
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crisis, especially in the governance structure of the EMU
188
. Despite the Lisbon 
Treaty reforms, it now seems that the EP has, once again, fallen considerably behind 
other supranational institutions. There is lack of EP participation, and even lack of EP 
oversight, throughout the EU-wide measures.  This is important, especially when 
considering the substantial increase in the authority of supranational, technocratic 
institutions.  
 
7.3.2. National Parliaments 
 The provisions on the input of national Parliaments in the supranational crisis 
measures are relatively constrained, similarly to the provisions outlined above in 
relation to the EP. However, this will have to be seen in a comparative perspective, as 
national Parliaments, contrary to the EP, derive their authority and power from the 
national level and are, hence, already capable of affecting most of these measures 
through the respective national legislative processes. Despite that fact, given the 
aforementioned increase in the ability of the supranational level (either in general or 
for specific institutional actors) to affect key national policy areas, the lack of a 
corresponding involvement by the national parliaments at the supranational level is a 
source of considerable democratic deficiencies. 
 In relation to EU-wide financial assistance measures, national parliaments are 
not referenced at all. In relation to EU-wide enhanced coordination measures, it is 
provisioned across most of the Six-Pack and Two-Pack that national Parliaments 
should be involved in the new economic governance framework, with the measures 
included in the relevant policy programmes, whether Convergence, Stability, MAP, 
etc., to be presented to them (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 
2011g, 13 and 17 and 20 and 2011h, 25 and 2013a, 4). Further to this, there are some 
provisions relating to a discussion and economic dialogue between the national 
parliaments and the relevant actors, with the Parliaments being able to invite key 
officials for interviews, in relation to the enhanced surveillance, EIP and MAP 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011h, 27 and 31 and 2013a, 
4-5 and 8). Finally, in relation to the EIP and, more importantly the ‘debt break’ of the 
TSCG, it is provisioned that the authority and prerogatives of the national Parliaments 
are to be fully respected, although the provisions of the TSCG immediately before this 
stipulation seem to directly overpower such authority, as described further above 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011h, 27; European Council 
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Theory and Institutions of European Integration. 
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2012a, 12). Also noteworthy is the complete lack of reference to the national 
Parliaments, and their prerogatives, from Two-Pack REG 473/2013, which provisions 
the budgetary oversight of Eurozone MS by the EC/EG.   
 From the above sections it is evident that the provisions relevant to the 
participation of representative institutions in the EU-wide crisis supranational 
measures, when examined either in relation to their volume or to their actual merits, 
are minimal, especially when compared to the augmenting of the decision-making 
capacity (relevant to the national level policies) of other EU institutional actors. The 
representative element is almost entirely absent from these measures. This is to the 
detriment of the EU DD, as most, if not all, of these measures, whether directly or 
indirectly, affect key national policy areas or include a substantial augment of 
decision-making capacity delegation from the national to the supranational level.  
 
7.3.3. Interim Conclusion on Indicator B 
 Indicator B has its focus on the provisions relating to the role of the EP and 
national parliaments, and the resulting dynamic between them and the rest of the EU 
institutional actors. From the aforementioned analysis, and even from the length of the 
above section compared to that for Indicator A, it is evident that representative input 
throughout the EU-wide measures is minimal. The only real ability of the EP is 
restricted to interviewing and discussing with key actors involved in the relevant 
processes, but without any real decision-making capacity. When factoring in the 
considerable increase of the decision-making ability of other supranational actors, 
particularly of the EC and ECB, it is concluded that the EP has remained several steps 
behind and that its role is considerably small and, mostly, without any real policy 
impact.  
Even in the case of financial assistance programs, one of the most 
controversial issues in relation to the EU DD precisely because of the absence of 
representative input, the real applications of the provisions relevant to the EP are 
revealed by this investigation to fall short of any real impact in policy making. It has 
been argued that this serves both the more politically oriented institutions of the EU 
(primarily EUCO), in order for there to be the appearance of representative input, as 
well as the EP itself, which wants to appear involved but not in an active manner
189
. 
Similar observations can be made in relation to national parliaments.  
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7.4. Indicator C: Processes of EU institutions   
Indicator C is focused on the existence of transparent, efficient and 
representative of multiple interests processes within the measures and during their 
adoption. None of these processes are explicitly referenced in any of the supranational 
crisis measures relevant to financial assistance mechanisms. In relation to EU-wide 
financial assistance measures, it is important to highlight the complete absence, both 
from the side of the mechanisms providing financial assistance and from the EU-
based side corresponding to the MoUs (REG 472/2013) of any kind of institutional 
guideline or operating framework for the Troika and financial assistance process. 
There is no reference into who is to be involved, how the process unfolds, who is 
responsible for what, etc. There is also a complete lack of provisions relating to the 
participation of civil society. In addition, in practice most of the deliberations relevant 
to financial assistance programs take place behind closed doors. This incurs a 
considerably negative impact on the EU DD, as citizens do not know who is to be 
held accountable and for what.  
In fact, it needs to be highlighted that as both the EFSF SA and the ESM are 
outside the EU framework, citizens do not have the same access rights as they do in 
relation to an EU institution. This is notwithstanding the fact that decisions taken in 
those international institutions are core to national policy and involve a wide variety 
of areas covered, as well as that, for example, the Guarantors of the EFSF SA that 
deliberate and approve the MoU and the granting of financial assistance are the EG or 
EWG, but are outside the EU framework. Therefore, while under the ECOFIN or EG 
configurations, a citizen could request any relevant documentation, which request is 
protected by relevant EU primary and secondary legislation (section 4.3.2) with very 
few exceptions under which the provision of the documents can be denied, under the 
EFSF SA framework, and albeit a meeting of the Guarantors is essentially an 
EG/EWG, there is no similar protection afforded. 
Despite the above, in terms of EU-wide measures of enhanced coordination, 
there is a considerable amount of stipulations relevant to accountability and 
transparency. In addition, in many cases the participation of social partners is also 
provisioned. Moreover, Six-Pack DIR 2011/85/EU provides for the need of MS to 
ensure transparency and consistency across all their respective national processes 
relevant to the budgetary process (Council of the European Union 2011g 42 and 46-
7). In REGs 1173/2011, 1174/2011 and 1176/2011 (EIP & SGP) the EP’s 
involvement is also ensured in order to provide for increased transparency (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e, 4 and 2011f, 11 and 2011h, 32). 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 141  
Transparency is also provisioned in relation to the requirements for independence of 
the national statistical authority of each EU MS, of their respective statistical 
processes, etc (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011g, 16).  
Effectiveness is addressed in REG 1175/2011, where numerical rules are set in 
order to determine whether the EU MS have taken successful steps towards correcting 
their deficit or towards effectively addressing a MTBF deviation (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011g, 17 and 19 and 21-22). Finally, 
social partners and stakeholders involvement is provisioned in the European Semester, 
the EIP correction plan (in which the social partners are to be both involved but also 
respected by the CoM and EC), and the MAP for Eurozone MS (European Parliament 
& Council of the European Union 2011g, 13 and 15-6 and 2011h, 27 and 28 and 30 
and 2013a, 8). The above measures do provide some safeguarding of proper, 
transparent and efficient processes, but, overall, and considering the substantial 
breadth that the crisis measures cover the performance in this indicator is rather 
disappointing, not least because most of the above are presented in a considerably 
broad and general form, with no clear limitations and structural elements, and 
providing no definitive obligation for EU institutions to endorse or fully apply the 
principles or input of these institutions/social partners in acts issued pursuant to this 
REG. 
 
7.5. Indicator D: Direction of EU policies & EU Citizens Rights   
 Finally, Indicator D concerns the direction of the measures and the successful 
protection of economic and social rights of EU citizens. There is no reference to any 
policy direction in the measures relevant to financial assistance mechanisms. 
However, the specific measures adopted within the framework of the financial 
assistance suffer from a strong neoliberal, Washington-consensus-based bias, which is 
more specifically analyzed in detail in SECTION C of the research. Overall, in 
relation to protecting rights of citizens, results are less than impressive, and these 
programs have very little consideration of the impact of these measures on society
190
. 
The EP’s Report on Employment and Social Aspects of the Role and Operations of 
the Troika noted that the structural conditionality “threatened the EU’s social 
objectives”, more specifically finding that the measures have resulted in (European 
Commission 2014c):  
 High numbers of unemployment, which, in combination with public and private 
sector pay cuts, threatens social protection and sustainability.  
                                                 
190
 This argument was raised in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of 
Constitutional Law.  
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 Brain-drain and risk of long-term structural imbalances in the economy from high 
youth unemployment rates. 
 Declining job quality, permanency and working standards.  
 Cuts in social spending (e.g. pensions, social security, healthcare), which could 
setback the fight against poverty. 
 Decreasing living standards for the middle class, leading to new forms of poverty.  
 Reductions in social spending and pay cuts lead to increase of poverty. 
 Reductions in healthcare spending, which have jeopardized quality and universal 
accessibility of the healthcare system 
In essence, the EP found not only complete failure of EU institutions to protect 
established social rights of citizens, but also found that in many cases, through the 
Troika and the financial assistance programmes, EU institutions further adversely 
impacted the situation, not adequately protecting these rights
191
.  
In terms of the enhanced economic coordination measures, those include some 
provisions aiming at safeguarding the EU’s social-policy-based model. These 
provisions focus on including sustainable growth and employment-fostering policies 
in the European Semester and relevant measures (e.g. EIP, etc), and on considering 
the social and economic impact of measures taken to correct imbalances (whether 
EIP, SGP-EDP, etc).  
However the above references are minimal and rather generic (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union 2011e, 1-2 and 2011f, 8 and 2011g, 13 
and 2011h, 25 and 27-30 and European Council 2012a, 9 and 17). The most concrete 
protection of EU citizens appears in Two-Pack REG 472/2013, whereby it is 
stipulated that, in addition to the above (growth/employment), collective bargaining 
agreements, wage regimes, etc should also be taken into account when drafting the 
MAP, and consideration should also be given in allowing funding for fundamental 
policies such as healthcare or education (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2013a, 6-7).  As opposed to the above, the measures included in the 
TSCG, especially the debt-break, and the Euro Plus Pact, as well as most of the 
measures enhancing the surveillance and sanctions on EU/Eurozone MS which breach 
fiscal obligations, do demonstrate a considerable reinforcement of the ordoliberal 
structure and direction of the EU and, much more, of the Eurozone.  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 This is one of the two core evaluative Chapters of this research (the other 
being Chapters 9 and 10 for MS-specific supranational crisis measures). The aim is to 
                                                 
191
 This argument was also raised in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of 
Constitutional Law. 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 143  
evaluate the impact of the EU-wide supranational crisis measures, as those were 
outlined in Chapter 6 (conclusively in Table 6), on the EU DD and, more specifically, 
on each of the four empirical qualitative indicators referenced in Chapter 3. What is 
the result of the analysis?  
 The analysis relevant to Indicator A yielded a considerable surge of decision-
making authority relevant to national policies, and especially to key policy areas such 
as the budget or budgetary process. This increase in the ability to influence policy was 
primarily in relation to the EC and ECB, i.e. the most technocratic of EU institutions. 
Furthermore, as this effect occurred both through the financial assistance and 
enhanced coordination measures, it is now permanent and not of an ad-hoc nature 
within the EU status quo. In fact, it appears that through the connection of MoU 
processes with EU-based processes, the latter ones acquire new characteristics, 
primarily that of conditionality. This, aside from potentially distorting the purpose of 
these processes, adds new attributes to them through which impact on national policy 
becomes more binding. Furthermore, the IMF seems to have acquired a permanent 
role within the EU, and Eurozone, framework. Therefore, policy-making that includes 
key national policy areas with redistributive effects, is moving increasingly away 
from political actors, even those at the supranational level and is progressively 
accumulated by highly technocratic supranational institutions, such as the EC and 
ECB, potentially distorting the very purpose of these institutions themselves. 
 So the supranational level has acquired the ability to influence more key 
national policies, and do this more directly. Has there been a matching increase in the 
ability of representative actors to do the same, or at least provide sufficient oversight 
(Indicator B)? The answer is rather negative and, combined with the above, yields a 
truly concerning mix in relation to democratic principles. The EP, as well as national 
parliaments, have been left considerably outside the entirety of EU-wide measures. 
Even if this is considered to be somewhat expected in relation to financial assistance 
programs, as they are mixture of EU and international law, it brings the increase of the 
EP’s authority after the Lisbon Treaty severa steps back in relation to enhanced 
coordination measures that are entirely EU-based. In both of these cases the EP is 
completely marginalized. Even in the case of oversight in implementation of 
MoUs/MAPs of financial assistance programs, an area in which there have been 
repeated calls for representative input, through unpublished documentation acquired, 
it is clear that the role of the EP is still minimal.  
 So far, there has been established a considerable increase in the ability of 
supranational, technocratic actors to influence national policy, and a substantial 
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stagnation or even reduction of the role of the EP and national parliaments. It may be 
the case that the principles of transparency and efficiency were, at least, applied 
(Indicator C). Once again, the analysis yields different results. The financial 
assistance process suffered from a complete lack of transparency as to who was 
involved and how the decision-making unfolded. As a result, citizens were completely 
unaware of how the decision-making process was conducted or even how it was 
actually conducted with adverse results in relation to accountability. Issues are 
somewhat improved in relation to enhanced coordination measures, where there are 
references in relation to the aforementioned principles, especially across the Six-Pack 
(EIP, MTBF, SGP) and the Two-Pack (MAP), with some transparency provisions 
ensured. However, even in this case, and partially because the Troika-based procedure 
was extended to issues beyond financial assistance, as well as because of the increase 
in the decision-making authority of technocratic actors, transparency is still 
questionable. For example, there is n explanation as to how the MAP process for a 
enhanced surveillance would actually work.  
Finally, in terms of the direction of the measures (Indicator D), it is worth 
noting that, whilst no direct reference is made, the reinforced numerical fiscal rules, 
sanctions and monitoring, as well as the additional fiscal discipline framework in 
relation to enhanced coordination measures (e.g. TSCG debt-break) indicate that the 
overall ordoliberal framework of the EU, and especially of the Eurozone, has been 
rather reinforced. There are some references in relation to social protection, but those 
are minimal and often inefficiently generic.  
What are the observations to be made relevant to the wider EU DD framework 
and debate? It is clear that, through the crisis, the unwillingness of MS to turn over 
greater decision-making capacity to EU institutions was surpassed in the name of 
necessary and quick action to counter the crisis. However, as was demonstrated 
above, these reforms are established permanently and are not temporary. 
Representative input, which seems necessary given the increased ability to influence 
key national policies with redistributive effects on the part of technocratic institutions, 
has been considerably minimal. In addition, throughout the measures, transparency 
has decreased considerably, to the point of the citizens being unable to determine who 
actually makes the decisions, while the effectiveness of the measures themselves is 
questionable. So, the input and throughput aspects of the EU DD yield adverse results. 
In terms of output, the direction of policies in relation to EU-wide coordination 
measures seems to largely reinforce the ordoliberal foundations of the EMU, with 
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even stronger review and oversight, and with even more rules that ensure strict fiscal 
discipline and a fiscal policy geared towards surpluses.  
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SECTION C: NATIONAL LEVEL & EU DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
Chapter 8: National Timeline  
8.1. Introduction  
 This Chapter aims at presenting briefly the events that unfolded during the 
investigated interval (2008-2013) in the national level case of this research: Greece. 
Emphasis is given on political events that unfolded. Similarly to Chapter 5, while the 
analytical value of this Chapter is limited, the timeline adds important contextual 
information into the situations under which the crisis measures were assumed.  
  
8.2. 2009-2011: Deficit Issues and 1st Economic Adjustment Programme 
The turning point for Greece was the October 2009 snap elections
192
, and the 
victory of the then centre-left major political Party of PASOK, after two tumultuous 
terms (2004-2009) of the then major centre-right party of New Democracy (Hellenic 
Ministry of the Interior 2009)
193
. In the elections, financial rhetoric received primary 
positioning in debates. The electoral platforms of the two major Parties were 
diametrically opposed. New Democracy proposed steep cutbacks and austerity, so as 
to proactively contain the adverse effects of the financial crisis, which had already 
reached Greece (Xrysogonos 2010, 17). In contrast, the majority opposition Party 
PASOK provided an ambitious and optimistic programme, proposing that wage cuts 
and freezes were not the way to go
194
 (PASOK 2009). More specifically, Table 7 
below presents the main differences between the electoral platforms of the two major 
political parties for the October 2009 elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
192
 Presidential Decree 127/07-09-2009 (Hellenic Republic 2009). 
193
 Wiretapping of government officials, catastrophic fires, alleged kickbacks to Greek politicians by 
SIEMENS, etc (Kyriakidis 2016, 8-9) 
194
 On 12-09-2009 Mr. Papandreou stated: “If today we freeze wages, we will freeze the market. If we 
raise taxes in the middle class, we will decrease its purchasing power, we will deepen the recession” 
(NOIAZOMAI 2010). 
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Table 7: Differences in 10/2009 electoral platforms: New Democracy & PASOK  
  (data compiled by author).  
 
New Democracy October 2009 electoral 
platform (Eleftherotypia 2009). 
PASOK October 2009 electoral platform 
(PASOK 2009, 10-86). 
 Freeze Public service recruitments for 
2010 and restrict 1 recruitment per 2 
departures until 2012. 
 Freeze wages, allowances and 
pensions in the Public sector for 2010 
 Reduce public employees available 
overtime and travel expenses by 30% 
for two years 
 Reduce MPs compensation and 
general government executives 
remuneration for two years 
 Liberalise restricted professions  
 Allow sectoral or firm employment 
collective agreements to overpower 
the general employment collective 
agreement.  
 Reduce the bodies of the Public sector   
 Wage increases above inflation  
 Reduce tax burdens on middle/low 
incomes  
 Specific provisions to stop the pretense 
exploitation of the crisis to reduce 
employment  
 Increase the basic pension of farmers  
 Abolish provisions on increase of 
retirement ages and reduction of 
pensions  
 Low fares for public transportation 
 Make it impossible for amendments to 
be submitted after the discussion of the 
Bill in the relevant Parliamentary 
Committee has been concluded  
 
Given the difference between the electoral platforms, with New Democracy proposing 
cutbacks and PASOK increases, and considering the already unfavourable political 
climate towards New Democracy, PASOK, not surprisingly, obtained the majority in 
Parliament and formed a government. The election results are presented in the 
following Table 8. 
Table 8: October 2009 national election results (Parties in Parliament; Hellenic  
   Ministry of the Interior 2009) 
Party Seats % Votes 
PASOK (ΠΑΣΟΚ) 160 43,92 
New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) 91 33,47 
Greek Communist Party (ΚΚΕ) 21 7,54 
Popular Orthodox Rally (ΛΑ.Ο.Σ.) 15 5,63 
SYRIZA (ΣΥ.ΡΙΖ.Α.) 13 4,60 
4 Parties in Parliament 300 89,53 
 
Almost immediately after assuming office, the then PM Giorgos Papandreou, 
followed a few days later by the then FinM Giorgos Papakonstantinou, announced 
that the previous government had underestimated the annual 2009 budget deficit of 
the country (6% GDP), and that it needed to be revised to almost double its former 
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value, reaching 12.5% GDP (PASOKwebTV 2009b; Ta Nea 2009)
195
. From that point 
on, all three major CRAs (Fitch, Standard & Poor’s, and Moody’s) kept consecutively 
degrading Greece’s credit rating (Koenig 2009; Smith & Seager 2009; Brandimarte & 
Papachristou 2009; Winfrey 2010; Global Credit Research 2011; Georgiopoulos & 
Brandimarte 2011; Agencies 2011). As the revision of the deficit was one of the 
primary reasons for Greece resorting to financial assistance and has been a matter of 
extensive debate, it is useful to briefly examine it.  
Normally, the deficit (as well as a number of other key statistical data) of an 
EU MS is determined at the EU level as follows
196
: For the ongoing fiscal year, data 
are sent to EUROSTAT first on late-March/April of that year, for the first estimate, 
and then again on late September/October of that year, for the second estimate. 
Naturally, as most expenses have not yet been made, the April estimate tends to be 
entirely based on projections, with the October estimate being based more on actual 
accounts. The half-finalized deficit is derived from statistics sent on April of the year 
following the year concerned.   
In the case of Greece, the deficit was officially reported for the second 
estimate on 2 October 2009, i.e. two days before the national elections, by the New 
Democracy government, at approximately 6% GDP
197
. The issues that occurred in 
relation to the increased defcit were not so much relevant to the deviation of the 
revised figure from the original reported 2009 deficit, as often presented, but rather 
the actual revision itself, and the fact that it had occurred immediately after the 
official deficit had already been announced
198
. This raised issues of credibility and 
statistical accuracy, and questions in relation to the sufficiency of the insulation of the 
statistical authority from political pressures. These issues were the key concern, and 
not the magnitude of the difference the original and revised figures, which were, in 
either case, projections, since even a deviation of such magnitude can be considered 
ordinary with large fluctuations from projection to projection for EU MS statistical 
figures (especially for those relevant to the debt and deficit, where multiple national 
accounts and methods are involved)
199
. It is also worth highlighting that the FinM 
requested the General Secretary of the then General Secretariat of the Greek National 
                                                 
195
 During April 2010, the 2009 deficit was again revised to 13,6%, and it was finally calculated at 
15.4% GDP on November 2010, after close cooperation between ELSTAT and EUROSTAT (Hellenic 
Parliament 2012b, 38-9; Eurostat 2010, 1-2). 
196
 Interview with Prof. Zoi Georganta, Professor of Econometrics and former ELSTAT Board 
Member. 
197
 ibid. 
198
 ibid. 
199
 ibid. 
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Statistical Service (which, in 2010, became the independent authority ELSTAT) to 
report the revised deficit figure to EUROSTAT, but the General Secretary did not 
proceed with any action, expressing the opinion that this would seriously jeopardize 
the trust in Greek statistics, and the independence under which they are reported, and 
that it would be better to wait the next projection (October next year) to report any 
alteration, as was the normal process
200
 (ELSTAT 2016). The term of the General 
Secretary was terminated and the FinM proceeded by himself with reporting the 
revised deficit figure
201
 (Ta Nea 2009).  
The November 2009 ECOFIN issued a statement including references on the 
problems of the Greek financial statistics, inviting the EC “to produce a report before 
the end of 2009” on this issue and to further “propose the appropriate measures to be 
taken in this situation” (Council of the European Union 2009d, 16). It is worth noting 
that these problems, such as the fact that some Ministries used a double-entry 
bookkeeping system and some did not, were known within Greece and ELSTAT from 
before
202
. The relevant report was issued by the EC on January 2010
203
, and reported 
several deficiencies, including methodological weaknesses, inappropriate governance 
structures, lack of independence of the statistical authority from the Ministry of 
Finance, etc. (European Commission 2010d, 4-5).  
Aside from the process relating to the deficit, there have also been issues 
raised in relation to the figure of the deficit itself, and its final reported value of 15.4% 
GDP (footnote 195). Mr Samaras, the then leader of the New Democracy majority 
opposition and later PM (after the October 2012 elections), argued during June 2010 
that artificial inflation of the deficit had occurred by the then PASOK government 
(Samaras 2010). During September 2011 a former Board Member of ELSTAT 
accused the President of ELSTAT for artificially inflating the fiscal deficit from 12% 
to 15,4%, thus enabling and/or facilitating the assumption of even harsher austerity 
measures (Kyriakopoulos 2011). It was supported by the member of ELSTAT
204
 that 
the deficit was further unnecessarily burdened with an additional approximate EUR 
27 bn
205
. In fact, the ELSTAT Board Member supported that there were emails sent 
                                                 
200
 ibid. 
201
 ibid. 
202
 ibid. 
203
 COM(2010) 1 final/08-01-2010 (European Commission 2010d, 4). 
204
 Interview with Prof. Zoi Georganta, Professor of Econometrics and former ELSTAT Board 
Member. 
205
 Including wrong classification of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the category of General 
Governments, hospital expenses that had not yet been paid, or even approved by the Court of Audit 
(which overviews and may not approve any order of payment made by the General Government), 
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from the former EC Commissioner of Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn to 
the then FinM Giorgos Papakonstantinou, in which the Commissioner outlined which 
amounts were to be added to the deficit, including the cross currency swap
206
. It is 
also worth highlighting that the then President of ELSTAT – a personal choice of 
appointment by the then FinM – was an IMF employee for more than 25 years, doing 
exclusive work on IMF programme monitoring in African developing nations
207
. The 
Athens Bar Association also filed a lawsuit for the same issue (Athens Bar 
Association 2011)
208
.  
In response to the growing pressure of international markets, on February 
2010, EUCO for the first time proclaimed the EU’s readiness to provide financial 
assistance to a Eurozone MS via an international ad-hoc cooperation with the IMF 
(European Council 2010b). During this EUCO meeting, there was also a commitment 
from the Greek government “to do whatever is necessary, including adopting 
additional measures” in order to contain the situation (European Council 2010b).  
Despite the above EUCO and Greek reassurances, the situation did not 
improve. Greece introduced austerity measures during February 2010 (Law 
3833/2010) in an attempt to further calm financial markets, as well as the growing 
fears among EU, and especially Eurozone, MS, causing the first large wave of 
protests and demonstrations (Eleftherotypia 2010; Kostarelou 2010; Illmer 2010). 
This was, however, again not sufficient
209
. On the March 2010 Eurosummit the 
participation of the IMF in the financial assistance was solidified, and the issue of 
conditionality was introduced (European Council 2010d). This was yet another 
turning point for the EU, for the first time introducing the concept of conditionality to 
provision of financial assistance to a Eurozone MS. This Eurosummit can be argued 
                                                                                                                                            
amounts relevant to the 2000-1 cross-currency swap by Greece, etc (Georganta 2012a and 2012b; 
Hellenic Republic Special Prosecutor 2013, 3-4) 
206
 ibid. 
207
 ibid. 
208
 This issue led to a Parliamentary Investigation Committee set up on February 2012 to investigate the 
relevant issues, which, in the majority opinion report (PASOK majority - a minority opinion was 
published by the Party of LAOS, while the rest of the political Parties either announced that they would 
not participate or withdrew; Opinion Post 2012) issued a month later, finding no artificial inflation of 
the deficit, no mistakes or inaccuracies the application of the prescribed methodology, and no 
interventions in the work of ELSTAT (Hellenic Parliament 2012b, 49-50). There was also a judicial 
Preliminary Investigation by two Financial Crimes Prosecutors (Athens Bar Association 2013). The 
relevant report concluded on January 2013, requesting the prosecution (felony) of three ELSTAT 
members: the then President and two department supervisors (Athens Bar Association 2013). The 
Prosecutor of the Athens Court of 1
st
 Instance instructed a Preliminary Investigation to a Special 
Prosecutor, who, on July 2013, concluded that there were no issues related to false certifications or 
breach of duty by those members and filed the case (Hellenic Republic Special Prosecutor 2013, 1). 
209
 Described as “too little, too late” in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor 
of Constitutional Law. 
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to be a core turning point, as it establishedthe active participation of the IMF for the 
first time within the Eurozone; this is
210
 a core issue in terms of both political 
economy but also democratic process within the EU/Eurozone.  
Close to a month later, on 23 April 2010, the then PM officially requested the 
activation of the financial support mechanism, through a nation-wide address
211
 
(PrimeMinisterGR 2010). The May 2010 EG confirmed the activation of the support 
mechanism, with a loan amounting to EUR 110 bn (at the time via pooled, bi-lateral 
Eurozone MS loans) combined with IMF financing
212
, subject to strong conditionality 
based on a programme which was “approved by the Greek Council of Ministers on 2 
May and endorsed by the Eurogroup on the basis of a Commission and ECB 
assessment” (Eurogroup 2010b). The conditionality terms would be incorporated in 
CoM DEC 2010/320/EU under TFEU articles 126/136 and an MoU between Greece 
and the EC (representing Eurozone MS). A day after the EG Statement, the 1st MoU 
for Greece was concluded, and one day later the corresponding national Law 
3845/2010 was submitted to Parliament, to be enacted on 6 of May 2010 and 
requiring ratification of any MoUs/loan agreements by parliament (Table 4; Hellenic 
Parliament 2010b and 2010i). A few days later, a modification to that Law would be 
introduced, to not require ratification by Parliament for any MoUs and loan 
agreements.  
In terms of the IMF SBA, it is worth noting that the IMF had at the end of 
2009 established four criteria for exceptional access decisions in which category 
Greece’s SBA was included (i.e. decision to grant assistance over 600% of quota 
cumulatively), one of which concerned the outcome of a Debt Sustainability Analysis 
yielding “a high probability that the member’s public debt is sustainable in the 
medium term”  (International Monetary Fund 2009, 30-32; Schandler 2016, 3) 213. 
However, in the case of Greece,  as Dr. Miranda Xafa, former IMF Executive Board 
                                                 
210
 This argument was raised in the interviews with the former ECJ judge and Prof. Dimitris 
Chryssochoou, Professor of Theory and Institutions of European Integration.. 
211
 “It is a need, a national and imperative need, to request, officially as well, from our partners in the 
EU the activation of the support mechanism which we, together, created” (PrimeMinisterGR 2010a).  
212
 On the 9
th
 of May 2010 the Executive Board of the IMF approved a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), 
requested by Greece, with a duration until May 2013 (Hellenic Parliament 2010c, 107) 
213
 The other criteria were: “exceptional balance of payment pressure on the current account or capital 
account… prospects of gaining or regains access to private capital markets… (and) the policy 
program of the member provides a reasonably strong prospect of success, including not only the 
member’s adjustment plans but also its institutional and political capacity to deliver that adjustment” 
(Schandler 2016, 3).  
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member suggests “the Debt Sustainability Analysis was conducted but the Fund (IMF) 
could not certify that there was a high probability that the debt was sustainable.”214 
Hence, in order for the IMF to provide for Greek financial assistance and 
avoid contagion and a possibly severely adverse situation in relation to the Euro, 
considering the opposition of the EU and Eurozone MS to any debt restructuring of 
Greece’s debt, and considering that the IMF “did not find that the outlook for Greece 
was compatible with a high probability of debt sustainability,” a decision was 
approved by the Executive Board to amend the debt sustainability criterion in 
providing access even though when it is “difficult to state categorically that there is a 
high probability that the debt is sustainable” if there is “a high risk of international 
systemic spillovers” (Schandler 2016, v and 5-6).  
Obviously, “ex post, Greek sovereign debt proved to be unsustainable” with a 
projected debt of 150% of GDP and an actual deficit of 177% of GDP in 2012, even 
with the 2012 PSI (Schandler 2016, 9). In January 2016, the IMF again modified the 
debt sustainability criterion, removing the concept of contagion, and providing that, 
when there is not a high likelihood of debt sustainability, then financing from sources 
other than the IMF must restore debt sustainability, or introduce measures towards 
this purpose (Schandler 2016, 25). As Dr. Miranda Xafa, former IMF Executive 
Board member suggests, if the case of Greece was repeated after this modification, 
and until the debt was deemed sustainable, there would be maturity extensions for the 
state concerned
215
. 
The Greek request for assistance was portrayed as a measure of last resort. 
However, there have been indications that the agreement for resorting to EU/IMF 
lending had been decided much earlier, even before the February 2010 EUCO 
statement. From December 2009 (2 months after the elections), the then PM Mr 
Papandreou insisted that IMF intervention was not an option, and communications 
with the IMF were meant solely for technical assistance
216
, reiterating this position on 
February 2010
217
, only 2 months before the official request for assistance (Al. Nik. 
2011). However, on May 2011 the then Managing Director of the IMF claimed that 
                                                 
214
 From the interview with Dr. Miranda Xafa, inter alia, former member of the IMF’s Executive 
Board. 
215
 ibid. 
216
 On 11-12-2009: “Of course, the scenarios for our resorting to the IMF do not exist. I am in contact 
with Strauss-Kahn, but in contact for me to discuss the general financial conditions, to use their 
(IMF’s) expertise” (PrimeMinisterGR 2009). 
217
 “… and I, personally, requested from Dominic Strauss-Kahn (then IMF Managing Director)… 
technical assistance. So, it is Greece that has requested this technical support. We did not request the 
financial support, i.e. our entry in the IMF” (PrimeMinisterGR 2010b). 
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resorting to IMF lending had already been prearranged from November/December 
2009 (1 month after the elections), and that the Greek government worked closely 
with the IMF to that end 3-4 months prior to the official request
218
. Moreover, Mr 
Samaras, then leader of the New Democracy majority opposition and later PM (after 
the October 2012 elections), in one of his major speeches during May 2011, argued 
that resorting to the IMF had been pre-decided by the then PASOK government 
(Samaras 2011). Hence, there are questions raised in terms of whether the situation 
was as unforeseen as often portrayed, and whether democratic processes could have, 
perhaps, been more efficiently followed, given that there was possibly less urgency.  
Right after the request of financial assistance and the MoU/relevant Greek 
Law, and for the next 2 years, major and consistent demonstrations took place, both in 
Athens but also across Greece, against the policies implemented and in relation to the 
policy drift they caused compared to the electoral platform of PASOK (Kyriakidis 
2016, 5-7)
219
. Indicatively, the largest of these protests are presented below:  
 On 3 May 2010, general strikes and demonstrations of substantial size took place 
against the austerity measures/MoU (Adedy 2010), primarily in Athens and outside 
Parliament (Kathimerini 2010a; The Telegraph 2010). The demonstration in Athens 
was one of the largest in the history of modern Greece, with the number of participants 
ranging from 20.000-60.000 (Police estimates) to reported 100.000-200.000 (Kopsini 
2010; Ethnos 2010; To Vima 2010a; RT 2010; Reuters 2010). Indicative is the 
following partial list of participants:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 On 25 May 2011, the Indignant movement (Αγανακτισμένοι) reached Greece with 
thousands gathering in major cities (Galanis 2011 and Ethnos 2011b). 
 On 15 June 2011, massive demonstrations with thousands of protestors took place 
outside the Parliament on account of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2012-
2015 (Law 3985/2011) discussed in Parliament (To Vima 2011g). Similar 
demonstrations take place all over Greece (Naftemporiki 2011).  
 On 28 and 29 June 2011, a 48-hour strike across the public and private sectors took 
place, during the voting of Law 3985/2011 in Parliament (To Vima 2011h and 2011j 
and 2011k).  
                                                 
218
 In the French television channel Canal+. The relevant segment was reportedly cut fromthe final 
version but it was aired on 3 May 2011 in Greece by a TV political satire/comedy show (news24.gr 
2011a). The then IMF Director stated: “…we concluded in 15 days because we had worked for months 
beforehand with the Greek authorities and we did so underground […]” (Al. Nik. 2011 and News247 
2011a). 
219
 This policy drift was also highlighted in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and 
Professor of Constitutional Law. 
 Public employees,  
 faculty of all educational levels,  
 hospital doctors,  
 court employees,  
 Local Governments’ employees,  
 Air Traffic Controllers,  
 public transportation employees,  
 
 ship and port employees,  
 taxi drivers,  
 banking sector employees,  
 Power Company employees,  
 lawyers,  
 engineers,  
 Mass media employees.   
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 On 10 September 2011, demonstrations (more than 20.000 reported) occurred, with 
some violent episodes, during the annual PM speech at the International Exposition of 
Thessaloniki (Vythoulkas 2011). 
 On 28 October 2011, the customary, in-memoriam, anniversary military procession in 
Thessaloniki to commemorate the 28 October 1940 Greek decision to enter WWII by 
resisting the Italian forces was reportedly cancelled, for the first time since its 
institution (To Vima 2011m and 2011n). However, after the President of the Hellenic 
Republic and government officials left, thousands of people took over the street and 
some vehicles and personnel continued with the procession through the people, who 
were watching and cheering (Ethnos 1940; Akropolis 1940). Various similar situations 
developed across Greece
220
. 
On July 2010, the then leader of New Democracy, at the time the majority 
opposition, gave the first of three key speeches in terms of the financial situation of the 
country and the MoUs, overall arguing for reducing taxation, restoring low pensions, 
placing primary focus on growth, escaping the prolonged recession that the direction 
of the country was geared towards, etc. (Samaras 2010). He argued that New 
Democracy would agree with the measures assumed only if they were accompanied by 
growth enhancing provisions and were less intense. Similar are the conclusions in 
regards to the second similar major speech almost a year later on May 2011.  
Under the increasing political pressure because of the above, the then PM 
initiated discussions about proposing a referendum on June 2011, which would 
eventually be announced (but never officially proclaimed) a few months later on 
October 2011, before the relevant Law for the 2
nd
 Greek program. There were major 
disagreements with the decision for a referendum. Within Greece there were issues 
raised with the decision to proclaim it in such a long time (close to 3 months) before it 
was to be conducted, as well as with the very decision to conduct a referendum, 
instead calling for elections, potentially leading the country to a prolonged division. 
Furthermore it was argued that a referendum for such a complicated issue would also 
be questionable outcome legitimacy (Kovaios 2011; To Vima 2011a). The entire array 
of opposition parties condemned the decision, counter-proposing elections (To Vima 
2011b).  
There were also objections raised outside Greece. The then EG President 
stated that the decision was taken without consultation with EU partners, and that 
should the Greek citizens vote no, this could potentially mean the default of the 
country. The French PM was reported suggesting “that the Greek referendum to be 
held on Dec. 4 or Dec. 5 will determine Greece’s future in the euro” (Fouquet 2011). 
                                                 
220
 For example, in the corresponfing customary Athens student procession, the main square in front of 
parliament had been blocked off by riot police, resulting in students marching only in front of few 
officials, instead of the usual crowd (Protohtema 2011). Many turned their head away from the officials 
(decorum is to turn the head towards the officials) while others marched with black 
scarves/handkerchiefs (Protohtema 2011; To Vima 2011m).  
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 155  
Even the US President seemed to object to the idea (To Vima 2011c). From 
information that surfaced later, it was reported that the German Chancellor and the 
then French President had agreed, already ahead of the G20 Cannes France meeting 
(3-4 November 2011 – G20 2014), that the referendum was to proceed only if the 
question was whether Greece would remain in the Eurozone or not (Financial Times 
2014). It was also reported that there were discussions between the EC President and 
the New Democracy leader about the latter Party’s participation in a national unity 
government in order to avoid the referendum, with potential technocrats considered as 
candidates (Financial Times 2014). Dr. Lucas Papademos, who would only a week 
after the G20 Canes meeting go on to assume office as PM in charge of the 2011-2 
cooperation government, was proposed by the then EC President (BBC 2011a; 
Financial Times 2014). This information raises serious concerns relevant to the 
influence of the supranational level, and at the same time of the intergovernmental 
level (i.e. of economically powerful Eurozone MS) on the national level of Eurozone 
MS under financial assistance.  
During July 2011 the EC created a Task Force for Greece (TFGR). The 
TFGR’s  
“…personnel in both Athens and Brussels, identifies and coordinates the 
technical assistance that Greece needs to help it deliver on its commitments in 
the context of its economic adjustment programme” (European Commission 
2012f). 
The TFGR has no legal framework of operation, while its employees receive their 
remuneration from their home countries and, in some cases, from amounts withdrawn 
from the financial assistance provided to Greece (European Commission 2012f). The 
TFGR was established after the request of the Greek government, and expands beyond 
mere limited technical advisory roles, covering all of the following policy areas 
(European Commission 2012f, 25 and 2014v):  
 
 
 
 
 
A 2
nd
 financial assistance programm for Greecee in the amount of EUR 109 
bn
221
 was agreed on the July 2011 EuroSummit, including a PSI (later PSI+), as well 
as a number of other facilitations (grace periods, loans’ maturity, etc; Council of the 
                                                 
221
 This included the undisbursed EUR 45 bn from May 2010 (Tsolis 2011). 
 
 Budget / taxes 
 Financial sector 
 Cohesion funds 
 Agriculture  
 Business environment  
 Public procurement 
 Labor market  
 
 Public heatlth 
 Justice system 
 Administrative reform  
 Statistics  
 Civil society  
 Social Partners 
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European Union 2011k)
222
. The official request for additional financial assistance 
would come a few months later in February 2012 (Deutscher Bundestag 2012, 3)
223
.  
 
8.3. 2011-2012: 2
nd
 Economic Adjustment Programme 
In November 2011, after the agreement on the 2
nd
 programme and because of 
the political turmoil, it was agreed by the then two major political Parties (PASOK-
New Democracy) to form a cooperation government that would lead the country to 
elections, but only after the new loan agreements/MoU were implemented (To Vima 
2011d and 2011e). The then PM Giorgos Papandreou resigned, and the new 
government was agreed, consisting of PASOK (38 members), New Democracy (6 
members) and LAOS
224
 (ΛΑ.Ο.Σ – 4 members), with Dr. Lucas Papademos as the PM 
(General Secretariat of the Government 2014; News24.gr 2011b; Ethnos 2011a; 
Kroustalli 2011)
225
. Under the new cooperation government, Law 4046/2012, relevant 
to the 2
nd
 MoU/Loan Agreements, was enacted.  It is worth noting that after the voting 
on the above Law, 45 MPs in total from the Parties partaking in the cooperation 
governments (PASOK, New Democracy, LAOS) were expelled from the respective 
Party Caucuses for voting against the official Party lines (Hellenic Parliament 2012c, 
5275-5299 and Stavropoulos 2012a). The PSI MoU, the 2
nd
 MoU and the second set of 
Loan Agreements were signed on March 2012, along with the new EFF request to the 
IMF (Table 4). One of the most important elements of the 2
nd
 programme, and one 
which was introduced for the first time across the EU, was the PSI. This was included 
in the July 2011 Eurosummit agreement and involved voluntary private participation 
(‘haircut) relevant to Greek bonds. 
 
8.5. 2012-2013: First post-2009 elections & Coalition government  
The first elections conducted since October 2009 and the beginning of the crisis 
and EU-IMF financial assistance programmes were proclaimed on April and held in May 
2012
226
 (Hellenic Republic 2012p). The majority opposition of New Democracy was the 
                                                 
222
 The entire 2nd Greek program officially expired on 30
th
 June 2015 (Kyriakidis 2016, 6). 
223
 The FinM sent a letter to the then EG President, the then Commission for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, and the ECB President (Deutscher Bundestag 2012, 3). 
224
 A conservative Party, placed in the right/nationalist end of the political spectrum, based on its focus 
on projecting national consciousness, supporting Patriotic Interventionism, Euroscepticism, etc 
(Kiousis 2007; LAOS 2014).  
225
 Resignations under PDs 107/11-11-2011, 108/11-11-2011 and new appointments under PDs 109/11-
11-2011, 110/11-11-2011 (Hellenic Republic 2011j and 2011k and 2011l and 2011m). 
226
 PD 40/11-04-2012 (Hellenic Republic 2012p). 
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frontrunner to assume office after the intensely negative political climate for PASOK that 
had implemented the MoUs. The election results are presented in the following Table 9. 
Table 9: May 2012 national election results (parties in parliament; Hellenic Ministry  
   of the Interior 2012a) 
Party Seats % Votes 
New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) 108 18,85  
SYRIZA (ΣΥ.ΡΙΖ.Α.) 52 16,78  
PASOK (ΠΑΣΟΚ) 41 13,18  
Independent Greeks (ΑΝ.ΕΛ.) 33 10,61  
Greek Communist Party (ΚΚΕ) 26 8,48  
Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) 21 6,97  
Democratic Left (ΔΗΜ.ΑΡ.) 19 6,11  
7 Parties in Parliament 300 80,98 
 
The election outcome was indicative of the reaction of the citizens to the abrupt 
and extensive structural adjustment and measures implemented, with both major Greek 
political parties (until then) experiencing a considerable reduction in their electoral 
percentages. PASOK underwent a striking 70% approximate reduction from 2009
227
, 
mirroring the discontent of the electorate in the policies implemented, and New 
Democracy, albeit coming first, also experienced an approxiamte 44% drop
228
 (Tables 
8 & 9). On the opposite end, parties away from the centre of the political spectrum, 
advocating for an intensely anti-MoU electoral platform, obtained large percentages. 
The, until then smaller, party of SYRIZA, belonging to the left side of the political 
spectrum, was elected in second place behind New Democracy, obtaining a high 
percentage and an increase of approximately 114% compared to October 2009 (Tables 
8 & 9). The extremist, right party of Golden Dawn, previously not in Parliament, also 
obtained a high percentage and managed to enter Parliament. The rise of this latter 
Party was of particular concern, given its methods and operation
229
. This demonstrates 
                                                 
227
 From 43,92% of votes in October 2009 to 13,18% of votes in May 2012 (Tables 9 & 10). 
228
 From 33,47% of votes in October 2009 to 18,85% of votes in May 2012 (Tables 9 & 10). 
229
 Golden Dawn was originally the title of a nationalist-based magazine founded on December 1980, 
drawing on inspirations of the Metaxa junta of the 1930s and of the military junta regime of 1967-1974. 
The current Party leader was the leader of the youth wing of the National Political Movement (Εθνική 
Πολιτική Ένωσης – ΕΠΕΝ), a political party founded in 1984 by the 1967-74 junta leader Georgios 
Papadopoulos. In 1993 the group became a political party. The first participation in national elections 
for the party was in 2009, (0.29% votes – outside Parliament; BBC 2013b; Hellenic Ministry of the 
Interior 2009). There was a judicial examination initiated during 2013 on account of various violent 
incidents related to the Party’s operation and members since its establishment, chiefly on account of the 
murder of a left-oriented, anti-fascist musician by a supporter of Golden Dawn in September 2013, who 
later confessed to the act (Kathimerini 2013a; Vythoulkas 2013; Hellenic Republic Special Prosecutor 
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the frustration and disagreement of a major portion of the electorate with the policies 
implemented. It is also potentially indicative of desperation with the then political 
status quo, with the electorate searching for new political party outlets. As a result of 
the above, the intensely, until then, bi-polar political party environment of Greece, 
with a considerably small number of Parties in Parliament (only four in the October 
2009 elections; Table 8), was replaced by a multi-polar environment, and with an 
increase in the parties in parliament (seven in the May 2012 elections; Table 9).  
The electoral result provided no Party with clear majority in Parliament and no 
government was formed by any party or by the President’s initiative (CoG article 37, 
§2,3; Hellenic Parliament 2008). The Parliament was dissolved within two days of the 
MPs being sworn in, and repeate elections were held on June 2012
230
 (Chasapopoulos 
2012a and 2012b; Stavropoulos 2012b). These were the last elections until the cut-off 
date of this research, and the results are presented in the following Table 10. 
Table 10: June 2012 national election results (Parties in Parliament; Hellenic  
     Ministry of the Interior 2012b) 
Party Seats % Votes 
New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) 129 29,66  
SYRIZA (ΣΥ.ΡΙΖ.Α.) 71 26,89  
PASOK (ΠΑΣΟΚ) 33 12,28  
Independent Greeks (ΑΝ.ΕΛ.) 20 7,51  
Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) 18 6,92  
Greek Communist Party (ΚΚΕ) 17 6,25  
Democratic Left (ΔΗΜ.ΑΡ.) 12 4,50  
7 Parties in Parliament 300 94,01 
 
The left (SYRIZA) and extreme right (Golden Dawn) maintained their high 
percentages (Hellenic Ministry of the Interior 2012b). The unsure political scenery, as 
well as the uncertainty in relation to the inability to form a government, are probably 
among the main reasons for the substantial percentage boost of the two Parties that 
came first in the May 2012 elections (New Democracy and SYRIZA), and for the 
slight reduction in the percentages of  the rest of the Parties.  
                                                                                                                                            
2014, 122). In October 2014, the Court of Appeals Prosecutor proposed the indictment of all Golden 
Dawn MPs, among 70 Party members, for constituting and/or participating in a criminal organization 
(Hellenic Republic Prosecutor of the Athens Court of Appeals 2014, 401-609).   
230
 PD 72/19-05-2012 (Hellenic Republic 2012q). In accordance with Article 53, §1 (Hellenic 
Parliament 2008a, 66), as well as Article 31, §1 of PD 96/05-06-2007, elections are held within 30 days 
from the dissolution of Parliament (Hellenic Republic 2007d, 2696). 
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Two days after the elections, a coalition government was formed between New 
Democracy, PASOK, and Democratic Left (ΔΗΜΑΡ)231. A year later, the coalition 
faced problems on account of the abrupt shutdown of the Greek Public Radio and TV 
Broadcaster (ERT SA; To Vima 2013a). The shutdown, as well as the decision to 
immediately proceed with cutting the signal caused nation-wide unrest (Protothema 
2013)
232
. The closure of the public broadcaster also caused major problems with the 
collation government. The two centre-left/left Parties (PASOK and DIMAR) partaking 
in the government disagreed with the way the issue was dealt with (To Vima 2013a). 
The leader of Democratic Left, the smallest of the three Parties partaking in the 
coalition government, disagreed with the closure and pointed out the lack of 
coordination within this government, and on June 2013 departed from the government 
with the part (To Vima 2013d; Eleftherotypia 2013; Mpitsika 2013). A brief 
summative overview of the national-level events is presented in the following Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
231
 The Party, based on the left/center-left end of the political spectrum, was created on 27-06-2010, 
formed by Party members of Synaspismos (ΣΥΝ), who decided to depart (Dimokratiki Aristera 2014).  
232
 The President and the Director General of EBU sent a letter to the then PM on the same day of the 
shutdown, arguing against the closure of the Public broadcaster by the government, especially without 
any provision for a replacement, emphasizing the fact that, in any case, such decisions should be taken 
through deliberation and the appropriate legislative channels, including Parliament, and not in a single-
sided manner only through the executive. They also emphasized the European aspect of democracy 
related to Public media, especially as a part of the EU’s acquis communautaire (EBU 2013). The 
concerns raised by EBU were also echoed by the President of the EP as well as by Greek MPs 
(Kathimerini 2013d; European Commission 2014w; Filothea Belgium 2013) 
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Table 11: Condensed timeline of national-level events (data compiled by author)
233
 
Date Event 
2
0
0
9
 
04-10 Elections — PASOK government 
09-10 BoG Governer announces 2009 deficit will exceed 12% 
16-10 PM 2009 deficit will be double, according to BoG 
21-10 FinM 2009 deficit will be double (6%-> 12,5%) 
2
0
1
0
 
05-03 General strike against austerity Law 3833/2010 
15-03 Law 3833/2010 enacted 
23-04 PM nationwide address: request financial assistance 
02-05 EG: agreement on Greek programme, conditionally, support EUR 110 bn 
03-05 1st MoU signed between Greece and the EU 
06-05 1st MoU Law 38452010 in force 
07-05 Modification to Law 3845/2010, in Law 3847/2010 during its voting 
08-05 GLF and Intercreditor Agreement signed 
09-05 IMF Executive Board approves SBA for Greece, after Greek request. 
11-05 Law 3847/2010 enacted. 
04-06 1st MoU and GLF/Intercreditor Agreements deposited in Parliament 
2
0
1
1
 
21-07 Additional assistance, 2nd MoU, PSI MoU decided on Euro Summit 
31-10 PM referendum at the 2nd MoU/Loan Ageements 
06-11 PM and New Democracy leaders agree to a cooperation government 
09-11 PM G. Papandreou resigns 
10-11 Coalition government (PASOK, New Democracy, LAOS) sworn in 
2
0
1
2
 
08-02 FinM Letter to ECB, EG, and EC requesting additional assistance 
12-02 2nd MoU Law 4046/2012 (Loan Ageements – 2nd MoU) enacted 
23-02 Law 4050/2012 (Greek Bondholder Act) for PSI - introduction of CACs 
01-03 PSI MoU signed 
01-03 Loan Ageements signed 
11-03 2nd MoU signed 
06-05 Elections — No government with majority 
16-05 Transitional government sworn in 
17-06 Elections — Coalition government (New Democracy, PASOK, Dem. Left) 
2
0
1
3
 11-06 ERT shuts down effective immediately —New Democracy initiative 
21-06 Dem. Left departs from the coalition government 
 
 
 
                                                 
233
 Source as in this Chapter. 
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8.6. Conclusion  
Although the timeline provides for limited conclusions in relation to the 
impact of MS-specific supranational crisis measures on the EU DD, there are some 
issues to be raised. It is important to highlight that the policy drift in which every 
post-2009 elected Greek government until the cut-off date of this research succumbed 
was considerable enough to challenge the premises upon which legitimacy to these 
government was conferred. Platforms implemented were, in most cases and especially 
in relation to economic policy, the exact opposite of what was included in the 
electoral platforms of those political Parties
234
. This is even more important given that 
citizens repeatedly proclaimed their opposition to the policies implemented through 
mass demonstrations and strikes. Furthermore, there are issues raised in relation to the 
temporal dimension of the initial request for financial assistance, as well as with the 
2009 deficit, indicating that democratic processes were not followed to the letter. In 
addition, from the events that unfolded, there was a considerable and apparent 
influence of the supranational level within the national level processes. The results of 
the above on Greece’s political system are evident. It moved (quite abruptly too) from 
an intensely bi-Partisan political system to a multi-Party, cooperation-government-
based one. It is also indicative that, upon disappointment with the two major center 
Parties (PASOK and New Democracy), and upon frustration with policies 
implemented, there was a considerable surge of parties of the left and extreme right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234
 From the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of Constitutional Law. 
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Chapter 9: Overview & Evaluation of National-level Measures 
9.1. Introduction 
 The aim of this Chapter is to provide an overview and an evaluation of the 
impact of MS-specific (i.e. Greek) supranational crisis measures on the EU 
framework constructed in Chapter 3. As outlined in section 4.2 and Figure 1, these 
measures largely consist of the financial assistance programmes, and they are divided 
in the FAFAs or loan agreements, and the MoU and other relevant acts. The former 
are the specifics of the assistance provided, i.e. interest rates, amounts, disbursements, 
etc. The latter consist of the structural adjustment policies upon which the 
disbursement of financial assistance is conditional.  
 
9.2. Brief Overview of MS-specific Measures  
Greece, in its three financial assistance programs, has received a total of 
approximately EUR 236.2 bn to date from the EU and the IMF, broken down as in Tables 
12 and 13.  
 
Table 12: EU financial assistance to Greece (data compiled by author; amounts in  
     EUR bn)
235
. 
 
Total amount 
disbursed 
Instrument 
Amount 
disbursed  
1st MoU 1st FAFA  Date out 
204.2 
GLF 52.9 03-05-2010  08-05-2010  11-03-2012 
EFSF SA 130.9 11-03-2012 01-03-2012  30-06-2015 
EFSM 7.16 17-07-2015 01-08-2015 
ESM
236 20.4 
19-08-
2015 
19-08-2015 TBC 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
235
 Sources: Algemene Rekenkamer 2014; European Financial Stability Facility 2012a and 2015a and 
2015d; European Stability Mechanism 2015b and 2015c; European Commission 2010a and 2012c and 
2015d; Hellenic Parliament 2010d; PrimeMinisterGR 2010a, Deutscher Bundestag 2012; Hellenic 
Republic 2015; Council of the European Union 2015a, 2015b.  
236
 Note that the agreement provides for financial assistance to Greece up to EUR 86 bn (ESM 2015d, 3 
and 6).  
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Table 13: IMF financial assistance to Greece (data compiled by author; amounts in  
     EUR bn)
237
. 
 
Total amount 
disbursed 
Instrument 
Amount disbursed 
(approx.) 
1st MoU Date Date out 
32  
(2465% quota) 
SBA
238 20 03-05-2010 14-03-2012 
EFF
239 12 09-03-2012 15-01-2016 
 
9.2.1. 1
st
 Financial Assistance Programme for Greece (GLF) 
Greece was the first Eurozone MS to request financial assistance from the EU-
IMF ad-hoc cooperation, announced to support, again, specifically Greece, on April 
2010. However, there was no precedent of the EU providing financial assistance to a 
Eurozone MS, nor of its cooperation with the IMF in providing such assistance. As 
such, the Greek Loan Facility (GLF) consisted of bi-lateral loans between each of the 
Eurozone MS and Greece, conditional upon implementation of structural adjustment 
policies adopted by the Greek Council of Ministers after and EC – ECB assessment 
(Eurogroup 2010b). At the time of the GLF, as well as during the EFSM and EFSF 
SA frameworks, the policy conditionality attached to the financial assistance provided 
consisted of two parts: the MoU  and a corresponding CoM EDP/TFEU article 136 
DEC, with both reflecting the same measures to be implemented by the beneficiary 
MS (section 7.1.1).  
The policy conditionality of the GLF was, in accordance with the Loan 
Facility Agreement, to be  
defined in a Council decision on the basis of Articles 126(9) and 136 of... the 
TFEU..., and the support granted to Greece is made dependent on compliance 
by Greece with the measures consistent with such decision and laid down in ... 
the MoU (Hellenic Parliament 2010a, 11). 
In pursuit of the above provision, CoM DEC 2010/320/EU was issued in May 2010 
(Council of the European Union 2010d). This DEC provided for the connection of the 
EU-based EDP/TFEU article 136 process with the MoU conditionality under the 
GLF, with the DEC including almost all MoU policies (Council of the European 
Union 2010d). This is a landmark DEC in constituting the first EU-based legal 
instrument to include detailed policy measures and timetables conditionally linked to 
                                                 
237
 Sources: International Monetary Fund 2010a and 2010b and 2010c and 2012a and 2016a. 
238
 Aimed mostly to providing short-term assistance to countries coping with crises and ensuing 
problems with balance of payments, with a duration of two (and a potentially third) years (IMF 2016b).  
239
 Aimed at providing medium to long-term financial assistance to countries with serious payments 
imbalances, with a duration of three (and a potentially fourth) years (IMF 2016a). 
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the provision of financial assistance to a Eurozone MS. In-between 2010-2012, the 
above DEC 2010/320/EU/10-05-2010 was amended a number of times
240
, with the 
main amending act, which recast it, being 2011/734/EU/12-07-2011.  
In relation to the international legal part of the GLF (loan agreement and 
MoU), on the EU’s side it consisted of the Loan Facility Agreement between Greece 
and the rest of the Eurozone MS, of the Intercreditor Agreement between the 
Eurozone MS except Greece, and the MoU between the EC (acting on behalf of the 
Eurozone MS) and Greece; all were entered into in May 2010 (Hellenic Parliament 
2010a). The Loan Facility included the specifics of the pooled bilateral loans from the 
Eurozone MS to Greece and the Intercreditor Agreement outlined the relationship 
between the Eurozone MS (except Greece) in relation to the loan and the agreement, 
including, among others, the first authorization to the EC to represent them in granting 
financial assistance to another Eurozone MS – in this case Greece – and also the first 
instance of policy conditionality monitoring by the EC in cooperation with the ECB 
(the IMF was added later) since the beginning of the crisis (Hellenic Parliament 
2010e, 40-2).  
 
9.2.2. 2
nd
 Financial Assistance Programme for Greece (EFSF SA) 
By the time of the 2
nd
 Greek program, the EU had already established the 
EFSF SA. The 2
nd
 Greek program was agreed on the July 2011 EuroSummit (Council 
of the European Union 2011k). The IMF participated through an EFF (and relevant 
MoU), with the remaining SBA cancelled, per the request of the Greek government 
(International Monetary Fund 2012a). In relation to the international aspect of the 2
nd
 
program (the EU-based aspect continued as amendments to DEC 2010/320/EU, 
referenced in footnote 240), on the side of the EU, this 2
nd
 program consisted, again, 
of an MoU, but, opposite the GLF, of multiple FAFAs of various kinds (PSI
241
, bank 
recapitalization, bond interest facility, etc), and later a Master FAFA (Hellenic 
Republic 2012b, 297-344 and 339-435 and 483-527 and 577-622 and 1721-85; 
European Financial Stability Facility 2012a and 2012b and 2012c; Deutscher 
Bundestag 2012, 341-90). Within the Greek legal framework, this 2
nd
 program was 
entered into the Greek ordre public through Laws 4046/2012, 4060/2012 and 
4111/2013.  
                                                 
240
 2010/486/EU, 2011/57/EU, 2011/257/EU, 2011/734/EU, 2011/791/EU, 2012/211/EU, 2013/06/EU 
(Council of the European Union 2010c and 2011c and 2011d and 2011e and 2011f and 2012a and  
2013a). 
241
 PSI LM Facility Agreement last amended December 2012 (Hellenic Republic 2013a, 371-380). 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 165  
In relation to the PSI of the 2
nd
 program, within the July 2011 agreement there 
was also a private sector voluntary contribution agreement (PSI), and involved 
voluntary private participation for a projected 21% reduction (‘haircut) on the Greek 
bonds’ Net Present Value (Council of the European Union 2011; IFF 2011). The 
round was never initiated
242
, and a reinforced PSI program, (PSI+), was agreed in the 
October 2011 Eurosummit, involving a 50% or more reduction in the Greek bonds’ 
nominal value, cutting an approximate projected EUR 100 bn from the country’s debt 
(Eurosummit 2011; To Vima 2011o)243. A separate MoU on the PSI+, setting out the 
details for the process, was signed on 01-03-2012 between the EC (on behalf of Eurozone 
MS) and Greece (European Commission 2012d, European Financial Stability Facility 
2012a, 1). The conditionality was the MoU of the 2nd program. Within the PSI MoU, 
there were two letters of a priori commitment to implementation of the MoU, and the 
entire program, by both of the then leaders of PASOK and New Democracy annexed 
(European Commission 2012d, 7-end). These were the leaders of the two major Parties of 
Greece at the time, i.e. those who were most likely to win the elections. The letter by the 
then leader of New Democracy Antonis Samaras, who was elected PM a few months 
after the MoU was signed, is at partial contradiction with the electoral and policy 
platform of the Party, as expressed in key speeches of his at the time (Kyriakidis 
2016, 5). The entire 2
nd
 Greek program officially expired on June 30
th
, 2015 
(Kyriakidis 2016, 6). 
The three Tables below summarize the documentation for the MS-specific 
supranational crisis measures relevant to Greece, as presented above. Table 14 
presents all the FAFAs or loan agreements between Greece and the EU, table 15 the 
MoUs between Greece and the EU, and table 16 present the MoUs between Greece 
and the IMF.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
242
 Inter alia, because the bond maturity was restricted to those ending on 2020, the coupons had high 
value, the deepening recession made the 21% ultimately insufficient for Greek recovery, etc. 
(Zettelmeyer et al. 2013). 
243
 The legal implementation of PSI+ on the Greek side was challenging, as the majority of Greek 
bonds (more than 86% of eligible debt) had been issued under Greek law and lacked any Collective 
Action Clauses (CACs) that permit a modification of the bond, in terms of debt restructuring, if agreed 
to by a majority of the bondholders (e.g. 75%), which is then enforced on all bondholders. Hence, they 
required unanimity to be modified (Zettelmeyer et al. 2013, 11). This would be very difficultly 
achieved given the 50% nominal value reduction. However, the fact that these bonds had been issued 
under Greek law provided the opportunity for the modification of the bonds simply by passing a law 
(Zettelmeyer et al. 2013, 11). The relevant national Law 4050/2012 was enacted, retroactively 
introducing CACs to the Greek bonds issued under Greek law and allowing for the ‘haircut’ to proceed 
under the approval of a 2/3 majority of bondholders (Hellenic Republic 2012a, 1076).  
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Table 14: Greek FAFAs/loan agreements (data compiled by author; ranked by  
     date)
244
. 
 
Program Date Agreements Relevant Law 
1
st
 (GLF) 
08-05-2010 Loan Facility  Pending since 
04-06-2010 08-05-2010 Intercreditor Agreement 
2
nd
  
(EFSF SA) 
01-03-2012 PSI LM Facility  
4046/2012 
-
245 Co-Financing  
01-03-2012 ECB Credit Enhancement Facility246  
01-03-2012 Bond Interest Facility 
01-03-2012 Bank Recapitalization Facility247 
15-03-2012 Master FAFA 4060/2012 
12-12-2012 Master FAFA First Amendment  
4111/2013 
12-12-2012 PSI Amendment  
19-12-2014 Master FAFA Second Amendment
248
 None Found 
 
 
Table 15: Greek EU MoUs (data compiled by author; ranked by date)
249
. 
 
Program Date MoUs Relevant Law 
1
st
  
(GLF) 
03-05-2010 First Economic Adjustment Programme  
3845/2010 
06-08-2010 First update  
22-11-2010 Second update  
23-02-2011 Third update 
04-07-2011 Fourth update  
31-10-2011 Fifth update250  
2
nd
  
(EFSF SA) 
01-03-2012 PSI MoU None found251 
11-03-2012 Second Economic Adjustment Programme  
4046/2012 
07-12-2012 First update  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
244
 Sources: sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 
245
 No date can be found anywhere for when this agreement was signed.  
246
 Repaid in full by December 2012 (Hellenic Republic 2013a, 331). 
247
 Never utilized. Availability period expired as of December 2012 (Hellenic Republic 2013, 331).  
248
 EFSF SA (2015c, 1). 
249
 Sources: sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2;for Updates: International Monetary Fund 2010d and 2011b, 27-60 
and 2011c, 41-89 and 2011d, 38-77 and 2012c, 62-145. 
250
 Letter of Intent for this MoU bears the date 31-10-2011, while the next page has 22-10-2011 
(International Monetary Fund 2011d).  
251
 Law 4050/2012 introduced retrofit CACs to Greek bonds and was relevant to PSI, but does not 
mention this MoU anywhere (Hellenic Republic 2012d).  
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Table 16: Greek IMF MoUs (data compiled by author; ranked by date)
252
. 
 
Program Date MoUs Relevant Law 
1
st
  
(SBA) 
03-05-2010 SBA Request & First MoU  
3845/2010 
06-08-2010 First update  
08-12-2010 Second update  
28-02-2011 Third update  
04-07-2011 Fourth update  
30-11-2011 Fifth Update   
2
nd
  
(EFF) 
09-03-2012 EFF request & Second MoU 
4046/2015 
21-12-2012 First update  
20-05-2013 Second update253  
17-07-2013 Third update  
 
9.3. Indicator A: Key national Policy areas, redistribution, delegation   
 It has already been argued in SECTION B above, that the EU, throughout the 
supranational crisis measures aimed at the EU level, has, overall, acquired 
considerable influence over key national policy areas with redistributive effects for 
the citizens of MS. It was also established that the overall level of delegation from the 
national to the EU level has considerably increased. But how are the elements of this 
first EU DD evaluation indicator shaped in relation to the MS-specific measures?  
 Issues of affecting key national policy areas, and instances of considerable 
increases in the delegated authority of supranational institutions, are evident in the 
MoU process of Greece. Because of the vast magnitude of specific policies affected 
by the MoUs investigated, the policies are grouped under the following broad policy 
categories, with the specific policies of each category being outlined in detail in 
APPENDIX B:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is already evident that the MoUs  affected almost all, if not entirely all, the policies 
within the Greek public order. The financial assistance structural adjustment process 
                                                 
252
 Sources: sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2; for Updates: International Monetary Fund 2010b, 1-30 and 2010d 
and 2011b, 1-26 and 2011c, 1-40 and 2011d, 1-37 and 2012c, 1-62 and 2013c. 
253
 The text of this MoU was not found either on the EC’s or the IMF’s relevant webpages. The 
existence and date of this MoU are deduced from the subsequent MoUs (IMF 2013, 1; IMF 2014a, 1). 
 Judiciary 
 Tourism  
 Transportation  
 Banks  
 Procurement  
 R&D  
 Privatization  
 Legislation  
 Social Security  
 
 Budget  
 Revenue 
 Public Remuneration 
 Public Administration 
 Defence 
 Energy 
 Labor Market  
 Healthcare 
 Education  
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was, essentially, an end-to-end, fundamental restructuring of the entire mode of 
operation of the Greek state.  
 To further elaborate on this observation, each of the MoUs of Greece (until the 
cut-off date of this research) are forensically investigated and analyzed, in order to 
establish where each category is referenced. This is a considerable contribution of this 
research to the existing field, since, as outlined in section 2.3, most references to the 
MS-specific crisis measures do not include a specification of exactly which policies 
are affected by the MoUs, and where those are referenced. The following Table 
provides the page numbers of each MoU in which each of the above policy categories 
are affected.  
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Table 17: Detailed breakdown of Greek policy areas affected by the MoUs (data compiled by the author; numbers refer to MoU page numbers)
254
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
254
 Sources: International Monetary Fund 2010b and 2010d and 2011b and 2011c and 2011d and 2012c and 2013c. The PSI MoU is excluded, not involving any policy conditionality.  
3/5/2010 6/8/2010 8/12/2010 28/2/2011 4/7/2011 30/11/2011 9/3/2012 13/12/2012 21/12/2012 17/7/2013
Budget 
57, 59-60, 62-3, 66-7, 
69, 71
4, 31, 37-9 34 30, 43 24, 44, 32, 43, 77-80 6-7, 19-20
8, 12-3, 26, 29, 52-3, 
58, 76
194-5, 200-2, 225-6, 
243, 251-2
21-2, 25-6, 28-30, 32, 
34-5, 41, 44-5, 62, 70, 
74, 79-83, 137-8
5, 14, 23-4
Tax 
43-4, 51, 55, 57, 59-
60, 62-5, 71
11, 32, 34, 48
9-11, 18, 30-3, 44, 52, 
55-6
5, 7, 31, 50-51
6-9, 24-5, 38-9, 40, 45, 
48, 77-80
5-8, 17, 22-3, 42-3, 45-
6, 49, 59
9, 11, 28, 30, 33-4, 55-
7, 76, 83-5 
194-9, 201-2, 226-8, 
233, 252
9, 17-8, 20-4, 34-5, 45, 
46, 61,  74-8
5-7, 10-3, 27-9
Renumeration 
41-2, 44, 48, 57, 60, 63-
5, 67, 71, 78-81, 90
1-3, 5, 11, 39, 46
9, 10, 18, 30-3, 45-7, 
51-3, 55-7
5, 10, 12, 15, 31-3, 43, 
47, 51
5-6, 24, 38-40, 49-52, 
77-80
5-8, 22, 42-3, 46-7, 49, 
53-5
7-8, 29, 33-4, 42, 52-3, 
61-3
201-4, 209, 238-9, 250-
1
8, 18-9, 33, 41-2, 135-
7
-
Administration 
41-3, 48, 57, 60-1, 63-
5, 68, 70-1, 78-81
5, 11, 34, 35-6, 46-7
10-2, 18, 30-3, 37-8, 
44, 47, 53-4, 55-7
4-5, 15, 31-4, 43-7, 50-
1, 55
4-5, 7-9, 17-9, 24-5, 
27, 40, 49-50, 61-4, 69-
70, 77-80, 
5-10, 22-3, 42-3, 45-7, 
49, 60, 64
7-8, 10-11, 13, 29, 33-
4, 56-9, 61, 66-7
196-207, 209, 226-7, 
250-2
18-9, 25-7, 30, 32-3, 
41, 74-8, 80, 84-5, 89, 
136-7
8-11, 13, 15, 26-7, 30
Defense - - 10, 18, 30-4, 56 44 24, 77-80 6-7 9, 52-3 204, 251-2 137 -
Energy 70, 83-4 42, 44 41, 49, 57 41, 50, 54, 56 17-19, 62-4, 69-70 18-9, 61-2, 65 84-7 231-2 114-8 5
Labor 49, 60-1, 68-9, 71, 82
1-2,7-8, 34, 38, 41, 45-
6, 48
8, 14-5, 18, 36-7, 40-1, 
43, 49, 53-4, 56-7
6, 43, 12, 15, 31, 37, 
39, 44, 47-8, 51-2
6, 17-9, 25, 51-2, 61, 
62, 64-8
7-8, 16-9, 22-3, 42-3, 
46, 49, 58-9, 60-3, 71-
2
21-4, 33-4, 75-84, 86-
7, 90
222-9, 233, 237-40
6, 7, 9, 32, 36-8, 104-
11, 122-6, 130-2
18-21, 49
Healthcare 48, 67, 81-2 5, 40 
9, 10, 30-3, 45-7, 52-3, 
35, 52, 56-7
7, 31, 34, 44-6, 51, 55 6, 52-8, 77-80 
6-8, 23, 42, 46, 49, 50-
2
7-8, 29, 52-3, 62-9
200, 202, 210, 211-5, 
250-2
20, 32, 43-4, 78-9, 89-
98, 137-8
-
Education 69 - 50, 54, 56 38, 42, 48-7, 52, 54 64-5,  73-5 62-3, 69-70 29, 79, 90 216, 239-40 137 -
Judiciary - - - 7, 31 48, 73-5 
18-9, 46, 57, 61-2, 69-
72 
24-5, 30, 33-4, 90-1 228-30 112-4, 132-3 21
Tourism - - 39, 56 12, 38, 47, 52 68 62-4 - - - -
Transport 82 - 3, 50-4, 56 33 17-9, 62-4, 69-70 18-9, 61-2, 45, 64 82-5 235-6 36, 119-21 -
Social Welfare 41-2, 70 46 9, 10, 30-3, 52, 56 50 5, 77-80 6-8, 23, 42, 46, 49
7-8, 12, 22, 29, 33-4, 
52-3, 58, 62-3,76
209, 251-2
20-1, 24, 30-1, 42-3, 
138
9-10, 28
Banks 46-7, 50, 60, 66-7 7
12-4, 18, 36, 48, 53-4, 
57
10-1, 15, 31, 44 13-4, 24, 60 22, 42-4, 56-7
10, 14-6, 19, 30, 33-4, 
62-3, 70-2, 74
203-4, 217-21
11-7, 30, 32-5, 40, 48, 
98-103
15-8, 25-6, 28
R&D 69, 84 - 42 39, 48 70-1 66 87-8 - -
Procurement 67,  78-9 - 38 49-50 48 60-1, 69 207-8 86-9 -
Privatization 57 8, 38, 46, 48 15, 18, 33, 40, 49, 57
9, 15, 31-2, 41, 44, 51, 
53
13-5, 27, 46, 68 15, 22, 24, 42-5
19-21, 33-4, 52, 54-5, 
58-4
194-5, 204, 236
10, 32, 39, 48, 71-3, 
83, 129
22, 26
Legislation 
44-5, 48, 57, 59-61, 66-
8, 70, 72, 75-7
6-7, 8, 38, 46, 48, 52
13, 14, 18, 34, 36-9, 
48, 53-4, 56-7
7, 15, 31, 37, 39,  47-8, 
51
15, 23-4, 42, 46, 49, 66-
8
7-10, 16, 21-2, 42-3, 
45-6, 48, 51-2, 59-60, 
62-3, 61, 66
10-12, 15-6, 19-20, 25, 
28-9, 30, 33-4, 53-6, 
58, 60, 62-3, 66, 71-3, 
75, 77-83, 86-8, 90-1
194-5, 202-8, 210, 
216, 219, 222, 224-36, 
238-40, 243, 252
7, 10, 30, 33-4, 36-46, 
71-84, 107-26, 130-2, 
135
5-7, 25-7
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It is evident that from 2010 and until 2013, most policies of the Greek state were 
included in the MoUs. Not only that, but the same policies were included in multiple 
MoUs, thus indicating a continuously changing policy environment. This meant that 
citizens were under a constant state of disorientation and change across the three year 
adjustment period examined.  
Implementation of policies within Greece from 2010 onwards, many of which 
key for the national level and most with redistributive effects, were decided, under the 
best case scenario, between the Greek executive and the Troika, with even the 
executive being transformed, on many occasions, to a mere facilitator
255
. From the 
information during the interview with Prof. Louka Katseli, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping, and former Minister of Employment and Social Security, it 
becomes clear that the negotiating process was very intense, and the Troika provided direct 
input to legislation even at the drafting stage
256
. In addition, similarly to the analysis of 
the EU-wide measures, the element of conditionality needs to be also be examined. 
Because of this element, the structural adjustment policies were not subject to 
discussion or deliberation. It was clearly stipulated that they constitute conditions for 
the provision of financial assistance, i.e. non-implementation meant zero funding. In 
relation to the EU-based legal instruments, the relevant CoM DEC 2010/320/EU of 
May 2010 (and hence all of its amendment and modifications issued under both the 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 financial assistance program of Greece), the following is stipulated: 
The lenders have decided that their support shall be conditional on Greece 
respecting this Decision. In particular, Greece is expected to carry out the 
measures specified in this Decision in accordance with the calendar set out 
herein (Council of the European Union 2010d, 7). 
In relation to the internationally-based legal instruments, across the Greek MoUs
257
 it 
is provisioned that:  
The release of the tranches will be based on observance of quantitative 
performance criteria and a positive evaluation […] Greece commits to consult 
with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF staff on the adoption of 
policies falling within the scope of this Memorandum (throughout all MoUs, 
e.g. International Monetary Fund 2010d, 30 and 2011b, 29, etc) 
                                                 
255
 This argument, related also more broadly to the entirety of the financial assistance programs (not 
just specifically Greece), was raised in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor 
of Constitutional Law.  
256
 Interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of Employment and Social Security 
(2010-2011).   
257
 In the 1st Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece under the GLF (May 2010; Table 16), there 
is no such clause, but there is one in the Loan Facility Agreement of the GLF (Hellenic Parliament 
2010a, 11).  
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 171  
Through this conditionality, the influence of supranational actors, whether of 
intergovernmental (e.g. EG) or purely supranational nature (e.g. EC) assumed a 
necessary or even obligatory character. However, especially in relation to the EU-
based legal acts that included conditionality, it is worth highlighting that neither 
TFEU article 126 nor 136, the combination of which was used to issue the relevant 
CoM DECs for Greece, include the possibility of being used as including conditions 
upon which disbursement of financial assistance is provided. Through this process, it 
seems that these EU-based legal instruments assume a character that is otherwise not 
included anywhere within their relevant provisions, thus distorting their true purpose 
and augmenting their impact upon national policy by making them de facto 
obligatory. Consequently, the institutions relevant with the issuance and monitoring of 
these acts, namely the CoM and EC, undergo a considerable increase in their decision-
making capacity and influence over policies at the national level.  
These effects were substantially deteriorated by the fact that, when deciding 
on issues relevant to EDP (TFEU article 126), the CoM decides without the vote of 
the MS concerned (European Union 2012, 101). While this is provisioned in 
relevance to a breach of obligations by a MS, this also became applicable in deciding 
specific policies and specific timetables that the MS had to implement, in order to 
receive financial assistance. Not only was this exceeding the purpose and nature of the 
relevant TFEU articles, but it also resulted in the Eurozone MS under financial 
assistance, in this case Greece, being virtually unable to even participate in the voting 
of policies which were to be implemented by it. Even if it is considered that the Greek 
state, albeit still only through its executive, partook and negotiated the terms of the 
MoU, the EU-based equivalent of this instrument – the CoM TFEU articles 126/136 
DEC – was decided officially without Greece’s input. This constitutes a truly 
considerable augmenting of the supranational level authority in national level policies, 
and a truly alarming indication in relation to the democratic process. 
A final observation in relation to key national policies must be offered in 
relation to the Loan Agreements/FAFAs and the attached opinion of the Legal 
Advisor to the State at the Greek Ministry of Finance
258
, where Greece resigns from 
immunity of its public property. It is argued that there has been a legal tradition of 
preventing enforcement of agreement terms against assets of a state which are meant 
for public purposes. However, there is the exception where a state is able to resign 
from this immunity through a written act. In this particular case, given that the loan 
                                                 
258
 The term Legal Advisor to the State at the MoF is an issue of debate as to whether it refers to a 
counselor of the Legal Council of the State or to an outside legal counsel, employed by the Finance 
Ministry (e.g. Deputy Minister of Finance 2013).  
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 172  
agreements are governed by English law, this resignation has been argued to be 
governed by the UK’s State Immunity Act 1978 (Iatrelis 2012, 10; Xrysogonos 2010, 
9; Marias 2010a, 2220-1). According to Article 13 of the Act, a state’s property is 
immune
259
 from any legal proceedings, except for when the state gives a written 
authorization that declares otherwise (United Kingdom 1978, 7). Within the EU 
framework, the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations
260
 stipulates that mandatory laws of a country are to be applied in regards 
to a contract, when necessary, , irrespective of the contract’s designated law (Council 
of the European Union 1980, 3-4). In addition, the contract’s designated law may not 
be applied if it runs contrary to the public policy (ordre public) of the forum (Council 
of the European Union 1980, 5). 
By agreeing to resign from the above immunity, the Greek state waives its 
protection under the UK’s State Immunity Act 1978. Even when considering the more 
broad protection of the Rome Convention, both in terms of mandatory laws and ordre 
public of the state, the resignation still applies. While it is provisioned within the Loan 
Agreements/FAFAs that this immunity is to be suspended except where mandatory 
law provides otherwise (e.g. European Financial Stability Facility 2012d, 39), the term 
mandatory law is not applicable within the Greek legal system
261
. Within the context 
of protection of public property against private entitlements, article 4(1) of Law 
3068/2002 prevents claims on “an object which has been tasked for the direct service 
of a specific public purpose” (Hellenic Republic 2002, 4986). However, it is not clear 
if this falls within the term mandatory law.  
Even as such, claims relating to this agreement would probably be adjudicated 
by English-law courts, which do not have to consider Greek legislation. Such a court 
decision would then be implemented within Greece via the Greek court system. While 
at this stage of the process the Greek legal order could be considered, Greek courts do 
not adjudicate on the merits of a case when implementing foreign court decisions. The 
decision on whether to implement the decision is based on it not running contrary to a 
Greek court decision for the same case, or to proper morals and public order
262
 
                                                 
259
 Immunity applies to public property only. Private property of a state, i.e. in accordance with UK 
State Immunity Act Article 13, §4: “property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes,” can be the subject of judicial proceedings (United Kingdom 1978, 7). 
260
 ref. no. 80/934/EEC/19-06-1980 as has been amended, mainly by REG (EC) 593/2008/17-06-2008 
(Council of the European Union 1980 and 2008d).  
261
 Potential explanations have included public order law and peremptory law (ius/jus cogens), the latter 
of which provides that no agreement to the contrary can prevent the application of certain laws (ius/jus 
dispositivum; Itarelis 2012, 5). 
262
 Articles 323 and 905 of the Greek Code of Civil Court Procedure 
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(Theofylaktou et al. 2010, 504 and 631-2). Hence the English-law court decision could 
potentially be enforced within the Greek state by Greek courts regardless of Greek 
legislation. Finally, aside from all the above, the protection afforded by the Rome 
Convention is also negated by the legal opinion of the Legal Advisor to the State at the 
Ministry of Finance, attached to the loan agreements, in §5 of which it is a priori 
stipulated that:  
The enforcement…would not be contrary to mandatory provisions of Hellenic 
law, to the ordre public of the Beneficiary Member State, to international 
treaties or to generally accepted principles of international (Hellenic Republic 
2012b, 339 and 2012c, 1768 and 2013, 335; signed legal opinion in Charitaki 
2012, 2).    
 This resignation from state immunity is considerably problematic for the 
democratic process, as the legitimacy of the executive to assume this action that not 
only binds any following governments, but also provides for the potential 
expropriation of property belonging to the Greek people, and is applicable for a 
duration that surpasses the agreeing government’s term, is highly questionable. In 
addition, the Greek legal order does not provide for the possibility of the Greek state to 
resign from this type of immunity
263
, making the legitimacy of this resignation by the 
Greek executive even more debateable. As MEP Hon. Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos 
suggests in relation to the above opinions of the Legal Advisor “they are completely 
unfounded, because in no case can there be execution (of claims) in relation to public 
property”264. Resignation of immunity and national sovereignty, regardless of the 
borrower, is something democratically unacceptable. Factoring in the capabilities of 
execution of claims when the lender is a state, and not a private entity, as well the 
sheer consequences of such claims on the sovereignty of the borrower State, this term 
becomes almost incompatible with any democratic principle, or even principle of 
international law
265
.  
   
                                                 
263
 This was also highlighted in the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of 
Constitutional Law.  
264
 From ibid.  
265
 It can be argued that similar types of agreements are part of typical international lending practises 
(Iatrelis 2012). For example, in relation to the resignation of Greece from any immunity over its assets, 
it is argued that “the same term, with basically the same wording is included in all the corresponding 
agreements that the State has signed before the MoU…”(Iaterlis 2012, 
11http://www.constitutionalism.gr/site/2286-i-symbasi-daneiakis-dieykolynsis-toy-
2010-kai-oi-y/). However, this will have to be seen in a different context, as the lenders are not 
private entities but other states.  
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 174  
9.4. Indicator B: Parliamentary authority (EP and national Parliaments) 
 The financial assistance programmes of Greece, until the cut-off date of this 
research, included virtually no EP participation whatsoever. The EP was completely 
excluded from the financial assistance process. However, specifically for the GLF, 
temporal constraints also need to be taken into consideration. As the former IMF 
Executive Board member Dr. Miranda Xafa, suggests  
the Greek program was approved two days before the need of Greece to roll-
over a bond amounting to approximately 10 bn, which the market would not 
voluntarily accept. So, either Greece would resort to an unordered default, if 
there were procedures such as going to the European Parliament for approval 
or for everyone to say their opinion, or it would have been as it happened; and 
I think it happened in the right way from this aspect.
266
  
However, from the overall application of the programmes, it is clear that the role of 
the EP was both ex ante, but also ex post facto, almost entirely non-existent. As the 
EP Report on the Employment and Social Aspects of the Role and Operations of the 
Troika
267
 conclusively observes: 
…Parliament has been completely marginalised in all phases of the 
programmes: the preparatory phase, the development of mandates and the 
monitoring of the impact of the results achieved by the programmes and 
related measures (European Parliament 2014c).  
The more democratically damaging factor, however, is that this was also mostly the 
case in relation to the Greek parliament.  
  
9.4.1. Primary MoU/loan agreements Greek legislation 
The first major issue in relation to parliamentary input was raised in relation to 
the GLF and the 1
st
 financial assistance program. The awkwardness with which the 
unprecedented situation was dealt with at the supranational level, also extended to the 
national level, especially in relation to where the Greek parliament fitted into the 
executive-Troika-CoM negotiations. Of the GLF, the only part introduced within the 
Greek ordre public was the MoU in Law 3845/2010. Whether the Law legally ratified 
the MoU is an issue of debate, as nowhere within it is such a provision directly 
referenced. However, the Law provides throughout its article 2 that regulatory 
Presidential Decrees (PDs)
268
 may be issued to modify existing legislation and align it 
with the MoU, as this MoU is referenced by title in article 1(3) of this Law and 
attached as an Annex to it (Hellenic Republic 2010a, 1321-3). There is also ambiguity 
                                                 
266
 From the interview with Dr. Miranda Xafa, inter alia, former member of the IMF’s Executive 
Board. 
267
 Procedure 2014/2007(INI) (European Parliament 2014c). 
268
 Regulatory PDs are issued by the President, after relevant legislative authorization (Law) and after, 
and within the limits of, a proposal by the relevant Minister (Hellenic Parliament 2008, 59).  
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as to the actual nature of the Law itself
269
.  Regardless of the actual nature of the 
MoUs (international agreement, international ‘soft law’, etc), Law 3845/2010 was 
ratified as a regular Law, not as one ratifying any type of international legislation.  
The key issue regarding Parliamentary input was raised in relation to  
authorization by the legislative to the executive. Article 1(4) of the Law included an 
authorization to the FinM to sign any MoU or loan agreement, or addendums thereof, 
and to implement the MoU annexed, with all of the relevant documents to be 
introduced to Parliament for ratification (Hellenic Republic 2010a, 1321). Despite this 
provision, one day after the Law was deposited in Parliament, Law 3847/2010 was 
deposited, originally pertaining only to pension provisions. During the discussion of 
this latter Law by the Plenum, the then FinM introduced a modification, whereby 
parliamentary ratification in Law 3845/2010 was no longer required (Hellenic 
Republic 2010b, 1410; Hellenic Parliament 2010c, 6882)
270
. This is key, as, given the 
extensive breadth of MoU policies (above), it effectively removed parliamentary input 
from almost all policies within the Greek state.  
The way this modification was introduced combined with the very content of 
the modification, i.e. henceforth not requiring any loan agreements and MoUs to be 
ratified by Parliament, raised serious concerns. In accordance with the Constitution of 
Greece (CoG) Article 74(4), as well as with Article 87 of the Standing Orders of 
Parliament, modifications and amendments to Bills can only be debated if submitted 3 
days prior to the Bill’s discussion in Parliament, a condition which was not satisfied 
in this case; the amendment was introduced during the actual voting process (Hellenic 
Parliament 2008, 85 and 2014, 68; Hellenic Parliament 2010c, 6882-6893). 
Furthermore, eliminating Parliamentary ratification for MoUs/loan agreements could 
constitute a potential breach of:  
 CoG Article 28(2): Constitutional authorities (e.g. determining taxation rates 
throughout Greece) may be vested in agencies of international organizations by law, 
but such law should be ratified by 180/300 MPs (Hellenic Parliament 2008, 45-6), 
 CoG Article 28(3): a law by 151/300 MPs can limit national sovereignty, but only 
under the principles, among others, of equality and reciprocity, and under the 
condition it does not harm the democratic foundations (Hellenic Parliament 2008, 45-
6),  
 If it is supported that the MoU or loan agreements are international conventions (e.g. 
Marias 2010b), then CoG Article 36, §2: International conventions which include 
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 E.g. Kasimatis (2010), Xrysogonos (2010), Manitakis (2011), Katrougkalos (2010), more generally 
Marias (2010a and 2010b), etc. Note that these academics also extensively debate the nature of the 
MoU itself (whether an international agreement, product of international ‘soft law’, etc), which, 
however, escapes the focus of this article.  
270
 More specifically, the modification to Law 3845/2010 included in Law 3847/2010 was “instead of 
the word ‘ratification’ the words ‘discussion and information. They (MoUs/loan agreements) are valid 
and executed from their signature’ are entered” (Hellenic Republic 2010b, 1410) 
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economic, trade, or tax related issues which may impose burdens on Greek citizens 
individually have to be enacted in a law (Hellenic Parliament 2008, 53). 
Legal issues aside, however, the fact that any MoUs/loan agreements decided 
by the executive in cooperation with supranational/international authorities would 
require Parliament ratification to enter into force ensured elementary representative 
oversight. The modification of this provision, as presented above, seems to provide 
the executive with a ‘blank cheque to, essentially, legislate. As was stated above, the 
measures included in the MoUs were to be implemented in return for financial 
assistance; there was no possibility for further debate, deliberation, etc. Furthermore, 
all relevant negotiations, even the ones within the CoM for the EU-based MoU 
equivalent DEC, took place behind closed doors. It is, therefore, impossible to discern 
exactly how the negotiation process unfolded. These elements, when combined, 
potentially provide the opportunity to the executive to introduce its own policies 
within the MoUs, and have them implemented with no deliberation, or even a typical 
parliamentary ratification, under the threat of non-disbursement of financial 
assistance. This seriously distorts the separation of powers within the national level, 
aside from considerably degrading (possibly to the point of essential elimination) of 
the role of the parliament in implementing policy within Greece.  
In relation to the other parts of the GLF, namely the Intercreditor Agreement 
and the Loan Facility, those were never ratified by Parliament. They were submitted 
as a Bill much later in June 2010, but voting on the Bill never took place (Hellenic 
Parliament 2010c). It was argued that on account of the aforementioned modification 
by Law 3847/2010 eliminating the requirement of parliamentary ratification for 
MoUs/loan agreements, there was no need and, in fact, no authority for the parliament 
to ratify these two agreements (Plavoukou 2010; Staikouras 2010). However, it has 
been counter-argued that that the two agreements were signed three days prior to the 
entry into force of that specific provision of Law 3847/2010 repealing parliamentary 
input, and, as such, they should have been ratified in accordance with article 1 of Law 
3845/2010 as in force during the signing, regardless of the fact that these agreements 
were deposited to Parliament almost a month (June 2010) after both of the above 
Laws entered in force (Marias 2010a).  
It is worth noting that the entire GLF (MoU and the Loan/Intercreditor 
agreements), as well as their subsequent amendments, have been ratified by 
Parliaments of other Eurozone MS (e.g. Irish Parliament; House of the Oireachtas 
2010a and 2010b and 2011 and 2012 and 2013). Again, the observation is made that 
democratic ‘double-standards’ apply in relation to MS acting as lenders and those 
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being borrowers. In the above example, the Irish Parliament was able to decide on 
issues relating to specific, and oftentimes key, policies of the Greek state, while the 
Greek parliament did not have this opportunity. Ironically, when Ireland was acting as 
a borrower receiving financial assistance, it encountered a similar problem vis-à-vis 
the German Bundestag, to which key, confidential details (e.g. 2% increase in VAT) 
of the Irish budget were provided before they were even given to the Irish Parliament 
(Smyth & Spiegel 2011). 
Issues were also raised in relation to the 2
nd
 financial assistance program for 
Greece. Despite the aforementioned provision not requiring Parliamentary ratification, 
the relevant MoUs/loan agreements for the 2
nd
 program were ratified by Parliament. 
Law 4046/2012 included the relevant Loan Agreements, except the Master FAFA, 
and the MoU, except the separate PSI MoU (Hellenic Republic 2012b). The Law 
stipulated that the FAFAs and the MoU, as annexed, are approved, provided 
authorizations to PM/FinM similar to those of Law 3845/2010, and stipulated that all 
of the above documents enter into force from the date they are signed, and are 
submitted to parliament for information only (Hellenic Republic 2012b, 291-2).   
Law 4060/2012, approving of the Master FAFA, and Law 4111/2013, 
approving the December 2012 amendments to the Master FAFA, and the FAFAs PSI 
LM Facility and Bond Interest Facility, were both enacted through the Act of 
Legislative Content (ALCs) procedure (Hellenic Republic 2012c and 2013a). In 
accordance with CoG Article 44(1), ALCs are issued “under extraordinary 
circumstances of an urgent an unforeseeable need,” by the President, upon a proposal 
of the Cabinet (Hellenic Parliament 2008, 60). They have typical legal force 
equivalent to a regular Law. However, they need to be submitted to Parliament within 
40 days of their publication and need to be ratified within 3 months of their 
submission. The ratification is not subject to modifications – the ALC submitted has 
to either be ratified as it is or rejected. If it is not submitted or not ratified within the 
above time limits, or if it is rejected, the ALC ceases to have legal force henceforth 
(Hellenic Parliament 2008, 60). In terms of authorizations, the same as in Law 
4046/2012 apply in these two Laws too.  
Although parliamentary approval was finally sought, the process was 
completed under considerable temporal duress. The first set of ratified loan 
agreements was enacted by Law 4046/2012, which also included the 2
nd
 MoU; this 
Law numbered a total of 573 pages, and was submitted and voted on by Parliament 
within only just two days (Hellenic Republic 2012b; Hellenic Parliament 2012a). 
Given the size and policy impact of the Law and, more importantly, its paramount 
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importance for national interests, two days is a severely constrained amount of time 
for MPs to read, comment, and provide feedback.  
Issues also exist in relation to the ALC process of Laws 4060/2012 and 
4111/2013. ALCs are designed to provide the necessary latitude to the executive to 
pass legislation of an emergency nature in order to address an unforeseen situation
271
, 
where provisions are urgent, of limited policy impact, and, in either case, do not 
necessarily require, or are not fundamentally altered by, any further deliberation or 
debate. That is the reason why the ALC can either be ratified or rejected; there is no 
modification possible. While this instrument is useful in case of policy satisfying 
these conditions, in this case it was used to ratify international legislation, binding on 
the national level, affecting most of the policy areas within the Greek state, and which 
would definitely benefit by further deliberation and discussion in Parliament. This 
presents a challenge in terms of the purpose of the ALCs. It could be argued that 
ALCs were eventually used because of the emergency character and need for urgent 
ratification of these agreements. However, both of the relevant Laws were enacted 
across 2012-13, already two years into the crisis and after the signing of several other 
relevant MoUs/loan agreements. There is, hence, a contradiction arising from the 
characterization of a situation that has been recurrent, repeated and anticipated, as 
urgent and unforeseen
272
. It is clear from the above that the process utilized in relation 
to parliamentary input on the MoUs/loan agreements was minimal and, when existent, 
considerably insufficient or constrained by various temporal or legal issues.  
 
9.4.2. Secondary MoU/loan agreements Greek legislation 
 The argument could be made that, while the aforementioned primary 
MoU/loan agreement national legislation suffered from lack of representative input, 
the secondary legislation, implementing the measures included in the MoUs within 
the Greek public order, compensated for or, at the very least, matched this deficiency, 
as the parliament had full authority to deliberate and discuss specific policies. In 
relation to this argument, it needs to be emphasized that the MoUs leave very little 
room for maneuvering, often even including detailed timetables of the policy steps to 
be taken. Despite this fact, it is the case that the Greek parliament was considerably 
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 E.g. financial relief for houses damaged by a catastrophic fire (e.g. ALC of 29-08-2007 ratified by 
Law 3624/2007 – Hellenic Republic 2007a and 2007b). 
272
 Per settled case-law by the Council of the State (Supreme Administrative/Constitutional-type Court 
of Greece; e.g. Plenary 3636/1989, 3612/2002, 1250/2003), the evaluation of whether the situation, in 
accordance to which an ALC is issued, is an emergency is not subject to judicial review. The authority 
to evaluate a situation as urgent and unforeseen lies with parliament (i.e. whether to vote for or reject 
the ALC; Hellenic Parliament 2012d, 3). 
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more involved in this process, than with the process relevant to the actual MoUs, 
although this has to be understood as somewhat expected in a democracy. Even in this 
case, however, democratic representative processes at the national level failed to be 
properly implemented, in the name of quick and urgent need to release financial 
assistance disbursements by proving satisfaction of conditionality through Laws.  
This sub-section briefly presents the transference of MoU policies within the 
Greek ordre public. As it is not possible to present the entire breadth of legislation 
relating to the MoUs within this investigation, an indicative list of the most important 
acts is presented in Table 18 below. This is secondary legislation of high importance, 
i.e. that implements or introduced MoUs/loan agreements etc. Most of the Laws 
presented where introduced by the very urgent procedure provisioned in article 76, §4 
of the CoG, and article 109 of the Standing Orders of parliament. The process allows 
only for a limited debate in the relevant parliament ccommittee, and plenum, setting a 
limit of one sitting for both, and for the latter an additional specific time limit (10 
hours; Hellenic Parliament 2008, 86 and 2014a, 84-5).The comments provided next to 
each Law are only partially summative (the most important) and are always inter alia 
other policies, most of which implement MoU measures.  In addition to the above, 
there is relevant secondary legislation that relates to MoU obligations that is not 
considered of high importance, i.e. that indirectly implements MoU policies enforcing 
specific MoU measures in various policy areas. These Laws have usually been passed 
through the regular and not the very urgent procedure, hence procedural details are 
not referenced, and are presented in Table 19 below.  
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Table 18: Secondary Greek legislation (high importance) relevant to MoU/loan agreements (data compiled by author)
 273
 
Law Important provisions (inter alia) Proceedure 
Duration 
(days)
274
 
Length 
(pages)
275
 
3845/2010 
 1st MoU,  
 MoUs/loan agreements to be submitted to Parliament for ratification,  
 Increase taxes,  
 Public sector remuneration cuts, 
Very Urgent 2 72 
3847/2010 
 Amendment to Law 3845/2010 = MoUs/loan agreements in Parliament only for information, 
 Public sector pensions’ Christmas/Easter bonuses and leave allowance paid only if the retiree is > 60 years and 
pension is < EUR 2.500 
Very Urgent 2 2 
3864/2010  Establishment of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund276 Regular 13 8 
3986/2011 
 Establishment of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund SA277 (right to use assets, including foreshores 
and beaches, for 99 years),  
 Labour reserve (“εργασιακή εφεδρεία”), 278 
 Extension of the 1/5 hiring/appointment ratio for Public sector to 31-12-2016 
Very Urgent 3 36 
4024/2011 
 Pre-retirement availability (“προσυνταξιοδοτική διαθεσημότητα”) 279,  
 Cuts in Public sector Christmas/Easter bonuses and leave allowance,  
 Reduction of Public employees’ lump sum amount (“εφάπαξ”) paid on retirement,  
 Evaluation of Public sector,  
 New tax scale 
Regular 19 36 
4046/2012 
 2nd MoU,  
 Authorizations for the FinM and BoG Governor to sign MoUs, updates-changes,  
 Provisions that Chapter E of MEFP280 and Chapter 4 of MoU281 constitute rules of full legal effect and are of 
immediate application  
Very Urgent 2 128 
                                                 
273
 Sources: Hellenic Republic 2010a through 2010c and 2011a and 2011b and 2012b through 2012e and 2013a. 
274
 Time between deposit and voting (regardless of time it took to publish in the GG).  
275
 Font: Type = MgHelveticaUCPol, Size = 9 at 2 columns/page. 
276
 In the Report of the Parliament’s Scientific Committee it is referenced that the MoU provides that its establishment is one of the conditions for Greece receiving financial assistance 
(Hellenic Parliament 2010f, 1-3). 
277
 The aim of the Fund is to make use of the private property of the State so as to achieve the desired revenue. The assets are utilized preferably by selling.  
278
 Employees receive 60% of the basic remuneration for 12/24 months. 
279
 Employees receive 60% of their basic wage, without any additional allowances. 
280
 Inter alia: labour market liberalization, reductions in nominal wages and contracts’ duration and grace period, abolishment of tenure clauses, freezing wage maturity, 22% wage cut and 
32% cut for youth <25 years (European Commission 2012a, 109-13).   
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4050/2012  PSI and retroactive CACs  Very Urgent 2 4 
4060/2012  Master FAFA ratification, FinM and BoG Governor authorizations for signature Regular 7 132 
4093/2012 
 MTFS 2013-16,  
 Retirement provisions,  
 Public sector pension reductions,  
 Abolishment of Public sector employees’ and retirees’ Christmas/Easter bonuses and leave allowance,  
 Labour availability (διαθεσιμότητα)282,  
 Reduction of Public employees’ lump sum allowance paid on retirement,  
 New wage bargaining system in the private sector,  
 New minimum wages for the private sector,  
 Criminal Code modifications,  
 Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure (Κώδικας Διοικητικής Δικονομίας) modifications 
Very Urgent 2 124 
4111/2013  Approval of MFAFA, PSI, Bond Interest Facilities’ Amendments and expenses Very Urgent 3 128 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
281
 Inter alia: ibid and, additionally, suspension of automatic wage increases (International Monetary Fund 2012a, 75-6). 
282
 8 months, ¾ of remuneration. Employment terminated if the employee is not transferred within 8 months. 
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Table 19: Secondary Greek legislation (not high importance) implementing MoU/loan agreement provisions (data compiled by author)
 283
 
Law Important provisions (inter alia) 
3846/2010 Private sector employment: increased flexibility/deregulation 
3862/2010 FinM authorised to sign MoU (whether Greek or other) under EFSF SA 
3863/2010 Public sector retirement regime modifications 
3865/2010 Increase of retirement ages 
3871/2010 Fundamental amendments to the basic State budget Law 2362/1995 
3888/2010 Abolish and replace CBR 
3891/2010 Restructuring of the Hellenic Railways Organisation SA (ΟΣE ΑΕ) 
3892/2010 E-prescribing (health system) framework implementation 
3894/2010 Deviations from construction/environmental terms allowed in case of strategic investments. 
3899/2010 State-Owned Enterprises remuneration caps/cuts. 
3918/2011 Unification of most Public sector healthcare funds in one (ΕΟΠΥΥ). 
3919/2011 Deregulation of restricted professions 
3695/2011 Hellenic Loan and Consignment Fund SA split up 
4002/2011 Closures/mergers/split-ups of SOEs by an MD 
4013/2011 Establishment of a single public procurement authority 
4014/2011 Legalization of unauthorised construction
284
 for 40 years after paying a special fine. 
4051/2012 Reduction of Public sector pensions retroactively. 
4110/2013 New tax scale/brackets
285
 from 2014 onwards. 
4141/2013 Creation of the Centre for Auditing Tax-Payers of Large Wealth 
4152/2013 Special tax (ΕΕΤΑ) on land property, collected via the electricity bill. 
4172/2013 New Income Tax Code, labour availability for school guards, municipal police, specialised personnel of secondary education 
                                                 
283
 Sources: Hellenic Republic 2010d through 2010m and 2011c through 2011i and 2012f through 2012o and 2013b through 2013h. 
284
 Buildings which have been established and raised in excess of either their Construction Permit or the terms and restrictions of construction for the property or without a Construction 
Permit. 
285
 Inter alia, abolition of tax-free amounts. 
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The information presented suggests that most, if not all, of MoU policies were 
introduced within the Greek legal order. Even in the case of secondary legislation, i.e. 
legislation relevant to the MoUs which went through parliamentary procedure, it is 
still clear that MoU policies were legislated to the letter. The parliament had little, or 
virtually no, ability to deliberate, given the conditional nature of the policies included 
in the MoUs. This was the case even in Laws that went through the regular legislative 
procedure, considerably limiting the decision-making ability of the legislature via 
procedural constraints, whereby great numbers of Bills were deposited, numbering 
oftentimes hundreds of pages and including numerous specifics and details for the 
entire restructuring of the state.  
Indicative of not only the reduction of the ability of the parliament to affect 
national policies, but also of the disequilibrium between its decision-making authority 
vis-à-vis the executive, is the amount of ALCs issued. As described above, ALCs are 
used by the executive in order to respond to an unforeseen and emergency situation, 
where, in either case, little or no Parliamentary deliberation is necessary. The 
legislature is, thus, constrained in terms of any disagreement or modifications to the 
ALC. This is complementary to the very purpose of the ALC process, aimed at 
offering the ability to address emergency issues of an unforeseen nature.  
During the investigation’s interval, and especially after 2011-12, when the 
structural adjustment intensified, the legal instrument of ALCs was stretched beyond 
its purpose.  Table 20 below presents all ALCs introduced, and their corresponding 
ratification Laws (if applicable), from 2009 until 2013. 
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Table 20: Greek ALCs between 2007-2013 & MoU relevance (data compiled by author)
286
. 
ALC Law Provisions (inter alia) MoU 
29-08-2007 3624/2007 Financial support for those devastated from fires. × 
No ALCs were found for 2008 - 
25-05-2009 Not Found Transfer of EP election lists to the President. × 
16-09-2009 3814/2010 VAT issues, readjustment of SSFs contributions, overdue debts to the State, suspension of auctions from credit institutions. × 
16-09-2009 Not Found Measures to counter atmospheric pollution.   × 
16-09-2009 Not Found Social provisions for employees of Olympic Air. × 
13-10-2009 3817/2010 National Intelligence Service to be under the Minister of Citizen Protection. × 
29-10-2009 3819/2010 Suspension of regularizing land-use violations (ημιυπαίθριοι χώροι). × 
02-11-2009 3831/2010 Readjustment of car circulation fees, abolition of the scrapping vehicles measure, etc.  × 
26-05-2010 3866/2010 Suspension of the operation of the judicial services in Thessaloniki on account of incendiary device being activated. × 
04-01-2011 3949/2011 Suspension of auctions from credit institutions and other creditors. × 
08-01-2011 3945/2011 Suspension of the operation of the judicial services in Athens on account of incendiary device being activated. × 
09-05-2011 3995/2011 Conduct a census of the population. × 
25-08-2011 4021/2011 FinM covering debts of various municipalities, extend deadline to publicize financial statements for stock market credit institutions  × 
14-09-2011 4031/2011 Increase in the amount of BoG guarantees to banks established in Greece in order to cover their credits. × 
16-12-2011 4047/2012 Provisions relative to the MTFS 2012-2015 (Law 3985/2011) and to the 2011 budget.  
31-12-2011 4047/2012 Provisions relative to the application of Law 4024/2011.  
14-03-2012 4060/2012 Approval of the MFAFA and relevant signature authorizations.  
14-03-2012 4080/2012 Postponement of the evaluation of the armed forces, Police and Port Authority-Coast Guard. × 
15-03-2012 4082/2012 Measures to restore damages incurred on account of episodes during 12-02-2012 in Athens city centre. × 
21-03-2012 4084/2012 Provisions relating to holding of illegal immigrants entering the country. × 
19-04-2012 4079/2012 Capital reinforcement of credit institutions.  × 
30-04-2012 4079/2012 Provisions relating to the application of Laws 3864/2010 , 4046/2012, 4051/2012, 4071/2012.  
29-05-2012 4079/2012 Provisions relating to the publication of financial reports by credit institutions and their subsidiaries. × 
01-06-2012 4086/2012 Payment to court representatives, secretaries to electoral committees, etc.  × 
                                                 
286
 As found from the Government Gazette Search option (specific criteria) of the National Printing Office on 17-04-2014 (Hellenic National Printing Office 2014). For the ratifying Laws 
sources are: Hellenic Republic 2007b and 2010o through 2010s and 2011i and 2011r through 2011v and 2012c and 2012g and 2012k and 2012n and 2012r through 2012y and 2013a and 
2013k through 2013t. 
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14-06-2012 4087/2012 Extension of the programme “Assistance at home” (Βοήθεια στο Σπίτι). × 
13-07-2012 4080/2012 Further postponement of the evaluation of the armed forces, Police and Port Authority-Coast Guard. × 
09-08-2012 4083/2012
287
 Provisions relating to investment plans.  × 
21-08-2012 4088/2012 Provisions relating to the transfer of officers of the Police. × 
05-09-2012 4089/2012 Provisions relating to the  students’ transportation.  × 
06-09-2012 4092/2012 Modification of the provisions relating to the HRADF.  
07-09-2012 4092/2012 Abolishment of minimum participation of the State in various SOEs (ports, Public Power Corporation, etc)  
03-10-2012 4116/2013 Extension of duration of the administration committee managing the liquidation of the labour force organisations.   
30-10-2012 4118/2013 Provisions relating to the Henri Dunant foundation  × 
31-10-2012 4117/2013 Provisions relating to the new way of issuing construction permits / licenses
288
. × 
12-11-2012 Not Found Provisions relating to the application of Law 4046/2012 and MTFS 2013-16 (Law 4093/2012).  
19-11-2012 Not Found Provisions relating to the application of Law 4046/2012 and Law 4093/2012.  
05-12-2012 Not Found Provisions relating to various Ministries.   
07-12-2012 Not Found Provisions relating to the Parliament’s employees Assistance Fund and to the Greek bond exchange.   
12-12-2012 4111/2013 Approval of amendments to the Master FAFA, PSI LM, Bond Interest Facilities.   
18-12-2012 4128/2013 Provisions relating to economic development.  × 
31-12-2012 4147/2013 Provisions relating to various Ministries.   
29-04-2013 4163/2013 Modifications to the ALC 30-10-2012, as ratified by Law 4118/2013.  
11-06-2013 Not Ratified
289
 Modifications in regards to the liquidation of assets of SOEs which have been shut down.  
28-06-2013 4206/2013 Extension of the deadline to submit a Statement of Assets (Law 3213/2003). × 
09-08-2013 4218/2013 Economic provisions. × 
11-09-2013 4211/2013 Provisions relating to the SOE Hellenic Defence Systems SA.  
11-10-2013 4227/2014 Further modifications to the ALC 30-10-2012 (Law 4118/2013), as amended by ALC 29-04-2013( Law 4163/2013).  
                                                 
287
 This abolished the relevant ALC.  
288
 Law 4030/2011 (Hellenic Republic 2011u). 
289
 Hellenic Parliament 2014b. 
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The following Graph 1 presents the above in a temporally-progressive graphical 
representation.  
 
  
The above demonstrates that the use of ALCs increased substantially over the 
years during which Greece underwent structural reforms. Within the three-year period 
2007 through 2010, there were a total of 8 ALCs issued, while between the three-year 
period 2011 through 2013 there were a total of 38 ALCs issued, which is an increase 
of approximately 375%. Of those 38 ALCs, almost half (17) concerned issues relevant 
to the MoUs. When analyzing the ALCs on their merits and substance, the 
comparison is even more striking. During the 2007-2010 interval, ALCs were only 
used for very specific incidents with very limited legal and socio-political aftermath 
(suspending the judicial operations of the courts on account of incendiary device, 
financial support for those suffering the consequences of catastrophic fires, etc)
290
. In 
comparison, most of the ALCs introduced in the period between 2011 and 2013 dealt 
with a wide variety of key national policy issues with large redistributive effects. For 
example, ALCs during 2012 included budgetary provisions, provisions spanning 
across the entire spectrum of various policy domains (and Ministries), closure of 
strategically important State-Owned Enterprises, modifications in tax, revenue, public 
administration, etc., issues. This clearly stretched the purpose of ALCs beyond 
proportion, and the usage of this legislative instrument for these purposes is quite 
                                                 
290
 This argument was also raised in the interview with Dr. Lina Papadopoulou, Associate Professor of 
Constitutional Law. 
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Graph 1: Number of ALCs between 2007-2013  
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likely at odds with its true purpose
291
. As Dr. Lina Papapdopoulou, Associate 
Professor of Constitutional Law, highlights,  
the ALCs became the subject of abuse…because they (mainly referring to the 
governments including and after PM Antonis Samaras) passed things in them 
which were not at all emergency […] The ratification of the agreement 
(financial assistance) must, in my opinion, go through Parliament
292
.  
As MEP Hon. Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos further observes “in most cases the ALCs are 
issued without the constitutionally-provisioned conditions for their issuance existing, 
but this cannot be an issue of judicial oversight (because there is no merit-based 
constitutional court in Greece)
293
.  
 
9.5. Indicator C: Processes of institutions   
The processes of institutions during the implementation of the financial 
assistance programmes of Greece were, at the very least, disappointing. This was both 
in relation to the supranational institutions partaking in the process, as well as to the 
national institutions. To begin with, the key institutional player in relation to the 
programmes, namely the Troika, lacked any official operating or institutional 
mandate. As such, and being an international, ad-hoc cooperation with authority to 
intervene in most, if not all, key national policies of the Greek state, there were no 
provisions relevant to transparency and efficiency, or any possibility for key 
stakeholders to be taken into consideration in the decision-making process. In fact, it 
is even uncertain exactly who the individuals that participated in the Troika during the 
negotiation or the review process were, how the negotiations and reviews were 
conducted, etc. In terms, then, of maintaining transparent processes, but also of 
ensuring accountability, the performance is rather poor. It is worth highlighting that 
two out of the three members of the Troika were EU institutions. However, given that 
these institutions were acting outside their EU mandate, the entire process was not 
bound by any of the EU safeguards for transparency, accountability, efficiency and 
stakeholder participation.  
 This lack of transparency also extended to the utilisation of the financial 
assistance provided, prompting a widespread belief across the EU that the bailout are 
rescue packages, given to assist some Eurozone MS in debt, i.e. that the German or 
Austrian or French taxpayers are bailing out Greek or Irish citizens. This was 
                                                 
291
 This argument was also raised in the interviews with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor 
of Constitutional Law, and with ibid. 
292
 From the interview with Dr. Lina Papadopoulou, Associate Professor of Constitutional Law. 
293
 From the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of Constitutional Law 
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reinforced by the perception that the waste of these countries, particularly Greece, 
which was applied towards EU or national funds, still continues to apply in the 
financial assistance (barrel without a bottom, bottom-less pit, etc; e.g. Bloomberg 
2012).  However, it is estimated (though no certainty exists, exactly because of the 
lack of transparency on the way the financial assistance was utilized) that 
approximately 90% of the Greek financial assistance was not actually used for budget 
support or to meet social needs , but went towards servicing the accumulated foreign 
debt and providing for the recapitalization of banks, i.e. “the European authorities are 
effectively lending Greece money so Greece can repay the money it borrowed from 
them” (Attac 2013a and 2013b; Mouzakis 2015; Fontevecchia 2012; Blodget 2010; 
Alderman & Ewing 2012). As the Chair of the Board of Directors of the National 
Bank of Greece and President of the Hellenic Bank Association Hon. Prof. Louka 
Katseli highlights “87% of them (financial assistance loans) was to repay debt. Only 
11% went in the Greek budget. They were debt to repay debt”294. 
What is often not mentioned, however, is tha the sector being repaid is the 
same financial sector who irresponsibly lent to Greece
295
 the amounts it irresponsibly 
borrowed, thus applying predatory lending practises.
 
In essence, the so-called 
‘bailouts’ are meant to save the banking and financial sectors, which were over-
exposed to Greek debt (Attac 2013a). The loans are not so much to save Greece, but 
to salvage the banking sector of the Eurozone (whether German
296
, French, Greek, 
Austrian, etc) from collapsing (e.g. for Germany see Thomson 2013, 8-10). Hence, 
the bailouts are not about German taxpayers bailing out Greek taxpayers, but about 
German and Greek taxpayers bailing out German, Austrian, Irish, Greek, Spanish, 
etc., banks; the latter through financial assistance, and the foremr through austerity, 
(Schultz & Wittrock 2011). As Maduro et al. (2012a) suggest, 
to the extent the crisis in Europe is described as a sovereign debt crisis, this is, 
in large part, of a result of states bailing out financial institutions, fearing the 
contagion effects of financial institutions failure. To a good extent the 
sovereign debt crisis is just a knock-on crisis to the 2008 financial crisis… (5). 
 
 
                                                 
294
 Interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of Employment and Social Security 
(2010-2011). 
295
 “By December 2009…German banks had amassed claims of $704 billion on Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, much more than the German banks’ aggregate capital” (Bloomberg 2012).  
296
 Note that Germany’s Central Bank (Bundesbank) enjoys an advantageous position vis-à-vis Greek 
debt. That is “if Greece reneged on its debt, the losses would be shared among all euro-area countries 
[…] much of the risk sitting on German banks’ balance sheets shifted to the taxpayers of the entire 
currency union” (Bloomberg 2012).  
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In fact, a principal reason for not addressing debt restructuring in the GLF was 
because of the extensive exposure of primarily German, but also French, banks to 
Greek financial assets. Specifically, according to Prof. Louka Katseli, EU banks 
unloaded approximately EUR 130 bn worth of Greek bonds either to Greek banks, 
pension funds or hedge funds, and only after this happened, the issue of potential 
restructuring was discussed during the summer of 2012
297
. 
In relation to the lack of transparency, given the aforementioned information 
relevant to the legislative aspects of the MoU/loan agreement implementation, there 
was minimal to no stakeholder input. The efficiency of the implementation of the 
programme, because of lack of ownership by the Greek government, of unwillingness 
to implement measures with political cost, of lack of social support for these far-
reaching, fundamental alterations of most policies of the Greek state, etc, was, at best 
mediocre. The same transparency issues that were presented for the Troika apply also 
to the Greek government. Given the above, it is even uncertain who exactly is to be 
held accountable for authoring the program. The only indications as to the authorship 
of the entire programme comes from two statements; one from the EG and one from 
the Eurosummit. The first one, released by the EG in May 2010, provides that: 
 …(the programme) has been negotiated with the Greek authorities by the 
Commission and the IMF, in liaison with the ECB. […] The main elements of 
policy conditionality…will be enshrined in a Council Decision under Articles 
126 and 136 TFEU…and further detailed in a Memorandum of 
Understanding, to be concluded between the Greek authorities and the 
Commission on behalf of euro area Member States (Eurogroup 2010b).  
From the above it is not at all clear who authored the programme, nor is the process of 
negotiation between Greece and the Troika delineated. Furthermore, the ECOFIN 
DEC under the process of articles 126/136 are taken without the vote of the EU MS 
concerned (in this case Greece). In the case of the MoU the same confusion exists, 
whereby no further details are provided in terms of the specific authors of the 
programme. The second statement originated from the October 2011 Eurosummit. It 
provides that:  
 the ownership of the programme is Greek and its implementation is the 
responsibility of the Greek authorities. […] the Commission, in cooperation 
with the other Troika partners, will establish …a monitoring capacity on the 
ground (Eurosummit 2011, 4).  
This is in accordance with the disclaimer existent in the Memorandum of Specific 
Economic Policy Conditionality of the 2
nd
 Economic Adjustment Programme for 
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 Interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of Employment and Social Security 
(2010-2011). 
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Greece. In addition, the statements within these latter documents establish not only 
the monitoring capacity of the Troika but also the commitment of the Greek 
government to consult with the Troika in regards to policies that fall within the scope 
of the MoUs. Again, there is no clear indication as to the authorship of the 
programme. From the aforementioned elements, it is impossible to determine who 
authored the programme, and so if they were in the legitimate position to do so, and it 
is evidently difficult to even determine which actor is to be held accountable in terms 
of its implementation. 
 
9.6. Indicator D: Direction of policies & Citizens Rights   
 It has been established throughout the sections above that supranational actors 
have exerted considerable influence over key national policy areas of Greece through 
the financial assistance programs. But what is the overall direction of the policies 
implemented, and how did they reshape the Greek political order? Already from the 
fact that the IMF participated in the financial assistance through the Troika, it is 
evident that the measures would be underlined by a considerable neoliberal 
foundation. Overall, the measures provisioned intense liberalization of the labour 
market, flexible and not collective employment agreements, aggressive privatizations, 
steep pay cuts in Public sector employees, intense internal devaluation (reduction of 
labor costs), and reduction of state influence in the market, etc. Table 21 below 
presents all the modifications to Greek legislation and included in the MoUs, and their 
relationship with the most conclusive description of the principles of neoliberalism, 
namely the Washington consensus policies (the policy categories are derived from 
Birdsall et. al. 2010)
298
. The policies included in the consensus are the closest to a 
policy-implementation definition of neoliberalism. It is not the aim of the Table to 
evaluate the actual policies, namely to present that most, if not all, were geared 
towards the same direction.  
                                                 
298
 Although these principles were already widely accepted by the 60s and 70s, it was not until the 
1990s that they became official guidelines for the direction of finance in Western, developed nations 
and their organizations (such as the IMF), turning them into de facto global financial principles (supra 
footnote 50). 
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Table 21: Direction of Greek MoUs policies & relevant laws (data compiled by author)
299
. 
                                                 
299
 Sources: Hellenic Republic 2010a and 2010b and 2010g and 2010i and 2010m and 2010t through 2010v and 2011a and 2011b and 2011d and 2011h and 2012e and 2012f and 2012h 
and 2012j and 2012n and 2013b and 2013d and 2013e and 2014a. 
300
 Case 1, sub-paragraph Z.5, paragraph Z, Article 1 
Washington
-consensus  
Law Article Modification introduced 
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4063/2012 3 
Ratification of the TSCG, which included the obligations for participating MS to introduce an automatic correction mechanism 
upon deviation from budgetary targets 
4270/2014 38-9 Correction mechanism for deviation from the MTBF targets 
3871/2010 
9 
Annual State Budget to include the maximum limits of expenses, and a maximum amount of lending for which the Parliament will 
authorize the Minister of Finance to assume, representing the Greek State. 
11 
The Minister for Finance submits the State Budget with, among others, a statement that the annual balance sheet is in line with 
MTFS or its update, for the relevant fiscal year. 
3871/2010 38 Every body of the General Government is required to submit a monthly report to the relevant Ministry with the financial data of 
expenses, revenues, financing and debt. The Minister for Finance can impose sanctions to bodies that do not comply with these 
provisions.  3899/2010 1 
Speaker’s Decision 
16074/31-12-2010 
Establishment of the Parliament Budget Office (PBO), which is responsible for monitoring the execution of the State budget. 
3833/2010 1 Remunerations/salaries of Public employees are decreased by 12%.  
3845/2010 3 
With retroactive effect from 01-01-2010 in relation to Public employees: 
 Remuneration/ salary reduction is further decreased by 8% to a total of 20%. 
 Christmas bonus is set to EUR 500 
 Easter bonus and leave allowance is set to EUR 250 
 The aforementioned bonuses/allowance are only paid if remuneration/salary does not exceed EUR 3.000/per month.  
 These provisions overpower any other general or specific provision or clause or term of a collective employment agreement. 
3847/2010 Single 
Christmas and Easter bonuses/leave alloowance for retired Public employees, are only paid if the beneficiary has exceeded the 60
th
 
year of age, and if the total amount of the monthly pension paid does not exceed EUR 2.500. If that is the case, the beneficiary 
receives EUR 400 as Christmas bonus, EUR 200 as Easter bonus, and EUR 200 as leave allowance. This overpowers any other 
general or specific provision or clause or term of a collective employment agreement, arbitration award or individual employment 
contract or agreement.  
3899/2010 3 Public employee remuneration increase freeze is extended to 2011.  
3833/2010 11 
From 01-01-2011 until 31-12-2016, the hiring ratio for Public employees 1 appointment every 5 departures.  3986/2011 37 
4093/2012 1
300
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 Subparagraph IA.5 
302
 Note that under CoS Plenary Ruling 3354/2013 (met on 18-01-2013 and decision published on 27-09-2013), the CoS ruled this provision to be unconstitutional. 
303
 Subparagraph IA.11 
304
 Subparagraph Γ.1 
305
 Εlement 1, sub-paragraph E.1, paragraph E, Article 1.  
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3865/2010 3 From 01-01-2015 and onwards the basic pension is set to EUR 360/per month. 
3986/2011 44 
All Public employees who are retiring on or after 01-01-2010, have their lump sum pension allowance (εφάπαξ βοήθημα)  reduced  
by 37.67% for retirement until 31-12-2010, and by 42.67% for retirement on or after 01-01-2011. 
4024/2011 2 
4093/2012 1
301
 
4024/2011 33 
Public employees, are automatically dismissed from their position with:  
 the completion of at least 35 years of service and  
 the completion of at least the 55th year of age,  
so long as the completion of those two take place until 31-12-2013. These employees are placed in availability on account of 
upcoming retirement (pre-retirement labor reserve – “προσυνταξιοδοτική διαθεσιμότητα”)302. The employees in pre-retirement 
availability receive 60% of their basic remuneration, without any additional wages, remuneration, or allowances, and the vacant 
permanent positions are automatically abolished 1 month after the entry into force of Law 4024/2011. 
4051/2012 1 From 01-01-2012 onwards, pension of Public employees which exceed EUR 1.300, are reduced by 12%. 
4093/2012 1
303
 Christmas and Easter bonuses, and leave allowance of Public employees are abolished effective from  01-01-2013. 
4093/2012 1
304
 
Until the end of the period of the MoUs, the minimum wage and salary of all employees of the private sector is for employees over 
25 years old EUR 586,08, and for employees under 25 years old EUR 510,95 
B
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4093/2012 1
305
 The CBR is repealed and cancelled, and is replaced with the Tax Code for Transaction Mapping.  
3842/2010 1 Tax-free amount is set to EUR 12.000, Receipts of 10% for up to EUR 12.000, Receipts of 30% for over EUR 12.000 
4024/2011 38 
 Tax-free income amount decrease from EUR 12.000 to EUR 5.000.  
 Tax rate increase of up to EUR 12.000 from 0% to 10%, of up to EUR 22.000 from 14% to 24%, of up to EUR 32.000 from 
32% to 35%, 
4110/2013 1 
 Abolish tax-free amount income,  
 Tax rate increase of up to EUR 25.000, 22% (up to EUR 21.000 = discount of EUR 2.100), up to EUR 42.000, 32% tax  (up 
to EUR 2.100 discount and EUR 100/EUR 1000 additional income), above EUR  42.000, 42% tax – (same discount as 
bracket below) 
3842/2010 6 
Businesses, corporations, enterprises, etc (whether PLC, S.A., etc) are taxed 10% less (25% from 2010, as opposed to 35% in 
1994).  
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 Sub-paragraph A.7 
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 employment Collective Agreements ranking = National > Sector > Business > National Inter-Professional > Local Inter-Professional 
308
 case 2
α
, subp-paragraph ΙΑ.11, paragraph ΙΑ, Article 1.   
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3833/2010 
22 
Regular VAT rate is increased from 18% in 2000 to a final 23% from 2011 onwards. Likewise, the exceptions of decreased VAT 
rate (meats, fish, vegetables, coffee, tea, cereal, etc)  is increased from 8% in 2000 to a final 13% from 2011 onwards.  
12 
3845/2010 4 
3899/2010 4 
3888/2010 17 
Increase in circulation fees of motor vehicles, exponentially increasing according to the displacement of the car (e.g..  1.072-1.357 
displacement in 2001 the annual circulation fee was EUR 73,37 as opposed to EUR 120 from 2010 onwards).   
3842/2010 29 From 2010 onwards a tax is imposed on all natural and legal persons in regards to their real-estate property, with exemptions. 
3845/2010 4 
 Excise tax on cigarettes raised by 2% 
 Excise tax on alcohol products raised to almost double its value 
 Excise tax on gasoline raise by EUR 60/1.000 ltrs (and by EUR 30/1000 ltrs in kerosene, diesel and biodiesel)  
4152/2013 1
306
 
Extraordinary special duty in constructed surfaces of properties which receive electricity (“Έκτακτο Ειδικό Τέλος Ακινήτων – 
ΕΕΤΑ”). The duty is included in and is paid with the electricity bill, and is calculated using criteria pertaining only to the relevant 
property (constructed area, age of the building, etc).  
4172/2013 1-72 Introduction of an entirely new Income Tax Code (“Κώδικας Φορολογίας Εισοδήματος”) 
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3846/2010 2 
Introduction of restricted full-time employment, whereby the employee and employer can agree that the former will work full-time 
only a restricted number of days per week (or weeks per month, or months per year). This can be imposed instead of employee’s 
contract termination, in case the business activities are constrained, for a maximum of 9 months in the same calendar year, and 
only after the employer has deliberated with legal representatives of the employees.  
3865/2010 3  All retirement ages for Public employees raised (e.g. 58 years for women and 60 for men to with 65 years for men/women). 
3899/2010 17 
Whereas before, after 2 months of employment under a contract of indefinite duration, the termination of the contract by the 
employer was subject to warning and severance pay (their values depending on the respective duration of employment), it is now 
stipulated that this employment contract constitutes a trial period employment for the first 12 months from its entry into force, and 
can be terminated without any warning and without any severance pay to the employee.  
4024/2011 37 
In case of multiple Employment Collective Agreements, the more favorable towards the employee is applied. Additional paragraph 
stipulates that for the duration of the MTFS, in case of concurrence the Business Employment Collective Agreement prevails over 
the Sector Employment Collective Agreements (it is the opposite that is normally the case, i.e. the Sector Agreement prevails over 
the Business one
307
). 
4093/2012 1
308
 
The National General Collective Employment Agreements determines the minimum wage terms of employment, which apply for 
all private-sector employees across the State, but this applies only for those  employed by employers belonging to contracting 
parties in the these National Agreements.  
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 sub-paragraph E.1, paragraph E, Article 1. This amendment pertains only to L2), adding that the Hellenic Competition Commission is to provide an agreement for the PD to be issued. 
310
 According to Article 18, Law 3986/2011, a surface right is the right to raise buildings on the ground of real-estate which, at the time of the constitution of the right, is public, and is the 
right to exercise on the building raised the authorities of ownership.  
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3919/2011 1-10  Deregulation of restricted professions lifting of restrictions/barriers 4 months after the entry into force of this Law (restriction 
on professions, geographic limitations, limitations on the provisions of certain goods, limitations on company forms when 
exercising certain activities, lowest price limitations)    
 Limitations which do not fall in the above, can also be lifted after a PD issued after a suggestion by the Cabinet, within 4 
months after this Law enters into force.  
 Limitations are maintained in the cases below, and can also be maintained after a PD, issued after an opinion issued by the 
Cabinet, after the agreement of the Hellenic Competition Commission (Ε.Α.), in respect to a specific profession, if  
 Under this restriction an overriding reason of public interest is served, and 
 this restriction is appropriate and necessary means of this profession’s convenience and, in terms of intensity of 
intervention in the sphere of economic freedom, is in reasonable proportion to the importance of the objective to serve an 
overriding reason of public interest, and 
 this restriction does not introduce directly or indirectly discriminatory provisions in terms of nationality or in regards 
companies’ registered office/headquarters. 
Restricted professions that are exempted from the above, and maintain limitations, are the following: notaries, lawyers, 
engineers, certified accountants, road freight, and pharmacists 
4152/2013 1
309
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3871/2010 11 
Annual State Budget is to be submitted with, among others, a report of the General Director of Public Property, which presents the 
outcomes of any uses / utilizations of the property of the State.  
3986/2011 1 Establishment of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund S.A. (Ταμείο Αξιοποίησης Περιουσίας του Δημοσίου Α.Ε. – 
Τ.Α.Ι.Π.Ε.Δ. Α.Ε.). The aim of the Fund is to make use of the private property of the State, as well as assets of LEPL or SOEs, 
according to the existing market conditions and under complete transparency, so as to achieve the desired targets of revenue. The 
Fund operates according to public interest, but is a completely independent S.A. and is not a part of the Public sector. 
4038/2012 7 
3986/2011 2 The asset or right, which was ceded or transferred to the Fund, in accordance with the provisions above, cannot be re-transferred to 
the previous owner or beneficiary, in any way whatsoever. Said previous owner  or beneficiary remains as the one responsible for 
the administration and management of the asset or right, under the legal instructions of the Fund and without remuneration, and is 
required to maintain it appropriate for its intended purpose, in accordance with the instructions given to them by the Fund, and is 
burdened with any costs which arise from his aforementioned obligations 
4111/2013 8 
3986/2011 5 
The assets are utilized by all appropriate means, preferably with selling the asset as a first choice. 
4038/2012 7 
3986/2011 14 To utilize public property, the direct allocation of rights to use the foreshore/beach, to the owner of the investment, is allowed for 
50 years (may be extended to a total of 99 years) against a price. The utilization must not impede the free and uninterrupted access 
of individuals to the foreshore and beach. 4092/2012 3 
3986/2011 19 & 25 
Notwithstanding Articles 953 & 954 of the Civil Code, it is allowed to institute a surface right
310
 (δικαίωμα επιφανείας) on public 
real-estate, for a period from 5 years minimum to a maximum of 99 years, in return for a price. 
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3842/2010 52 The Real-Estate Property Database is introduced, which includes all real-estate assets of every natural and legal person. 
3843/2010 5 
It is allowed, after paying a special fine, to maintain, for a period of 40 years, semi-outdoor spaces (Ημιυπαίθριοι Χώροι), as well 
as spaces located in the basement, ground floor or other level of a building, which are included in the approved building permit, 
but have now been transformed to spaces of primary use in excess of the terms and construction restrictions (except for buildings 
which are in streams, habitats, public real-estate by the sea, archeological sites and forests or reforestation areas). 
4014/2011 
 
24 
Sanctions imposed for buildings, with their main body completed by 28-07-2011, which have been established and raised in excess 
of either their construction permit or the terms/restrictions of construction of the property or have been built without a construction 
permit, are suspended for 40 years, after paying a Unified Special Fine (Ενιαίο Ειδικό Πρόστιμο).  Any case files that concern 
offenses under the provisions for Illegal Construction, if still outstanding, are filed.  
Interest rate 
liberalization  
EU/Eurozone participation 
Trade 
liberalization  
Liberalize 
foreign 
direct 
investment 
inflow 
Competitive 
exchange 
rate 
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As is evident from the detailed analysis of most of the MoU measures and 
their corresponding Greek legislation, the neo/ordo liberal direction of the policies is 
clear. The policy paradigm followed an intense liberalization of restricted professions, 
deregulation of labour market bargaining and employment procedures, considerable 
reductions in public employee wages and pensions, extensive privatizations, and 
extensive and successive alteration in the taxation framework resulting in raising 
taxes, reducing or eliminating tax free amounts, and broadening the tax base (indirect 
excise taxes, etc).  
 
9.7. Conclusion   
 The conclusions to be drawn in relation to the national level evaluation and the 
Greek case overall support the conclusion drawn from the supranational evaluation of 
Chapter 7. Greece was the first Eurozone MS ever to request financial assistance and, 
thus, in a way, is the reason for the EU-IMF ad-hoc cooperation within the Eurozone. 
As evident from Tables 4 and 12, Greece has utilized every mechanism of financial 
assistance since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, from the ad-hoc, bi-lateral GLF 
with each Eurozone MS to the permanent ESM. The amounts it has borrowed 
surpasses EUR 235 billion within 6 years, with the IMF’s assistance amounting to an 
astonishing 2465% of Greece’s quota. This translates to permanent oversight from the 
Troika, even after the end of the financial assistance program, within the context of 
PPS/PPM for decades to come. It is clear that policy in Greece, at least insofar as 
sovereignty and democratic due process at the national level, has been semi-officially 
suspended. As MEP Hon. Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos suggests “the essence is that 
Greece has de facto been deprived of its national sovereignty, at least in relation to 
economic affairs”311 
 From the GLF to the EFSF SA assistance programmes, it was clear that the 
strict and conditional character of the measures included in the MoUs, and their 
corresponding EU-based process (at the time CoM EDP/TFEU article 136 DEC) 
would be difficultly compatible with principles of the national-level democratic 
process. The prolonging of this situation only deteriorated this incompatibility even 
further. The list of policy areas affected by the MoUs, and the extent and 
repetitiveness with which these areas were affected until the cut-off date of this 
research (demonstrated in Table 17), has considerably negatively affected the 
democratic process within Greece and has meant a tremendous surge of influence 
over key national policy areas by supranational actors, particularly the EC, ECB and 
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 From the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of Constitutional Law. 
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CoM/EG. Even from the strictly legal perspective, the legal foundation of the EU-
based MoU process, i.e. the CoM relevant DEC is somewhat thin and even perhaps at 
odds with EU Treaty provisions, since the CoM was never expected to decide in such 
specificity over so many policy areas of a MS, and with this DEC having almost an 
obligatory character on account of the conditionality element.    
It is also worth highlighting that the areas affected accounted for most, if not 
all, of the policy within the Greek state, and entailed considerable and continuous 
changes to Greek legislation and policy paradigm (Table 17). As such, not only were 
most areas of the Greek state modified since 2010, but they kept constantly changing 
for the years to come. This resulted not only in the frustration of the citizenry, due to 
the obvious lack of legitimacy and accountability, but also in their overall policy 
disorientation, as policies were changed on a monthly basis. From the above, it is 
evident that, in relation to Indicator A, supranational institutions, and particularly the 
EC/ECB, have acquired considerable decision-making capacity in relation to key 
national level policy areas, which they did not have before (at least in terms of 
Eurozone MS). What is more, the influence over these policy areas is for a 
considerably prolonged duration.  
Similar conclusions are drawn in relation to Indicator B, i.e. parliamentary 
process. In this case also, there is an overall marginalization of the representative 
institutions in relation to the measures adopted. In most cases, parliamentary approval 
was sidestepped, and when it was sought, the conditions under which the process 
unfolded resulted in inefficiencies and distortions of parliamentary proceedures. An 
excellent example is the ratification of FAFAs and loan agreements through the ALC 
process (section 9.4.1 and Table 20), which clearly distorted and was beyond the 
purpose of this legislative process, depriving the parliament of expressing any real 
opinion or conducting any meaningful deliberation over the documents at hand. In 
most other cases, the legislation that did go through parliament, was under the very 
urgent legislative procedure, leaving only two days for MPs to study, deliberate and 
vote on Bills that were in excess of 150 pages each (Tables 18 and 19). Furthermore, 
the element of conditionality and the logic of necessity on account of impeding 
financial constraints, further negatively impacted the above effects. 
Despite the above, perhaps one of the most problematic elements in terms of 
impact of the MS-specific measures of Greece on the EU DD were the processes 
included in Indicator C. The analysis yields that the process under which the 
negotiations took place over the structural adjustment policies were, almost 
exclusively, behind closed doors, with the inability of citizens to be aware of who 
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makes these decisions (is it the Greek executive, the Troika, certain MPs, etc) or how. 
In fact, the very formation of the Troika was only officially (but still rather 
informally) established in 2013, still, however, lacking an official mandate, structure, 
etc. Transparency was surprisingly low, especially when considering the amount and 
force of the impact on national level policies.  
Finally, in evaluating Indicator D, the neoliberal (in the broad sense, i.e. 
including the sub-category of ordoliberalism for this specific case) character of the 
measures, taking into account the participation of the IMF to the program, is evident. 
To further establish that, it was demonstrated that most policies implemented in 
pursuance of MoU prescriptions followed, many times to the letter, the Washington –
consensus-based policy guidelines (Table 21). This, as highlighted by the EP, resulted 
in considerable lack of protection for EU citizens social rights (especially those 
related to employment agreement, private sector wages, living standards, etc), which 
is a compounding effect on the potential contradiction of the role assumed by EU 
actors, and especially the EC, within the process of financial assistance.   
 An excellent example of all the above is the process of abolishing collective 
bargaining agreements in Greece, as was narrated during the interview with Prof. 
Louka Katseli, former Minister of Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping, and 
former Minister of Employment and Social Security8. It had already been agreed with 
her predecessor that “collective bargaining, the minimum wage, the extension of 
sectoral collective agreements were to be practically abolished and that the 
arbitration system was to be changed.” However, the then Minister argued that the 
abolition of collective t agreements would be to the detriment of the economy (e.g. 
across-the-board wage reductions, causing recessionary effects and not succeeding in 
boosting employment) and, with the written agreement of social partners, proceeded 
with a Bill that would provide some flexibility in terms of employment agreements, 
by introducing the concept of “a firm-level collective agreement” 312, that would allow 
for contractual flexibility at the firm level without abolishing sectoral agreements 
altogether, (this became Law 3899/2010; Hellenic Republic 2010m). However, a few 
months later and during the next review, the Minister was notified by the then FinM, 
Giorgos Papakonstantinou, that the Troika insisted on abolishing collective sectoral 
agreements. It became clear that some Greek big companies who were unfavorable 
towards the process of the aforementioned Law, also favored their abolition. When 
the Minister refused to sign the abolition, her term in the Ministry of Labour Affairs 
                                                 
312
 Companies could opt, after discussion with their employees, for this type of agreement rather than 
the sectoral agreement. 
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and Social Security was ended one month later, after a Cabinet reshuffle (Agrolampos 
2011).  
 So what does the analysis in relation to the MS-specific measures provide in 
relation to the EU DD? Similarly to the observations relevant to the EU-wide 
measures, MS-specific measures during the crisis have considerably reinforced the 
EU DD. Through these measures, the actual authority and increase in decision-making 
capability of supranational institutions is demonstrated in reality. This impedes on the 
proper democratic process within the MS concerned (in this case Greece), as the 
legitimacy of these actors, and particularly the EC and the ECB, to take policy 
decisions that have redistributive, direct effects and are electorally salient is 
considerably low. This process is, in addition to the above, plagued by a complete 
lack of transparency or civil society participation, and its efficiency is questionable at 
best, especially in the case of Greece. This results in the inability of citizens to 
properly hold accountable those who make policy decisions. Again, both the input and 
throughput aspects of the EU DD have been considerably reinforced to the detriment 
of democratic process at the national level.  
 The output approach has also been negatively affected. It is clear that the 
measures implemented suffer from a considerable neoliberal bias, which, in 
combination with the almost complete disregard for social protection and rights of 
citizens, consistitutes a substantially one-sided character to the policies implemented. 
Indirect accountability through the national level was also inefficient at best, as 
legislation was essentially agreed between the Troika and the executive of the MS 
(because of either impeding or emergency financial conditions) with little ability of 
the legislative or the judiciary to really exercise their full role.  In conclusion, the MS-
specific measures, yield, similarly to the EU-wide measures, considerable deficiencies 
in relation to the democratic process and have definitely exacerbated the EU DD.  
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Chapter 10: Comparative National Level Analysis 
10.1. Introduction  
 The aim of this Chapter is to place the national level case of this research, 
namely Greece, in a comparative perspective, i.e. to determine whether the 
conclusions drawn in terms of the impact of the MS-specific measures on the EU DD 
are part of larger patterns or demonstrate any similarities or differences with other 
cases where similar measures were applied. To investigate this issue, the additional 
case of Ireland is examined. As also outlined in section 4.2.2, Ireland is chosen as it 
was the first Eurozone MS to suffer from the late-2000s financial crisis upon its 
transference from the USA to EU, and it was also one of the two first that exited its 
financial assistance program (essentially, the first to exit a full financial assistance 
program, as the other one of the two was Spain, which received assistance only for 
restructuring its banking sector and, thus, had a limited MoU/FAFA). Finally, of the 
Eurozone MS under financial assistance, Ireland is the one closest to Greece in terms 
of the indicators referenced as part of the reason for choosing Greece as the primary 
MS-specific case (APPENDIX A).  
The Chapter unfolds as follows. A brief timeline of the crisis specific to 
Ireland is presented, followed by a section analyzing in detail the measures assumed, 
again, specifically for Ireland. The section that follows outlines the similarities, 
differences, and conclusions to be drawn from a comparative analysis between Greece 
and Ireland, and the Chapter concludes with broader issues that were raised from the 
comparison presented in relation to the impact of MS-specific measures on the EU 
DD.  
 
10.2. Brief timeline of the Irish crisis  
 As presented in section 5.3, Ireland was actually the first Eurozone MS 
affected from the financial crisis. A main` reason was the very nature of the late-
2000s financial crisis in the USA as a property ‘bubble,’ which also affected the 
weaknesses of the Irish economy
313
, i.e. the Irish property ‘bubble’ (Fitzgerald 2014, 
8)
314
. In a period when Ireland was known as the ‘Celtic Tiger,’ Irish real estate prices 
kept increasing
315
 considerably from the late 1990s until 2007, peaking in 2006 
                                                 
313
 For example, the problem of sub-prime mortgages in the USA was similar to the obviously 
declining lending standards that allowed the rapid expansion of the banks’ loan books in Ireland 
(Eichengreen 2015, 2). 
314
 The causes behind the Spanish crisis were similar (Fitzgerald 2014, 8).  
315
 It is indicative that in November 2005, the Irish Central Bank admitted “that estimates of 
overvaluation of 20% to 60% in the Irish residential property market existed” (Kennard & Hanne 2015, 
86). 
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(Kennard & Hanne 2015, 85). The expansion of the Irish economy during these years 
was astonishing, with household lending from 2003 to 2007 being among the highest 
in the Eurozone, also leading to warnings of a potential medium-term collapse from 
the IMF (Kennard & Hanne 2015, 86; Eichengreen 2015, 3). This was also made 
possible by “the relaxed and weak Irish regulatory supervision of the financial 
sector”  (Kennard & Hanne 2015, 86). When this ‘bubble’ burst, the Irish banking 
crisis began, as “Irish banks faced mounting losses on a scale that exposed them to a 
collapse of confidence” (Kennard & Hanne 2015, 86; Eichengreen 2015, 1). Given the 
fact that most of the banking sector was Irish-owned and had a large share of business 
in Ireland, the “collapse in the domestic housing market led to the collapse in the 
domestic banking system” (Fitzgerald 2014, 10). Finally, the Irish banking sector itself 
was considerably leveraged, with claims peaking at 400% GDP during 2007-2008 
(Eichengreen 2015, 1).  
In September 2008, the Irish government moved to guarantee all Irish banks’ 
loans and deposits – approximately EUR 400 bn316 initially for two years317– among 
growing fears of a domino effect from the USA credit crunch and a potential bank 
run, (Pop 2013; Murray-Brown & Dennis 2008; Eichengreen 2015, 6). However, this 
move further adversely impacted the Irish economy, which could not sustain to 
covering this amount (BBC 2016). Ireland became the first Eurozone MS to impose 
austerity measures in an attempt to counter the deteriorating lending situation of the 
state in the international markets, initiating, waves of protests by thousands of people 
(The Irish Times 2008; The Irish Examiner 2008; Little 2008). There were protests 
against budget cuts across February and March 2009, with demonstrators reaching 
more than 100.000, while the unemployment rate reached its highest point since 1996 
(11%; Bloomberg 2011; RTE 2009a and 2009b; BBC 2009 and 2016; The Irish 
Times 2009). In December 2008 a bank recapitalisation programme was announced, 
while in January 2009, the Anglo Irish Bank, one of the largest banks in Ireland was 
fully nationalized
318
 (Irish Minister for Finance 2010, 1). It is worth noting that, 
because the recapitalization process of this bank was included in the Irish deficit for 
that year, the deficit reached an impressive 32% of GDP for 2010 (Whelan 2013, 14). 
                                                 
316
 There are indications that the Irish government might have underestimated the true breadth of the 
issues in the banking sector and might have “believed the assurances of the Irish Central Bank that the 
banks were fundamentally sound and were merely suffering from a short-term liquidity problem,” and 
that such an extensive state guarantee would not substantially affect the financial position of the state 
(Whelan 2013, 13).  
317
 Throughout this period, banks relied on ECB credit (Eichengreen 2015, 6). 
318
 Total capital injections for this bank alone reached EUR 29.3 bn or over 18% of Irish GDP 
(European Commission 2011d, 13).  
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 Because of the above, Irish banks almost exclusively depended on ECB credit, 
particularly Emergency Liquidity Assistance, resulting in concerns on the part of the 
ECB (Eichengreen 2015, 6). Indicatively, the amount of credit that the guaranteed 
banks received from the ECB increased by 105% within just four months in 2010 
319
 
(Whelan 2013, 15). The then President of the ECB warned the Irish government in 
November 2010 that further support was conditional upon the request of financial 
assistance from the EU-IMF cooperation (Trichet 2010, 1-2). In other words, the Irish 
banks would be cut-off from credit unless a financial assistance programme was 
requested. The Irish FinM replied two days later that Ireland would request assistance 
and would enter into an EU-IMF financial assistance programme (Irish Minister for 
Finance 2010, 2-3). The request was officially made in early December 2010 for an 
EU-IMF financial assistance at the amount of EUR 85 bn, which, in combination with 
the withdrawal from the government of the minor coalition Green Party led to a call 
for snap elections by the then Taoiseach (BBC 2016; RTE 2011). 
The early elections took place on February 2011, and resulted in a truly unseen 
defeat for the ruling party of Fianna Fáil experiencing a considerable electoral 
percentage reduction of more than 24% (loss of 58/165 MP seats) since the last Irish 
elections in 2007 (Trinity College Dublin 2011). The until-then majority opposition 
party of Fine Gael formed a coalition government with the Labour Party in a bid to 
renegotiate the terms of the financial assistance program (Taggart 2011; BBC 2016). 
The primary electoral commitments revolved around lowering the interest rate of the 
assistance loans
320
, which was eventually achieved by the new, incoming government 
“in parallel with an amendment of the terms of the Greek bailout in July of 2011,” and 
minimizing the reduction on the minimum wage, which was also achieved in July 
2011 (Coutts 2014, 2; Whelan 2013, 20). Despite these renegotiations however, the 
new Fine Gael/Labour government failed to renegotiate any core elements of the 
pogramme, continuing to implement fiscal consolidation measures (Whelan 2013, 
20).  
In late-May 2012, Ireland held a referendum to introduce an amendment
321
 to 
the Constitution in order to allow for the Irish government to ratify the TSCG, which 
                                                 
319
 EUR 36 bn in April 2010 to EUR 74 bn in Spetember 2010 (Whelan 2013, 15).  
320
 This was a central issue in relation to Ireland’s financial assistance program, with the 5.8% interest 
rate being “considered punitive” (Coutts 2014, 2).  
321
 30
th
 amendment to the Constitution of Ireland, adding a subsection 10 to section 4, article 29: “The 
State may ratify the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union done at Brussels on the 2nd day of March 2012. No provision of this Constitution invalidates 
laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State that are necessitated by the obligations of the 
State under that Treaty or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by bodies competent 
under that Treaty from having the force of law in the State” 
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resulted in a 60.29% in favor and 39.71% against (Piedrafta 2014, 330-1). Pursuant to 
the amendment, the Fiscal Responsibility Bill of 2012 introduced the actual 
provisions of the TSCG into national law (330-1)
322
. It is worth noting that concerns 
in relation to democratic process were raised when 
during the reading (of the Bill), only a few independent deputies insisted that 
the Bill would damage democratic legitimacy and accountability, 
dismembering the welfare state with the excuse of ‘balancing the books,’ 
increasing the powers of technocrats and enshrining neoliberal policies in 
law, which would constrain future governments wanting to implement 
different economic policies (Piedrafta 2014, 330). 
 Finally, Ireland, similarly, but perhaps less intensely, to other Eurozone MS, 
underwent substantial protests against austerity measures and the MoUs, the most 
important of which are referenced below:  
 During September 2010, some of the largest demonstrations took place in Ireland 
against the Troika, with participants estimated at 100.000 (The Journal 2009). 
 In March 2012, demonstrations in Ireland take place with an estimated participation 
of 10.000 demonstrators (The Irish Examiner 2012).  
 In October 2012, Irish farmers demonstrate against measures included in the 
upcoming budget, reaching as high as 20.000 protestors (RTE 2012).  
 Another major other protest occurred during February 2013 in Ireland, when more 
than 100.000 people “took part in demonstrations across the country today, in protest 
at the country’s continued bank debt burden” (SIPTU 2013). 
Ireland exited its financial assistance program on December 2013, and will be under 
PPS until at least 2031 (European Commission 2016c).  
 
10.3. Brief overview of Ireland-specific supranational measures 
 As outlined in Table 4, Ireland has received financial assistance from the 
EFSM and EFSF SA on the side of the EU, and from the EFF on the side of the IMF. 
The MoU had been approved through an Ireland-specific EFSM DEC, continuing also 
to be in force for the EFSF SA financial assistance program, presenting no need for 
further issuing an EDP/TFEU article 126 DEC that incorporates MoU measures (as 
was the case with Greece; Council of the European Union 2011a). The following 
Table 22 conclusively presents the programme documents (FAFAs and EU/IMF 
MoUs) of the Irish financial assistance programme 
 
 
 
                                                 
322
 Provisions relating to the numerical limitations set to consider a budget balanced/in-surplus, and to 
the automatic correction mechanism/debt rule (Piedrafta 2014, 330-1).  
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Table 22: Irish program documents (FAFAs/EU-IMF MoUs; data compiled by  
     author)
323
 
 
Type Date Agreements 
E
U
 L
o
a
n
 
A
g
re
e
m
en
ts
 
07-12-2010 CoM DEC 2011/77/EU (EFSM) 
22-12-2010 Loan Facility Agreement 
27-10-2011 First FAFA 
09-12-2011 Second FAFA 
30-12-2012 Master FAFA 
26-06-2013 Amendment to Master, First, Second FAFAs 
E
U
 M
o
U
s 
28-11-2010 Ireland MoU on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality 
07-12-2010 CoM DEC 2011/77/EU (EFSM) 
08-12-2010 Ireland Economic Adjustment Program 
18-05-2011 First Update  
28-07-2011 Second Update  
28-11-2011 Third Update 
06-03-2012 Fourth Update 
25-06-2012 Fifth Update 
13-09-2012 Sixth Update 
00
324
-01-2013 Seventh Update 
12-03-2013 Eighth Update 
03-06-2013 Ninth Update 
IM
F
 M
o
U
s 
03-12-2010 EFF request & First MoU 
18-05-2011 First Update  
28-07-2011 Second Update  
28-11-2011 Third Update 
10-02-2012 Fourth Update 
30-05-2012 Fifth Update 
20-08-2012 Sixth Update 
29-11-2012 Seventh Update 
12-03-2013 Eighth Update 
03-06-2013 Ninth Update 
29-11-2013 EFF termination and last disbursement/review 
 
In relation to ratification within the Irish legal order, the MoUs relevant to the 
financial assistance program of Ireland were not actually ratified into any Law that 
incorporated it within the Irish public order. As the MoU was argued to not constitute 
an international but rather only a political agreement, it was deemed that there was no 
                                                 
323
 Sources: Council of the European Union 2011a; European Financial Stability Facility 2012d and 
2013b; International Monetary Fund 2010f and 2011e and 2012d through 2012g and 2013d through 
2013f; European Commission 2011d; Ireland 2011a and 2011b.  
324
 Date is referred as “[xx] January 2013” (International Monetary Fund 2012g, 27).  
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obligation for its ratification in accordance with the Irish Constitution (Coutts 2014, 
57). However, the then government party brought forth the agreement as a motion to 
the Irish parliament for the deal struck between the Irish government and the Troika 
on the financial assistance program, which motion carried (Coutts 2014, 57). The 
motion was introduced in Parliament on 15 December 2010, even though this was not 
legal requirement for the MoU to have effect. The IMF decided to postpone the 
approval of the MoU until after the outcome of the debate and motion, “in deference 
to Ireland’s parliamentary process” (Coutts 2014, 57; International Monetary Fund 
2010e).  As the Irish Department of Finance (2013) informs, “…following each 
review, the updated programme documents were laid before the… (Parliament) once 
finalized” (3).  
 
10.4. Comparison with Greece 
It is worth noting that the MoU accompanying the financial assistance 
program was, essentially, a previous adjustment programme constructed by the Irish 
government to tackle the financial instability in 2010 (to be implemented from 2011-
2014 and termed the National Recovery Plan), of which the measures were accepted 
by the Troika to be included in the MoU with no important alterations (Fitzgerald 
2014, 9; Coutts 2014, 56). In fact, during the debate in the Irish Parliament for the 
MoU in December 2010, the then FinM argued that  
the programme builds on the bank-rescue policies that have been implemented 
by the Government over the past two and a half years and on the national 
recovery plan announced in November, 2010 […] In other words, the national 
recovery plan is effectively embedded in the programme […] some have 
suggested that control has been taken out of the Government’s hands. This is 
not the case” (Coutts 2014, 56).  
As Fitzgerald (2014) concludes, “thus, it was the Irish government’s plan, rather than 
a plan imposed from the outside” (9). This amicable cooperation with the Troika 
continued throughout subsequent modifications to the MoU (Fitzgerald 2014, 10). 
This designates that the Irish government had a strong ownership of the adjustment 
program, as well as that the measures included were decided following a normal 
legislature rather than an ad-hoc emergency procedure.  
The above is in contrast to Greece, whereby very few of the measures included 
in the MoU were also measures of the electoral platform of the Greek governments, 
and of its plan. This resulted in ownership of the Greek program, both of the citizens 
but, primarily of the government itself, being considerably reduced compared to 
Ireland, constructing a sense that the MoU included measures that were imposed by 
the Troika and the lender MS. This further adversely impacted the implementation of 
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the program, and led to unwillingness to transfer the MoU and relevant provisions of 
Greek laws into actual policy, resulting in considerable delays and inefficiencies in 
satisfying the conditionality (which can be argued to be one of the main reasons for 
Greece being the only one still in financial assistance, having requested a third 
assistance program until 2018; Table 12)
325
. As the Governor of the Bank of Greece 
Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras suggests, the fact that Greece has remained the last 
Eurozone MS in a financial assistance programme “is owed…in the lack of courage of 
Greek governments to be done with the program, and in a very restricted 
conceptualization of political cost”326. Furthermore, because of the emergency 
character of the Greek program, even in the case where measures were acceptable, 
lack of civil society participation and adequate information led to considerable 
objections to the measures from citizens, as well as often leading to the 
implementation  of measures that were either misaligned with or mis-designed for 
Greek society and the public order, leading to even further delays and difficulties both 
in relation to ownership but also to effectiveness and implementation.  
In addition to the above, the Irish progress, contrary to Greece (as well as 
Spain), was slow and steady, and involved projecting smaller targets and then over-
performing, which “was rewarded with a steady fall in bond yields” (Fitzgerald 2014, 
10; Whelan 2013, 20). Despite the overly optimistic projections of the EU and IMF 
(and its underestimation of fiscal multipliers), “the Irish authorities were fully 
committed to the goal of rapid fiscal consolidation […] (and) the Troika may in fact 
have excercised something of a moderating influence” (Eichengreen 2015, 10). 
 In terms of the measures imposed, it is worth noting that in Ireland the 
adjustment had an adverse impact on the income of high earners. As Fitzgerald (2014) 
observes (12): 
 between 2007-2010, the number of individuals earning more than EUR 100.000 was 
reduced by 15%, 
 between 2007-2010, the income of individuals earning more than EUR 100.000 was 
reduced by 8% , 
 between 2009-2014, the income of the richest 10% of the population was reduced by 
15.5%, 
and also the distribution of income was not severely disrupted by the structural 
adjustment process, compared to the pre-MoU period. In contrast, in Greece wages 
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 This argument was also raised in the interview with Dr. Lina Papadopoulou, Associate Professor of 
Constitutional Law.  
326
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of Greece, 
Professor of Economics and, inter alia, former FinM. 
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across the board were reduced by 30% and pensions across the board by 50% (Katseli 
2016, 19). 
 Similarly to Greece, a major part of the MoU was devoted to reducing the 
public wage bill, freezing public recruitment and increasing pension contributions 
(Coutts 2014, 3). However, opposite the continuous one-sidedness of the way 
measures were implemented in Greece, the Irish government drafted an agreement 
with the public sector, termed as the Public Service Agreement 2010-2014 or Croke 
Park Agreement, which included a number of substitute measures to wage reductions 
or compulsory redundancies, such as redeployment flexibility, hiring freezes, and 
increased productivity (Ireland 2010; Irish Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform 2010, Coutts 2014, 3).   
 In terms of bank recapitalization,  
controversy centered on whether to  impose losses on the holders of EUR 19 
billion of senior unsecured and unguaranteed debt. The IMF initially favored 
a haircut of roughly 50 per cent, a proposal which gained the Irish 
government’s full support. But the ECB opposed this approach on the grounds 
that it might disrupt the flowof wholesale funding to other Eurozone banks. 
Again the ECB’s position prevailed (Eichengreen 2015, 7).  
The prevailing ECB opinion resulted in a substantially unbalanced distribution of 
bank recapitalization and, in turn, in undermining support for the financial assistance 
programme among Irish citizens. It is worth noting that “the Irish population was 
burdened with by far the largest national bank bail-out of the entire euro zone. 
Between 2008 and 2010, EUR 76.5 billion of public funds were moved directly
327
 or 
indirectly to Irish financial institutions” (Attac 2013). In addition, the front-loaded 
character and quick pace of asset sales to deleverage the Irish banking system (as 
opposed to options in Greece and Spain), resulted in considerable asset depreciation 
and higher “cost of the Irish taxpayer,” thus also reducing public support for the 
assistance programme (Eichengreen 2015, 10-1).  
 
10.5. Conclusion  
 The aim of this Chapter was to provide a summative standpoint of the 
financial assistance programme for Ireland, in order to provide a comparative analysis 
with Greece. What are the conclusions that can be drawn? Firstly, the national debate 
focused, similarly to Greece, around the urgent need to resort to EU-IMF lending 
because of financial and lending difficulties that rendered the Irish state’s position in 
the market unsustainable. However, the very nature of the crisis in Ireland or Spain 
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 The direct capital injections (without accounting for Irish government guarantees, etc) reached EUR 
46.3 bn or 29% of GDP until February 2011 (European Commission 2011d, 13). 
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was different from that in Greece. As Prof. Louka Katseli, former Minister of 
Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping, and former Minister of Employment and 
Social Security highlights in relation to the different types of crises across the 
Eurozone, “Ireland, Spain and partly Portugal and Cyprus faced banking crises that 
evolved into systemic crises. In Greece a sovereign debt crisis became a banking 
crisis”328. 
In addition, the problems of the Irish economy were far from including the 
extensive and numerous rigidities and concerns that the Greek economy included
329
. 
Thus, the problem was contained considerably more quickly and was, in either case, 
of less magnitude compared to Greece. The fact that the Irish crisis had a monetary 
component (banks) that amounted, essentially, to half or more of the problem also 
contributed to the containment being quicker than in Greece, of which the major 
problems were structural as well as economic imbalances in the real economy. As the 
Governor of the Bank of Greece Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras observes “I think that 
(having) a fiscal (problem) is worse (than a banking problem)”330. Concordantly, Prof. 
Louka Katseli, former Minister of Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping, and 
former Minister of Employment and Social Security, suggests that “no program (of 
financial assistance) included such harsh conditionality clauses as ours”331. 
 Secondly, and relevant to the above, Ireland managed to successfully complete 
and exit its one financial assistance program on schedule (3 years), while Greece 
completed two programs, and is currently undergoing its third until 2018. This is, of 
course, on account of the aforementioned structural issues in the real economy of 
Greece, which have not only taken considerably more time to be addressed but have 
also affected the lives of citizens much more directly (hence support for the program 
is considerably decreased). Naturally, the failure to exit financial assistance after the 
first Greek program (GLF) must be seen in light of the truly novel and unforeseen 
situation and measures assumed to counter it during the first months of the crisis. In 
addition, other issues that may have burdened the Greece’s budget (debt) have to be 
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 Interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of Employment and Social Security 
(2010-2011). 
329
 From the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of Constitutional Law. 
330
 From the interview with the Hon. Prof. Ioannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of Greece, 
Professor of Economics and, inter alia, former FinM. 
331
 Interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former Minister of Economy, 
Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of Employment and Social Security 
(2010-2011). 
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considered, chief among them the adverse conditions, both in trade and defense
332
, of 
neighboring with Turkey. This increased competition in these areas can be argued to 
have increased the public debt to the amount that, were this factor absent, the Greek 
problem would be as contained as, for example, was in the case of Portugal
333
. As 
MEP Hon. Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos observed “the Greek economy is in its own class 
size, because the Greek economy has all the structural problems of the rest of 
Mediterranean economies, plus the big problem of neighboring with Turkey”334. 
Even in the case of similar measures, however, it seems that the Irish 
government went to greater lengths to ensure societal participation in the programme, 
thus achieving more support for the structural adjustment reforms (in turn raising the 
rate and speed of their successful implementation), whereas in Greece this was not 
achieved, with societal actors continuously opposing changes that were seen as simply 
imposed by external actors. The example of substitute measures in terms of the Public 
sector’s wage cuts is indicative of this. In this case, while the Irish government came 
to a compromise with the Public sector in introducing some instead of other reforms, 
the Greek government continuously insisted on successive waves of wage reductions, 
additionally decreasing support for further reforms. Despite these observations, it 
needs to be highlighted that the entirety of the measures as a whole were of the same, 
intensely neoliberal direction. In the case of Ireland, the status quo was closer to these 
principles compared to Greece, and thus adjustment was, consequently, considerably 
less forceful.  
In either case, relevant to the reforms more generally, those were introduced in 
the Irish legal order much more quickly and with more to-the-point parliamentary 
proceedings, whereas the Greek legal order and legislature suffered through multiple 
misuses of various legal instruments, most of which were stretched disproportionately 
to accommodate the nature of the MoUs. This also reduced support for the program, 
in this case not only for citizens but also for MPs, who also saw the program as 
something imposed from abroad. 
 Thirdly, and contingent on the support for the program, a major difference 
between Greece and Ireland is that, in the case of Ireland, the MoU was essentially the 
Irish government’s National Reform Programme. This increases the rate of successful 
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 It is worth noting that Greece has greatest government expenditure on defense among all EU MS 
between 2005-2014 (standing an average of 2,7% of GDP), and by far the largest among Eurozone MS 
that have received financial assistance as a percentage of GDP, contrary to Ireland which has the lowest 
(Cyprus 1.7, Portugal: 1.3, Spain:1, Ireland: 0.4; Eurostat 2016f). 
333
 From the interview with Prof. Kostas Xrysogonos, MEP and Professor of Constitutional Law. 
334
 ibid. 
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reform implementation considerably, as the political order created and supports these 
reforms, at least compared to Greece, whereby the MoU contained mostly estranged 
provisions to both the public but also to the political order. This made the ownership 
of the program, in this case both by the public but, more importantly, by the political 
realm that has to lead with and implement the reforms, virtually impossible. 
Congruent with the above is the fact that the political opposition in Ireland had very 
few and specific objections to the assistance program. There was minimal opposition 
to most of the reforms introduced, and, more importantly, to the nature and need of 
the program. In the case of Greece, however, from 2010 and onwards, the political 
opposition has continuously argued for the fundamental alteration or even abolition of 
parts or of the entirety of the program (particularly the MoUs). This translates to little 
political unity around the overall purpose of the program
335
, compared to Ireland.  
 The aforementioned observations relate to comparisons between the elements 
of the financial assistance programmes of Ireland and Greece. But what of the 
programmes themselves? In this case, few differences exist. The MoUs were still the 
formation of the strict conditionality under which financial assistance was provided, 
i.e. the Irish state had to implement the reforms. In relation to EU-based instruments, 
in the case of Ireland, the EFSM-based DEC offers somewhat more legitimacy in 
terms of being designed for this specific purpose, as opposed to the EDP/TFEU article 
136 DEC relevant to EFSF SA assistance for Greece, which was not provisioned for 
outlining policies upon which financial assistance is conditional. Overall, issues 
relating to domestic legislation were much simpler in Ireland compared to Greece, 
thus creating less public opposition. It needs to be highlighted, however, that the 
Greek parliament and government were much more consistent with representative 
democratic principles, as, even under legally ambiguous usage of some legal 
instruments, almost all MoUs and FAFAs/loan agreements were ratified through 
parliament, compared to Ireland. This potentially designates that the model of 
representative democracy was more consistently applied and adhered to in Greece 
than in Ireland in this respect.  
 What conclusions can, thus, be drawn from the above in relation to the impact 
of the MS-specific supranational crisis measures on the EU DD? In terms of key 
national policy areas, redistribution and delegation (Indicator A), it is clear that issues 
are, essentially, similar. Given the less intense structural adjustment of Ireland, as well 
                                                 
335
 The lack of political unity behind the overall purpose and aims of the financial assistance programs 
in Greece as a contributing factor to the lack of ownership and inefficient implementation was also 
raised in the interview with Prof. Dimitris Chryssochoou, Professor of Theory and Institutions of 
European Integration. 
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as the fact that the MoU consisted mostly of policies that were the political platform 
of the government even before resorting to EU-IMF financial assistance, the effect of 
supranational actors was less in Ireland than in Greece. In terms of parliamentary  
input (Indicator B), Greece seems to perform considerably better than Ireland, 
although, again, similar issues apply to both. The EP was equally not involved in any 
aspect of either program, although it has made relevant improvements after the cut-off 
date of this research (section 7.3.1), which, it needs to be stressed, were on account of 
requests by the Greek government. In relation to the national parliaments, Greece also 
seems to outperform Ireland, as virtually all relevant programme documentation were, 
in one way or another, passed through the Greek parliament. In Ireland, this was the 
case only in the initial MoU. In relation to the processes of relevant institutions 
(Indicator C), similar conclusions apply to Ireland as well as Greece. However, again, 
considering that the Irish government’s pre-existing plan was essentially transformed 
into the MoU, created better conditions in terms of accountability and transparency. 
Finally, in relation to Indicator D, i.e. the direction of policies and the rights of 
citizens, it needs to be emphasized that the measures were largely of the same, 
intensely neoliberal nature, in both cases. However, the two factors contributing to a 
considerably reduced adjustment intensity and breadth in Ireland were the fact that a 
major part of the problem was restricted to the monetary realm (and not the real 
economy as in Greece), and that the Irish state was much closer to the neoliberal 
paradigm compared to Greece.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | 212  
Chapter 11: Conclusion 
 It was the aim of this investigation to analyze one of the most important issues 
prevalent in the global political realm during recent years: the Eurozone crisis and its 
impact on the EU’s DD. This has been a key issue and debate in EU politics 
throughout the crisis. The research question was: How have the Eurozone crisis 
supranational measures, both EU-wide and MS-specific, impacted the EU’s 
Democratic Deficit? The independent variable was set as the supranational crisis 
measures assumed, and the dependent variable as the impact on the EU DD. The 
relevant issues are focused at both the national and supranational levels.  
The analysis was separated along the above two levels. Measures were 
categorized to those that were EU-wide (e.g. Six-Pack) and those that were MS-
specific (e.g. financial assistance programmes). In relation to the former those 
measures were further sub-categorized into measures aiming at providing financial 
assistance to Eurozone/EU MS (e.g. EFSF SA, ESM, etc) and measures aiming at 
enhancing and further strengthening coordination between Eurozone/EU MS (e.g. 
Six-Pack, Two-Pack, etc). In relation to the latter, those are mostly related to the 
financial assistance programmes, and were further sub-categorized into the loan 
agreements or FAFAs (e.g. setting interest rates, disbursements, etc), and the MoUs 
and relevant EU-based counterparts (e.g. EDP or TFEU article 136 DECs, etc.). These 
two categories, along with their sub-categorizations, constitute the overall 
operationalization of the independent variable, more specifically delineated in Chapter 
6 for the EU-wide measures and Chapters 9-10 for the MS-specific measures.  
Next, the dependent variable, i.e. impact of the measures on the EU DD, is 
operationalized as an empirical evaluative framework of four indicators. Why is that? 
Throughout the relevant literature examined in Chapter 2, there was found no 
evidence of an existing framework for consistently and systematically evaluating the 
impact of EU measures on the democratic process. Most of the relevant scholarship 
focuses on one or more concepts of democracy, broadly defined, and the way it is 
impacted by some of the measures in question. Hence, there is room for further 
contributing a single empirical and consistent framework for this evaluation. 
To construct this framework, an appropriate starting point is the EU DD 
literature. Although scarcely referenced across the existing scholarship relevant to the 
Eurozone crisis, the EU DD literature offers great insights and contributions to 
examining democratic process specifically within the EU, taking also into 
consideration its two-level policy field (national-supranational). This literature is 
separated across input, output and throughput. However, while offering excellent 
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theoretical contributions, the insights offered are, as existent, unfit for serving as a 
comprehensive evaluative framework, although they offer ample foundations fupon 
which such a framework can be built. Utilizing additive theory, these theoretical 
approaches are reformed into an empirical, evaluative framework. Albeit theoretically 
different, from an empirical point of view, all three approaches analyze the same 
concerns in relation to the EU DD. The difference arises in the answers to those 
questions. In this case, as the aim is to empirically evaluate the impact of the 
measures, the questions to which scholars from all three EU DD approaches agree are 
utilized, without also incorporating the differing answers that each one provides. This 
is done through a careful analysis of the literature, and cautious application of the 
additive theory model, which, in any case, has been applied to considerably more 
different theoretical approaches than input, output and throughput, in constructing an 
empirical framework. Through this process, an empirical, evaluative framework of the 
impact of supranational measures (any measures) on the EU DD is constructed in 
Chapter 3. This serves as the operationalization of the dependent variable.  
 In relation to the research question in hand, the temporal limitations of the 
research were set from 2008 to 2013. 2008 was arguably the beginning of the 
financial crisis in the USA, and its transference to the Eurozone (Chapter 5; Ireland), 
whereas by the end of 2013 two Eurozone MS (Ireland and Spain) exited their 
financial assistance programmes, prompting arguments of success of said 
programmes. If it is, then, admitted by the EU that the above two Euro MS exiting the 
programmes constitute the first in a number of successful programme completions, 
thus marking the end of a circle of instability, this should be possible to constitute an 
indicator for setting the end of an analysis of this type. Furthermore, 2013 marked the 
last instance when a Eurozone MS resorted to EU-IMF financial assistance (Cyprus). 
Finally, by the end of 2013, almost all important legislation relating to the re-
structuring of the EU and Eurozone framework had already been proposed and 
enacted. 
 The aforementioned observations constitute the foundations of the research, 
more extensively delineated in Chapter 4. But why is this an important issue at all, 
and what does this research contribute to the broader academic field? In relation to the 
importance of the issue, on the one hand, it could be argued that all the measures, 
whether EU-wide or MS-specific, have gone through all the appropriate democratic 
processes. Intergovernmental, international Treaties have been duly ratified, in 
accordance with each MS’ constitutional procedures. EU REGs, DECs, OPs, PROPs, 
etc, have all gone through the regular EU legislative process; the same process as a 
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great number of other similar acts undergo every day in the EU. MS-specific 
measures, i.e. financial assistance programs were within the remits of proper 
democratic process in their transposition into national plicy. Therefore, the argument 
could be put forth as to why would any of these issues be considered undemocratic at 
all.  
On the other hand, the argument could also be made that the nature and 
obligatory character of these measures, as well as the lack of any representative input 
in relevant provisions, indicates a democratic deficit. EU-wide measures lack almost 
any kind of representative input. The Troika and the structural adjustment provisions 
included in the financial assistance programmes could be presented as essentially 
imposed upon Eurozone MS in financial trouble, which, in either case, had little or no 
financial room to object to any of the conditions. National procedures in relation to 
these measures were stretched beyond proportion to accommodate the necessary 
character of these measures. In addition, the EU largely failed to protect EU citizens 
social and economic rights. Finally, the international character of the many of the 
measures is disappointing for the EU, and the IMF’s participation raised serious 
concerns.  
The aforementioned elements suggest that this issue might not be as 
straightforward as it is often thought, and that there is much nuance to be analyzed in 
terms of the way in which these measures impacted the EU DD. For example, it may 
be that the MoUs did not adversely impact the EU DD, but rather that their 
conditional nature did, through the interlink between them and the EU-based MAPs 
(as demonstrated throughout sections 7.2.1, 7.2.5, 7.6). So, it is important to identify 
and properly evaluate where and in relevance to which provisions these measures 
impact the EU DD, and how. This is important in order to properly identify how 
democracy within the EU has changed after the crisis, and how (in what areas and 
measures) it should be improved if needed. In other words, the importance lies mainly 
not on if (although this is a key point too) but on how these measures have impacted 
the EU DD.  
In relation to the contributions of this research, firstly, the introduction of 
single empirical framework for evaluating the impact of any EU measure(s) on the EU 
DD, which is entirely founded on the EU DD relevant literature constitutes a novelty. 
This offers a consistent and systematic way of evaluation, which can be used at both 
the national and supranational levels. A second contribution is the forensic and 
detailed analysis of the supranational crisis measures. As established across Chapter 2, 
there is ample room to contribute with more specificity into what exactly the 
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supranational crisis measures were, and how they are legally formed and political 
negotiated. A third contribution is the evaluation of these measures utilizing the 
empirical framework established in Chapter 3. This is the first such evaluation across 
the relevant scholarship, and even when not factoring in the novelty of the empirical 
framework, it is the first time that provisions of these measures are so forensically and 
meticulously evaluated against a comprehensive set of standards of the democratic 
process. In other words, this research settles in a definitive manner how the crisis 
measures impacted the entire EU DD (and not for example one or a few specific 
concepts of democratic process). Finally, an evaluation of both the national and 
supranational levels is assumed, in providing for a conclusive overview of how the 
measures impacted not only one or the other but both levels.  
 In terms of structure, the research was divided across three Sections (and the 
Introduction and Conclusion). Section A included all the fundamentals of the research 
(literature review, methods, EU DD empirical framework construction, etc). It is 
worth highlighting that the research employed the following methods: document 
analysis, requests for unpublished documentation from EU institutions, semi-
structured elite interviewing. Section B concerned the evaluation of the impact of EU-
wide measures on the EU DD. Section C of the research aims to analyze the impact of 
MS-specific measures on the EU DD. For these specific measures, a choice was made 
to investigate the measures implemented in one case in detail, rather than 
investigating one specific measure for all cases. The focus is on financial assistance 
and relevant structural adjustment programs. Greece is chosen as the primary case for 
this investigation, with Ireland serving as a comparative case for the conclusion drawn 
in relation to Greece. This is in order to establish whether there is, indeed, a pattern in 
relation to the impact of supranational crisis measures for specific Eurozone MS on 
that national level. 
 What were the results of the analysis. Throughout Section B, a detailed 
evaluation of the impact of the provisions of each EU-wide supranational crisis 
measure (conclusively presented in Table 6 and Chapter 6) on the EU DD was 
undertaken. The outcome of the EU-wide measures analysis, presented in Chapter 7, 
was unfavourable in relation to this impact. It was found that across these measures, 
EU supranational actors, and in particular the EC, ECB, ECJ and even CoM, now 
enjoy considerably augmented ability to affect key national policy areas with 
redistributive effects, many times in partial conflict or excess of their mandate. A key 
issue here was the ability of these actors to undertake duties that were outside the EU 
legal framework (in relation to the sub-category of EU-wide measures aiming at 
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providing financial assistance). In terms of the specifics for each actor, it was 
established that the EC and ECB acquired increased influence over key national 
policy areas, but mainly of a review-based and increased surveillance nature. The 
CoM, while appearing having lost some of its ‘political manoeuvring’ capacity, has 
acquired the ability to issue increasingly binding legislative acts in relation to 
compliance of EU/Eurozone MS with the rules. This appears as an EU-integration 
paradox, as both supranational integration as well as intergovernmental methods 
coexist at the same time.   
 Perhaps the most important issue in relevance to the ability of supranational 
actors to affect key national policy areas has been the ability of the EG to monitor 
Eurozone MS budgets. This is a decisive step forward towards increased political 
integration. In relation to the other indicators, the participation of the EP across these 
measures is alarmingly minimal to virtually non-existent, which is a major setback in 
terms of democratic process, especially given the considerable increase in the 
decision-making capacity of the other supranational actors. In terms of institutional 
processes, these measures do introduce some increased efficiency, but include little 
room for inclusion of societal actors and participation of civil society. Finally, the 
direction of the policies introduced have a clear neoliberal character, if not only by 
considerably reinforcing the ordoliberal foundations of EMU.  
  Overall, and across the four indicators of the EU DD empirical framework, 
the impact of the EU-wide measures was found to be largely negative. The increase in 
the ability of supranational actors to influence key policy areas with redistributive 
effects was not matched by an equivalent increase in a similar ability of representative 
institutions (whether national or supranational). This, eventually, resulted in the de 
facto decrease of these institutions’ decision-making and oversight ability, and the 
progressive transfer of authority even on key redistributive areas away from 
majoritarian and into technocratic processes. Furthermore, most of the processes 
established, especially in relation to the operation of the Troika (either in financial 
assistance programs or, more generally, the Two-Pack/MAP framework), lack 
transparency and, thus, accountability on the part of the electorate is almost 
impossible. Stakeholders had minimal participation, and the direction of policies, far 
from guaranteeing social and economic rights of EU citizens, introduce even more 
fiscal rules and close oversight, in an apparent reinforcement of the ordoliberal nature 
of the EMU.  
 In relation to the impact of MS-specific measures, the conclusions drawn are 
similar, as presented in Section C across Chapters 9 and 10. Influence of supranational 
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actors in key national policy areas takes place through the MoU process, in which 
there is little and, in many cases quite distorted, parliamentary input. An emergency 
character was invoked in most cases, and parliamentary and other relevant procedures 
were essentially put on hold. The analysis from Greece yields disconcerting outcomes 
in relation to the influence of the Troika in domestic national policies that covered 
virtually all policy areas of the Greek state. Observation relating to transparency were 
similar to those referenced in Section B above, with citizens not being aware who 
decides on policy and how, while stakeholder participation was non-existent. Finally, 
the measures implemented in Greece were proven to have a clear neoliberal character, 
oftentimes running opposite fundamental social and economic rights.  
 The comparative aspect in relation to Ireland does provide that, in some cases, 
the Greek case was unique, especially in relation to the problems it faced prior to the 
crisis, to the form of the state prior to the crisis, as well as to implementation to the 
structural adjustment. However, it is worth noting that representative processes were 
found to be adhered to much closer in the Greek rather than in the Irish case, and the 
influence in policy was much deeper and extended. Therefore, democratic process 
worked efficiently in Greece, which raised several issues in relation to supranational 
influence and other MoU-relevant factors that may not have come to light in other 
Eurozone MS. In addition, the direction of the measures was essentially identical. The 
major difference with the Irish case, in accordance with the analysis in Chapter 10, 
was the participation of stakeholder in the MoU process. In Greece, as opposed to 
Ireland, stakeholder were kept mostly outside of policy-making, which, in turn, made 
the actual implementation of the program much more difficult. However, again, the 
structural adjustment in Greece was considerably deeper and affected much more 
extensively established rights and prerogatives of citizens (i.e. the real economy) that 
in the case of Ireland.  
 What is to be concluded in relation to democracy? It is clear that, in terms of 
both output, input and throughput, the outcome is negative on the EU DD. An 
increasing number of key policies with redistributive effects have been moving away 
from representative institutions and majoriatrian politics. The unidirectional character 
of the EMU has been reinforced, and all this has been happening under the auspices of 
EU institutions. The legitimacy of actors who take decisions has become increasingly 
questionable, and accountability is progressively harder to implement. The crisis 
measures have reinforced, and in fact further advanced, the EU DD, regardless of the 
specific approach taken. Citizen input is withering and representative institutions have 
shrinking authority (input), processes are becoming more complicated, less 
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transparent and move further from citizens (throughput), while the EU supranational 
level has acquired permanent and, in most cases, direct influence over key national 
redistributive policies of MS (output, arguing that based on this not happening, further 
input is unnecessary). From this process, the influence of key state actors, primarily 
Germany, has indeed been reinforced, while at the same time the technocratic 
authority of EU institutions, particularly of the EC and ECB, have also increased. As 
Prof. Dimitris Chryssochoou aptly concludes, the crisis  
has essentially led, beyond any financial consequences...,(to) an asymmetry... 
in addressing of the two exceptionally important issues: on the one hand, the 
future of European economic governance, and, on the other hand, of political 
integration. Because, at this moment, it seems that there have been important 
steps… in the field of further integration of economic governance, which, 
however, have not been matched with corresponding steps in the field of 
political and social integration
336
 
The question to be asked then, is whether the EU is a well-functioning democracy, or 
whether the EU DD has turned it into the scenery of the Melian Dialogue, where the 
Athenians highlight that “δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης 
κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν,”337 i.e. 
what is just is defined only between those with equal power; but the powerful do what 
they can and the weak concede
338
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
336
 From the interview with Prof. Dimitris Chryssochoou, Professor of Theory and Institutions of 
European Integration. 
337
 From Thucydides, The Pelloponesean War, Book 5, Chapter 89.  
338
 This quote was referenced in the interview with the Hon. Prof. Louka Katseli, inter alia, former 
Minister of Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping (2009-2011), and former Minister of 
Employment and Social Security (2010-2011)  . 
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APPENDIX A: Intensity of Greece’s Structural Adjustment (Statistical 
Tables) 
 
Table 23: EU MS people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (% of total  
     population; ranked by average 2008-2013; Eurostat 2016a)  
EU MS 
Year 
Average 
2008-2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Bulgaria 44,8 46,2 49,2 49,1 49,3 48,0 47,8 
Romania 44,2 43,1 41,4 40,3 41,7 40,4 41,9 
Latvia 34,2 37,9 38,2 40,1 36,2 35,1 37,0 
Croatia - - 31,1 32,6 32,6 29,9 31,6 
Lithuania 28,3 29,6 34,0 33,1 32,5 30,8 31,4 
Hungary 28,2 29,6 29,9 31,5 33,5 34,8 31,3 
Greece 28,1 27,6 27,7 31,0 34,6 35,7 30,8 
Poland 30,5 27,8 27,8 27,2 26,7 25,8 27,6 
Ireland 23,7 25,7 27,3 29,4 30,0 29,5 27,6 
Italy 25,5 24,9 25,0 28,1 29,9 28,5 27,0 
Spain 23,8 24,7 26,1 26,7 27,2 27,3 26,0 
Portugal 26,0 24,9 25,3 24,4 25,3 27,5 25,6 
Cyprus 23,3 23,5 24,6 24,6 27,1 27,8 25,2 
United Kingdom 23,2 22,0 23,2 22,7 24,1 24,8 23,3 
Estonia 21,8 23,4 21,7 23,1 23,4 23,5 22,8 
Malta 20,1 20,3 21,2 22,1 23,1 24,0 21,8 
Belgium 20,8 20,2 20,8 21,0 21,6 20,8 20,9 
Slovakia 20,6 19,6 20,6 20,6 20,5 19,8 20,3 
Germany 20,1 20,0 19,7 19,9 19,6 20,3 19,9 
Austria 20,6 19,1 18,9 19,2 18,5 18,8 19,2 
Slovenia 18,5 17,1 18,3 19,3 19,6 20,4 18,9 
France 18,5 18,5 19,2 19,3 19,1 18,1 18,8 
Denmark 16,3 17,6 18,3 17,6 17,5 18,3 17,6 
Luxembourg 15,5 17,8 17,1 16,8 18,4 19,0 17,4 
Finland 17,4 16,9 16,9 17,9 17,2 16,0 17,1 
Sweden 14,9 15,9 15,0 16,1 15,6 16,4 15,7 
Netherlands 14,9 15,1 15,1 15,7 15,0 15,9 15,3 
Czech Republic 15,3 14,0 14,4 15,3 15,4 14,6 14,8 
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Table 24: EU MS GDP (amounts in EUR bn, except when indicated otherwise; ranked by % change 2008-2013; Eurostat 2016b)  
EU MS 
Year 
% change 
2008-2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Greece 241.990,4 237.534,2 226.031,4 207.028,9 191.203,9 180.389,0 -25,5% 
Croatia 48.129,8 45.090,7 45.004,3 44.708,6 43.933,7 43.487,1 -9,6% 
Spain 1.116.207,0 1.079.034,0 1.080.913,0 1.070.413,0 1.042.872,0 1.031.272,0 -7,6% 
Latvia 24.317,9 18.731,2 17.772,4 20.144,2 21.982,7 22.805,2 -6,2% 
Hungary 107.503,1 93.670,7 98.198,4 100.704,5 98.972,8 101.273,3 -5,8% 
Slovenia 37.951,2 36.166,2 36.252,4 36.896,3 35.988,3 35.907,5 -5,4% 
Portugal 178.872,6 175.448,2 179.929,8 176.166,6 168.398,0 170.269,3 -4,8% 
Ireland 187.547,2 169.431,7 166.157,5 173.940,0 174.844,2 179.447,7 -4,3% 
Cyprus 18.822,0 18.482,3 19.117,7 19.547,1 19.468,9 18.064,6 -4,0% 
Czech Republic 160.961,5 148.357,4 156.369,7 163.583,2 160.706,6 156.932,6 -2,5% 
Italy 1.632.150,8 1.572.878,3 1.604.514,5 1.637.462,9 1.613.265,0 1.604.477,9 -1,7% 
Romania 142.396,3 120.409,2 126.746,4 133.305,9 133.511,4 144.253,5 1,3% 
Netherlands 639.163,0 617.540,0 631.512,0 642.929,0 645.164,0 650.857,0 1,8% 
Finland 193.711,0 181.029,0 187.100,0 196.869,0 199.793,0 203.338,0 5,0% 
Denmark 241.087,3 230.213,3 241.516,9 246.074,7 252.915,2 255.235,4 5,9% 
France 1.995.850,0 1.939.017,0 1.998.481,0 2.059.284,0 2.086.929,0 2.116.565,0 6,0% 
Lithuania 32.696,3 26.934,8 28.027,7 31.263,1 33.334,7 34.962,2 6,9% 
United Kingdom 1.908.370,2 1.667.594,9 1.813.331,2 1.866.018,3 2.053.612,8 2.042.895,0 7,0% 
Poland 363.691,8 314.689,4 361.744,3 380.176,9 389.273,3 394.601,8 8,5% 
Germany  2.561.740,0 2.460.280,0 2.580.060,0 2.703.120,0 2.754.860,0 2.820.820,0 10,1% 
Austria 291.930,4 286.188,4 294.627,5 308.630,3 317.055,8 322.878,3 10,6% 
Slovakia 65.839,8 63.818,5 67.387,1 70.443,5 72.420,0 73.835,1 12,1% 
Bulgaria 37.373,3 37.245,0 37.723,8 40.955,1 41.693,3 41.911,8 12,1% 
Estonia 16.517,3 14.145,9 14.718,5 16.667,6 18.006,0 19.014,9 15,1% 
Luxembourg 37.647,4 36.268,2 39.525,5 42.226,9 43.574,1 46.541,1 23,6% 
Sweden 352.317,1 309.678,7 369.076,6 404.945,5 423.340,7 435.752,1 23,7% 
Malta 6.128,7 6.138,6 6.599,5 6.879,4 7.217,9 7.650,1 24,8% 
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Table 25: EU MS Overall Unemployment Rate (% of population; ranked by  
     average 2008-2013; Eurostat 2016c)  
EU MS 
Year 
Average 
2008-2013 
Difference 
2008-2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Spain 11,3 17,9 19,9 21,4 24,8 26,1 20,2 14,8 
Greece 7,8 9,6 12,7 17,9 24,5 27,5 16,7 19,7 
Latvia 7,7 17,5 19,5 16,2 15,0 11,9 14,6 4,2 
Slovakia 9,6 12,1 14,5 13,7 14,0 14,2 13,0 4,6 
Lithuania 5,8 13,8 17,8 15,4 13,4 11,8 13,0 6,0 
Portugal 8,8 10,7 12,0 12,9 15,8 16,4 12,8 7,6 
Croatia 8,6 9,2 11,7 13,7 16,0 17,3 12,8 8,7 
Ireland 6,4 12,0 13,9 14,7 14,7 13,1 12,5 6,7 
Estonia 5,5 13,5 16,7 12,3 10,0 8,6 11,1 3,1 
Hungary 7,8 10,0 11,2 11,0 11,0 10,2 10,2 2,4 
Bulgaria 5,6 6,8 10,3 11,3 12,3 13,0 9,9 7,4 
France 7,4 9,1 9,3 9,2 9,8 10,3 9,2 2,9 
Poland 7,1 8,1 9,7 9,7 10,1 10,3 9,2 3,2 
Italy 6,7 7,7 8,4 8,4 10,7 12,1 9,0 5,4 
Cyprus 3,7 5,4 6,3 7,9 11,9 15,9 8,5 12,2 
Sweden 6,2 8,3 8,6 7,8 8,0 8,0 7,8 1,8 
Finland 6,4 8,2 8,4 7,8 7,7 8,2 7,8 1,8 
Slovenia 4,4 5,9 7,3 8,2 8,9 10,1 7,5 5,7 
United Kingdom 5,6 7,6 7,8 8,1 7,9 7,6 7,4 2,0 
Romania 5,6 6,5 7,0 7,2 6,8 7,1 6,7 1,5 
Czech Republic 4,4 6,7 7,3 6,7 7,0 7,0 6,5 2,6 
Denmark 3,4 6,0 7,5 7,6 7,5 7,0 6,5 3,6 
Malta 6,0 6,9 6,9 6,4 6,3 6,4 6,5 0,4 
Germany 7,4 7,6 7,0 5,8 5,4 5,2 6,4 -2,2 
Netherlands 3,7 4,4 5,0 5,0 5,8 7,3 5,2 3,6 
Luxembourg 4,9 5,1 4,6 4,8 5,1 5,9 5,1 1,0 
Austria 4,1 5,3 4,8 4,6 4,9 5,4 4,9 1,3 
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Table 26: EU MS Youth (less than 25 years old) Unemployment Rate (% of  
      population; ranked by average 2008-2013; Eurostat 2016c)  
EU MS 
Year 
Average 
2008-2013 
Difference 
2008-2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Spain 24,5 37,7 41,5 46,2 52,9 55,5 43,1 31,0 
Greece 21,9 25,7 33,0 44,7 55,3 58,3 39,8 36,4 
Croatia 23,7 25,2 32,4 36,7 42,1 50,0 35,0 26,3 
Slovakia 19,3 27,6 33,9 33,7 34,0 33,7 30,4 14,4 
Portugal 21,6 25,3 28,2 30,2 38,0 38,1 30,2 16,5 
Italy 21,2 25,3 27,9 29,2 35,3 40,0 29,8 18,8 
Latvia 13,6 33,3 36,2 31,0 28,5 23,2 27,6 9,6 
Lithuania 13,3 29,6 35,7 32,6 26,7 21,9 26,6 8,6 
Hungary 19,5 26,4 26,4 26,0 28,2 26,6 25,5 7,1 
Ireland 13,3 24,0 27,6 29,1 30,4 26,8 25,2 13,5 
Poland 17,2 20,6 23,7 25,8 26,5 27,3 23,5 10,1 
Sweden 20,2 25,0 24,8 22,8 23,7 23,6 23,4 3,4 
France 19,0 23,6 23,3 22,7 24,4 24,9 23,0 5,9 
Estonia 12,0 27,4 32,9 22,4 20,9 18,7 22,4 6,7 
Bulgaria 11,9 15,1 21,9 25,0 28,1 28,4 21,7 16,5 
Romania 17,6 20,0 22,1 23,9 22,6 23,7 21,7 6,1 
Cyprus 9,0 13,8 16,6 22,4 27,7 38,9 21,4 29,9 
Finland 16,5 21,5 21,4 20,1 19,0 19,9 19,7 3,4 
United Kingdom 15,0 19,1 19,9 21,3 21,2 20,7 19,5 5,7 
Czech Republic 9,9 16,6 18,3 18,1 19,5 18,9 16,9 9,0 
Luxembourg 17,3 16,5 15,8 16,4 18,0 16,9 16,8 -0,4 
Slovenia 10,4 13,6 14,7 15,7 20,6 21,6 16,1 11,2 
Malta 11,7 14,5 13,2 13,3 14,1 13,0 13,3 1,3 
Denmark 8,0 11,8 13,9 14,2 14,1 13,0 12,5 5,0 
Netherlands 8,6 10,2 11,1 10,0 11,7 13,2 10,8 4,6 
Austria 8,5 10,7 9,5 8,9 9,4 9,7 9,5 1,2 
Germany  10,4 11,1 9,8 8,5 8,0 7,8 9,3 -2,6 
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Table 27: EU MS General Government Debt (% GDP; ranked by average 2008- 
       2013 Eurostat 2016d)  
EU MS 
Year 
Average 
2008-2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Greece 109,4 126,7 146,2 172,1 159,6 177,7 148,6 
Italy 102,4 112,5 115,4 116,5 123,3 129 116,5 
Portugal 71,7 83,6 96,2 111,4 126,2 129 103,0 
Ireland 42,4 61,8 86,8 109,1 120,1 120 90,0 
France 68,1 79 81,7 85,2 89,6 92,4 82,7 
Austria 68,5 79,7 82,4 82,2 81,6 80,8 79,2 
Hungary 71,6 78 80,6 80,8 78,3 76,8 77,7 
Germany 64,9 72,4 81 78,3 79,6 77,2 75,6 
United Kingdom 51,7 65,7 76,6 81,8 85,3 86,2 74,6 
Malta 62,7 67,8 67,6 69,9 67,5 68,6 67,4 
Cyprus 45,1 53,9 56,3 65,8 79,3 102,5 67,2 
Spain 39,4 52,7 60,1 69,5 85,4 93,7 66,8 
Netherlands 54,5 56,5 59 61,7 66,4 67,9 61,0 
Croatia 39,6 49 58,3 65,2 70,7 82,2 60,8 
Poland 46,6 49,8 53,3 54,4 54 56 52,4 
Finland 32,7 41,7 47,1 48,5 52,9 55,5 46,4 
Slovenia 21,8 34,6 38,4 46,6 53,9 71 44,4 
Slovakia 28,2 36 40,8 43,3 52,4 55 42,6 
Denmark 33,4 40,4 42,9 46,4 45,2 44,7 42,2 
Czech Republic 28,7 34,1 38,2 39,9 44,7 45,1 38,5 
Sweden 36,8 40,4 37,6 36,9 37,2 39,8 38,1 
Latvia 18,7 36,6 47,5 42,8 41,4 39,1 37,7 
Lithuania 14,6 29 36,2 37,2 39,8 38,8 32,6 
Romania 13,2 23,2 29,9 34,2 37,4 38 29,3 
Luxembourg 15,1 16 20,1 19,1 22 23,3 19,3 
Bulgaria 13 13,7 15,5 15,3 16,8 17,1 15,2 
Estonia 4,5 7 6,6 5,9 9,5 9,9 7,2 
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Table 28: EU MS General Government Defict/Surplus (% GDP; ranked by  
            average 2008-2013; Eurostat 2016e)  
EU MS 
Year 
Average 
2008-2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Ireland -7 -13,8 -32,3 -12,6 -8 -5,7 -13,2 
Greece -10,2 -15,2 -11,2 -10,2 -8,8 -13 -11,4 
Spain -4,4 -11 -9,4 -9,6 -10,4 -6,9 -8,6 
United Kingdom -5 -10,7 -9,6 -7,7 -8,3 -5,6 -7,8 
Portugal -3,8 -9,8 -11,2 -7,4 -5,7 -4,8 -7,1 
Slovenia -1,4 -5,9 -5,6 -6,7 -4,1 -15 -6,5 
Lithuania -3,1 -9,1 -6,9 -8,9 -3,1 -2,6 -5,6 
Croatia -2,8 -6 -6,2 -7,8 -5,3 -5,3 -5,6 
Romania -5,5 -9,5 -6,9 -5,4 -3,7 -2,1 -5,5 
France -3,2 -7,2 -6,8 -5,1 -4,8 -4 -5,2 
Poland -3,6 -7,3 -7,5 -4,9 -3,7 -4 -5,2 
Slovakia -2,3 -7,9 -7,5 -4,1 -4,3 -2,7 -4,8 
Latvia -4,1 -9,1 -8,5 -3,4 -0,8 -0,9 -4,5 
Cyprus 0,9 -5,5 -4,8 -5,7 -5,8 -4,9 -4,3 
Hungary -3,6 -4,6 -4,5 -5,5 -2,3 -2,6 -3,9 
Italy -2,7 -5,3 -4,2 -3,5 -2,9 -2,9 -3,6 
Netherlands 0,2 -5,4 -5 -4,3 -3,9 -2,4 -3,5 
Czech Republic -2,1 -5,5 -4,4 -2,7 -3,9 -1,3 -3,3 
Malta -4,2 -3,3 -3,2 -2,6 -3,5 -2,6 -3,2 
Austria -1,4 -5,3 -4,4 -2,6 -2,2 -1,3 -2,9 
Denmark 3,2 -2,8 -2,7 -2,1 -3,5 -1,1 -1,5 
Germany -0,2 -3,2 -4,2 -1 -0,1 -0,1 -1,5 
Bulgaria 1,6 -4,1 -3,2 -2 -0,3 -0,4 -1,4 
Finland 4,2 -2,5 -2,6 -1 -2,2 -2,6 -1,1 
Estonia -2,7 -2,2 0,2 1,2 -0,3 -0,2 -0,7 
Sweden 2 -0,7 0 -0,1 -0,9 -1,4 -0,2 
Luxembourg 3,4 -0,7 -0,7 0,5 0,3 0,8 0,6 
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APPENDIX B: Categorization (grouping) of policies affected by Greek 
MoUs into larger policy categories 
 Budget: Alterations in the state/local government/state enterprises’ budget, Arrears. 
 Revenue: VAT, Wage taxation, Regular/excise /luxury/green taxes, Presumptive 
taxation, Levies, Gaming/environmental/telecommunications’/concessions’ licenses, 
Real estate taxes, Fines for unauthorised construction, Customs’ changes, Tax collection 
systems, Solidarity tax. 
 Public Remuneration: Remuneration and pension reform / cuts, Public wage bill / cuts, 
SOEs wage changes. 
 Public Administration: Public employment policy (staff reductions, labour reserve, 
mobility scheme,  reviews, etc), Revenue administration reform (closure of offices, 
staffing plans, object and number of audits), State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) & Public 
entities policies (restructuring, price controls, closures, etc), Statistical overhaul (rules 
and obligations, agencies’ restructuring, etc), Local government restructuring / reform.  
 Defence: Defence / military spending (ex. equipment). 
 Energy: Electricity and gas policies, tariffs, etc, Electricity and gas agencies’ changes, 
Liberalisation, Renewable energy.   
 Labour Market: Liberalise restricted professions, Reorganise / alter private sector 
workplace (minimum wage / wage agreements / wage controls, collective agreement 
regime, overtime, employment protection laws, part-time vs full-time contracts, list of 
heavy and arduous professions, etc), Alterations in business environment (setting-up / 
resolution of companies, enterprise licensing, etc), Policies on competition, Public works 
/ investments (simplification of processes, etc), Car circulation fees, Digital Dividend, 
Unemployment (benefits, time schedules), Imports / Exports policy.   
 Healthcare: Health funds, Hospital Restructuring (accounting, pricing, etc), 
Pharmaceuticals (ex. generics / off-patent over brand), Hospital staff regime. 
 Education: Franchised diplomas and professional qualifications (validation, etc). 
 Judiciary: Tax administration disputes system alterations, Trial fees. 
 Tourism: Tourism sector/coaches’ changes. 
 Transportation: Road freight/haulage, Railway sector reforms/ liberalisation, Buses, 
coaches, limousines, trucking industry, taxis, ferries, ports. 
 Banks: Loans, Mergers/acquisitions/resolutions, BoG (payroll, structure, role, etc). 
 Procurement: Any type of public procurement, (hospitals, public works, etc). 
 R&D: Research & Development in the private, scientific or industrial sectors. 
 Privatisation: Concessions, sales, tenders of real estate, airports, ports, gaming, 
buildings, banks, utilities, etc, Allocation privatising revenue. 
 Legislation: Adopt new legislation, Repeal / alter old legislation, Creation of new 
agencies, offices, Secretary General positions, etc. 
 Social Security: Social benefits/ programmes, Social Security Funds, Unemployment 
benefits, List of disabilities.  
 
 
   
